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Abstract
Did governments in different countries regulate common concerns about patient safety
differently? If so how and why did they do this? This thesis undertakes a historical
comparison of the regulation of patient safety in Britain and Canada between 1980 and 2005.
These jurisdictions began the period with very similar regulatory frameworks, but by 2005
there were distinct differences in each jurisdiction’s regulatory response to patient safety.
Britain was very actively regulating all aspects of service provision within its health system in
the name of patient safety, whereas Canada’s regulatory direction showed adherence to the
1980s model with only scattered incremental developments. This thesis assesses the broader
sociopolitical context and the structure of the health systems in each jurisdiction and
concludes there are differences in the logics of these systems that established a foundation
for future regulatory divergence. It is argued that between 1980 and 2005 there were two
factors that influenced regulatory directionality in each jurisdiction: changing political norms
associated with the development of neoliberalism and the New Public Management; and
events or scandals associated with the provision of health services. The differing levels of
penetration of both the changing political norms into governance cultures and of scandals
into the public and political consciousness are critical to explaining regulatory differences
between jurisdictions. The thesis concludes that what and how governments chose to
regulate is a function of the perceived need for action and the dominant social and political
norms within that society. Context is everything in the formulation of regulatory approaches
to address pressing social problems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Problem
Internationally, between 1980 and 2005, many health systems saw episodes of failure with
disastrous consequences for patients. Children died unnecessarily after undergoing pediatric
heart surgery in Bristol, Britain, and Winnipeg, Canada.

The blood systems in many

countries were poorly managed, resulting in significant numbers of people contracting
HIV/AIDS or hepatitis C. Health professionals in Britain and the United States have
committed mass murders of patients. Patients have lost their lives as a result of failures in
drug monitoring and approval systems (notably in the United States and Canada). Medical
research has gone dreadfully wrong, including gene-transfer research in the United States and
France and cancer research in New Zealand.
While remarkable in their size and scope, and in the publicity they garnered, these incidents
are not isolated. Recent empirical studies from Canada, Australia, Denmark, New Zealand,
the United States, and the United Kingdom reveal that between four and seventeen per cent
of hospitalized patients experience an adverse event 1 during hospitalization. 2 Thus, on a
daily basis there are many less public failures within health systems – a wrong diagnosis, a
misread test, an incorrectly dispensed medication, or poorly performed surgery – most of

An ‘adverse event’ is an occurrence in the healthcare setting where something happens to injure or harm a
patient. The term ‘adverse event’ has received a multiplicity of definitions. See J. Davies, P. Hebert, C.
Hoffman & the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, Canadian Patient Safety Dictionary (Ottawa:
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, 2003) at 39-40 online at: RCPSC
<http://rcpsc.medical.org/publications/PatientSafetyDictionary_e.pdf>.
2 In Canada, it is estimated that 7.5 per cent of hospitalized patients experience an adverse event, of which 37
per cent are preventable. In real terms, it is estimated that 9,250 to 23,750 Canadians die each year as a result of
unsafe care and treatment and many thousands more are physically injured. See G. Baker, et al. “The Canadian
Adverse Events Study: The Incidence of Adverse Events Among Hospital Patients in Canada” (2004) 170:11
C.M.A.J. 1678 [Baker, “Adverse Events”]. Similar results have been found in other countries that have studied
the incidence of adverse events. See T.A. Brennan et al. “Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I” (1991) 324:6 N. Engl. J. Med. 370
[Brennan, “Adverse Events”]; R. Wilson et al., “Quality in Australian Health Care Study (1996) 164:12 Med. J.
Aust. 754 [Wilson, “Quality”]; C. Vincent, G. Neale, & M. Woloshynowych, “Adverse Events in British
Hospitals: Preliminary Retrospective Record Review” (2001) 322:7285 BMJ 517, erratum in: (2001) 322:7299
BMJ 1395 [Vincent, “Adverse Events”]; T. Schioler et al., Danish Adverse Event Study “[Incidence of Adverse
Events in Hospitals. A Retrospective Study of Medical Records]” (2001) 163:39 Ugeskr Laeger 5370 [Schioler];
P. Davis, et al., “Adverse Events in New Zealand Public Hospitals I: Occurrence and Impact” (2002) 115:1167
N.Z. Med. J. U271 [Davis]. Evaluation of the rates of adverse events in other health-related sectors such as
long-term care, residential care, home care and primary care is currently underway.
1

1

which have at least the potential to cause physical, emotional, psychological and/or financial
distress.
Adverse events in health services have been, until recently, a silent epidemic. Silent, because
many patients never knew that some of the range of negative outcomes they experienced
when receiving health services might be due to an adverse event, rather than the recognized
risks of treatment or the progression of their disease or condition. This epidemic is no
longer silent, at least in a policy sense. Internationally, patient safety has become a significant
public policy issue. 3 This does not appear to be because there has been a significant upsurge
in adverse events in health systems – adverse events have always occurred in health systems
and have always been subject to some degree of regulation. 4 It is rather that there have been
significant changes in awareness of and concern about safety and risk. 5 Specifically, in the
patient-safety context, there is an increasing understanding of the risks and consequences of
receiving unsafe health services. This increased awareness of risk, and therefore safety, is a
tangible manifestation of what Beck and others call the ‘risk society’. 6 A policy response to
risk is often an inclination to regulate; hence, the focus of this thesis is to analyse
developments in the frameworks for the regulation of patient safety in Britain and Canada.
The movement of patient safety from back to centre stage between 1980 and 2005 offers an
opportune moment to critically analyse developments in this area by comparing the
regulatory responses of two jurisdictions, Britain and Canada, jurisdictions confronted by the
same policy problem. How did these governments regulate the provision of health services
to protect users of such services before 1980 and did these regulatory frameworks shift
during the period 1980-2005? If these regulatory frameworks did indeed shift, were there
significant divergences between the jurisdictions and, if so, what could these divergences be
attributed to?

3 The term ‘patient safety’ as discussed later refers to the prevention of iatrogenic injury (injuries caused by the
provision of health services as opposed to the underlying disease process).
4 D. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University
Press, 2002) at 13 [Moss].
5 See, for example, D. Lupton, Risk (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) [Lupton]; V. Covello & J.
Mumpower, “Risk Analysis and Risk Management: An Historical Perspective” (1985) 5:2 Risk Anal. 103
[Covello]; M. Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 1992) [Douglas]; U. Beck,
Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) [Beck, “Risk Society”].

2

Britain and Canada provide an especially apt comparison for taking up such questions.
Before 1980, each jurisdiction had had similar regulatory frameworks to address patient
safety. Subsequently, the regulatory frameworks grew further divergent. Given that medical
knowledge and health management practices do not respect national boundaries, the
divergences suggest that other factors have played an important role in shaping regulatory
responses. What are these factors? To identify these factors I ask a series of further
questions. Does health system design constrain a government’s regulatory response to a
policy problem within that sphere? Do constitutional, political and social norms influence
governance? How influential are changes in political norms on the regulation of patient
safety? What role do scandals play as drivers of regulatory change?
The answers to these questions provide important insights into the processes of regulation.
They also illuminate the factors that may incline one jurisdiction to adopt a different
regulatory response to a common problem than that adopted in another jurisdiction. Such
insights may allow regulators seeking to adopt regulatory solutions from other jurisdictions
to determine whether such solutions will be likely to be successful in different contexts. The
fact that two jurisdictions with such common regulatory pasts have so dramatically diverged
is not only a provocative puzzle for comparative public policy research, more importantly, it
is potentially life and death matter for patients.

Defining Some Key Terms
Before I proceed any further, I must define some key terms and concepts. ‘Patient safety’
has been defined in multiple ways, but for the purposes of this thesis I define it as systems to
prevent iatrogenic events. 7 Iatrogenic events are injuries caused by the provision of health
services as opposed to those caused by an underlying disease process. Health services
include personal and public health services, so such services as preventative strategies,
treatment, and personal care provided by health-providers (individual and organizational,
Beck, ibid.; A. Giddens, “Risk Society: The Context of British Politics” in J. Franklin, ed., The Politics of Risk
Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 23 [Giddens, “Risk Society”].
7 M. Mello, C. Kelly & T. Brennan, “Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient Safety” (2005) 30:3 J. Health Pol.
375 [Mello, “Fostering Regulation”].
6
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licensed or non-licensed) or in acute hospitals, community clinics, mental health facilities,
and long-term or community-care facilities fit within the scope of this definition. I also talk
of health professionals and health-providers. I use the term health professionals to refer to
members of health professions and health-providers to refer to institutional or organizational
providers of health services, such as hospitals.
The ‘governance of patient safety’ encompasses a panoply of regulatory processes that
directly or indirectly intend to manage, prevent or limit iatrogenic events. However, for the
purposes of this thesis, a more limited definition is employed, and the ‘governance of patient
safety’ means the regulation of health-providers (individuals and institutions/organizations),
health procedures, and the treatment environment that directly or indirectly intend to
manage, prevent or limit iatrogenic events. The regulation of drugs and devices is outside
the scope of this thesis.
Regulation is a process of imposing social order through the creation of rules. However,
there is some contention about the interpretation of this definition. Traditionalists, as
MacDonald notes, ground their concept of regulation in the theory of legal positivism –
regulation is therefore a product of the political state and its agents. 8 Traditionalists regard
regulation as a top-down projection of state authority.

Because of constitutional

arrangements, the state and its agents have a monopoly over the creation of law and legal
processes. 9 Only the state and its agents regulate, and the paradigmatic form or expression
of regulation is legislation; therefore, traditionalists equate regulation with law. According to
this view, there is a clear distinction between what is, and what is not, law and therefore what
is and what is not regulation.
A broader, modernist view of regulation, again according to MacDonald, suggests that nonstate normative orders are part of the regulatory system. 10 This perspective suggests that
regulation is an interdependent endeavour involving a variety of actors within and outside
See discussion in R. MacDonald, “The Swiss Army Knife of Governance” in P. Eliadas, M. Hill & M.
Howlett, eds., Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens
University Press, 2005) [MacDonald].
9 R. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 1997) [Rhodes].
10 MacDonald, supra note 8.
8

4

the political state all seeking to create a form of social order. So, adopting a modernist view,
law, or regulation, includes tacit and implicit processes of social ordering such as custom,
practice, and culture. 11 It can also be understood to include bottom-up forms of regulation
that also create rules and social ordering, such as tort law, a mechanism that relies on
individual patients to initiate claims. 12 I acknowledge the truth of the latter – that custom,
practice, and culture developed by actors at all levels in the health system (including
government) and bottom-up regulatory mechanisms play a significant role in shaping and
establishing social order in the health system. The state’s regulatory role fits within a broader
regulatory context as part of a network of policy and other actors who, through one
mechanism or another, regulate the health system.

Non-state actors make important

contributions to the regulatory process. However, the focus of this thesis is on the state’s role
in regulating patient safety in the health system.
I talk in this chapter and throughout the thesis of the concept of a health system. In
functionalist terms, all societies and cultures depend upon individual members to perform
specific social roles to enable societies to function to fulfil the social needs of their
members. 13 Illness, trauma, and death impede, at the very least, an individual’s ability to
perform social roles 14 and are a recognized social risk. The devastating effects that illness,
injury, and death have on societies and economies is well known. 15 All societies and cultures
develop responses to these risks, including the development of specialized occupational

MacDonald, supra note 8.
See discussion in Mello, “Fostering Regulation”, supra note 7.
13 M. Field, “The Concept of the ‘Health System’ at the Macrosociological Level” (1973) 7 Soc. Sci & Med. 763
at 764-765 [Field].
14 This is so whether that social role is perceived in functional or economic terms or holistically, as part of social
and societal development. Critical disability theory offers a persuasive critique of purely economic analyses of
societal functioning; see, for example, D. Pothier & R. Devlin, Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy,
Politics, Policy and Law, (Vancouver & Toronto: UBC Press, 2006).
15 An extensive enumeration of illustrations is neither possible, nor is it necessary for the purposes of this
thesis, but illustrative is the impact that the ‘Black Death’ had on societies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East
in the 14th century. The Black Death caused the deaths of up to one third to one half of Europe’s population,
and some economic historians have concluded that the plague contributed to a recession, as well as other social
and economic changes such as increased social mobility. See F. Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th
Century, Vol. I: The Structure of Everyday Life, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) [Braudel]; less
dramatically, perhaps, but just as pervasive is that countries whose citizens experience poor health do less well
economically. Or, as Abel-Smith put it, “countries had poor health because they were poor and to some extent
they were poor because they had poor health.” B. Abel-Smith & A. Leiserson, Poverty, Development and Health
Policy, (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1978) [Abel-Smith, “Poverty”].
11
12
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roles, structures, and facilities. 16 These responses evolve according to social norms intrinsic
and extrinsic to the system. Systems usually reflect developments in socialization and move
from the simple to the increasingly complex. So any system is merely the aggregate of the
degree of commitment and resources (human, economic, cultural, and political) a society
devotes to a particular concern, whilst concurrently also making commitments and devoting
resources to other concerns. 17

It is therefore important to acknowledge that the

development of a health system, or a legal system for that matter, is merely one subsystem
within a larger system of governance. The development of a specialized subsystem is part of
the broad social evolutionary forces at play in a society at any given time. We also often
infuse the concepts of systems with more modern understandings of how societies are
organized, centring on a strong nation state. Certainly the early history of each jurisdiction
indicates that central authorities, the Crown, and its agents, exercised control imperfectly,
leaving much scope for actions by other policy actors. As the power of the state increased,
so did the degree of its involvement in systems as regulator.

The Literature
Patient safety has been an increasingly significant academic concern since the mid 1990s.
There are a multitude of publications discussing patient safety in a clinical context and
characterizing it as a responsibility of health-providers – individual and organizational. 18
There are publications examining the governance of patient safety at a macro level as a
function of government and as a system in and of itself. There have, of course, been
examinations of more specific issues or elements of the governance of patient safety. Health
professional regulation is one such issue and has been subject to a great deal of academic
scrutiny from a regulatory perspective, as well as from sociological, anthropological, political,
and historical perspectives. 19 The regulation of healthcare is another, 20 as are the legal
Field, supra note 13.
Ibid.
18 While it is clearly impossible to list all books and articles that have been written to date, the U.S. Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality provides a list of references, including those the Agency considers ‘classics’,
the most influential, frequently cited articles, books, and resources.
Online: AHRQ
<http://www.psnet.ahrq.gov/>. See recently, J. Healy & P. Dugdale, eds., Patient Safety First, (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin, 2009).
19 See for examples of assessments from a largely regulatory perspective: E. Kuhlmann & M. Saks, eds.,
Rethinking Professional Governance: International Directions in Healthcare (Cambridge: The Policy Press, 2008)
[Kuhlmann]; M. Davies, Medical Self-Regulation: Crisis and Change (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) [Davies, “Self16
17
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systems that address medical error (criminal law, discipline, and the tort of negligence). 21
There have been a few jurisdiction-specific analyses of how governments use or could use
law to govern patient safety through the use of regulation. The most significant include the
seminal text To Err is Human by the Institute of Medicine in the United States, 22 and works
from New Zealand 23 and Australia, 24 as well as a body of work from scholars in the United
States, 25 the United Kingdom, 26 and Canada. 27
What is missing from this literature is an examination of the evolution of the governance of
patient safety in a comparative context. Identification of factors specific to governance,
health governance, and the governance of patient safety that results in governments taking
Regulation”]; J. Allsop, & M. Saks, Regulating the Health Professions (London: Sage Publications 2003) [Allsop,
“Regulating”]; R. Blair, & S. Rubin, eds., Regulating the Professions: A Public-Policy Symposium, (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books 1980) [Blair, “Regulating”]; G. Freddi & J. Björkman, eds., Controlling Medical Professionals: The
Comparative Politics of Health Governance (London: Sage, 1989) [Freddi & Björkman]; D. Gladstone, ed., Regulating
Doctors (London: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2000) [Gladstone]; J. Glynn & D. Gomez, Fitness to
Practise: Health Care Regulatory Law, Principle and Process (London: Thomson/Sweet and Maxwell, 2005)[Glynn]; T.
Jost, ed., Regulation of the Healthcare Professions (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Health Administration Press, 1997) [Jost,
“Regulation”]; M. Stacey, Regulating British Medicine: The General Medical Council (Chichester: Wiley, 1992) [Stacey,
“Regulating”].
20 J. Healy, The Governance of Healthcare: Reluctant Regulators (forthcoming, Ashgate, 2010) [Healy, “Regulators”];
K. Walshe, Regulating Healthcare: A Prescription for Improvement? (Buckingham: Open University Press,
2003)[Walshe, “Regulating Healthcare”]; T. Brennan, “The Role of Regulation in Quality Improvement” (1998)
76:4 Milbank Q. 709 [Brennan, “Role”]; T. Jost, “The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the
Quality of Health Care” (1988) 25:5 Houston L. Rev. 525 [Jost “Necessary”].
21 See, for example, A. Merry & A. McCall-Smith, Errors, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001)[Merry]; R. Bovbjerg, R. Miller & D. Shapiro, “Paths to Reducing Medical Injury: Professional
Liability and Discipline vs. Patient Safety and the Need for a Third Way” (2001) 29:3-4 J.L. Med. & Ethics 369
[Bobvjerg]; J. Holbrook, “The Criminalisation of Fatal Medical Mistakes: A Social Intolerance of Medical
Mistakes has Caused them to be Criminalised” (2003) 327:7424 B.M.J. 1118 [Holbrook]; C. Murdoch & J.
Brockman, “Who’s On First? Disciplinary Proceedings by Self-Regulating Professions and Other Agencies for
‘Criminal’ Behaviour” (2001) 64:1 Sask. L. Rev. 23 [Murdoch].
22 U.S., Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 2000) [IOM “To Err”].
23 P. Roberts, Snakes and Ladders: The Pursuit of a Safety Culture in New Zealand Hospitals (Wellington: Victoria
University Press, 2003).
24 J. Braithwaite, J. Healy & K. Dwan, The Governance of Health Safety and Quality: A Discussion Paper (Canberra:
Commonwealth of Australia, 2005) [Braithwaite, “Governance”].
25 Mello, “Fostering Regulation”, supra note 7; P. Aspden et al, Patient Safety: Achieving a New Standard of Care
(Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 2004); L. Palmer, “Patient Safety, Risk Reduction and the Law”
(1999) 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1609 [Palmer]; IOM “To Err”, supra note 22.
26 J. Bridgeman, “Learning from Bristol: Healthcare in the 21st Century” (2002) 65:2 Mod. L. Rev. 241; C.
Newdick, “N.H.S. Governance after Bristol: Holding on, or Letting Go?” (2002) 10:2 Med. L. Rev. 111
[Newdick, “N.H.S.”].
27 E. Bonney & G. Baker, “Current Strategies to Improve Patient Safety in Canada: An Overview of Federal
and Provincial Initiatives” (2004) 7:2 Healthc. Q. 36; G. Baker & P. Norton, Patient Safety and Healthcare Error in
the Canadian Healthcare System: A Systematic Review and Analysis of Leading Practices in Canada with Reference to Key
Initiatives Elsewhere [Baker & Norton], online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/pubs/caresoins/2002-patient-securit-rev-exam/index_e.html>

7

divergent approaches to regulation can be more fully identified and analysed by using a
comparative method (as discussed in more detail in the approach section of this chapter). As
promising as the comparative framework is, very few researchers have used such an
approach. Baker et al and Downie et al conducted comparative synthesis research into
patient-safety-focused regulatory initiatives. 28 Baker’s work examined regulatory processes
occurring at governmental and non-governmental levels, whereas Downie’s research focused
on legal frameworks, including some discussions of the regulation of drugs and devices. This
research showed that internationally regulatory actors were adopting different approaches to
patient safety. Nonetheless, the studies were more descriptive than analytical and did not
engage in any great depth with questions relating to why regulatory responses differed. Only
Healy’s forthcoming work undertakes a cross-national survey of a number of international
jurisdictions and their regulation of patient safety, examining this issue through the lens of
responsive regulation. 29

Contributions of the Thesis
Applying a governance lens to the regulation of patient safety promises to extend our
knowledge and understanding of patient safety and of health governance. It situates the
discussion of the regulation of patient-safety issues within a literature that reassesses the
methods and mechanisms with which societies deal with public problems. Employing this
approach provides a valuable global context to the analysis of regulatory evolution. This
thesis proposes to fill gaps in the literature by undertaking a detailed comparison between
Canada and Britain and the divergences in their approaches to regulating patient safety
between 1980 and 2005. Such a comparison is important because the different approaches
in each jurisdiction to the specific issue of why and how to regulate patient safety illuminate
differences in political, legal and health-related cultures, as well as societal values that lead to
the enactment of regulation.

Baker & Norton, supra note 27; J. Gardner et al, for the Advisory Committee on Health Services Working
Group on Quality of Health Care Services, Governments and Patient Safety in Australia, the United Kingdom and the
United States A Review of Policies, Institutional and Funding Frameworks, and Current Initiatives, online: Health Canada
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/pubs/care-soins/2002-gov-patient-securit/index_e.html>; J. Downie et al,
Patient Safety Law: From Silos to Systems [Downie], online: Health Canada <http://www.patientsafetylaw.ca>.
29 Healy, “Regulators” supra note 20.
28
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Approach of the Thesis
The research questions informing this thesis are addressed using a multi-method orientation
that draws on legal, historical, sociological, and political literature.

This thesis is best

understood as engaging with the sociology of law methodological school. Sociology of law
bridges the gaps between law and sociology, social policy, economics, political science,
anthropology and other disciplines within the humanities and social sciences. Those who use
the sociology-of-law approach draw extensively on insights from the social sciences and
humanities, and these disciplines influence the perspectives and methodologies of scholars of
sociology of law. Scholars who use the sociology-of-law approach also take account of
juristic ideas and practice. 30
One of the tasks of sociology of law is to explore the social forces which bring about
changes in the law. Stuart Henry captures this he states that sociology of law is “… not
simply the study of law and society but the study of the interrelationship of law with
society.” 31 Sociology of law demonstrates that law is born of sociopolitical contexts existing
in different historical eras and different societal structures, or forms of organization that give
rise to different laws and legal systems. 32 It seeks to discover if and how law affects human
behaviour. Conversely, it also examines how social change affects law, whether of a cultural,
political, or economic nature. Accordingly, all those who undertake research into sociology
of law use multidisciplinary methodologies.

It is important to note from the outset,

however, that this is not a purely sociological thesis, rather I approach the analysis as a legal
scholar who is interested in the design of public institutions and legal processes and in
questioning when, why, and how governments choose to use regulatory tools in relation to
patient safety in the health system. In exploring the research questions set out above I use
analytical approaches from a number of disciplines and draw upon critical analysis that has
emerged from these different perspectives.
Examinations of the legal frameworks that surround health systems are well suited to
sociology of law. At first glance, healthcare is about healing the sick, but, as Fierlbeck notes:

R. Cotterrill, ed., Sociological Perspectives on Law: Volume II, (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2001) [Cotterrill].
S. Henry, “Preface” in D. Milovanovic, ed., A Primer in the Sociology of Law 2nd ed. (Albany, N.Y.: Harrow and
Heston, 1994) at viii [Henry].
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[I]t is also a source of cultural identity, economic industry, a way of comprehending
the nature of human beings and of being human, a political arena for vested interest
politics, personal identification, communal identification, economics, sciences, and
ideological beliefs. 33
These factors are not static; ideological beliefs and identification, for example, evolve,
develop, and change over time. So in addition to the concept of ‘health’ being complex and
interdependent, it is also inherently fluid. Any social activity of any complexity requires the
imposition of social order and therefore rules of conduct. A sociological approach to
examining the role of law in the regulation of the provision of health services would
therefore suggest that the many complexities and the fluidity inherent in the concept of
‘health’ – and therefore the provision of health services – influence the scope and shape of
law. In turn, in formulating our conceptions of health systems, health services, healthproviders, and concepts related to ‘health’, we are influenced by the structures we use to
impose social order and the prevailing social and cultural constructs of our time. Rousseau
stated that “Society has to be studied in the individual, and the individual in society; those
who wish to separate politics from morals will never understand either.” 34 We can separate
patient safety from its broader setting in complex political and societal structures for some
analytic purposes.

However, if we truly want to understand why governments have

responded differently to patient safety, we need to consider patient safety as part of a whole,
as part of broader sociopolitical and socioeconomic processes in each country. We also need
to consider patient safety in the context of the historical development of institutions of
governance within the health system and more broadly. Thus this research also adopts a
historical framework reflecting my view that regulation is an essentially temporal process.
This project employs a comparative methodology by conducting a micro-comparison of the
evolving regulatory frameworks around patient safety in two jurisdictions: Britain and

Ibid.
K. Fierlbeck, “Canadian Healthcare Reform and the Politics of Decentralisation” in C. Altenstetter & J.W.
Bjorkman, eds., Health Policy Reform: National Variations and Globalization (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997).
34 J.J. Rousseau, quoted in R. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1971) at 13 [Titmuss].
32
33

10

Canada. Such an examination is important, as comparing how and why regulation has
evolved in different countries may offer insights about our systems of governance, in
particular which features are characteristic of a jurisdiction’s approach to regulation. It may
therefore help us understand how regulatory innovations from other countries may or may
not be readily adaptable to the social context within which regulation is occurring.

Why Britain and Canada
A logical question then is: why Britain and Canada? Canada and Britain are often subject to
comparison, as there are sufficient similarities between them in terms of culture and legal and
political structures to make such a comparison meaningful. 35 For the same reasons, macrolevel decision-makers in one country often study the innovations of another. Canada and
Britain share ‘Westminster’-type parliamentary systems and similar parliamentary
conventions. However, a significant constitutional difference is that Canada has a federal
system, whereas Britain is a devolved unitary state. 36

Accordingly, in Canada, the

Constitution divides responsibility to provide and regulate health services between the
federal and provincial/territorial governments with the primary responsibility for regulating
the safety of institutions and professions accorded to the provinces/territories. In Britain,
the responsibility for providing and regulating health services is a national or regional
responsibility, in that the central government has devolved powers in relation to health to the
Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland Parliaments.

The British Parliament retains the

responsibility for providing and regulating health services in England, and for regulating
some aspects of health in which there is a national interest, e.g. the continuing regulation of
health professionals.
In both countries, in common with many other countries in the West, there was a significant
reappraisal of the manner in which governments governed in the period from the late 1970s
to the 1990s. 37 Influenced by the neoliberal economic models emerging primarily from the
See in the health field, for example, C. Tuohy, Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena
in the United States, Britain and Canada (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) [Tuohy “Logics”].
36 It is also a federacy in that the Channel Islands and the Isle of Mann are Crown dependencies. A further
complication is Britain’s membership in the European Union.
37 See, for example, D. Longley, Health Care Constitutions (London: Cavendish, 1996) [Longley]; M. Moran,
Governing the Health Care State – A Comparative Study of the UK, the United States and Germany (Manchester:
35
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Chicago School, 38 governments were convinced, again to varying degrees, that there needed
to be a reappraisal of the appropriateness and efficiency of government provision of services
that the free market could more appropriately and efficiently provide.

In addition,

governments were re-examining the way in which bureaucracies functioned, favouring
increased fiscal accountability mechanisms, flexible, responsive and professional
management cadres, deliverable outputs, ideally linked to desirable policy outcomes, and so
on. Public sector reform proceeded more quickly and more completely in Britain (and New
Zealand) than it did in Canada (and Australia and the United States). 39 This resulted in more
complete and thorough transformations in the manner in which the British public sector
operates than it did in the public sector in Canada. In short, the culture of the governmental
policy process in Britain and Canada comes from similar roots, yet as a result of reforms is
different – perhaps substantially different – in the two countries.
The provision of health services by the state to some, or preferably all, citizens has long been
considered a pillar of the welfare state, along with other social policies that redistribute social
risks, such as social services. Both Canada – and increasingly Britain – fit within what
Esping-Anderson categorizes as the ‘liberal’ model of the welfare state. 40 Esping-Anderson
suggests that liberal welfare states, certainly in regard to the delivery of social services, limit
assistance to targeted groups who are in the ‘bad’ risk strata through means-tested assistance,
modest universal transfers, or modest social insurance plans. Canada and Britain fit within
the ‘liberal’ cluster, as do Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Within this ‘liberal’
cluster there is considerable variance within types, especially in regard to the provision of
health services. Both Canada and Britain aspire to the universal provision of health services
but do not achieve it. Both use different mechanisms to provide and fund such services,
Manchester University Press, 1999) [Moran, “Governing”]; and M. Moran, & T. Prosser, eds., Privatization and
Regulatory Change in Europe (Buckingham and Bristol, PA: Open University Press, 1994) [Moran & Prosser].
38 Moran & Prosser, ibid.
39 See, for example, Longley, supra note 37; World Bank, Administrative and Civil Service Reform “OECD
Countries” online: World Bank
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/oecdcountries.htm>; D. Porter & D. Craig, “The
Third Way and the Third World: Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion in the Rise of ‘Inclusive’ Liberalism”
(2004) 11:2 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 387; M. Barzelay, The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy
Dialogue (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001) [Barzelay]; P. Aucoin, The New Public Management: Canada
in Comparative Perspective (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1995) [Aucoin].
40 The others are: social democratic (Nordic countries) and conservative (continental Europe). See G. EspingAndersen, Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) [EspingAndersen]. This typology is not without its critics, who argue that there are more than three models.

12

with Britain embracing a ‘national’ health system funded through taxes, and a social
insurance program in Canada, also funded through taxes. 41 Similarly, the health system in
Britain reflects a form of state hierarchy, in that the centre controls functions, at least
nominally, whereas the systems for delivering health services across Canada reflect values
related to professional collegiality. 42 Within Canada the legal framework surrounding the
provision of health services is designed in such a way to create disincentives for doctors to
accept private funding. 43 This in effect creates a one-tier health system for certain defined
core health services; outside this core area of service provision, government permits private
provision and thus a two-tiered system. In contrast, Britain has a two-tiered system of public
and private provision of all health-related services. In both countries, there is a trend
towards some form of devolution in the administration by government of the health system.
In Canada, this has involved provincial/territorial governments devolving powers to regions
or districts (regionalization) in most provinces/territories. Britain initially devolved powers
to the regions, but since the 1990s has been in a period of post-regionalization where
services have been gradually further devolved from regions to individual National Health
Service (NHS) Trusts, i.e. hospitals or other health-providers, such as ambulance services.
A comparison of Britain and Canada, in respect of patient safety, shows startling similarities
in incidence, incidents, and issues. However, a comparison also shows that in some respects
Britain and Canada demonstrate striking dissimilarities in terms of choices in respect of
regulatory interventions. Britain and Canada have both relatively recently undertaken studies
into the incidence of adverse events in hospitals in each country. In 1999, British data
indicated an 11.7 per cent incidence rate for adverse events, with 48 per cent of these events
deemed preventable. 44 Canadian data from 2004 indicated a 7.5 per cent incidence rate for
adverse events, with 37 per cent of these events deemed preventable. 45 Both jurisdictions
have had some form of inquiry, public or coronial, into the deaths of children undergoing
paediatric cardiac surgery; both have had issues related to the safety and security of the blood
system; and both have had wide publicity accorded to the rates of nosocomial infections in
Moran, “Governing” supra note 37 at 17.
Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35 at 27.
43 C. Flood & T. Archibald, “The Illegality of Private Health Care in Canada” (2001) 164:4 CMAJ 825.
44 M. Woloshynowych, G. Neale & C. Vincent, “Adverse Events in Hospitalised Patients: A Pilot Study and
Preliminary Findings” (2000) 1:2 Clinical Governance Bulletin 2 [Woloshynowych].
45 Baker, “Adverse Events”, supra note 2.
41
42
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hospitals. The differences between these countries do not relate to incidence, incidents, or
issues but rather are in relation to their responses to these issues. Canada and Britain are
eminently comparable, especially in regard to the issue of regulating patient safety.

Methods
The research methods employed in this thesis are nonempirical, involving critical review and
analysis of existing literature. More importantly, I draw heavily from primary sources – socalled ‘grey’ literature – and also various legal instruments, including legislation, regulations,
and policies and guidelines.

These resources will be analyzed and evaluated using the

conceptual framework set out below.

The Conceptual Framework
This research presents a way of understanding the processes of regulatory change in health
systems in response to a particular problem – that of the safety of patients receiving health
services – and how these responses differ between countries. I draw upon studies that have
identified local specificities as important mediating factors in determining specific policy
outcomes. 46 These contexts establish the parameters within which regulators make choices
about what to regulate, how to regulate, and to what ends. As such, this project draws upon
theories from political science that seek to explain policy evolution, notably the literature on
“path dependency”, 47 “punctuated equilibrium”, 48 and Tuohy’s “accidental logics”. 49
Broadly, these frameworks suggest policy decisions accumulate over time and accretion can
create limits for future policy-makers 50 – or, in other words, once a country or region starts
down one path, it is difficult to reverse course. 51 Change will still occur, but it will likely be
bounded change unless something occurs to puncture the equilibrium or to create a window

For example, Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
A. Kay, “A Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies” (2005) 83:3 Pub. Admin. 553 [Kay]; P.
Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics” (2000) 94:2 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 251
[Pierson].
48 F. Baumgartner & B. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1993) [Baumgartner].
49 Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
50 Kay, supra note 47.
51 Pierson, supra note 47.
46
47
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of opportunity, a policy ‘accident’ that is conducive to change. 52 Thus time, or the temporal
progression of the process of policy development, becomes a key focus for analysis rather
than a merely incidental factor.
One of the central critiques, of path dependency in particular, is that the concept does not in
and of itself provide a necessary or sufficient condition to understand or explain the
processes leading to policy change. Path dependency stresses the ‘how’ of policy-making –
an empirical question – rather than the ‘why’, which requires theorizing. 53 As Eagleton
notes:
For much of the time, our intellectual and other activities bowl along fairly serenely,
and in this situation no great expenditure of theoretical energy is usually necessary.
But there may come a point where these taken-for-granted activities begin to falter,
log-jam, come unstuck, run into trouble, and it is at these points that theory proves
necessary.

Theory on a dramatic scale happens when it is both possible and

necessary for it to do so – when the traditional rationales which have silently
underpinned our daily practices stand in danger of being discredited, and need either
to be revised or discarded. This may come about for reasons internal to those
practices, or because of certain external pressures, or more typically because of a
combination of both. Theory is just a practice forced into a new form of selfreflectiveness on account of certain grievous problems it has encountered. 54
Theory, in its various guises, drives analysis around the ‘why’ questions. Ideas, and especially
expert knowledge, as well as political ideologies, drive policy analysis. From this perspective,
it is helpful to draw upon governance theory and insights from social theory to seek to
explain why, in the context of patient safety, regulatory paths in Britain and Canada changed
markedly or remained consistent with a pre-existing regulatory path.
Beginning with social theory: social theorists increasingly describe many societies (particularly
in the West) as being at some form of impasse, where new social structures and norms are
52
53

Ibid.
Kay, supra note 47.
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superseding the old, previously dominant structures of power and authority. This transition
is occurring, not from the top-down, but almost stealthily, and certainly – at least to a degree
– unwittingly. 55 This slow, often-hidden impetus for change has profound implications for
governance, for law and for how law is used to address public problems. 56 While cultural
theorists operate at a macro or “world-historical” 57 level of analysis, there are also many
researchers who seek to ascertain whether and to what extent cultural theories are borne out
by lived experience, adding an empirical layering to a theoretical discussion. From social
theory I suggest, in the context of regulating safety in the health system, that certain factors
derived from social theory are of central concern to regulators. These include: 1) the degree
of risk associated with the provision of health services; 2) the levels of distrust or mistrust
associated with the current institutional and structural regulatory arrangements; 3) whether
accountability measures are (in)effective; and 4) the desired level of control by the state. I
maintain that these factors contribute to the decision-making process about what, when, why
and how to regulate in respect of patient safety and, I would suggest, in matters touching
upon public safety more generally.
Social theorists suggest broad cultural shifts associated with the concepts of risk, trust,
accountability and control are emerging. It is widely agreed that the concept of risk has, to
quote Lupton, “become an increasingly pervasive concept of human existence in western
societies” 58 which acts to organize, monitor and regulate the conduct of societal actors.
Giddens and Beck suggest that we increasingly live in a ‘risk society’ where we have an
overwhelming preoccupation with regulating risks to the public. 59 Ericsson and Haggerty
conclude that “a risk society is a regulatory society.” 60 Some scholars suggest that we –

T. Eagleton, The Significance of Theory and Other Essays, (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990) at 26 [Eagleton].
U. Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflective Modernization” in U. Beck, A.
Giddens & S. Lash, eds., Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) 1 [Beck, “Reinvention”].
56 See, for example, L. Salamon, “The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction” in L.
Salamon, ed., The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1
[Salamon “Introduction”].
57 C. Hood, H. Rothstein & R. Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001) [Hood, “Risk”].
58 Lupton, supra note 5 at 25.
59 See, for example, U. Beck, A. Giddens & S. Lash, eds., Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in
the Modern Social Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) [Beck, “Modernization”].
60 R. Ericson, & K. Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society (Toronto and Oxford: University of Toronto Press &
Oxford University Press 1997) [Ericson].
54
55
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certainly we in the Western world – live in a “post-trust society” 61 at least insofar as societies
are increasingly expressing distrust, or suspicion, of traditional and established institutions of
social order, such as governments, professions, religious institutions and other social edifices
that were traditionally trusted to regulate risks. If the public or key policy-actors begin to
distrust, or at least to feel ambivalent, about key institutions, policy-actors may change the
policy and legal frameworks surrounding those key institutions in an attempt to restore or
bolster trust. Rowe and Calnan note that “changes in trust relations reflect changes to the
distribution of power, modes of governance and accountability within the health service.” 62
Changes in frameworks of control can causally impact upon perceptions of trust or distrust
or, again from Rowe and Calnan, “changes in trust are driven by the dialectical relationship
between trust, power, governance and accountability, so that each affects the other in a
continuing iterative process.” 63
These broad theories of social change are interesting and compelling but do not particularly
assist with the analysis of why there has been change in respect of a particular issue or
regulatory concern. For that I must have recourse to the more applied levels of social
theory. In particular, theorists and empiricists alike consider that the interrelationships
between trust/distrust and risk/risk perception are key determinants of the acceptability of
policy or, for the purposes of this thesis, regulation, although there is some contention about
the causality of the relationships between risk and trust. Some empiricists claim that trust is
the determining factor in the perception of risks and the acceptability of policies, i.e. they
posit a causal explanation: 64 trust influences risk perception which influences perceptions as
to the acceptability of policies. Others argue that the acceptability of a policy could be a
determinant of trust, so that trust and risk could be indicators of a more general attitude or
perception about a policy, i.e. they posit an associationist model of trust: 65 trust influences
and is influenced by perceptions of policy acceptability which in turn influences and is
influenced by risk. There is empirical evidence to support both interpretations of the

61 See, for example, R.E. Lofstedt, Risk Management in Post-Trust Societies, (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave MacMillan,
2005) [Lofstedt].
62 R. Rowe & M. Calnan, “Trust Relations in Health Care: Developing a Theoretical Framework for the ‘New’
NHS” (2006) 20:5 J. Health Org. Manage. 376 at 379 [Rowe].
63 Ibid. at 379.
64 For a general overview, see discussion in W. Poortinga & N. Pidgeon, “Trust in Risk Regulation: Cause or
Consequence of the Acceptability of GM Food?” (2005) 25:1 Risk Analysis 199 [Poortinga].
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relationship between risk and trust, although the evidence to date more strongly supports the
associationist model. 66
Setting aside empiricism for the present, in this thesis I argue on a normative level that both
the causal and the associationist models apply, at least in relation to the regulation of patient
safety, but that these models must expand to include the interrelated concepts of
accountability and control. Perceptions that mechanisms both exist and are adequate to
ensure that individuals and organizations are accountable for their actions are an important
determinant, I suggest, as to whether current controls on specific activities or practices are
sufficient and, accordingly, whether changes in the levels and mechanisms of control are
required. Trust is a determining factor of the perception and acceptability of risk, which is
in turn a determining factor as to the degree of accountability required of policy-actors,
which in turn determines policy or regulatory acceptability, which in turn impacts upon
perceptions of how much control is required, which impacts upon trust, and so on.
I further contend that the concepts of risk, trust, accountability, and control are key factors
driving safety regulation and regulation in the health system more generally. It has long been
recognized that there are risks of harm associated with the provision of health services. 67
Accordingly, individuals and groups have historically employed a number of regulatory
strategies to manage such risks – most saliently, for the purposes of this thesis at least – the
development and use of the common law and direct regulation through legislation (discussed
in more detail in Chapter 2). 68 Consumers of health services in the 20th and 21st centuries are
more aware of the probability of the standard risks of adverse outcomes associated with the
competent provision of health services.
Trust is, and has always been, a cornerstone of the relationships between the public and
health systems, organizations, institutions, and professions within the health system and

Ibid.
Ibid.
67 In respect of historical occurrences, see for example G. Ayliffe & M. English, Hospital Infection: From Miasmas
to MRSA (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) [Ayliffe]; and for modern confirmation Baker,
“Adverse Events”, supra note 2; Brennan, “Adverse Events” supra note 2; Wilson, “Quality”, supra note 2;
Vincent, “Adverse Events”, supra note 2; Schioler, supra note 2; Davis, supra note 2.
68 Also one sees the employment of insurance and voluntary self-regulation, Covello, supra note 5.
65
66
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individuals and health-providers, institutional and individual. 69 At the macro-systems level,
health services are a public good, substantially funded and/or provided, managed and
regulated by the state, or by policy-actors to whom that state has delegated authority. When
the state delegates authority to other actors, it generally does so as it – and the public more
generally – trusts a policy actor to act in the public interest towards the public good. In the
health system, policy actors that provide health services, or that are representatives of those
who do, i.e. health professions, have moral, ethical, and legal obligations to do no harm to
those who use those services. These obligations form the basis of the public trust in those
institutions, as health-providers or as self-regulatory policy actors (macro-level trust
relationships). Additionally, trust, as an ethical and a legal construct, is central to the
relationship between individual health professionals and individual patients. 70 Micro-level
trust relationships may influence macro-level trust and vice versa, although these
relationships are complex. 71

Trust has become a significant issue with some, such as

Mechanic, arguing that, for a number of reasons, public trust in health institutions and in
healthcare-providers is in decline, a claim to some extent backed by empirical data. 72
The concept of accountability has also assumed a prominent place in discussions about the
health system. Emanuel and Emanuel suggest that at times a single “key word” comes to
dominate discussions about a topic and serves to both organize related ideas on the topic and
as a shorthand expression for an entire view to the extent that the topic seems incomplete
without that term. 73 They suggest, in the United States context at least, that in health policy
“accountability” has become a key word. 74 Others agree that accountability is a core element
in health policy and, to an extent, drives many of the health reforms seen internationally in

69 M. Calnan & R. Rowe, “Researching Trust Relations in Health Care: Conceptual and Methodological
Challenges – An Introduction” (2006) 20:5 J. Health Org. Manage. 349 [Calnan].
70 See, for example, V. Sharpe, “Introduction: Accountability and Justice in Patient Safety Reform” in V.
Sharpe, ed., Accountability: Patient Safety and Policy Reform (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004)
[Sharpe, “Introduction”]; C. McLeod, “Understanding Trust” in F. Baylis et al., eds., Health Care Ethics in Canada
2nd ed. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace and W.B. Saunders, 2004) at 186.
71 See, for example, B. Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1996) [Misztal]; Calnan, supra note 69 at 353-354.
72 See D. Mechanic, “In My Chosen Doctor I Trust” (2004) 329 BMJ 1413 [Mechanic].
73 See, for example, E. Emanuel & L. Emanuel, “What is Accountability in Health Care?” (1996) 124 Ann. Int.
Med. 229 [Emanuel].
74 Ibid.
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the last twenty years. 75 The concept of accountability for action or inaction within the
patient–health professional relationship has always been important, especially in the context
of adverse events, although latterly also in terms of the quality of practice in general. 76
However, this is not the sole locus of accountability for professionals. As Stacey describes in
respect of doctors:
There are so many ways in which a doctor may be held to account for her/his
actions; for clinical actions to individual patients and, in medical audit, to colleagues;
at law, in terms of obligations to patient or employer; to the profession for his/her
behaviour; to employers for the money spent and the priorities adopted in
treatments. Furthermore, as a collectivity the profession is held to account to the
public at large for the quality of medical care in general and particular. 77
The discourse of control also has a prominent place in the health context as direct regulation,
as well as other regulatory tools, has increasingly been used to support the development of a
state-sponsored health system and through that to control actors, individual and institutional,
and activity within that system.
The sense that government uses regulation to control activity in a sector is linked with the
other analytical framework employed in this analysis – governance. ‘Governance’ has many
definitions and is a term that is remarkable for its fluidity and its generality. 78 I prefer the
definition of governance as being “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions,

See, for example, D. Brinkerhoff, “Accountability and Health Systems: Towards Conceptual Clarity and
Policy Relevance” (2004) 19(6) Health Pol’y & Plan. 371 [Brinkerhoff]; A. Simanowitz, “Accountability” in C.
Vincent, M. Ennis & R. Audley, eds., Medical Accidents (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993) 209
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Report Cards on Surgeon Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1 [Oakley]; M. Rodwin,
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note 75 at 211.
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(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005) [Eliadas]; also L. Salamon, ed., The Tools of
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public and private, manage their common affairs.” 79 Central to the concept of the ‘new’
governance is the recognition that government is not the sole actor in the policy sphere.
Governance focuses on interactions between multiple state and non-state actors. The ‘new’
governance suggests that this approach is different from the previous model that focused
mainly on state interactions. There has always been state and non-state involvement in
regulation, if you use regulation in the broadest sense of the word. So what is new is possibly
the extent of and recognition of non-state penetration into the regulatory realm and the use
by governments of more inclusive regulatory mechanisms. 80 A complex array of public and
private actors, at the individual, local, regional, national, and international levels are, or can
be, active in the policy sphere and help define a set of policy objectives. These policy
objectives are then pursued through the use of a dense mosaic of regulatory tools, which may
place public agencies in complex, interdependent relationships with a host of third-party
actors, as the newer regulatory tools often involve shared discretion over the use of public
authority and public funds. 81

However, old regulatory forms – command and control

regulation – are often still used to govern these interrelationships. Tool choice tells us
something about the nature and perhaps quality of the relationships between stakeholders in
these sectors.
It is important to acknowledge that although this research places government and
government agencies at the centre of the research paradigm – perhaps reinforcing the image
of the centralized, monolithic, bureaucratic state – this is not the complete picture. Although
top-down activity by legislatures and government administrative agencies shapes the
behaviour of health-providers, other forces are also influential. These forces include, to a
greater or lesser degree, depending on the context, private and quasi-private bottom-up
approaches such as tort law. However, even what is seen as top-down activity can be
attuned to what Salamon calls the central reality of public problem-solving, namely its
collaborative nature. 82 Public problem-solving relies on third-party actors, in addition to

K. Webb, “Sustainable Governance in the 21st Century: Moving Beyond Instrument Choice” in Eliadas, supra
note 78.
80 Some suggest that ‘New Governance’ is a political construct used to rationalize the privatization and
commercialization of public services.
81 Salamon, “Introduction” supra note 56
82 Ibid.
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government, to address public problems and pursue public purposes. 83 A classic example is
the traditional regulatory treatment of patient safety by governments characterized by Mello
et al as “an unparalleled faith in the ability of medical professionals to regulate themselves.” 84
This is in itself an expression of commitment to collaborating with a third-party actor by
delegating discretion considered in other settings a state responsibility. So the governance
approach also takes account of how the use of particular regulatory instruments encapsulates
the nature of the relationships with other policy actors.
One of the significant differences between the ‘new’ governance and more traditional public
administration is that the unit of analysis shifts from the traditional program or agency
analysis to analyzing the tools of public action that are employed. 85 Rather than seeing policy
programs as unique, it examines commonalities and difference on the basis of the regulatory
tools used or embodied. The types of tools used may have changed but, despite this,
common features are identifiable, regardless of the field or jurisdiction where they are used.
The process of choosing a particular regulatory tool to address a specific issue once
identified is a complex and not well understood process. As Rhodes notes, there are clearly
limits and constraints on central intervention, whether through the use of legal regulatory
instruments or not. 86 Limits may, for example, be a result of the many interdependencies
within policy domains 87 and accordingly the degree of deference given to some policy actors
in health systems, such as physicians, may influence instrument choice. 88 Proponents of the
‘new’ governance suggest that the views, actions, and responsiveness of the other actors
within the polity, including the public, non-state actors, politicians and the bureaucracy,
influence the process of tool selection. Some further note that the decision to use a
particular regulatory tool is in itself a political act as it defines the set of actors as part of the
cast of players who are involved in implementation and the roles they will play. 89 Since
actors will all have perspectives, standards of practice, skills, and incentives and these will all
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85 Salamon, “Introduction” supra note 56 at 9.
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differ, determining the choice of tool may influence the outcome, as it gives some actors an
advantage in shaping the new policy.
Cultural norms and ideological predispositions also shape choices and in turn affect public
attitudes towards the state. 90 So, to use Salamon’s example, a pro-market bias may affect
tool choice in the United States, whereas governments in Canada and Western Europe are
more wary of the market but may be more receptive to command- and control-type
regulation. 91

Ultimately, however, one needs to look beyond tool choice to determine

whether the regulatory change involves what Hall terms a first- or second-order change
(changes in instruments and their use) or a third-order change to the regulatory (or, in Hall’s
work, policy) paradigm. 92 A shift in a regulatory paradigm is indicative of a change that
moves away from or transforms the traditional regulatory path.

Limitations
The strength of comparative research is the window it opens to enable the evaluation of
other ways of regulating common problems. It is an important, but complex, methodology
to employ because of the requirement that the broader context of political and legal systems
and social and cultural norms form part of the analysis. Because of the complexity of the
methodology, any comparative work is vulnerable to critiques. Some may suggest that,
because of different constitutional frameworks, comparisons between Britain and Canada are
untenable. Obviously, the large literature using these countries as comparators belies this
point. Some may suggest that more than two jurisdictions are necessary for meaningful
comparative work. However, a multiplicity of comparators can upset the delicate balance
between breadth and depth of analysis and hence I worked with two jurisdictions. As a final
comment, comparative work is both challenging and difficult, and one is often left with as
many questions as answers, even after sustained scrutiny of the issues in question. This is
how it should be. Diversity and difference are important and render even the best of
comparisons imperfect.
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Salamon, “Introduction” supra note 56 at 11.
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Others might critique the variables that have been used in this thesis to shape the
comparative analysis. These were chosen as a result of some deliberation. It was clear from
the extensive literature focusing on health systems policy and regulation in the British
context that the NPM and event-driven change were two key variables predicating change,
both of which appeared understudied in the Canadian context. An analysis of the health
systems in each jurisdiction and the governance systems as they applied to health more
generally are central to a comparative and sociology-of-law approach to analysis. If we truly
want to understand why governments have responded differently to patient safety, we need
to consider patient safety as part of broader sociopolitical and socioeconomic processes in
each jurisdiction. All contributions intended to fill a gap within the comparative scholarship
of patient-safety regulation should be welcome.
Lastly, it may be said that my methods of critical review and analysis of existing literature
(including grey literature), of legislation, and other legal instruments is limited, and the thesis
could have benefited from empirical study. This is a valid point. However, the evaluation of
literature and legal instruments is both an accepted and important method of enabling critical
analysis. It allows for an examination of a broader context. Empirical research methods, on
the other hand, may result in more limited projects constrained in part by the logistics of
research and the focus and interests of any research participants. Further, I simply point out
that any doctoral research project is bounded both by resources (time and monetary) and the
competencies of the researcher in question. I freely admit that my competencies in empirical
research are limited. The employment of empirical research techniques could shape the
design of any future work in this area.

The Argument
I suggest that the regulatory framework that governed patient safety in each jurisdiction was
very similar at the beginning of the 1980s (discussed in Chapter 2). This is of course partly
attributable to Canada beginning as a colonial possession of Britain, with the resultant
importation (at least in English Canada) of the legal frameworks that governed patient safety
in Britain at that time.
92

Whatever the genesis of these regulatory frameworks, the
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commonalities are striking. Both were characterized by a dependence upon self-regulation
by health professionals and by health-providers. The preference for self-regulation was in
itself historically contingent. The provision of health services had traditionally been a matter
for the private and charitable sectors and for health professionals acting as entrepreneurs.
Under this model, government’s interest was limited to ensuring that those providing health
services were qualified to do so by meeting basic standards (often established by the health
profession) and to ensure that those harmed by the provision of health services had some
means of seeking redress. Although attitudes about the role of government in healthcare
changed as a consequence of two world wars and a severe economic depression, the
regulatory framework around patient safety essentially remained the same – how clinical
services were provided was a matter for professionals who had the requisite expertise,
knowledge and experience and who should not be second-guessed by government or the
courts.

It was a risk-management strategy predicated on trust in professionalism and

expertise, with an expectation that professionals would be accountable to their fellow
professionals, to individual patients, and so to the public. It was a strategy where control was
formally delegated by government to other actors.
While the regulatory frameworks around patient safety were markedly similar, at least until
the 1980s, I suggest that the first steps leading to divergence in each jurisdiction’s regulatory
path became apparent when those regulatory frameworks were placed within each
jurisdiction’s broader governance context.

This context includes the structures and

institutions within each health system but also how the health system fits into the broader
social, economic and political frameworks that shape the governance of public problems
across the ambit of state responsibility. 93 I argue that the structures and institutions of the
health system are influential factors in setting jurisdictions along different regulatory paths
(discussed in Chapter 3). In Britain, the post-World War II government nationalized the
existing hospital sector (comprised of private/charitable organizations that provided health
services, as well as public services run by local authorities) to create the NHS. In future, the
government would fund, plan, manage and operate hospital services. In face of opposition
from the medical profession, the government ‘encouraged’ medical professionals based in
By ‘institutions’, I mean organizations and their instruments of social control. By ‘structures’, I mean the
balance of power between actors within the system. See Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
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hospitals (consultants) to participate by, as Aneurin Bevan, the then Minister of Health,
reputedly put it, “stuff[ing] their mouths with gold”. 94 Hospital consultants would be paid a
salary (including a system of bonuses or distinction awards), but would be able to maintain
their lucrative private practices, and they would also play an important and central role in the
management structures of the NHS. 95 General practitioners were mollified by keeping their
autonomy – they would not become salaried employees of the new order but were to be paid
on a capitation basis as independent contractors and their contracts administered by local
committees upon which their representatives would sit. Thus a national health system was
created where the Ministry of Health funded health services through regional boards that
reported to the Minister of Health.
In Canada, it will be seen that events took a different turn. The constitutional division of
powers resulted in the provinces/territories being responsible for health policy, but their
limited fiscal capacities meant that they were dependent upon the federal government’s socalled ‘spending power’ to fund a major portion of any universal free public health system.
This ultimately resulted in the federal government entering into an agreement with the
provinces to co-fund provincially based insurance schemes to ensure access to medically
necessary health services. Health systems remained firmly rooted in the provinces under
provincial administration, only somewhat constrained by the parameters of the agreement
with the federal government. While provincial governments would regulate and administer
the health system in each province, services would be delivered by non-governmental actors
acting as agents of government.

It was not until the 1980s that a greater degree of

centralisation in administrative practices through processes of regionalization was seen. In
addition to the constraints imposed by constitutional arrangements, culture and ideology, as
well as pragmatism, may have been important factors in determining the shape of these
arrangements. The provincial and federal governments were looking to the creation of the
NHS in Britain for inspiration, but were also attuned to the debates in the United States
where socialism was, and still is in many quarters, a dirty word, and this attitude shifted
across the border. 96

This meant that Canadian governments tended to be somewhat

94 Cited in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography
<http://www.oup.com/oxforddnb/info/freeodnb/magazine/health/> [Oxford].
95 Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
96 See, for example, Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
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ideologically hybrid – not socialist and not libertarian – concerned, as Kenny described it,
“with peace, order and good government” 97 and thus with mediating between socialism and
libertarianism. This is perhaps illustrated by a certain pragmatism displayed when organizing
provincial health systems when Medicare was introduced. Policy-makers at provincial and
federal levels recognized that the system of private provision (for-profit or not-for-profit) of
health services worked reasonably well and that the nationalized system in Britain of public
delivery had attracted some criticism. 98 A middle way was to create state-supported health
insurance funds to ensure universal access to a bundle of ‘core’ health services.
Thus, the pattern in Canada was to establish health insurance programs that would enable all
Canadians to receive free hospital and primary medical-care services.

The federal

government would partly fund such programs, but its influence in how these programs
would be operated and managed would be limited by the terms of its agreement with the
provinces/territories.

Provincial/territorial governments were in turn responsible for

funding, planning and managing health policy. This included determining what services
should be provided and ensuring some integration between health services providers to meet
the needs of the populations they served. Delivery of hospital-based services was delegated
by governments to a variety of for-profit, not-for-profit, or local organizations (there are very
few state-owned and -controlled hospitals 99 ) and to individual medical professionals.
As in Britain, Canadian governments recognized that the acquiescence of the medical
professions was critical to the success of the new health insurance programs. Unlike in
Britain, medical professionals were not really divided between hospital-based and nonhospital-based interests, and salaried positions were rare. 100 The continuation of fee-forservice agreements between provinces/territories and medical professionals meant medical
professionals remained agents at best, but were not embedded in the same way as in Britain
in any local or regional management structure.

N. Kenny, “The Continental Divide: A Modest Comparison of American and Canadian Values in
Healthcare” (2004) 1:2 Org. Ethics 65 at 69 [Kenny].
98 See, for example, Tuohy, “Logics”supra note 35.
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The first critical point of departure between the two jurisdictions in terms of the regulatory
path established by the health system was that the British government’s responsibilities vis-àvis the health system were broad, encompassing direct responsibility for funding, planning,
management, ownership, and delivery. Thus the extent of their responsibilities within the
health system was greater than that of Canadian governments.

Although the British

government chose the expedient approach of enabling medical power and autonomy to selfregulate professional practice and created a hierarchical system that gave much organizational
authority to consultants to self-regulate the practices of the hospitals within which they
worked, the public system was still owned, operated and managed by the state. Ultimately, in
this system, consultants were state employees. Primary care providers were contracted to the
state and embedded within state mechanisms. Thus the nature of the relationship between
the state and medical professionals had a very different basis in Britain from what it did in
Canada where the operational edifices of the medical profession were not integrated with
governmental management structures to any extent. This difference did not manifest in any
real differences in the levels of accommodation accorded to medical professionals within
each system, at least initially. It did, however, establish conditions within which the state in
Britain could, if it chose to do so, exercise greater control through the use of organizational
mechanisms over those who provided health services – organizations and individuals. In
Canada, the delivery side of the health system was not as firmly integrated into the
management side and thus in practice there was less government control and, therefore, in
some senses, a less hierarchical structure.
In terms of the broader governance context (discussed in Chapter 4), federalism is, at least to
some extent, thought to be a predictor of stability in regulatory frameworks and in
approaches to regulation. In contrast, a unitary political system is perceived in many respects
to be more responsive to public concerns and therefore more likely to create regulatory
patches or fixes to mitigate problems with the original regulatory framework. Constitutions
and politics play a role in influencing the level and extent of regulatory change within those
systems. It is not just constitutional structures that are important; rather the general social,
political, economic and cultural context within which that constitutional structure functions
may be even more important as a predictor of change.
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I argue that the marked divergence seen from the 1980s in each jurisdiction’s regulatory
frameworks are attributable to what Tuohy terms “windows of opportunity” 101 that open at
certain times and not others because of factors in the broader political system – and, I assert,
unlike Tuohy, in the health system as well. In the case of patient-safety regulation, I suggest
that the “windows” in question in Britain were the commitment of successive British
governments to the tenets of the New Public Management (NPM), imposing private sector
controls over public sector operations (discussed in Chapter 5), and a series of significant
patient-safety scandals that emerged into the public domain, particularly in the late 1990s
(discussed in Chapter 6).
The enthusiastic uptake of the NPM theories into the regulatory frameworks by successive
governments in Britain saw a transformation in regulatory practices with a focus on clear
prospective and retrospective accountabilities and control from the centre exercised by a
variety of monitoring bodies. 102 Ideologically, the NPM encapsulated a profound distrust of
policy and regulatory actors, suspecting that these bodies were likely to be subject to capture
by vested interests. 103 This distrust tipped over into self-regulatory bodies, which were
perceived likely to be captured by the self-interest of the professions and hence to act in
ways that were not in the government or the public interest. Successive British governments
influenced by the NPM entered into a period of intense regulatory activity where risk
management and trust deficits combined to produce regulation that was focused on
increasing control through the establishment of accountability frameworks. The health
sector was decidedly not immune from this regulatory trend.
In the British context, I contend that the number, scope and scale of the scandals in question
illustrated the risks, not just of receiving health services, but of self-regulation where selfregulatory actors failed to take appropriate steps to create conditions for prospective or
retrospective accountability. This created a trust deficit where traditional institutions of
governance were not longer trusted in light of their past failures. The response was to

Ibid.
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increase accountability and other control mechanisms and move to meta-regulatory
frameworks which provided oversight of key systemic actors, at the same time increasing
associational pressure on self-regulatory actors to perform or face losing their authority.
I suggest that similar windows did not open in Canada, so we did not see marked changes to
regulatory forms and practices but rather a process of regulatory evolution occurring within
the bounds of pre-established norms.

The commitment of Canadian governments to the

tenets of New Public Management could be characterized as lukewarm at best, and therefore
did not fundamentally change the regulatory and governance climate nationally or in the
provinces or territories. 104 As I subsequently argue in following chapters, the accountability
and control requirements that were a feature of regulatory frameworks in Britain were not
imported into the Canadian regulatory landscape to anywhere near the same extent.
Canada’s systems retained trust in key institutional actors for longer, and the manner in
which they began to lose trust in those actors can be attributed more to concerns about
access to health services.
Further, there were few patient-safety-related scandals erupting in Canada during this period;
and those that did, I argue, were limited in their regulatory impact by geographical or
subsystemic 105 factors. There was no generalised loss of trust in existing regulatory actors,
with, of course, the notable exception of the Canadian Red Cross. 106 Some regulatory
evolution did occur – regulatory structures are not usually static. This evolution was not
necessarily led by, although it was generally supported by, government. I argue that the
evolutions in regulatory practices and policies occurred as a response to evolution in
professional and legal thinking about safety. Professional evolution saw health professionals,
health professions and health organizations becoming more concerned about patient safety
and the risks associated with the provision of health services. Changes in the manner in
which key individuals and organizations viewed patient safety in turn influenced regulatory
and policy evolutions to give health professions and organizations the tools to better respond
to safety concerns. The approach of government was to work with and support responsible
Aucoin, ibid.
They related to a subsystem within the broader health system and were handled in such a manner to deny or
minimize any broader systemic implications.
106 See discussion in Chapter 6.
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professional practices, rather than to impose change from the top. Changes in common law
reflecting a desire to enable patient self-determination and level the relationships between
health professionals and providers and patients occurred at an earlier stage than in Britain.
In summary, I argue that such evolutions in regulatory practices in Canada were very much
framed within the existent and accepted regulatory framework.

The Chapters to Come
The following chapters show how I developed this argument. Chapter 2 reviews the pre1980 regulatory frameworks in each jurisdiction designed to address patient safety, and
asserts that both jurisdictions entered the 1980s with broadly similar regulatory frameworks.
Chapter 3 focuses on the structure of each jurisdiction’s respective health system(s) and each
health system’s institutions of governance, and examines their features. Chapter 4 examines
the differing regulatory contexts in each jurisdiction, in particular the influence of the
constituent constitutional structures on processes of regulatory change. Chapter 5 analyzes
the nature of post-1980 changes to political norms in each jurisdiction and the implications
of these factors for health governance. Chapter 6 analyzes the connections between patientsafety-focused ‘scandals’ and regulatory change.

Chapter 7 re-examines the regulatory

frameworks as at 2005 and traces the divergences between the jurisdictions. The final
chapter draws together the threads of the argument presented in this thesis. Informed by the
exploration of the British and Canadian experiences it offers insights into health governance
more generally.
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Chapter 2
Off With His Hands: The Development of a Regulatory Consensus Around the
Regulation of Patient Safety
Introduction
The first surviving written reference to the legal regulation of health risks dates from 1795–
1750 BCE. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi stated: “If a physician make a large incision
with the operating knife, and kill him, or open a tumor with the operating knife, and cut out
the eye, his hands shall be cut off.” 107 The Babylonians were not alone in recommending
extreme sanctions against health-providers who erred; Alexander the Great, for example,
recommended crucifixion. 108
The need to regulate the provision of health services is also evident in common law and
legislative histories of Britain and Canada, with records that law was employed in the health
context dating from shortly after the Norman Conquest. 109 The legal instruments used to
regulate risks associated with the provision of health services shifted and changed across the
centuries, shaped by historical contexts. With the rise of the nation state, we saw the
emergence of much more systematized forms of regulation aimed at dealing with the issues
facing societies by increasingly more complex social problems. In Canada and Britain, the
state acknowledges responsibilities for regulating the safe provision of health services. The
scope of the state’s regulatory responsibilities continues to develop, in concert with
evolutions in our understandings of the appropriate role of the state and of the nature of
health and health services. In Britain and Canada, health regulation has long recognized that
public problem-solving in complex areas of practice requires collaboration between many
actors. 110 These actors included legislators, employing the state’s monopoly over law; health
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professions and providers, developing codes and standards of professional practice through
informal self-regulation; and patients who were engaged with the regulatory process through
litigation. As this suggests, regulation in this context has emerged as much from bottom-up
processes as it has from top-down ones. It has also developed incrementally.
By the middle of the 20th century, there was a general convergence among most common-law
jurisdictions, including Canada and Britain, about the best way and the most appropriate legal
tools through which to regulate patient safety in the health system. This chapter describes
that convergence.

Subsequent chapters assess the context-specific factors in each

jurisdiction that led to regulatory divergence by 2005.

Characteristic of the regulatory

convergence in this area was what Mello et al described as, “an unparalleled faith in the
ability of medical professionals [and other health-providers] to regulate themselves.” 111 The
degree of trust afforded to professional groups, especially the medical profession, was
evidenced by the state’s willingness to devolve to professional bodies various forms of quasilegislative authority. It was, however, bounded trust. Externally controlled retrospective
accountability mechanisms were also in place.
What is particularly striking in respect of Canada and Britain is that, despite the somewhat
flexible dimensions of health regulation, they were closely aligned in their approaches to it at
the beginning of the 1980s. In this chapter, I seek to understand the conditions upon which
this regulatory convergence was formed. As illustrated in this chapter, there are a number of
points of convergence between Canada and Britain, in particular their common legal heritage,
their reliance on professional expertise, and knowledge and similar understandings about the
appropriate scope of government in social and economic life. However – and crucially for
my analysis in subsequent chapters – I also show significant points of divergence in the
emergence of their respective regulative frameworks. It is here, in this historical context, that
we find the beginnings of fractures in the regulatory convergence that, while seemingly
minor before the 1980s, become significant afterwards.

supra note 24. See also F. McDonald, “Working to Death: The Regulation of Working Hours in Health Care”
(2008) 30:1 Law & Pol’y 108 [McDonald “Working to Death”].
111 Mello, “Fostering Regulation”, supra note 5 at 375.
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This chapter provides an introduction to the events and influences that led to the pre-1980s
convergence about how to address patient-safety issues and illustrates the nature of that
convergence. Although the consensus was sustained into the latter part of the 20th century,
importantly the chapter also foreshadows some divergences that may explain in part why
regulatory responses to patient safety in each country in the 1980s and 1990s were so very
different in degree and scope – themes that are developed more extensively in later chapters.
It also illustrates a central argument of this thesis that changes in governance approaches to
patient safety emerge from societal shifts in respect of the state’s perception of its
governance role, in particular the extent of its responsibilities in relation to health and
healthcare. Evolutions in governance are accompanied by social evolutions, and the state is
not immune to these developments. In this chapter, I examine the development of the
frameworks used to regulate patient safety in each jurisdiction. 112 First, I provide a brief
historical overview of regulation in this area. I then analyze the regulatory tools traditionally
employed in this area. These include: voluntary self-regulation; the criminal law; tort and
contract law; government-sanctioned self-regulation; and direct regulation by the state.
These many tools create a framework which responds to and addresses the risks associated
with the provision of health services.

Historical Overview
The regulatory framework for the regulation of patient safety developed incrementally over a
period of many hundreds of years and was influenced by the shape and structures of the
health systems in each country. McDonald notes:
The health systems that grew and evolved during this period [pre-World War I] in
response to the risks associated with illness, disability, trauma and death were
relatively simple. The needs of individuals, the entrepreneurship of individual health
France also had a significant role in colonizing Canada. Although I may touch upon health system-related
issues from Québec, the emergence of a patient-safety regulatory framework in Québec is not directly the
subject of this thesis. For pragmatic reasons relating to time, space, language and the nature of the legal system
(civil law in Québec as opposed to common law elsewhere in Canada), the focus is upon developments in
common-law jurisdictions. Developments in Québec are left for others to explore. It is, however, important to
note that the role of Québec in Canadian federalism is absolutely essential to understanding how federalism has
evolved and operates in Canada, and Québec’s role has consequences for how the federal government exercises
its powers.
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providers, and the charity of organized religions and devout men and women
influenced its continuing existence and its shape and purpose. Health systems, such
as they were, were only indirectly a concern of the state. 113
The relationships between patients and health-providers during the pre-World War I period
were largely direct and personal, whether it was a commercial or non-commercial interaction,
not mediated through a web of complex health services and a multiplicity of providers. For
the most part, it was a relationship characterized by some passivity on the part of the patient,
who generally accepted whatever the health-provider recommended. 114

This pattern

remained largely unchanged until the early to mid-20th century. It was not until the early to
mid-1900s that health systems as we understand them today developed. There was increased
demand for health services because of significant advances in the processes for diagnosis and
treatment, including the increasing development and use of highly complex technologies.
Patients became less a passive recipient of treatment and more engaged and involved in
decision-making about treatment decisions. These factors, and others, resulted in more
complex interactions between the patient, often a multiplicity of health-providers, many of
whom provided a specialist service, and health systems.
Initially, the state played a limited role in ensuring the health of its citizens. The state was
focused primarily on domestic and international security and matters touching upon trade
and commerce. Thus, the early state involvement in patient safety from a legal sense was
fairly limited – the regulation of the business of providing health services through the
availability of civil proceedings and professional regulation, and ensuring good order through
the use of the criminal law. It was not until the late 18th and the 19th century when this
perception changed. The state increasingly assumed a role in the regulation of public-healthrelated issues once science linked problems with the physical environment (e.g. rampant,
uncontrolled industrialization, pollution, and increasing urbanization) to poor health
outcomes and understood how infections and infectious diseases spread. 115

There was

F. McDonald, “The Criminalisation of Medical Mistakes in Canada: A Review” (2008) 18 Health L.J. 1 at 5
[McDonald, “Criminalisation”].
114 T. Szasz & M. Hollender, “A Contribution to the Philosophy of Medicine: The Basic Models of the DoctorPatient Relationship” (1956) 97:5 Arch. Int. Med. 585.
115 See, for example L. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California
Press & Milbank Memorial Fund, 2008) [Gostin].
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generally no question that the state should assume responsibility for ensuring its population’s
access to health services until the First World War and the Great Depression illustrated its
necessity.
The emergent legal framework around patient safety reflects, to some extent, these systemic
trends, but it also reflects developments in what legal tools were available, necessary and
effective. The regulatory tools (civil/criminal law) initially used to regulate patient safety
recognize the limited role of the state in this sphere. The tools enabled reparations to be
made to those harmed, deterrents created, and justice to be seen to be done, but largely left
the question of prospective regulation to those in the best position to make and enforce
standards of practice – health-providers (individual and organizational).

The health

professions, especially medicine, were supported by a grant of state power. These regulatory
frameworks were also structured in such a way as to regulate the transaction or interaction
between a patient and a health-provider – a simple, one-dimensional relationship.
Important, too, was the increasingly central role of the state in governance. Britain moved
from an absolute to constitutional monarchy and Canada from a group of semi-autonomous
colonies, to a quasi-independent federated dominion to an independent country.
Government’s central role rendered logical the use of tools of direct regulation, such as
legislation regulating health facilities. Direct regulation developed further as a regulatory tool
in this area once government formally assumed responsibility for funding and/or delivery of
health services (discussed in Chapter 3). Despite the increased tendency to use direct
regulation, such regulation was still underpinned by the perception that health professionals
and health-providers had a greater knowledge, expertise and experience and could be trusted
to act in the public interest.

Criminal Law
There are a number of models assigning hierarchies in regulation, including a model of
ascending hierarchies of coercion. 116 In this hierarchy, the criminal law sits at the apex of the
regulatory triangle as the ultimate form of regulatory coercion. The criminal law is central to
N. Gunningham & P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon and
Oxford University Press 1998) [Gunningham]; Braithwaite, “Governance”, supra note 24.
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the internal security of states, and effective criminal justice systems are essential to good
governance. 117 Fleming notes that criminal law (and tort law) stem from “a common desire
for vengeance and deterrence …” 118 The criminal law is the penultimate symbol of societal
condemnation of an act or practice, as it generally comprises offences that are mala in se (‘evil
in itself’) and which therefore incorporates moral denunciation of the act and punishment of
the offender.

Criminal law has a constitutive function, too, as criminal prosecutions

contribute to the development of standards of practice and conduct for individuals and, in
this context, for professions.
The criminal law has a long history as a regulatory tool in respect of patient safety. The
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi discussed in the introduction is evidence of that. But the
common law, too, has a long history of using criminal law in this context, albeit relatively
rarely.

The criminal law regulated patient safety when alleged negligence in a health

professional’s practice resulted in the death or grievous injury of a patient. 119 Criminal law
was, and is, also used in a patient-safety context where a health professional deliberately and
intentionally intends to harm a patient.

Examples of this include patients who are

deliberately murdered (e.g. by serial killers or in the context of so-called ‘mercy killing’);
sexually abused; and physically and/or psychologically abused (e.g. beatings, torture, etc.). 120
For many hundreds of years, the common law had a general law of wrongs that provided
vengeance, deterrence, and compensation. 121

Early law did not distinguish intentional

murder from accidental killing; if the actions of the individual caused the death of the person,
that was sufficient. It also did not distinguish between criminal acts and tortious ones. It
J Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, (London: Butterworths, 1971) [Baker, “Legal History”].
J. Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) at 1 [Fleming, “Law of Torts”].
119 See, for example, McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113; R Ferner & S. McDowell, “Doctors Charged
with Manslaughter in the Course of Medical Practice, 1795-2005: A Literature Review” (2006) 99:6 J. R. Soc.
Med. 309 [Ferner]; P. Skegg, “Criminal Prosecutions of Negligent Health Professionals: The New Zealand
Experience” (1998) 6 Med L. Rev. 220 [Skegg]; A. McCall Smith, “Criminal or Merely Human?: The
Prosecution of Negligent Doctors” (1995) 12 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 131 [McCall Smith “Criminal”]; A.
McCall Smith, “Criminal Negligence and the Incompetent Doctor” (1993) 1 Med. L. Rev. 336 [McCall Smith,
“Negligence”].
120 The other health-related foci of the criminal law have a less proximate connection to patient safety. For
many years, the law criminalized the provision of abortions primarily for moral reasons. Criminal law is used in
respect of health professionals (especially doctors) who traffic prescription drugs in the course of their
professional practice. Criminal charges may be laid against doctors, and other health professionals, who
allegedly have committed fraud in respect of their claiming practices.
121 Baker, “Legal History”, supra note 117 at 1.
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was not until the 1500s that ‘murder’ came to denote malicious or premeditated killing and
‘manslaughter’ was used to denote killing without malice but in circumstances amounting to
a felony. 122
Case reporting from the early period in common-law history is sparse; hence, identification
of cases where health-providers faced what we would consider criminal proceedings is not
easy, but records show an example dating back to the 14th century. 123 It was such an
established part of the criminal law that by 1660, Christopher Merrett (a fellow and historian
of the College of Physicians) could write: “If one who is no physician or surgeon (or who is
not allowed to use or practice such faculty) will take a cure upon him, and his patient dieth
under his hand, this has been holden to be a felony.” 124 The criminal law permitted criminal
proceedings against health professionals, and such charges were indeed laid, albeit rarely.
British courts increasingly recognized that criminal convictions were not appropriate in every
instance where a patient died after treatment or care by a health-provider. By the mid-19th
century, the courts acknowledged that health-providers were “not immune to human
error”. 125 Judges directed juries to convict the accused of criminal charges only if the provider
owed a duty of care to the injured party and had acted with a gross want of skill and care. 126
In other words, the courts concluded that the criminal law should only be used for the most
serious of circumstances in which a patient died, where the conduct in question amounted to
a gross departure from expected professional standards. In an 1862 case, the judge said:
Every medical man was of course liable to make a mistake, and he would not be
criminally responsible for the consequences if it should appear that he had exercised
reasonable skill and caution, and it was only in the case where a medical man, as he had

Baker, “Legal History”, supra note 117.
O. Quick, “Prosecuting ‘Gross’ Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion and the Crown Prosecution
Service” (2006) 33:3 J. Law & Soc 421 [Quick, “Prosecuting”].
124 Quoted in H. Cook, The Regulation of Medical Practice in London under the Stuarts 1604-1704 (PhD. Thesis,
University of Michigan, 1981) [unpublished] at 185 [Cook].
125 Ferner, supra note 119 at 313.
126 Central Criminal Court, April 10, The Times 11 April 1862: 10.
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before stated, was guilty of gross negligence, or evinced a gross want of knowledge of
his profession, that he could be held criminally responsible. 127
The courts adopted a pragmatic approach in criminal cases involving doctors and other
health-providers, recognising the public interest in doctors and other health-providers
continuing to provide health services.

The courts also implicitly recognized the risks

associated with the provision of health services. Implicitly, the courts acknowledged – to
quote Kenny and Giacomini slightly out of context – that “moral quandaries arise not in the
question of whether to harm or benefit but how to harm and benefit: whom, how much, how
certainly, in what ways, and so forth”. 128 Hence, the courts concluded that the ultimate
sanction of the state – the use of the criminal law – should be used judiciously in the public
interest. They came to recognize that the inherent risks associated with the provision of
health services were generally outweighed by the benefits, and that there was a public interest
in generally limiting the extent to which law imposed disincentives on the provision of health
services.
In 1925, the English Court of Appeal clarified the standard for gross negligence in the
Bateman case stating that, to be convicted, the defendant’s negligence must be “so gross that
it showed such a disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against
the state and conduct deserving punishment.” 129 The court took pains to clarify that it must
be more than a mere mistake that renders a health-provider liable for conviction for a
criminal offence such as manslaughter. Until the passing of the Criminal Code of Canada 130
(the Code), the common law applied in Canada, and health professionals could face charges
of manslaughter for gross negligence in their practice. The Code was subsequently amended
to create a specific offence of criminal negligence causing death or criminal negligence
causing grievous bodily harm, the former replacing negligent manslaughter. Despite this
change to the name of the offence, the standard to be applied in each jurisdiction was and is
gross negligence. 131
Ibid.
N. Kenny & M. Giacomini, “Wanted: A New Ethics Field for Health Policy Analysis” (2005) 13:4 Health
Care Analysis 247 at 254 (original emphasis) [Kenny & Giacomini].
129 R. v. Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R. 8.
130 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code].
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While in Canada and Britain the criminal law could be used to sanction the conduct of erring
health professionals, it is also evident that it was seldom used. Recent research indicates that
authorities in Britain charged approximately 43 doctors with manslaughter due to alleged
errors between 1795 and 1980 (a 185-year period) and at least eleven pled guilty or were
convicted. 132

Many of the cases occurred in the 19th century and were connected to

obstetrics; childbirth was increasingly medicalized at this time and involved the use of new
technologies, such as forceps. 133 Only one charge was laid between 1935 and 1980. 134 In
Canada, there is no record of a doctor facing criminal charges before 1935 (although this
does not mean to say that such charges were not laid), and it seems only six doctors faced
charges of manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, or criminal negligence causing
grievous bodily harm, from 1935 to 1980. 135 While there were three convictions during this
period, none were sustained on appeal. 136
In both Canada and Britain, the criminal law has had limited use in this context. Although
used rarely, it was available in the regulatory arsenal in 1980 – the ultimate sanction for
professionals who erred and thus the ultimate accountability tool. The criminal law was
firmly ensconced as forming one – perhaps, given usage patterns, relatively minor – element
of the regulatory framework to address patient-safety issues.

Civil Proceedings
Arguably less coercive than the criminal law is what Viscusi terms “regulation by
litigation.” 137 Although Viscusi tends to use this term in the context of deliberate attempts by
the state to use the threat of civil proceedings to change corporate behaviour, the label is, I
argue, also applicable when individuals bring civil proceedings against health professionals
and providers. 138 While civil proceedings are designed to provide successful claimants with
Ferner, supra note 119.
Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
136 Ibid.
137 W. Viscusi, “Overview” in W. Viscusi, ed., Regulation Through Litigation (Washington: AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, 2002) [Viscusi].
138 McDonald, “Working to Death” supra note 110.
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compensation for harm and provide a form of accountability and hence justice of sorts,
increasingly, at least in theory, it is also suggested that civil proceedings have a prospective or
regulatory function. 139

Civil proceedings are said to create incentives, economic and

otherwise, for those committing ‘wrongs’ (and hopefully their colleagues) to create riskmanagement systems to prevent future harms. 140 Certainly, current research suggests that
many claimants bring legal proceedings, at least in part, to invoke the prospective element of
successful litigation – they seek systems change to ensure what happened to them happens to
no-one else. 141 However, in actuality, claims about litigation’s prospective effect are strongly
contested, with some researchers suggesting that there is little evidence to support such
claims. 142
Civil proceedings brought by individual claimants are a bottom-up form of regulation.
Although the state enables this regulatory mechanism, if nothing else by the operation of the
legal system, it is impotent unless aggrieved persons bring proceedings.

Use of civil

proceedings for patient-safety-related purposes has a long history. As discussed in the
previous section, civil and criminal law proceedings were intertwined until around the
1700s, 143 but the difference became that civil proceedings provided redress to individuals and
criminal law was concerned with public order and punishment.
Initially, claimants could bring an action, such as trespass, seeking a private remedy for
wrongs. 144

Trespass against the person addressed nearly every wrongful act, whether

criminal or tortious in nature, that impacted upon the person forcibly and directly. Trespass
on the case included harms resulting from carelessness or arising indirectly, including
performing carelessly a task undertaken with consent. 145 It involved a lack of force because
of the prior consensual relationship or because the act caused indirect harm to the plaintiff.
M. Madden, “Tort Law Through Time and Culture” in M. Madden, ed., Exploring Tort Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005) [Madden].
140 See discussion in McDonald, “Working to Death” supra note 110.
141 Ibid..
142 See, for example, M. Mello & T. Brennan, “Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for
Malpractice Reform” (2002) 80 U.Tex. L. Rev. 1595 [Mello & Brennan]. See also Mello, “Fostering Regulation”
supra note 5.
143 The distinction between criminal law and civil remedies became important when responsibility for punitive
processes passed from communities to local or national entities and so financial penalties were forfeited to
authorities rather than being of benefit to the family. Baker, “Legal History”, supra note 117.
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In all of the early cases involving ‘negligent’ acts, there was a pre-existing relationship
between the parties. 146 The person who caused the harm was responsible, not for doing the
act but for doing it carelessly. The degree of fault only became relevant as part of a defence
of accident, and even then the defendant would have to establish the extent to which the
accident was preventable. 147 The common law imposed duties upon those who were in a
‘common calling’, including physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, but also common carriers
and inn-keepers – based, some think, on the concept of deceit. 148 The nature of these
callings meant that there had to be a degree of pre-existing relationship between the parties
in order that services are provided. Doctors (or the closest equivalent) were considered to be
a common calling, as they claimed to serve the public, in this case by providing a specialized
and skilled service. If, in the course of one’s interaction with a doctor, there was no skill
(manual dexterity, knowledge, and training), or a lack of care, then there was a breach of the
representation that the person was skilled at their trade. 149 However, because the person
caused the damage by performing negligently a service which they were paid to perform with
care, they could also be sued for breach of contract. 150
The first recorded mention of the liability of a health-provider for an action on the case i.e. a
civil action, dates from 1290 and involved a doctor. 151

In 1374, J. Mort, a surgeon,

undertook to heal his patient’s hand, but instead, it was alleged, acted with a lack of care and
skill so as to maim it. 152 The court dismissed the case on a technicality but noted that if the
surgeon had done as well as he was able and had employed all diligence in ministering to the
patient, then “it is not right that he should be held culpable.” 153 Another case, also from
1374, laid the ground for claims in contract. The courts examined the quality of the services
performed pursuant to the surgeon’s duties under the contract and decided that if there was
due diligence, there should be no liability. 154 In 1436, Newton stated: “So if a doctor takes
upon himself to cure me of my disease and he gives me medicine, but does not cure me, I
Ibid.
Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 N. Arterburn, “The Origin and First Text of Public Callings” (1927) 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 411 [Arterburn].
149 Ibid., and see Roady, supra note 109.
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shall have an action on my case.” 155 Later cases also focused on remedying injuries caused by
ignorance and lack of skill by a person purporting to be qualified. 156 However, there were
not many of these cases (at least as far as can be told from the records) until later in this
period. Those cases that were brought, not surprisingly, focused on injuries rather than
illness or disease, as effective treatments for illness were some centuries away whereas
surgery, although primitive by modern standards, could be efficacious. Winfield suggests
that there were few cases because it was not until later that the professions attained social
dignity by measures taken to eliminate “quacks and swindlers” and therefore it became worth
suing them. 157 It may have also been that simply being able to access health services was
important, and death and illness was more common so people were less likely to sue. It was
also difficult to bring proceedings to a court (due to the confusing writ system). 158
There is some disagreement about when the general law of negligence began to emerge. The
classic account is that of Winfield, who dates negligence from 1825 onwards. 159 But others
consider that the segregation of the law of torts from other areas of law began to occur from
around 1720. 160 Some associate the creation of negligence with theorists’ categorizing law
and divining rules for each area of law, some with universal application. 161 Still others
suggest that the establishment of negligence was associated with the dominance of certain
philosophical perspectives, most notably liberal individualism. They note that negligence
rests on an individual’s choice to pursue a particular course of action and that individual’s
responsibility for the consequences of wrongful choices. 162 Irrespective of why it developed,
there is general acceptance that the advent of a tort of negligence had a strong association
with the industrial revolution. 163 The late 18th century and 19th century saw the proliferation

Stratton v. Swanlone (1374), Y.B. Hill. 48 Edw. III, fol. 6 [Stratton].
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of causes of action and special duties of care, but a general duty of care was not formulated
until the beginning of the 20th century.
In 1615, Sir Edward Coke discussed the negligent provision of health services, noting “the
law gives the party sufficient remedy to recover … for default of performance, or for
negligence in the performance.” 164 By the late 1700s, legal scholars explicitly recognized a
special category of law that related to health-providers. In 1768, Blackstone linked the
concept of professional malpractice to physicians and included under the title mala praxis
(malpractice) “injuries … by the neglect or unskilful management of physician, surgeon or
apothecary … because it breaks the trust which the party had placed in his physician and
tends to the patients destruction.” 165
Although a cause of action against individual health-providers had been identified as early as
1298 in English law, it was not until the 1700s and 1800s that a broader category of
negligence emerged, which also had application to the manufacturers of medications and
medical devices, and institutions that provided health services. Again, it is noticeable that the
evolution in the law reflected and addressed the greater complexities of an industrializing
society.
With regard to hospitals and institutional liability, it was by no means clear until well into the
20th century the extent of a facility’s liability in tort for negligent acts. 166 In the mid-1800s in
Britain, hospitals were exempt from tort liability because the courts initially believed that
charitable operations deserved immunity, a position never adopted by Canadian courts. 167
There were a number of reasons postulated for this immunity, all essentially coming back to
the fact that in a society where voluntary societies provided the majority of social services for
the poor, some protections on their activities were required to ensure continued provision of
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services (provision which incurred no costs to the state). 168 However, by 1866, the House of
Lords had abandoned this idea as being unsatisfactory and determined that liability should as
a matter of consistency rest with a charity for harms caused by its negligence or the
negligence of its employees, either directly or vicariously. 169 What remained uncertain in
both countries was the extent of a facility’s responsibility for negligence in respect of
professional, as distinct from administrative, duties. In both countries, a facility had a
general duty to ensure that professional employees were qualified and competent, but
otherwise had no responsibility for negligent acts. 170 This changed in Canada from the 1930s
when hospitals became liable for actions of employees, even if they were professionals and
acting in a professional capacity. 171 The process of change also commenced in Britain in
1942. 172
Governments paid scant attention to medicines, despite governments, health professions,
and the general public regularly expressing concerns about the quality and effectiveness of
such products. The common law provided some limited redress throughout the 19th century;
however, its ability to deter future conduct remained limited. If an apothecary or pharmacist
prepared the medication as a person in a common calling, there was a specific duty of care
and thus redress through the tort of negligence. Patent medications were always popular
with the public, and an increasingly corporatized society saw an increase in manufacture of
so-called ‘medicines’ in the 1800s. This increase, and corporatization and industrialization
more generally, raised questions as to whether manufacturers of products, including
medications, owed a direct duty of care to users of those products. A person who purchased
a medication and suffered harm could sue the seller in contract, alleging a breach of the
general contractual terms that the goods were warranted for safe use. In turn, the seller
could sue the manufacturer for a contractual breach. 173 The purchaser could not directly sue
the manufacturer. Additionally, if a person purchased a medication for the use of another
person who sustained harm, there could be no redress as in tort law there was no general
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duty of care and that person was not the party to the contract. 174 The common law’s stance
on product-related issues reflected the political values of the time; some argue that prior to
the 20th century, the common law protected the interests of manufacturers, who were
considered vital to the growing economy, by not imposing liability for products. 175 By the
late 19th century, however, the manufacturing sector was developed and producing significant
amounts of consumer goods, encouraging society to demand more-effective consumer
protection, a demand met by the courts. 176 In 1932, the House of Lords in Donoghue v.
Stevenson clarified the law by creating a general duty of care. 177 Lord Atkin affirmed the
proposition that:
A manufacturer of products, … with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable
care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the
consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable
care. 178
In Britain and in Canada, the doctrines of direct and vicarious liability in respect of the
negligence of facilities providing health services continued to expand.

Lord Denning

attributed the British expansion to the development of the NHS. 179 It also aligned closely
with developments in employment law and the continued evolution in the conduct of
commercial affairs both of which came to recognize the necessity of flexibility in
employment-type relationships. 180
Once the general duty of care in negligence was established, proceedings in negligence
increased markedly, including in relation to patient-safety issues. In the decades following
World War II, there was a gradual increase in the numbers of such proceedings in both
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countries. 181

In Britain, the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Personal Injury

estimated that by 1978 there were an estimated 500 claims against the NHS annually. 182
There were broadly comparable rates of increase in such proceedings between Britain and
Canada, 183 such that by the 1980s there was talk internationally of a malpractice ‘crisis’.
Generally, the ‘crisis’ did not seem to be framed as a patient-safety issue, rather as a financial
issue for doctors and insurance companies concerned about cost increases. The focus of
attention was how civil proceedings, insurance, and related matters should be organized to
enable economic efficiency and the continued provision of health services. 184
A schism developed between the jurisdictions in terms of the approaches to standards of
care, clearly having little effect on the relative rates of claims for negligence in each
jurisdiction. In Britain, the Bolam test indicated that the standard of care is established by
determining whether a body of similarly skilled health-providers is practising consistently
with the conduct in question. 185 Deferring to the medical profession in particular, the courts
in Britain did not (at least until very recently) consider whether the risks associated with that
practice were reasonable, as the courts considered that they lacked expertise in determining
whether one therapeutic approach was better than another. 186 There was also a presumption
that doctors acted in the best interests of their patients and in accordance with the spirit of a
profession that emphasized excellence. 187 No lesser authority than Lord Woolf suggested
that in comparison with other common-law countries, like Canada and Australia, the legal
system in Britain during this period was excessively deferential to the interests of the medical
profession. 188 The court’s deference to professional judgements, particularly that of doctors,
continued when the court considered what information was required to be provided to a

V. Harpwood, Medicine, Malpractice and Misapprehensions, (Abington: Routledge Cavendish, 2007) [Harpwood]
and D. Dewees, M. Trebilcock, & P. Coyte, “The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Comparative Empirical
Perspective” (1991) 54:1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 217 [Dewees].
182 Harpwood, ibid.
183 Dewees, supra note 181.
184 See, for example, Harpwood, supra note 181; Dewees, supra note 181.
185 Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 583 (H.L.) [Bolam].
186 H. Woolf, “Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?” (2001) 9:1 Med. L. Rev. 1
[Woolf].
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
181

47

patient to enable consent. Lord Woolf described the court’s approach as “patients are
entitled to know only what their doctor thinks they should.” 189
The courts in Canada were not similarly deferential. In the early 1950s, Canadian courts
recognized that there were occasions when an accepted standard of practice could be
negligent. This would occur when those practices were fraught with risks – risks that could
readily be determined and judged unreasonable by lay people. 190 Justice Coyne stated that if
the Bolam approach was followed in Canada, health professionals, “could legislate
themselves out of liability for negligence to the public by adopting or continuing what was an
obviously negligent practice.” 191 In 1980, Canada also departed from the common-law norm
when the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the doctrine of informed consent. 192 The
Canadian Supreme Court applied a modified objective test to determine what information
should be provided to patients. 193 While the differences in approaches are conceptually
interesting and important from a patient-rights perspective, in regulatory terms it appears
that the different approaches made no real difference, as claim rates for negligence remained
comparable between jurisdictions (as set out above). 194
The risk-management strategy inherent in the tort of negligence evolved in the 20th century
beyond harms associated with how health services were provided to include the information
that was provided to the patient so that the patient could assess risk and agree or disagree
with the proposed action – the doctrine of informed consent. Although the emergence of
informed consent was linked with moral imperatives associated with autonomy and selfdetermination, 195 informed consent can also be seen as a risk-management strategy for
patients and for health professionals and providers. 196 As Lantos bluntly puts it:
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because the legal doctrine of informed consent was first codified in the context of
malpractice suits, there is a defensive-medicine approach to much of the discussion
of informed consent in the clinical context … we tell patients the risks of treatments
in order to prevent them from suing us … Informed consent forms become waivers
of liability … Obtaining informed consent can be seen as a pre-emptive legal strike in
an essentially hostile relationship between doctor and patient. 197
In both jurisdictions, civil litigation, especially negligence claims, were – and are – a central
component of the regulatory framework around patient safety.

Voluntary Self-Regulation
Using an ascending hierarchy of coercion model of regulation, 198 the bottom layer of the
hierarchy is voluntary self-regulation, which relies on individuals, organizations or
associations to voluntarily self-regulate with no active state involvement (direct or
indirect). 199 Until the 19th and 20th centuries, it was a primary mode of regulating patient
safety. The basis of self-regulation is the perception that individuals or organizations may be
best placed to regulate performance and conduct because they have the knowledge and
expertise to do so. It may equally be the case that the state, for some reason or another, does
not see the social imperative to regulate or is simply unable to. Certainly, prior to the 19th
and 20th centuries in both jurisdictions there were more pressing concerns for governments
than the regulation of patient safety.
Relying on individuals and organizations to voluntarily self-regulate is highly tenable when
the regulators are assumed, to quote Kagan and Scholz, to be “responsible political
actors”, 200 or Braithwaite “virtuous” actors. 201 Given that providers of hospital services, until
about the 19th century, were overwhelmingly religious and/or charitable in nature, it would
have seemed at the time a reasonable assumption that these providers were indeed both
responsible and virtuous enough to self-regulate risks to patients (as much as it was possible
Ibid. at 2813.
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to do so given the knowledge and practices at that time). The emergence of private-forprofit hospital services in the 19th century seemed, in Britain in particular, to bring with it a
number of scandals, a lessening of the reliance on voluntary self-regulation, and a greater
employment by the state of command and control regulation to create minimum
standards. 202
Until the 15th to 16th centuries, individual providers of health services were less homogenous
– some were from religious backgrounds, some had begun to make claims to expertise based
on science, some drew upon traditional knowledge, and others were no doubt charlatans.
Those from religious backgrounds could generally be assumed by the state to be ‘virtuous’
(although undoubtedly there was the odd bad apple) and also to be subject to some oversight
by the religious hierarchy to which they belonged. In respect of the others, for the most part
that their vocation was to heal, or at least to care for the sick, could have been enough at that
time for authorities to assume beneficent intent.
For some occupational groups, notably medicine, claims to virtue were bolstered by external
developments. 203 The 12th century saw the resurgence of the classical practice of medicine
with the reopening of the universities and the availability of Greek, Roman and Muslim
works on healing. Despite this, there remained few (successful) treatments, with the primary
expectations of a health professional being to diagnose and predict the outcome of an illness
and to provide some alleviation of suffering. 204 But the resurgence of classical medicine led
to stratification of health-providers on the basis of their learning. Those unable to make
claims to learning and science were increasingly marginalized as the centuries passed. In 12th
century Europe, some formal standards for training and apprenticeship in the practice of
medicine were developed. 205

Such standards were slower to develop in Britain, partly

because it took longer for the new knowledge to travel across the Channel from Europe, and
partly because Britain lacked mechanisms through which the formation of professional
associations could be supported (see the discussion of chartering below). Both standards
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and professional associations did, eventually, develop. For many professions, voluntary selfregulation continued to be the norm, although the privilege of government-sanctioned selfregulation was eagerly sought by many groups.
In North America, accreditation was a key part of voluntary self-regulation of hospitals.
Accreditation was initially driven by the health professions, led by the American College of
Surgeons, which, in 1917, developed a hospital standardization program. In 1951 the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals was created by a number of actors, including the
Canadian Medical Association, to provide voluntary independent accreditation of hospitals.
In 1953 a Canadian organization, the Canadian Commission on Hospital Accreditation,
performing the same functions as the Joint Commission was formed by the Canadian
Hospital Association, the Canadian Medical Association, the Royal College of Physicians and
Surgeons and l’Association des médecins de langue française du Canada. 206 Hospitals could
voluntarily choose to seek accreditation to provide an indication to the public that the
facilities and services provided complied with established standards. Accreditation grew in
Canada from 1960 when there were less than 350 accredited facilities to 850 by 1980.207
Conversely, accreditation did not play a role in respect of regulating British hospitals until the
early 1980s.

Government-Sanctioned Self-Regulation
Government-sanctioned self-regulation occurs when government delegates regulatory
powers to professions to self-govern. Some have described this conferral of powers as
creating almost a “ ‘ state within the modern state’ with either acquired or invested
sovereignty.” 208

There were, of course, limits to that sovereignty, as government also

constrained the “character and extent” of that power. 209 The relationship between the state
and the professions has been characterized as a form of social contract. In 1975, the British
Committee of Inquiry into the Regulation of the Medical Profession described it as:
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A contract between the public and the profession, by which the public go to the
profession for medical treatment because the profession has made sure it will provide
satisfactory treatment. Such a contract has the characteristic of all freely made
contracts – mutual advantage. 210
As Stacey noted, there is a form of public accountability inherent in this characterization of
the relationship – a collective accountability of the profession for ensuring professionals
practise appropriately. 211
From the 13th century, the state recognized the economic necessity of creating mechanisms to
establish public or private corporations and to define their privileges and purpose. 212 In
Britain, the granting of a Royal Charter was the only way, until the industrial revolution, to
incorporate a company. Chartering enabled government to regulate and hence to control, to
some degree, the internal functions and operations of the chartered corporation.

The

Crown, as advised by the Royal Council (Privy Council), had to approve all changes to the
corporation’s charter, and thus to its purpose and functions. 213

A charter was not an

operational necessity, but conveyed “pre-eminence, stability and permanence”. 214

Being

chartered was recognition by the state or another government actor, e.g. the City of London,
that the association of individuals seeking chartered status had a recognized and accepted
position in society – that to some extent their operations had the trust of government –
affording it some legitimacy. That legitimacy was only bolstered if the organization had
internal rules. Henry VIII granted Royal Charters to a number of hospitals, starting in 1547
with Bethlem and St Bartholomew’s. 215 Charters were the primary tool used by the Crown to
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regulate the purpose, and to some extent the practice, of hospitals, until 1572 when direct
regulation was used to create corporations. 216
In Britain, medical practice was first indirectly sanctioned by government through the
conferral of guild status to associations of doctors by the City of London. Guild masters
were accountable, at least in theory, to both city officials and to their members. 217 Medical
guilds actively instituted measures to improve medical practice and to provide safeguards
against risk, at least within London. The guilds did this by controlling entrance, setting fair
fees, regulating medical activities, and punishing malpractices. 218 For example, the 1423 rules
for the short-lived Guild of Physicians and Surgeons state that physicians and surgeons
cannot accept cases that are “desperate or deadly” or where they may result in “death or
maiming” without prior consultation with specially appointed peers. 219 So for members of
that guild, high-risk cases were subject to a mandatory second opinion. This process offered
protection for the patient against unskilled care, and for the professional and the profession
protection against allegations that a cure should have been possible. Cosman notes that the
available evidence suggests that this process lowered the number of malpractice suits and was
“a successful modality for the control of malpractice.” 220 However, these rules did not
survive for many years, probably because members feared losing patients and looking
inferior before their peers, and uncertainty as to when to seek such a consultation. 221
However, it was the first semblance of self-regulation of the health professions in Britain that
was quasi-sanctioned by the state. Medical guilds or professional associations continued to
rise and fall for the next several hundred years, until the first instance of what we today
understand to be government-sanctioned self-regulation.
From the 15th century, the recognition, status, and authority of physicians, apothecaries and
surgeons began to grow as a result of receiving formal recognizance by the Crown. Henry
VIII’s reign saw the first use of legislation to regulate the practice of medicine. In 1511, An
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Act for the Appointing of Physicians and Surgeons came into force. 222 It recognized that “Phyfick”
and surgery “to the perfect Knowledge whereof be requifite both great Learning and ripe
Experience.” 223 It sought to protect the “king’s liege people” from ignorant persons with no
training (described as Artificers, Smiths, Weavers and Women!) who take it upon themselves
to provide health services (using noxious medicines, sorcery and witchcraft). 224

These

unqualified providers “to the high Difpleafure of God, great Infamy to the Faculty …”
caused “… grievous Hurt, Damage, and Deftruction of many of the King’s liege People,
moft efpecially them that cannot difcern the uncunning from the cunning.” 225 To protect
the public, the Act said that a person could not style himself (and it was always a ‘him’ at this
time) a physician or surgeon within or outside London without the approval of the local
bishop. Bishops were empowered, with the assistance of an expert or a panel of experts, to
examine candidates in any way that they saw fit before granting approval to practise. The
intention was to protect the public from unqualified persons by providing a mechanism that
granted standing to ‘qualified’ individuals. The conferral of standing provided the public
with the necessary information to make an informed choice to attend the governmentsanctioned health professional or to seek succour from other health-providers, labelled by
the state as ‘cunning’ and therefore untrustworthy.
Seven years later, in 1518, Henry VIII supplemented the Act by awarding a Royal Charter to
the College of Physicians in London. 226 The Charter empowered the college to grant licences
for physicians and apothecaries to practise. The charter also authorised the college, only
within the boundaries of London, to punish unqualified practitioners or those who
committed malpractice. The Roll of the College states:
Henry the Eighth, with a view to the improvement and more orderly exercise of the art
of physic, and the repression of irregular, unlearned, and incompetent practitioners of
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that faculty, in the tenth year of his reign founded the Royal College of Physicians of
London. 227
However, the charter was ineffective in that it could not compel other actors, such as the
City of London, to recognize the powers of the college. 228 To remedy this, in 1523 an Act of
Parliament ratified the Royal Charter and expanded the college’s powers to include the whole
of Britain. 229 Despite this government conferral of regulatory powers, it appeared that the
College of Physicians had no real power outside London. Doctors in other cities or rural
areas continued to call themselves physicians, choosing by preference, or necessity, to gain a
licence from the local bishop. 230 Even within London, bishops continued to provide licences
to physicians, despite the Act of 1523. 231 The college gained the reputation of being a closed,
exclusive and elite shop, unwilling to approve ‘outsiders’ until well into the industrial
revolution. 232

Henry VIII also passed another Act in 1540 granting similar rights and

privileges within London to the Company of Barbers and Surgeons. 233
On receipt of a complaint, the college was to commence a disciplinary process where a panel
of peers heard and judged the complaint; penalties included losing one’s membership, fines,
and imprisonment. It appears, however, that there was some disjunction between what the
College of Physicians (there is little information about the barber–surgeons) and other
groups or individuals thought the college should do with its legal powers. 234 It appears that
patients or relatives thought the college should punish practitioners who harmed patients,
and the public thought that the college should protect the public from dishonest and harmful
practitioners. 235 The Crown thought the college should provide it with advice on public
health and exert authority over its members, and surgeons, apothecaries and unlicensed
healers to prevent harm. 236 The college, however, appears to have thought that its legal
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powers were best used to suppress rivals, establish a monopoly and a hierarchy of practice. 237
Cook noted that less than one half of the total disciplinary committee hearings between 1635
and 1702 were malpractice cases; the majority were initiated by the college to deal with
competitors practising without a licence. 238

Few complainants managed to pursue

complaints of malpractice to the point where a verdict was passed. 239 This was in marked
contrast to unlicensed practice cases where a verdict was almost always reached and often
involved imprisonment. 240
The colleges lost their regulatory powers during the civil war when, in 1656, a court declared
Henry VIII’s Act and the charters of the existing colleges null and void; but Cromwell later
reinstated the college’s powers. 241 In 1704, the House of Lords upheld an appeal from an
apothecary prosecuted by the College of Physicians, and the college subsequently stopped
disciplining non-college members. 242 The responsibility for regulating most health-providers
was once again the sole province of the courts through civil proceedings.
The passing in 1858 of the Medical Act 243 heralded a new epoch in the regulation of healthproviders in Britain and its colonies. The reforms saw the disparate elements of the medical
profession (i.e. physicians and surgeons) united under one regulatory framework. It was a
series of reforms, as Loudon notes, initiated by the profession and agreed to by
Parliament. 244 The reforms were apparently driven by the profession’s desire for social and
professional respectability, as well as to provide the justification to increase their incomes. 245
The previous system of regulation, if one can call it such, provided the profession limited
powers, and it was argued that patients could have no assurance that the professional they
were receiving treatment from was indeed adequately and appropriately trained. 246
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The Medical Act established a governing council, the General Medical Council (GMC), a
medical register to record addresses and qualifications, and a procedure for determining
minimum academic qualifications required for registration. It provided statutory protection
of title. It also established a procedure for striking off the register doctors convicted of a
felony, misdemeanour, crime or offence that constituted ‘infamous conduct’, as well as
continuing existing powers of discipline. It also prohibited anyone not registered under the
Medical Act from holding an appointment in any facility or service unless he (or subsequently
‘she’) was registered. 247 In an era when individuals claimed to be physicians, surgeons, or
general practitioners without qualification, or by virtue of an apprenticeship, the legislation
sought to ensure some degree of public safety through a process of assuring a minimum and
consistent standard for qualification. All those who were on the register were legitimate in
the eyes of the profession and the state and hence trustworthy. The legislative scheme also
sanctioned a tighter and more exclusive monopoly for the medical profession.

Other

professions were subsequently regulated, beginning with nurses in 1919, dentists in 1921,
opticians in 1958, and allied health professionals in 1960.
This framework remained essentially unchanged until 1973, when a Committee of Inquiry
into the Regulation of the Medical Profession was commissioned to review it on the request
of the medical profession. The medical profession was in the midst of an acrimonious
dispute with its members about fees, but also there were concerns about the registration of
international medical graduates and the perceived inadequacies of the existing framework to
address the needs of doctors who were impaired. It was clear from the outset that the
commission was not to question the fundamental premise of the regulatory structure – selfregulation. When announcing the inquiry, the Secretary of State noted:
The General Medical Council is a body with a notable record of service to the public
and to the profession. It is not contemplated that the profession should be regulated
otherwise than by a predominantly professional body, but, as the General Medical
Council itself has pointed out, its functions are very much the concern not only of
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the medical profession but also of the public, as well as of the Universities and other
bodies. 248
In emphasising the “notable record of service”, the Secretary of State was in fact reiterating
that the government retained its trust in the profession and continued to sanction the
profession’s self-regulation of its members. It also signalled that the purpose of the review
was regulatory modernization, rather than a fundamental reappraisal of the framework itself.
The committee of inquiry noted:
We are in no doubt that the community will be best served by a professional
regulating body. … it is on the self-respect of the medical profession that the public
must rely for high standards of medicine … The ultimate safeguard of the public
interest is the power of Parliament. The new GMC will be established by Parliament
through legislation, and Parliament will be able to intervene if the [social] contract …
is not operating in the general public interest. 249
The new regime, the Medical Act 1978, created more flexibility in the processes for handling
complaints, allowing those professionals with impaired competence or capacity because of
illness to be dealt with through a more-rehabilitative and less-punitive process. It also
reformed the governance processes of the GMC. Until these reforms, the governing board
of the GMC had been dominated by doctors appointed by various governing agencies (46
members, of which three were lay). 250 Subsequently, the majority of the board members
were elected and not appointed, and the presence of lay members on the GMC was state
sanctioned rather than at the discretion of the Privy Council, although numbers remained
low.
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In Canada, the regulation of doctors commenced in the French colony of Québec in 1750,
with the passing of an act to regulate medical practice. 251 It stated:
From information we have received it appears that many unknown individuals
coming from Europe and elsewhere have engaged in surgery as much in the cities as
in the country districts of this colony, without any permission; that these strangers
whose ability is unknown treat the sick with little care and without giving them relief;
distribute worthless remedies which give unsatisfactory results, not having all the
experience necessary, and leading as a final result to abuses which are prejudicial to
the well-being of the subjects of the King. 252
The Act banned doctors from dressing wounds or treating the sick until they had passed an
examination, supervised by the King’s physician in Québec. This Act lapsed when the
British acquired the colony in 1764. 253 The colonies that were to become Canada also
enacted legislation regulating health professionals, starting inevitably with physicians and
surgeons. For example, in Québec in 1788, An Act or ordinance to prevent persons practising physic
and surgery within the Province of Quebec, or midwifery in the towns of Quebec and Montreal, without license
was passed. 254 The legislature passed a very similar Act in 1795, when the province of Upper
Canada (Ontario) was officially separated from Lower Canada (Québec), to regulate physic
and surgery because of the “inconveniences” caused to his Majesty’s subjects by “unskillful
persons practicing phyfic and furgery”. 255 Both Acts set up a licensing system for those who
wanted to practise medicine, surgery, or midwifery, which basically required application to
designated officials, immediate approval if qualifications were from an approved school, or
examination if not. The Acts did not contain any provisions for discipline, only containing
cursory qualification standards for initial licensing and penalties for unauthorized practice.
The Acts were largely ineffective because there were very few health professsionals of any
kind; thus the Act in Upper Canada was repealed in 1806. Another, almost identical, Act was
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passed in Upper Canada in 1815, repealed and re-enacted in revised form in 1818. 256
Provisions for discipline for poor practice were to come later in the 19th century.
Legislatures across Canada had moved to legislate for the regulation of doctors and other
health professionals by the beginning of the 20th century. This regulation was substantially
based upon the British model.
In both countries, professional regulation continued to be central to addressing patient-safety
issues. The model of government-sanctioned self-regulation put in place in the 1500s was
continued, with professional bodies operating under the express authorization of the state,
which also defined the extent of their powers and authority. Professional regulation did not
change much from the pattern set in the 1858 legislation in Britain and the later legislation in
the Canadian provinces. In both countries, the focus continued to be upon standards and
accountability. Legislation continued to permit professional bodies to set standards for entry
into the profession and for continuing practice, as well as enabling accountability through
disciplinary actions against erring health professionals.
At least initially, government or key representative bodies of the profession appointed
members of the governing body. It was not until well into the 20th century that physicians
elected members and government required at least some representation from lay persons.
Both moves, particularly the representation of lay people, were aimed at making the
professional bodies more accountable to the public for their actions. Government and the
public had concerns that professional regulatory bodies were too much of a closed shop.
This meant that they may be predisposed to favour fellow health professionals at the expense
of the public interest or the private interests of the aggrieved person. 257 This was one of the
first indicators of an emergent lack of trust in the how self-regulators exercised their
functions. It also coincided with social movements in the direction of consumerism and
participatory democracy.
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Direct Regulation
Although regulatory law may have a lesser normative status than criminal law – regulatory
law, for example, is suggested to be a form of mala prohibita (wrong because the act is
prohibited) – it is an enormously important tool of government and governance.
Governments often use direct regulation to regulate risks that the private sector has proven
incapable and or unwilling to self-regulate and where there is a strong public interest in
government intervention. 258 In the health context, the need for direct regulation initially
arose from a series of scandals about abuses within facilities catering for the poor, infirm
and/or mentally ill.
The consequences of urbanization and industrialization led to a general recognition that
government had a regulatory role to play in an industrial society – namely, to manage risk. 259
The incentives associated with rampant production had rendered free-market actors unable
or unwilling to address the risks associated with their operations, which included the risks of
unsafe or unhealthy places of work, but also the consequences of poor pay and long hours. 260
Individuals often had no choice but to accept such risks if they wanted to eat, and all the
efforts of civil society could not effectively mitigate such risks. The recognition that the state
had a legitimate and necessary role as a risk regulator led to a rapid expansion of
government’s responsibilities beyond traditional concerns of national defence, public justice,
and the very basic regulation of social functioning.

Thus, government began to pass

legislation to regulate risks – risks that manifested at the individual or population level that
seriously affected, or that were thought to affect, the current or future health, safety, or
wellbeing of citizens. 261
One issue of continuing concern was alleged abuses within facilities providing care and
treatment for the mentally ill. In 1774, the British Government passed legislation to address
“great and dangerous Abufes” by requiring all places “for the Reception of Lunaticks” to be
licensed. 262 The College of Physicians granted licences for facilities within and close to
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262 An Act for Regulating Madhoufes, 1774 (Eng.) Geo. III c.49.
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London, and Justices of the Peace granted licences outside of London. Licence grantors
were required to be available, at the Crown’s request, to inspect the premises they licensed
and issue inspection reports. Licensing was limited in that it did not per se address issues
relating to the treatment provided in those institutions; rather, the licensing process focused
on the issues of habeas corpus – hospitals for the mentally ill were not to be used as a
convenient means of disposal for unwanted spouses, or unruly parents or children.
In Britain, concerns about the management of hospitals for the mentally ill continued,
subsequently focusing on the treatment of patients.

In 1807 and 1815, a House of

Commons committee investigated the conditions in ‘madhouses’. These facilities displayed a
wide spectrum of quality, including those that provided good care and those that were
dominated by callousness, squalor, coercion, and confinement. 263 A series of Acts was
passed from the 1820s onwards requiring medical supervision of asylums, a requirement said
by some critics to serve the monopolistic ends of the medical profession rather than as a
guarantor that the quality or safety of services would improve. 264 However, these Acts also
established Commissioners for Lunacy to monitor the care of patients receiving
institutionalized treatment for mental illness (although their effectiveness as a tool to
improve conditions for patients was questionable). 265
However, it was not only conditions in hospitals for the mentally ill that attracted the
attention of the public and legislators; concerns soon arose about workhouse infirmaries. In
Britain in the 1800s, there were regular scandals about abusive treatment of the poor in
workhouses, focusing particularly on the quality (or lack of quality) of health services
received in workhouse infirmaries. In a series of articles, the prominent medical journal The
Lancet castigated workhouses for the quality of health services provided, calling the system “a
disgrace to our civilization.” 266 The passing of the Metropolitan Poor Act, as a consequence of
The Lancet’s articles, saw centralized administration of workhouse infirmaries in London. 267

263 R. Porter, “Madness and its Institutions” in A. Wear, ed., Medicine in Society: Historical Essays, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992) 277 [Porter].
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Quoted in G. Rivett, “Poor Law Infirmaries” online: NHS history net
<http://www.nhshistory.net/poor_law_infirmaries.htm>.
267 Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vic. c.6.
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In London, and in other areas, workhouse infirmaries were subject to more rigorous and
regular inspections.

The law provided for more professionalized administration, better

conditions within workhouses, and the building of new hospitals specifically for those with
infectious-type diseases.

These reforms somewhat improved the safety and quality of

services provided to patients within hospital facilities provided within the Poor Law structure,
at least in London. Conditions continued to be poor in workhouse infirmaries outside of
London until well into the 20th century.
Improved regulation of poorhouses within London also did little to improve the safety of
patients in voluntary or private hospitals or nursing homes. 268 There were significant abuses
associated with the proliferation of nursing homes and private hospitals, including:
unqualified persons operating facilities; accommodation that was unsanitary, dirty, noisy, and
overcrowded; and some facilities that masqueraded as ‘massage hospitals’ but which in fact
were brothels. The 1900s saw the first demands that private hospitals and nursing homes be
licensed and inspected, but, as Abel-Smith notes, there were no similar demands to protect
poor patients from similar conditions in some voluntary hospitals. 269 It was not until 1927
that Parliament passed the Nursing Homes Registration Act. 270 The Act required that nursing
homes be managed by a ‘fit’ person in ‘fit’ premises. Nursing homes were also required to
employ at least some qualified persons i.e. nurses. Voluntary or private hospitals were not
regulated until 1936. 271
Regulation followed quite similar lines in Canada both pre- and post-confederation. Using
what became the province of Ontario as an example, concerns about the conditions of the
mentally ill in prisons stimulated efforts to provide treatment facilities for the mentally ill at a
provincial level. 272 It was not until 1841 that a temporary facility for the care of the mentally
ill was established. There were a number of problems associated with the management of
the asylum. Accordingly, in 1853 the first regulation of publicly provided hospitals for the
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mentally ill occurred with the passing of The Act for the Better Management of the Provincial Lunatic
Asylum. 273 This was followed by legislation entitled An Act to Provide for the Inspection of
Asylums, Hospitals, Common Gaols, and Reformatories in this Province. 274 Passed in 1868, it allowed
the governor to appoint inspectors and required regular inspections of the conditions in
health or penal facilities that received some form of funding from the state (i.e. in the context
of healthcare for the care of paupers).

Legislated inspection requirements continued,

although the legislature eventually created separate requirements and administrative
processes for prison inspections and inspections of mental health facilities. Parliament
extended regulation to private facilities for the treatment of the mentally ill in 1887 – The Act
Respecting Private Lunatic Asylums, which required that the proprietor seek a licence, allow
regular external visitors (inspections) to monitor conditions, and provide medically
supervised and sanctioned treatment to patients. 275
It was not until 1887 that the regulation of general hospitals commenced through the Charity
Aid Act, although it is important to note that initial regulation was more concerned with
providing institutions with a governance structure and setting rates for poor relief. 276 Later
Acts focused more on inspections of public and private facilities, contained provisions for
financial sanctions against public hospitals that failed inspection, required licensing for
private hospitals and, in the 20th century, nursing homes. 277 Licensing requirements and
inspections focused for the most part on sanitary arrangements, the basic environment
within which patients received care (i.e. were they abused or neglected), and facility design.
These regulatory initiatives in both Britain and Canada focused on risks identified at that
time that impinged upon the safe delivery of health services. These were the risks of
hospital-acquired infections within poorly designed, improperly cleaned, crowded, and
otherwise unsanitary facilities.

Inadequate care of the kind provided by manifestly

unqualified or unfit providers, and/or by providers who put profit ahead of the welfare of

Development of the Lunatic Asylum in the Maritime Provinces” in S. Shortt, ed., Medicine in Canadian Society:
Historical Perspectives (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1981) at 93 [Francis].
273 An Act for the Better Management of the Provincial Lunatic Asylum at Toronto, S.Prov.C. 1853 16 Vict., c. 188.
274 An Act to Provide for the Inspection of Asylums, Hospitals, Common Gaols, and Reformatories in this Province, S.O. 1868
31 Vic. c. 21.
275 An Act Respecting Private Lunatic Asylums, S.O. 1887, c. 246.
276 Charity Aid Act, R.S.O. 1887, c. 248.
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their patients, and providers who abused their patients, were other recognized risks. In
response, regulation required approval for hospital design and formation, the licensing of
individuals and facilities, and regular inspections. Facilities regulation continued to follow
the same basic pattern with the focus on infection control, the physical environment within
which care was provided, including facility design, and the treatment meted out to patients. 278
Quality within healthcare facilities became a concern in the 1960s and 1970s. In North
America, quality assurance was primarily an academic movement that sprang from emerging
evidence about the success of quality management and assurance schemes in manufacturing
sectors. Donabedian, a leader of the quality movement, suggested that ‘quality’ evaluated the
science and art of medicine in relation to a single episode of care for a single patient or more
broadly to treatments and care provided to patients in institutions. 279 He defined quality at
the micro level as “the application of medical science and technology in a manner that
maximises its benefits to health without correspondingly increasing its risk.” 280

He

supplemented this technically focused description with a further requirement that quality
includes conformity to “socially defined values and norms that govern the interaction of
individuals in general and in particular situations,” 281 and to the ethical aspirations of the
profession. Full consideration of quality must also, according to Donabedian, take into
account how the individual perceives the care and treatment and how it affects society. 282
In Canada, there was a general reliance on the professions to address issues relating to the
competence of individuals, although credentialling requirements also enabled facilities to
address concerns about performance should they arise. Many hospitals voluntarily adopted
quality-assurance mechanisms to review, assess, and analyze clinical performance, particularly
from the 1970s onwards. In order to get doctors who were concerned about liability to
participate and to get broader uptake of quality-assurance mechanisms in hospitals,
governments across Canada (with the exception of Ontario) amended existing legislation

See for example, Private Sanitaria Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 296.
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relating to evidence to protect information generated as a result of quality-assurance practices
being disclosed in court. 283
Although never as pervasive as in North America, concerns about quality also spread to
Britain. The adoption of quality assurance processes within the health system was fostered
by several scandals in the late 1960s about the quality of care provided to patients in longterm resident treatment facilities. In the late 1960s, the ‘Sans Everything’ investigation and
the Ely Hospital scandal led to a public inquiry into the quality of the care received by
patients in long-stay facilities for the mentally ill or for geriatric populations. 284

These

inquiries were instrumental in encouraging the promotion of some new regulatory oversight
of quality. There were three key initiatives relating to monitoring, complaints, and peer
review. A Hospital Advisory Service was established in 1969 to monitor the quality of care
provided for long-stay or chronic users of facilities providing care or treatment for patients
experiencing mental illness, intellectual disability, or the elderly. 285 In 1974, government
established a Health Services Commissioner to provide a venue for the receipt and
independent assessment and investigation of complaints about actions that did not relate to
exercises of clinical judgement in relation to care and treatment in NHS facilities. 286
Government relied on the professions to manage poor performance and competence issues
for the most part, so although mechanisms for clinical audit and the ‘three wise men’ system
were set up to assess issues with individual performance through peer review processes, they
remained largely voluntary. 287
Perhaps surprisingly, given the levels of government involvement in the provision of health
services in each country, direct regulation was used sparingly as a mechanism to address
Downie, supra note 28.
The ‘Sans Everything’ scandal arose after a publication of a book of the same name where private
investigations alleged systemic low standards of care associated with the provision of health services to elderly
patients. Government convened a commission of inquiry to investigate allegations that the care and treatment
provided to patients with learning disabilities at Ely Hospital in the late 1960s was abusive. See discussion
about the effect of these cases for governance in C. Ham & K. Alberti, “The Medical Profession, the Public and
the Government” (2002) 324:7341 BMJ 838 [Ham].
285 See J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). This was renamed the Health
Advisory Service in 1976.
286 National Health Services Reorganisation Act 1973 (U.K.), 1973, c. 32 [Reorganisation Act].
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safety and quality issues. Although both countries used direct regulation to progressively
establish licensing requirements for public and private health facilities, these established
relatively minimal requirements – a requirement for appropriate staff, appropriate facilities,
and provision for inspection. Canada continued to rely greatly on health-providers to selfregulate through accreditation processes and developed mechanisms to support that coregulatory form of governance. However, the 1970s saw the first indication that Britain
might choose to rely more heavily on direct regulation in respect of facility safety and quality,
although at this time such mechanisms were still highly limited so as to accord maximum
capacity for the exercise of professional autonomy and professional self-regulation. Direct
regulation was a part of the regulatory framework, but in both jurisdictions government
control of the activities of facilities and professionals was minimal and hence co-regulatory in
nature.

Public Inquiries
Public inquiries into matters of public concern have long been an important tool in
common-law countries to ensure accountability, particularly of government and government
actors, but also of private actors whose actions cause public disquiet. 288

In general,

governments most commonly constitute inquiries during periods of crisis, change, growth, or
adjustment. While some are convened as a form of social inquiry into a pressing policy
problem, others are convened as a response to an issue of grave public concern – scandals
and tragedies. Public inquiries addressing matters of public concern ask what happened,
why, and what lessons can be learned for the future, 289 and as such they serve both a
retrospective and prospective accountability function. Such inquiries may be a trigger for
further legal action against those whose conduct was examined during the course of the
inquiry and may result in policy recommendations for future regulatory amendments.
There are a variety of ways such inquiries could be constituted. For example, in Britain a
Royal Commission of Inquiry can be convened under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act
See generally, A. Manson & D. Mullan, eds., Commissions of Inquiry: Praise or Reappraise? (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2003) [Manson].
289 A.W. Bradley, “Commissions of Inquiry and Governmental Accountability: Recent British Experience”
[Bradley] in Manson, ibid. at 31.
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1921, a public inquiry may be convened under specific statutory powers, for example,
pursuant to s. 84 of the National Health Service Act 1977, or government may commission a
public inquiry without recourse to statutory powers. There are also other forms of public or
quasi-public inquiry. For example, in Britain, Parliamentary inquiries have responded to
concerns about the safety of the care and treatment of those required to access workhouse
infirmaries and of the institutionalized mentally ill. 290 Coroners’ inquiries were and are a tool
used in both jurisdictions to examine unexpected deaths while in receipt of health services.
Royal commissions of inquiry have a long history in Britain, some suggesting that their
institution dates back to the 11th century. 291 It was not until the 19th century that such
mechanisms saw extensive use in the health context with British royal commissions inquiring
into various public health issues, as well into grave public concerns about the care and
treatment of mental health patients. 292

Royal commissions saw use in Canada from

confederation in 1867 at both the federal and provincial levels of government. At the federal
level, issues related to the provision of health services were examined (see for example the
Hall Inquiry discussed in subsequent chapters), but unsurprisingly, given the federal
government’s limited powers in respect of healthcare, patient-safety-related issues were not,
at least prior to the 1980s. At the provincial level, there were Commissions of Inquiry into
health related issues, including patient safety, from 1878 to 1945, primarily in relation to
allegations of abuse of institutionalised patients. 293 Inquiries related to patient safety tended
to only be convened at this time to investigate care and treatment characterised as abusive,
rather than safety issues per se.
Post-World War II inquiry processes continued to play a limited responsive and reactive role
to address general and specific concerns about patient safety in both countries. Public
inquiries, whether royal commissions of inquiry, a public inquiry pursuant to an authorizing
statute, a ministerial inquiry, a parliamentary inquiry, or an inquiry commissioned by a
hospital board played a small but growing role in inquiring into allegations relating to
U.K., H.C., First Report: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee Appointed to Consider Provisions being
made for the Better Regulation of Madhouses in Britain (London: HMSO, 1816).
291 Manchester, supra note 259.
292 Manchester, supra note 259.
293 L. Maillet, Provincial Royal Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry 1867-1982, (Ottawa: National Library of
Canada, 1986) [Maillet].
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negligent treatment, especially in Britain. The 1946 Act that established the NHS contained
provisions for the Secretary of State to commission a committee of inquiry. 294 A local
hospital board commissioned the first inquiry relating to patient-safety issues in 1967, and
there were two more commissioned by the Secretary of State in the 1970s, again primarily
responding to allegations of abuse. 295 In Canada, commissions of inquiry (provincial) were
used sparingly in respect of patient-safety issues, again primarily to respond to alleged abuses,
rather than unsafe or negligent care or treatment. 296
In both jurisdictions coronial inquiries and inquests were standard procedures to respond to
alleged patient-safety incidents if there was uncertainty about the cause of death. 297 They
usually occurred where the family was concerned about the quality of the care the deceased
person received or where the coroner identified issues of concern during a routine review.
There were numerous recommendations about improving the safe provision of health
services forthcoming from these inquiries or from inquests; however, they seldom received
much public prominence, or indeed few facilities or professionals knew of them outside of
the facility concerned. 298
Public inquiries played a role in ensuring the accountability of actors and actions within the
health sector in both countries. Apart from coronial processes, most public or quasi-public
inquiries that addressed so-called scandals in the health system related to allegations that
invoked potential criminal consequences – allegations of the abusive care and treatment of
patients – thus, public inquiries were only convened in respect of allegations that addressed
issues that were fundamental to the functioning of society and the rights of individuals (i.e.
into abuses accorded mental health patients or those in residential care. More general
concerns about quality and safety were not the subject of such inquiries in this period.
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That the health-system-related legislation in Britain and in Canadian jurisdictions contained
provisions for ministerially convened inquiries was an indication that governments
recognized that further accountability mechanisms may be necessary in this context. 299
Other prospective accountability mechanisms such as litigation were often not appropriate or
adequate to address systemic abuses and formal commission of inquiries were often costly,
and administratively cumbersome – more flexible mechanisms were required. That the
employment of these mechanisms was generally limited to inquiring into allegations of
abuses by professionals was no limit upon their being used more broadly should the
circumstances dictate.

Conclusion
Up until 1980, in both countries, we can discern some key themes in respect of the
management of patient safety. First, as a general comment, it is evident that patient safety is
not a new issue, but is an issue that societies have always, at least in some measure, engaged
with, recognizing the significant impact that unsafe treatment has on patients and on the
effective functioning of the societies that they live in.
This examination of the regulatory frameworks employed in Britain and Canada shows a
convergence as to how the recognized risks associated with the provision of health services
should be governed. The elements of this convergence align with the development of health
systems and with perceptions of the appropriate role of government in healthcare, as
represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Evolution in Health Services Regulation Pre-1800 to 1980
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Although health services were first characterized as a private transaction and then as a public
necessity, the governance mechanisms that evolved as governments response to patient
safety did not markedly change. Thus, there was a convergence in both Britain and Canada
as to how much government should intervene to introduce governance measures in relation
to patient safety, even if the rationale for this changed. Essentially, the convergence was that
a mixed system of governance mechanisms was preferred. Users of health services could
seek fiscal redress for harms caused through the use of the bottom-up civil proceedings from
individual health-providers, facilities, and manufacturers of health-related products and utilise
the prospective function of regulation by litigation. Government supplemented this with
basic government-sanctioned self-regulation of many of the professional groups that
71

provided health services. Professions set standards in respect of qualifications for practice
and ensured the accountability of members to the public and to the profession. In return,
the public gained some basic consumer information and protection. Top-down regulation of
safety and quality issues associated with facilities and products filled in the rest of the
regulatory picture, although there was still significant autonomy accorded in practice to
facilities with regulatory attention primarily, almost exclusively, focused on input regulation.
Government retained the ultimate power to sanction individual health-providers through the
use of the criminal law (a tool of very limited use in Canada). Also, government had the
capacity to determine how significant an issue of patient safety was in general or in regard to
specific cases by using its investigatory powers associated with public inquiries and coronial
inquests.
At first, when government regarded health as a private transaction in a free marketplace,
government intervention into health was limited to consumer protection (or expansion of
state controls depending upon your perspective) rather than risk management.

State-

sanctioned self-regulation intended to create mechanisms to provide consumers with enough
information to make a choice about the qualifications and standing of a practitioner when
making market decisions. The industrial revolution saw the characterization of risk change
from a matter of the market to a matter of public health, and become less of a private matter
and more a central responsibility of the state to mitigate. 300 Government’s role as a regulator
of risk therefore escalated, but not significantly, in regard to health services, where a handsoff approach leaving issues of risk management to health-providers remained. Government
may have adopted this approach because it was busy elsewhere or ensuring access was a
greater priority. It may have believed that existing mechanisms were adequate to manage the
risk there was real faith in the will and abilities of health professionals and providers to selfregulate safety. As to the last, in granting professions government-sanctioned self-regulatory
status, the (perhaps unintended) effect was to improve their social standing and reputation.
An increased professionalism in approach and public presentation also assisted in reassuring
the public and government that the profession was committed to public welfare and
excellence. The reputation of the health professions was further enhanced through their
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association with technological discovery, scientific innovation, and progress, which granted
the profession the expertise and knowledge that allowed the public to hope for a better,
longer life. All of these factors created a sense that government intervention into healthcare,
apart from ensuring access, was not necessary, and indeed that health was such a complex
matter that government lacked the expertise to regulate it effectively. In addition, once the
social responsibility assumed by the government flowered into the creation of the welfare
state, physicians in particular were essential to the success of government plans, so it was a
functional necessity to continue to respect their autonomy. Hospitals, too, were accorded
considerable autonomy by governments as they were strongly associated with the medical
profession and were at the centre of the care and treatment paradigm.
Although regulatory frameworks showed signs of a regulatory convergence, those
frameworks were employed in different contexts – contexts discussed in more detail in
subsequent chapters. The different contexts, both in terms of the structures of health
systems and in governance structures more generally, are important as regulatory frameworks
are implemented and thus interpreted in a context-specific manner. Regulatory frameworks
shape and are shaped by their context. The following chapter discusses the differences in the
structure and function of health systems in Britain and Canada.
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Chapter 3
Health Systems: Sites of Convergence, Sites of Divergence
Introduction
As the last chapter demonstrated, in 1980 Britain and Canada had generally convergent
regulatory frameworks for healthcare that paid little attention to patient safety. However,
within each jurisdiction these similar regulatory frameworks were employed in different
contexts, in health systems with different structures and operating logics. 301 This chapter
delineates a context – the health system(s) within which the regulatory frameworks analyzed
in the previous chapter were employed. Context is important. The structural framework
around health systems in each jurisdiction creates conditions within which governments are
inclined to select one form of regulatory intervention over another when certain other
factors (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) may impel a review of the accepted regulatory
frameworks. The similarities and differences between the health systems suggest conditions
for divergences between the jurisdictions – divergences that could influence future regulatory
responses and direction.
The period after 1945 was significant for health services provision in both Canada and
Britain. Public expectations about access to health services and of the role of the state and
health-providers changed. 302 The public increasingly perceived that they were entitled to
access health services. 303 Underpinning this shift was the assumption that it is in the public
interest that the whole of a nation’s population can access what is termed in Canada
‘medically necessary’ health services.

It is, at least to some degree, accepted that the

provision of health services improves quality of life and extends life expectancy – benefits
with, among other things, obvious economic implications for society as a whole. 304 The
perspective that government should enable access to health services also flowed from the
commitment of successive governments in Britain and Canada to Keynesian-type economic
Tuohy, “Logics”, supra note 35.
See, for example, R. Porter, Blood and Guts: A Short History of Medicine (New York and London: W.W. Norton
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theories. However, governments lacked expertise and knowledge about health services. In
order to make the new systems work, governments needed to closely engage with those
believed to have expertise and knowledge in this area. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the medical profession was deemed to have the requisite expertise in determining how, when,
and why health services should be available to the public at large. 305

This necessary

engagement shaped the development and operation of modern health systems in both
Britain and Canada.
Behind the basic assumption that the state should guarantee the population’s ability to access
at least some forms of health services, there are differences between countries as to how to
establish governance frameworks to enable this. There are also differences as to what is the
appropriate role of the state and of governments. It is these differences, and in some cases
similarities, that are explored in this chapter. Accordingly, I first discuss some key structural
and operational norms of the British NHS until 1980, highlighting the influence the structure
of the NHS had on future regulatory directions around patient safety. 306 In the second
section of this chapter, I undertake a similar examination of the Canadian health systems. In
the third section, I examine the convergences and divergences between the two jurisdictions.
Throughout, I ask the questions how and why the structural features and operational norms,
or, as Tuohy would put it, the “logics” 307 of health systems might affect the future direction
of patient-safety regulation. While there are many similarities between the health systems in
these countries, there are also some divergences, and these prove significant for future
regulation. The central argument in this chapter is that the differences apparent in the health
systems in Britain and Canada constitute logics or norms which may have constrained, and
may yet constrain, future choices. 308 In short, I suggest, the statist and centralist tendencies
J. Lewis, “Providers, ‘Consumers’, the State and the Delivery of Health-care Services in Twentieth Century
Britain” in A. Wear, ed., Medicine in Society: Historical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 317
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306 More comprehensive examinations of the dynamics of each country’s health systems can be found in other
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in the British system incline it to use forms of regulation that strengthen the role of the state.
Conversely, I suggest that the quasi-corporatist and co-regulatory norms embedded in the
structures and relationships within Canadian health systems generally incline governments
towards the use of regulatory tools that foster partnerships and collaborations.
Britain
Prior to the 20th century, health services in Britain were primarily offered as a matter of
charity or entrepreneurial endeavour.

Government’s role in the health system was

reasonably limited. As a provider of services, it focused on providing workhouses and other
similar facilities for the very poor, some psychiatric facilities (focusing more on incarceration
than treatment), and, increasingly as the 19th century progressed, public health services such
as sanitation. 309 Its role as a regulator was discussed in the previous chapter.
By the close of the 19th century, Britain and other nations were moving away from policies
and regulation based on individualism towards what Dicey dubbed “collectivism”, where the
interests of the individual were to some extent sacrificed to confer benefit on the collective
whole. 310 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the movement towards collectivism began
through legislated social programs intended to improve social conditions for the less well off.
In the health context, a beginning was made with the passing of the National Insurance Act
1911 (NI Act). 311 The NI Act was the first step in fundamentally changing the shape of the
British health system from a private to a largely public system. The NI Act established an
unemployment insurance scheme and a health insurance scheme for a proportion of citizens
who were currently employed. The health insurance scheme provided government funding
for the provision of health services to the employed poor (the unemployed poor could access
health services through the workhouses). The passing of the NI Act had consequences: it
increased state involvement in the provision of health services, and established the medical
profession as a key stakeholder in the governance of the health system. 312 These were
important factors in setting the agenda for future regulation. It cemented the state as a core
actor in respect of ensuring the health of its citizenry. Further, the health insurance program
See for example, Abel-Smith, supra note 268.
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created a structure where doctors continued to enjoy autonomy and control over their
professional practice and remuneration through the creation of local medical committees
dominated by the medical profession. 313 This was an autonomy they were loath to lose, and
which the state continued to accommodate in future law reform initiatives.
Although the movement towards collectivism began at the end of the 19th century, certainly
in Britain, it was the Great Depression that convinced governments that the laissez-faire
approach to the governance of social matters that had been adopted by successive
governments was not satisfactory. 314

During this crisis, it became evident that the

institutions of civil society (charities and professional associations) did not have the capacity
to ensure that the basic social needs of citizens were met. 315

The belief increasingly

developed that it was the rightful role of the state to provide social services. Although
government involvement in health service delivery was initially constituted through an
insurance plan, the stresses imposed upon Britain by the Great Depression and then the
Second World War, as well as evolutions in how health services were provided, meant that
another fundamental reappraisal of the role of the state in healthcare would occur. The
move towards collectivism peaked with the formation of the so-called ‘welfare state’ in the
years following the Second World War.
The demands of the Second World War resulted in government regionalizing hospitals
(although local, charitable or private ownership was retained) and providing stable levels of
funding in the anticipation of large-scale casualties from German bombing. 316 As a result, the
public and the state increasingly perceived hospitals as the centrepiece of the healthcare
enterprise – a certainty that was only to increase as the century progressed. 317

The

government’s wartime action, in combination with the previously introduced health
insurance, demonstrated that a broader government role in ensuring access to health services
was feasible. The Second World War also established that a portion of the population was
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not able to access adequate nutrition or sanitation and was generally in poor health. As a
result of regionalization, government also recognized that health services were not organized
rationally, as different levels and types of services were provided across the country. 318
Hence, the war years saw the development of a broad consensus that Britain needed a
comprehensive, universally accessible health service. 319

During the war, the coalition

government convened a review of social policy. In 1942, the Inter-Departmental Committee
on Social Insurance and Allied Services, chaired by Sir William Beveridge, made a number of
recommendations to government to develop a comprehensive social system to be
implemented in the post-war years. 320 A key plank in its proposed framework was the
development of a free and comprehensive health service at point of need. The plan was
highly popular with the public. 321
Post-war, the Conservative government baulked at the huge cost commitment inherent in
the Beveridge plan, but in 1945 the Labour Party won the general election by a landslide. In
a first-past-the-post electoral system, that a party was elected by a landslide (albeit without a
majority of the general vote) meant that it could claim a mandate. It certainly had the power
to bring about reforms, particularly given that the Beveridge Report had been so popular.
Thus, the government commenced a program of significant social policy reforms and created
the so-called ‘welfare state’. In furtherance of the vision set out in the Beveridge Report,
government, after much discussion and in the face of some opposition, created the NHS
with the passing of the National Health Service Act 1946 (NHS Act). 322 The NHS commenced
operations in 1948. Naturally, as Kingdom notes:
The NHS is an intensely political institution. Perhaps more than any other part of
Britain’s welfare state it has enshrined the values of collectivism over those of
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individualism … virtually no part of its architecture has been untouched by the
interplay of political forces. 323
The NHS was a comprehensive scheme aimed at providing a free health service for all paid
for by government (the provision of private services for those who could afford them
continued in parallel to the NHS). The insurance model set up in 1911 was not pursued;
rather, the NHS was the first health system to offer care to an entire population based on
national provision of services. 324 According to Klein, no other advanced post-industrial society
has such a centralized healthcare system 325 - not a great surprise considering the wartime
dependence on and tolerance of centralized planning in the national interest. 326 Saltman and
Otter suggest that Britain is one of a small family of states that is characterized by a distinct
paradigm of policy-making: “[t]he dominant policy paradigm during this period of post-war
expansion [of health care provision] was a relatively rigid command-and-control planning
model.” 327 Moran notes that Britain developed a particularly centralized form of commandand-control planning. 328
Kingdom also posits that:
If a camel is a horse designed by a committee, the NHS, shaped by several
committees and subject to advice from numerous interests, including doctors’
associations, trade unions, local authorities, voluntary hospitals, academics and
politicians, was scarcely less curious an animal. 329
The NHS comprised three strands: hospital services, public health, and primary care. The
NHS Act nationalized the hospital sector – in “one legislative stroke”, government
nationalized 1,000 voluntary hospitals, 540 hospitals operated by local government, and a
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number of cottage hospitals. 330 Although it was a centralized system, hospitals – which
because of the legacy of the war continued to be the centre of the health system in Britain –
were organized regionally, reporting to the Minister of Health. 331 The hospital sector was
administered, not by local government, but through a centrally created regional system with
local management boards for each hospital. These boards reported to regional authorities.
These boards were not democratic or bureaucratic in composition, as the medical profession
was resistant to democratic or bureaucratic control of the health system. Membership of the
boards was by appointment. As Kingdom notes, there was:
the selective breeding of a new species of constitutional animal, the hospital
authority, a non-elected local authority with members appointed by ministerial
patronage, and guaranteeing strong representation of the doctors themselves. 332
Every attempt was made to ensure the autonomy of each region and each hospital, as the
government wanted to reconcile its acceptance of the principle of national responsibility for
healthcare with the principle of localism – that the system should be responsive to local
conditions and needs. 333 The administrative philosophy within the NHS was a product of
interactions between levels of governance and a degree of central planning. 334 The principle
of localism meant that the centre did not and could not know best, and even when it did,
according to Klein, all it could do was ask, educate, inspire and stimulate the regions. 335
There was also tension within the NHS between the centre wanting to ensure accountability
and the periphery which perceived that government interfered too much. 336
Doctors practising within hospitals were employees of the state, albeit extraordinarily
privileged employees. Hospital consultants were paid a salary, their contracts were held at
the national level, and they did not report to hospital management; rather, they formed self-
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governing medical staffs. 337

Consultants preferred to be employed by the national

government rather than at local or regional level, as they believed they would be able to
exercise more influence if negotiation occurred nationally. 338
General practitioners and other primary-care providers (dentists, pharmacists, etc.) became
independent contractors to the state. They were paid on a capitated basis, and virtually all of
their income derived from the state. Their contracts were administered by local committees
(first Executive Councils and later Family Practitioner Committees) comprised of members
representing local professional associations, local government, and the Minister of Health.
There were direct negotiations between the government and medical groups around
remuneration until 1962. After 1962, annual increases in salaries and capitation payments
were determined by an independent review body: the Review Body on Doctors’ and
Dentists’ Remuneration. 339 Public health functions (for example, ambulances, vaccination
and immunization, health education, etc.) remained under the control of local government.
Governments of all persuasions were keenly interested in containing costs, and a general
attitude of ‘do more with less’ prevailed. Governments were keen to avoid the appearance of
rationing by the state, with the result that doctors undertook rationing at the bedside to
remain within the national budget centrally allocated to the regions, and the global budgets
allocated to hospitals and units within those facilities. 340 Perhaps because of the post-war
environment from which the NHS sprang, and the impact of the implicit bargain between
the state and the medical profession, the national budget for the NHS was not a significant
issue for the public through the early operation of the NHS, although rationing became a
subject of public discourse from the 1970s. In general, the tripartite NHS system attracted
relatively lean funding from central government, especially compared to other health systems
like Canada.
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Government recognized that in order for the NHS to function, the cooperation of the
medical profession was required, and reached an implicit bargain with the profession.
Traditionally, the power of the medical profession has rested upon two pillars: the ability of
the profession to determine the health policy agenda, and to define areas out of bounds for
non-professionals. 341

Autonomy is portrayed as an indispensable hallmark of

professionalism. 342 Autonomy, according to Freddi, includes the following elements: the
remuneration of doctors according to a fee-for-service formula determined by the doctor;
the right to independent practice – clinical autonomy – where diagnostics and therapeutic
decisions are made between the doctor and the patient with no external control; the
responsibility to lead and coordinate other health professionals; and addressing professional
issues according to a social consensus model with the profession. 343 Tolliday, on the other
hand, suggests autonomy includes: the right to independent practice; the right to refuse an
individual patient; the responsibility to lead and coordinate other health professions; and the
overarching primacy of medical knowledge. 344 However autonomy is determined, there is no
question but that the profession wanted to retain as much autonomy as possible. Its
retention was a key part of the implicit bargain the medical profession reached with
government as part of the negotiations around the formation of the NHS. Autonomy has
always been granted to the profession by society, and particularly by the state – a conferral of
power which inevitably involves the profession in the political process in Britain and
Canada. 345
In broad terms, part of the implicit bargain between the profession and the state was that the
state would not intervene in the profession’s exercise of clinical judgement if the medical
profession did not challenge the national budget, undertook the rationing of health resources
at the bedside, and worked constructively to make the NHS system work. 346 But the bargain
also went further than this. Aneurin Bevan, the Secretary of State for Health when the NHS
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was formed, famously remarked he had to “stuff their [hospital consultants] mouths with
gold” to get their cooperation. 347 The government created a system of distinction awards
where consultants could get increased salaries, based solely on the recommendations of their
colleagues. Consultants could also retain their private practices, and ‘private’ beds would be
available for their use in public hospitals. However, government was required to do more
than wave its fiscal wand to ensure cooperation; a variety of other concessions to the medical
profession had to be made, with the result that under the NHS doctors preserved their
professional autonomy as well as their influential position at the centre of health service
policy development and provision. 348
Another part of the bargain was that government constituted the NHS to have parallel
authority structures: a managerial structure and a clinical structure for the medical
profession. 349 It brought the structures together in “consensus management”, which gave
effective veto power to the medical profession over decisions made at any and every level. 350
Within this system, the role of the hospital manager has been described as that of a diplomat
mediating between different interests with no authority over clinicians. 351 Managers did not
perceive that it was their role to exercise any control over doctors. 352 This perception was
reinforced by the system. For example, a 1979 memorandum from the Department of
Health and Human Services stated, “It is the purpose of management to support them
[doctors, dentists, nurses and other health professionals] in giving that service.” 353 Conflict
was contained and limited through the structural necessity of obtaining consensus between
the medical profession and managers, a theme that runs through the history of the NHS. 354
Within the overarching budgets set out by the central state and the regions, doctors had
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significant autonomy in determining what services were provided, to whom and how, and, in
general, medical self-governance proceeded on a collegial basis. The institutionalized medical
voice defined issues in terms that ensured that they would represent legitimate expert
authority. 355 Thus, the medical profession had great power within the system. 356
The features identified above persisted, and in some cases were strengthened, through the
reforms of 1974. The reforms established 15 regional health authorities (RHAs), 90 area
health authorities linked to family practice committees, 200 district management teams, and
200 community health councils. The 1974 reorganization brought the tripartite structure –
hospitals, primary care and public health and community services – together under one
management framework. 357 The reforms of 1974 promoted a more managerialist ethos and
emphasized planning and consensus management.

But the reforms may have further

contributed to the power of the medical profession. The reforms set the voice of the expert,
the medical profession, “into the concrete of the institutional structure even more firmly
than Bevan’s [Secretary of State responsible for the creation of the NHS] design had
done.” 358 For example, doctors gained formal representation on regional and district
authorities. Since decisions at these levels were thought to require the cooperation of the
doctors as experts in the area, it was seen to be a policy imperative to build medical
participation formally into the decision-making machinery. 359
In summary, the key features of the NHS before the 1980s, according to Klein, included a
high level of centralization, a geographically dispersed administrative structure (14 regions), a
tripartite structure (hospitals, primary health and public health and community care), a
corporatist style of policy-making, a lack of clear lines of accountability within its
management structure, and a weak system of democratic accountability. 360
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Canada
Health services in Canada were viewed as a local matter when the federal Constitution was
passed in 1867. As discussed in detail in the following chapter, the Constitution gave most
health-related powers to the provinces, saving powers in respect of the provision of health
services to the armed forces, federal prisoners, aliens (i.e. non-Canadians) and First Nations
and Inuit peoples, and powers over quarantine. 361 In Canada, the movement towards a
comprehensive publicly funded health system, and indeed a social services system, was
attained in a rather different and far more incremental manner than in Britain.
Lahey asserts three roles for governments in Canada in respect of health services:
stewardship; regulation; and funding. Governments perform a stewardship role – they
establish the general objectives of the system, monitor and evaluate the system’s success
against its objectives, coordinate and ensure continuity between different parts of the system,
and ensure reasonable access. 362 Lahey sums this up by stating:
In short, it is the general state responsibility of ensuring that there is a functioning
health care system in place, capable of delivering to citizens the level of health care
that most would agree should be, and that international law says must be, available to
all people. 363
Governments also regulate the quality of health services (discussed in the preceding chapter)
and fund the delivery of health services.
Soon after confederation, the four Canadian provincial governments within the
confederation began to take on a larger role in regard to healthcare services, for instance in
respect of public health and sanitation. 364 Ontario was the first to pass legislation signalling a
greater role for the province in regard to healthcare. The Charity Aid Act of 1874 stated that
all not-for-profit municipal, charitable and religious hospitals were required to accept patients
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on the basis of medical need in return for a per diem payment and some regulatory
oversight. 365 Much later in the early 1900s the Prairie provinces, particularly Saskatchewan,
took the lead in health policy influenced by the cooperative movement which saw the
collective development of mutually agreed-upon resources for community benefit. 366 During
the First World War, Saskatchewan amended its municipal legislation to facilitate the
formation of municipal hospital districts and to allow the appointment of salaried doctors to
provide general medical services to the community. 367 The scheme spread on a limited scale
to Manitoba and Alberta shortly thereafter. 368
In the 1920s and 1930s, when Canada was reeling from the devastating effects of the Great
Depression, that there were a number of policy inquiries, especially in the Prairie and
Western provinces, into the feasibility of establishing a provincial health plan.

The

Depression generally reinforced the need for communal action and expanded the role of
governments in respect of the provision of social services. 369 However, attempts to establish
a role for provincial governments to fund health services remained unsuccessful in the face
of concerted opposition. 370 For example, the government of British Columbia introduced
legislation in 1936 to provide health services for low-income people, an attempt that
ultimately failed because of sustained objections from the medical profession. 371 While this
undertaking proved unsuccessful, it was significant as it focused public discussion of the
issue and garnered public support for a larger role for government in healthcare. 372
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During the Second World War, the federal government, following international trends,
focused more extensively on the creation of social policy, including health policy. The
context was dissimilar from Britain, as the prospect of mass casualties from bombings was
slight and hence reorganization of hospital facilities unnecessary. There was also not the
same degree of concern as to the general state of the population’s health. Any deficiencies in
the structure of then-current services and the necessity to rationalize services in the national
good was not thrown into such stark relief as it had been in Britain.
atmosphere was different in Canada from that in Britain.

The post-war

Nevertheless, the growing

dominance of Keynesian economic thought had an important impact on the health systems
in both jurisdictions. After the federal government’s powers were constrained by the courts,
on one view it could only influence health policy through transferring funding to the
provinces with conditions attached. 373

These conditions would be matters of federal

provincial negotiation 374 – “[a] national insurance policy, then, would inevitably require a
coalition of support within and between levels of government.” 375 While there was broad
public support for the introduction of some form of national insurance, including some
conditional support from professional groups, the provincial governments generally were
highly sceptical of federal intentions, believing there had been considerable federal
“aggrandisement” during the war years. 376
The end-of-war federal Liberal government was elected by a bare majority, and hence could
not claim a mandate for extensive change. 377 Post-war, it proposed the introduction of
compulsory national health insurance system to be partially funded by the federal
government. This was rejected by the provinces as constituting too great an incursion upon
their jurisdiction and because of disagreements over taxation policy (funding was offered on
the condition that the provinces would give up certain taxation powers). 378 The federal
government was only weakly committed to funding a health insurance system, and so was
This view is contested by some. See, for example, A. Petter, “Federalism and the Myth of the Federal
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not prepared to negotiate further with the provinces. 379 Instead, the federal government
committed itself to a program of hospital building as a public works measure rather than as
part of a welfare program. 380

In the post-war years, medical services continued to be

provided on a private fee-for-service basis, and hospitals were operated by voluntary not-forprofit or for-profit organizations. The federal grants program that provided funding for
building hospitals was successful in increasing the numbers of hospitals, most of which were
operated by municipal authorities and other not-for-profit organizations, and the numbers of
private-for-profit hospitals decreased (although there were not all that many to begin
with). 381
The 1944 election of the progressive Douglas government in Saskatchewan saw the first
moves to implement large-scale policy and regulatory change to ensure universal access to
health services. The government proposed to introduce a comprehensive universal health
insurance scheme encompassing the delivery of hospital and doctor services through a
regionalized model.

This proposal met with intense opposition, particularly from the

medical profession. The medical profession objected to regionalization, which would reduce
referrals to specialists clustered in the two major cities, and democratization, as elected
boards would limit the influence of the medical profession. 382 They also objected to the
continuance of the municipal doctors scheme where doctors were paid a salary, preferring a
fee-for-service payment model. 383

The government modified its proposals to agree to

administration by an independent commission and fee-for-service payment for doctors.
Ultimately, government decided pursuing its policy of a comprehensive scheme would be too
difficult in the face of the concerted opposition of the medical profession, and left the
funding of medical services to a later time, focusing instead on hospital services.
Thus, in 1947, Saskatchewan implemented a universal hospital services plan which provided
funding, initially on a per diem basis, and then, after per diems were found to increase
utilization, a flat fee based on 90 per cent occupancy rates, for citizens to access hospital
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services. 384 These included x-rays, laboratory testing, and some medications, provided they
were medically necessary. 385 The Saskatchewan model created the pattern for what was to
come. It institutionalized what Naylor describes as the “private ownership, public payment”
bargain between health-providers and the state. 386

In 1949, British Columbia followed

Saskatchewan, as did Alberta, albeit incompletely, one year later. 387 Newfoundland had a
similar scheme, although it still had dominion status and was not yet part of Canada.
The late 1950s and 1960s heralded an era of “cooperative federalism” where federal and
provincial governments were prepared to work cooperatively together in the national
interest. 388 This was significant timing for health policy, as Tuohy notes, because “the British
NHS was no longer a bold and promising conception: it was a real-life example” – an
example that had attracted much critique, and especially vitriolic criticism from the American
Medical Association decrying socialized medicine. 389

The federal government remained

reluctant to act on health issues until pressure from the provinces and the public forced it to
the negotiating table. 390 After two years of negotiations in 1957, the federal government
entered into a cost-sharing agreement with the provinces and territories to fund a health
insurance program for the delivery of hospital services. The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic
Services Act 1957 (HSD Act) set out the conditions that had to be satisfied in order for a
province to receive funding. 391 Basically, the provinces were required to meet scope and
universal coverage requirements to receive 50 per cent funding from the federal government.
By 1961, all provinces had complied with the minimal conditions and were receiving funding.
This was an important first step, as agreement established the legitimacy of a federal role in
health insurance, even if its constitutionality remains a contested question. 392
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While the introduction of universal insurance schemes for the funding of hospitals services
was largely uncontentious, the same could not be said for plans to extend the insurance
program to include services provided by doctors. The medical profession continued to
oppose any plans for publicly administered medical services, as this would involve
negotiations with government over fee levels and methods of payment. The profession
strongly advocated the retention of private insurance plans controlled by the medical
profession. 393 In 1962, Saskatchewan again took the initiative, extending its health insurance
program to include medical services. This extension was controversial. It was bitterly
opposed by doctors and triggered a province-wide strike lasting 23 days. The government
of Saskatchewan was in a weak position, facing a monopolistic medical association with
regulatory, licensing, and political powers, a doctor shortage, and a recruitment and retention
problem. 394 It also recognized that it needed the cooperation of the medical profession for
the scheme to succeed. Accordingly, an end to the strike was negotiated when government
agreed to recognize the autonomy of the medical profession through retention of fee-forservice payments, professional control over payment-setting mechanisms, and the ability of
doctors to opt out of the Medicare scheme. 395
When Saskatchewan designed its medical insurance scheme, it did so, according to Taylor,
believing that the success of private insurance plans had “irrevocably institutionalized” 396 feefor-service payment mechanisms and hence the autonomy of doctors. The model that
Naylor describes as “private practice, public payment” was at the heart of the implicit bargain
struck between the profession and the government of Saskatchewan: a bargain that was
replicated across all Canadian health systems. 397 The Saskatchewan insurance program was
popular and administratively straightforward, and set the pattern for provincial and federal
reforms. 398 However, in 1963, Alberta adopted a different approach and chose to subsidize
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private insurance premiums for low-income earners as opposed to the adoption of a
comprehensive plan. 399
In 1961, the federal government, prodded by the medical profession, convened a royal
commission of inquiry to examine health services in Canada. In a blow to the medical
profession, the commission of inquiry rejected voluntary private insurance models, seen in
the US and in Australia, in favour of establishing a comprehensive universal health insurance
program to include hospital and medical services.

Its 1964 report described the

Saskatchewan model as:
… a sound blend of federal financial support and respect for provincial
responsibility. In fact, it goes beyond that for in its administration it utilises a
number of joint Federal-Provincial committees and working parties.

It is a

remarkably successful example of what has long been termed ‘cooperative
federalism.’ 400
The medical profession opposed the commission’s recommendations, fearing a loss of
autonomy. 401 After a federal–provincial conference in 1965, and in the face of objections by
Alberta and Québec, as well as at least one influential cabinet member, the Medical Care Act
1966 (MC Act) was passed with only two dissenting votes. 402 As Tuohy notes:
[t]he adoption of medicare was part of a remarkable era in Canadian public policy
development, from 1958 to 1971, that also saw the adoption of federal–provincial
shared-cost programs for postsecondary education and social assistance, and the
establishment of a public pension program involving complex federal–provincial
arrangements. These various programs, in effect, constituted a mutually reinforcing
momentum of social policy change. 403

Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
Canada, Royal Commission on Health Services, Royal Commission on Health Services, vol. 1 & 2. (Ottawa: Royal
Commission on Health Services, 1964) at 413 (Chair: E. Hall), cited in Gray, supra note 306.
401 Medical Care Act S.C. 1966 c. 64 [MC Act]; Canada Health Act R.S.C. 1984 c. C-6 [CH Act].
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The acceptance of medical services insurance remained contentious at the provincial level,
with some provinces believing they had been coerced into agreement by the federal
government, despite deep-seated objections to its form. Federal cost-sharing was available
for both hospital and doctor services for provinces and territories complying with the general
principles of universality, portability, public administration, and comprehensiveness, thus
defining the shape of Canada’s health systems. It was a program of its time, cementing
hospitals and doctors at the centre of the health-delivery paradigm.

It also preserved

significant autonomy for the provinces and for hospitals and doctors in broader systemic
management issues. Significantly, what it also did was to create 12, later 13, different health
systems within Canada, with little formal integration between them, except that required by
the Medicare principles. 404
Federal legislation established the parameters for provincial/territorial governments;
however, the principles are very general, leaving considerable discretionary leeway for
provincial/territorial governments. 405 For example, while most provinces used tax-based
systems to fund their health insurance schemes, British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta
collected insurance premiums. But despite this, Hurley, Lomas, and Bhatia note:
With the exception perhaps of Quebec, over the past twenty five years the provincial
health care systems have shared not only the five principles of Medicare but also
similar delivery and management structures. In the coming years they may resemble
each other only in sharing the principles of Medicare. 406
Interestingly, the federal government chose not to place any further conditions on funding
transfers – for example, that funding for the health system would be conditional on
restructuring the governance of the health system in that province or territory. This lack of
action by the federal government points to continued uncertainties about the

404 A. Maioni, “Roles and Responsibilities in Health Care Policy” in T. McIntosh, P. Forest & G. Marchildon,
eds., The Governance of Health Care in Canada: The Romanow Papers: Volume III (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004) 169 [Maioni, “Roles and Responsibilities”].
405 K. Banting & S. Corbett, “Health Policy and Federalism: An Introduction” in K. Banting, ed., Health Policy
and Federalism (Kingston, Ont.: Queen’s University Press, 2004) 1 [Banting & Corbett].
406 J. Hurley, J. Lomas & V. Bhatia, “When Tinkering is Not Enough: Provincial Reforms to Manage
Healthcare Resources” (1994) 37:3 Public Admin. 514, quoted in Banting & Corbett, ibid at 33.
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constitutionality of imposing such conditions. 407

But it also may perhaps point to the

political costs associated with the imposition of such terms arising from Québec’s separatist
aspirations and, increasingly, concerns about the alienation of the western provinces.
What finally emerged in 1972, when all provinces became eligible to receive funding, was a
universal social insurance program.

Unlike the NHS, the Canadian system does not

constitute a national model and nor could it considering the constitutional responsibilities of
the provinces and territories. Maioni suggests, “A better description is that of provincially
regulated healthcare systems financed by public revenues, and a federal fiscal contribution
tied to the maintenance of certain standards across the provinces.” 408

Although some

uniformity could perhaps be expected to be achieved through the principles set out in the
MC Act and the HSD Act, these principles were reasonably general, leaving considerable
scope for provincial innovation. Medicare programs were administered by the provinces and
territories and jointly funded by the federal and provincial/territorial governments. The
program enabled access to “medically necessary” hospital and medical services, provided by
non-profit or for-profit actors. It is a publicly funded not-for-profit private delivery system.
Uniquely, there was little in the way of formal parallel private delivery system for access to
“medically necessary” services, 409 resulting in a reduced role for private insurance plans. As
noted by Evans, and unlike Britain, Canada does not have a completely socialized health
system(s). 410 Only the health insurance programs could be said to be socialized, because for
most doctors and hospital services, they involve exclusive funding by the state (at all levels)
to ensure universal access to “medically necessary services”. 411
At the close of the 1970s, the hospital sector was composed of facilities operated by
municipal and provincial governments and not-for-profit community or charitable trusts.
Generally, the accountability of hospitals was to the communities in which they were based
407 Others argue that the federal government both could and should act more aggressively by requiring the
provinces and territories to take action to ensure the efficient and effective management of the health system.
See, for example, Choudhry, “Social Policy”, supra note 373.
408 A. Maioni, “Federalism and Health Care in Canada” in K. Banting, ed., Health Policy and Federalism (Kingston,
Ont.: Queen’s University Press, 2004) 173 at 179 [Maioni, “Federalism”].
409 Kenny, supra note 97.
410 Cited in F. Stevens, “The Convergence and Divergence of Modern Health Care Systems” in W. Cockerham,
ed., The Blackwell Companion to Medical Sociology (Malden, MA & Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) at 159 [Stevens].
411 Ibid.
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as well as to provincial/territorial governments in respect of financing and regulatory or any
contractual requirements. 412 Hospitals were generally financed by global budgets, latterly
based on case-mix formulas, negotiated with the state or territorial governments.
Unlike in Britain, in Canada regionalization within provincial and territorial health systems
had not yet occurred. This resulted in a more centralized structure, at the heart of which was
the Health Department, coupled with local provision of services. The principle of localism
was perhaps more finely developed under the Canadian models than under the British
regionalist approach due to a greater involvement with the local community. 413

The

convergence here is seen in regard to the principle of localism – that local or regional health
authorities are better placed to evaluate and provide for the specific needs of that
community.
Doctors were not government employees, were usually not the employers of hospitals, but
instead had admitting privileges and belonged to the medical staff, which was essentially a
self-governing entity within the hospital. 414 Doctors were paid on a fee-for-service basis –
the fee structure negotiated between the provincial/territorial medical associations and the
government or its delegate. As such, they were not even independent contractors with the
government; rather, they were said to have an agency relationship with the state. 415
Remuneration was negotiated with government which, in all provinces with the exception of
Québec, meant that negotiations occurred in relation to the overall rate of increase of the
schedule. It was for the profession to determine the relative values of each item in the
schedule. Doctors and hospitals remained independent of direct control by the state. 416 The
independence of doctors from hospitals is also clearly established in Canadian health law. 417
P. O’Reilly, “The Canadian Health System Landscape” in D. Adams, ed., Federalism, Democracy and Health
Policy in Canada (Kingston: Queen’s University Press, 2001) 17 [O’Reilly].
413 It is interesting that in the 1980s and 1990s, regionalization gave way to localism in Britain, whereas in
Canada localism was replaced (eventually in all provinces and territories) with regionalism.
414 Lahey, supra note 306.
415 Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
416 The separation of the delivery system from government was later illustrated by Stoffman v. Vancouver General
Hospital, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms were not applicable as the government of British Columbia could not be said to control the hospital.
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital [1990] S.C.J. No. 125, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.), although see Eldridge v
British Columbia (Attorney-General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.).
417 See, for example, Yepremian v. Scar borough General Hospital, [1978] O.J. No. 3457, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (Ont.
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By the 1970s, the costs of funding the national insurance system had escalated and costcontrol became a significant issue for policy debate. In the 1970s, it was first noted that
although Britain spent less on health than Canada, the health outcomes of populations were
very similar. 418 In practice, it appears that federal states generally spend more of the nation’s
gross domestic product (GDP) on health than non-federal states, possibly because of greater
opportunities to cost-shift between government actors. 419

The Federal–Provincial Fiscal

Arrangement and Established Programs Financing Act 1977 reduced federal contributions to 25 per
cent of the 1977 provincial expenditure on hospitals and doctors and tied subsequent
increases to the GDP. Global budgeting based on case-based funding formulas for hospital
services was introduced within provinces in an attempt to control costs, and changes to
medical fee schedules were limited. 420 This resulted in the provinces having to spend more
to support the health system. By 1979, the public rhetoric was that the health system was
under-funded and that its principles were being undermined. Citizen groups mobilized to
defend universal health insurance. 421 In 1979, the federal government convened a further
review of the Canadian health system; the results of this review will be discussed in Chapter
5.

Convergences and Divergences
There were obviously some marked similarities, as well as some substantial differences,
between the health systems in each jurisdiction by the end of the 1970s. But what is
important is what the logics of the operations of each system(s) might illustrate about the
future directionality and nature of regulation within that system when addressing patientsafety issues.
The nature of the health system in place in each jurisdiction is different, with Canada using
an insurance-based model and Britain a model of national provision. Klein suggests that the
provision of state-funded health insurance emphasizes the right of individuals to access
healthcare, whereas a national model emphasizes the obligation of public authorities to make
Gray, supra note 306.
Banting & Corbett, supra note 405 at 25–29.
420 Gray, supra note 306; O’Reilly, supra note 412.
418
419
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provision for the health of the community at large. 422 A systemic focus on individual rights
to access healthcare may result in an increased focus on access or entitlement issues, at the
expense of concern about other facets of the system. Indeed, the traditional focus of
concerns for Canadian citizens is access – equality among persons, distance, travelling, and
waiting times. 423 This is not to say that access is not of concern to the British public, who
have indeed been concerned about the overt rationing of health services, nor is it to say that
other issues are not of importance to Canadian citizens. However, the tensions occurring
within the negotiation processes that occur between federal and provincial/territorial
governments, governments and hospitals, and governments and health-providers focus
attention on allocation issues in a manner unknown in Britain. The fact that there is no real
parallel private system in Canada for the provision of “medically necessary” services, apart
from heading across the border, also focused attention on equality and equity of access issues
for individuals in a way unknown in Britain; in Britain, the national system places the focus on
government’s role and responsibility for the delivery of health care.
An insurance model is consistent with what some suggest are individual medical values – that
the provision of medical and health services is based on an agreement, transaction, or
contract, depending on your point of view, between a patient and a health (especially
medical) professional. 424

Thus, insurance schemes may inherently retain a market

orientation, with competition between players in the system providing some assurance of
effectiveness, efficacy, and quality of services. In contrast, the NHS was seen as a triumph of
socialist ideology inspired by egalitarian ideals, 425 and it has been described as “a model based
on seeing health as a public good rather than an individual right.” 426 Consistent with this
philosophy, the relationship between health professional/provider and patient in the NHS
was no longer to be mediated by liberal–individualist notions of a private contract between
patient and health provider, 427 but rather through a quasi-contract between patients, the
public, health professionals/providers and the state. State mediation in this relationship was
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paternalist and protective in intent to ensure the welfare of its citizens as a whole. 428 This
separation points to the beginnings of a divergence between the systems.

Market

mechanisms with a liberal individualistic focus may result in a system that relies, at least to
some extent, on those mechanisms, regulation by litigation initiated by individuals, and a
reliance on collegial and corporatist mechanisms. Conversely, a less individualistic, more
collectivist orientation may provide more interventionalist regulatory logic.
It is not just an insurance model, as compared to a national model, which may indicate
differences between jurisdictions, but also payment methods through which health services
are funded. Payment methods can be correlated by the degree of “organizational density” of
public interventions in health. 429 At the less organisationally dense end of the spectrum are
pure fee-for-service payments; then payments through private insurance with no cap on
payment levels; private insurance with capped payments; public or semi-public insurance
schemes; salary schedules allowing for individual merit increases; salary schedules linked to a
combination of rank and seniority; and capitation. 430 In Canada, health services are generally
clustered towards the middle and less organizationally dense end of the spectrum, whereas in
Britain payment mechanisms are clustered towards the more highly organizationally dense
end of the spectrum.

The degree of organizational density evident in health systems

organization may indicate a culture that is more or less likely to use increased regulatory and
other forms of intervention to control activities within that sphere. 431
The Canadian health systems do have some features in common with the NHS in that there
is a distinct corporatist element within the health systems in each jurisdiction. Corporatism
in this context refers to a merger of state and corporate power, a form of interest group
politics or co-regulation, where the state structures a governance system to ensure
participation by a specific group. The inclusion of group(s) within the governance structure
of a sector or system provides the system with some legitimacy. It also gives the interest
group in question a monopoly of access to the state and at least a modicum of power within
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that system. 432

A group is a politically representative organization which controls, or

purports to control, people and activities within its jurisdiction, as facilitated or sanctioned by
the state. The corporatist model is predicated, to a certain extent, on the interest group in
question being a so-called “virtuous” 433 or “responsible” 434 actor. If corporatism is to be
effective, the interest group embedded within the corporatist model must be able to control,
as much as is possible, the practices and conduct of its members and ensure compliance with
its norms, or else the implicit bargain at the heart of the corporatist agreement is void. In the
health context in both jurisdictions, the corporatist approach can be seen through the
inclusion of the medical profession in all stages of the decision-making processes within the
sector, particularly in the consensus management structure that was explicit in Britain and
implicit in Canadian health systems.
In both jurisdictions, accommodation with the medical profession was believed to be central
to the establishment, viability, and sustainability of modern health systems. Tuohy’s review
of the NHS concluded that it was:
a system that gave heavy weight to state authority and hierarchical mechanisms in
budgetary matters, but left much discretion in clinical matters to individual medical
professionals operating through collegial decision-making networks.

In these

respects it was a state-sponsored system of ‘hierarchical corporatism.’ 435
This was epitomised by the sense “… that the doctor knew best not only in the consulting
room but also in the corridors of Whitehall.” 436

Corporatism was reasonably highly

developed as an informal process in the British NHS from its formation, and was formalised
after the 1974 reforms. However, the corporate model in the NHS had a weakness in that
the centralizing tendencies described above, and the statist tendencies described below,
created the possibility, if not probability, that circumstances might arise where corporatism
was declared antithetical to the public interest. This was especially so given the nature of the
Giaimo, supra note 306.
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relationships between the medical profession and the state, with most doctors being
employees or independent contractors and thus, at least to some extent, under the control of
their employer/contractor – whether the employer or contractor chose to exercise that
control or not. Doctors were lower in a hierarchy in an employment sense, although the
government chose for reasons of expediency to overlook that fact in what was then the
public interest.
Tuohy suggests that “the central structural axis” of Canadian health systems was “an
accommodation between the medical profession and the state …” 437 Tuohy suggests that
Canada is perhaps the country in the world where the accommodation between the state and
the profession is the most highly developed and most integral to the functioning of the
system. 438 The Canadian health systems had elements of a liberal ideology; doctors, for
example, are not employees of the state or of hospitals but independent entrepreneurs in
private relationships with patients. 439

The implicit bargain between the state and the

profession was first established in Saskatchewan, where the medical profession accepted the
role of the state as a single payer, recognizing this would constrain their entrepreneurialism in
so far as it came to price setting, although not in other respects, such as location of
practice. 440 In return, the state recognized the continuance of professional autonomy in
respect of clinical practice and practice ownership.

The profession has more formal

autonomy than it does in Britain, as the state is not an employer or a contractor but has a
quasi-agency relationship with the profession. 441 As Tuohy puts it:
[A]gency relationships between state and professional bodies entrusted physicians
with making decisions about the provision of care within resource limits.
Mechanisms of control within these structures relied heavily on hierarchical lines of
accountability in budgetary matters and upon collegial networks among professionals
in matters relating to the quality and appropriateness of care. 442
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Doctors were placed at the heart of the decision-making system at all levels as a separate
governance entity with considerable power and influence within service delivery and in terms
of setting government policy. 443 However, it is important to note that the nature of the
accommodation with the profession varied in the different health systems: in British
Columbia and Manitoba it was adversarial, in Québec it was statist, and in other provinces it
was collaborative, albeit with episodes of conflict. 444 Tuohy concludes that the Canadian
health system(s) reflects the collegiality model of healthcare organization that gives
predominant weight to medical professionals and to encouraging models of collegial
governance between independent but mutually dependent policy actors. 445 Although, as with
Britain, the system is premised on accommodation and is corporatist in nature, the degree
and quality of independence of the medical profession and doctors in the Canadian context
creates a different dynamic – an agency relationship – which is more like a partnership
between two equal parties.
Arguably, the agency dynamic established a preference for a co-regulatory model of
regulation. Co-regulation is a model where policy actors cooperate to create rules for a
specific context. Such negotiated policies pursue public and private interests. 446 This coregulatory framework is not just characteristic of the relationship between government and
the professions, but also with hospitals, and is seen to some degree in the relationship
between federal and provincial/territorial governments in the health context.

Thus

governance trends in health systems in Canada incline towards reaching accommodations
with other parties in the public interest. Arguably, I suggest the deeper the co-regulatory
corporatist relationship is embedded in the logic of the system, the harder it is to move to
another other form of regulatory model. Drawing again from path dependency, once a
system starts down a path, it is difficult to reverse course. 447
In both jurisdictions, corporatism may be challenged by any governance failures by the
corporate partner. In the patient-safety context, this raises a question about the adequacy of
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the medical profession’s internal self-governance. In the NHS, there was no systematic peer
review undertaken by any of the bodies representing the medical profession – the British
Medical Association, the Royal Colleges, or the GMC – and any review within individual
hospitals was driven by individuals and was sporadic at best. 448

In Canada, peer-review

systems were being developed by the profession – with the engagement and support of
government. As discussed above, the real risk is that if a corporate partner is perceived to be
shirking its governance responsibilities and to fall down on its side of the implicit bargain, it
may find that the corporatist model comes under review.
Unlike Tuohy, Giaimo contends that the NHS was both corporatist and statist 449 and this
constitutes another divergence between Britain and (most of) Canada. Statism is manifest in
the NHS, argued Giaimo, through the role of the central state when it assumed responsibility
for the provision of universal health care, financed through general revenue, and determined
the national budget for healthcare. 450 The state was at the centre of healthcare provision in
Britain.
At the NHS’s inception, government accountability for the NHS was considered critical
because, as the then Secretary of State for Health Aneurin Bevan described it, “When a
bedpan is dropped on a hospital floor, its noise should resound in the Palace of
Westminster.” 451 But, in practice, the chain of accountability within the NHS was flawed. In
theory at least, the government, through mechanisms of parliamentary accountability, was
publicly accountable for the operations of the NHS. The Secretary of State for Health was
accountable through ministerial responsibly for his or her performance and for the
performance of departmental employees. The difficulty faced by the state was that the NHS
system was constituted in such a way that the central state could not prevent or respond to
any deficiencies within the operations of the NHS because it had little or no power over the
functions of local managers or doctors. 452 In addition, it had little information about how
hospitals actually spent their budgets and, even if it did have the information, information
Giaimo, supra note 306.
Ibid.
450 Ibid.
451 Quoted in P. Day & R. Klein, Accountabilities: Five Public Services, (London: Tavistock, 1987) at 78 [Day &
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systems could only measure inputs and outputs (e.g. numbers of hip surgeries performed),
not outcomes (e.g. hip surgeries performed with low rates of complications reducing hospital
stay times and increasing the prospect of rehabilitation), so there was no information about
the quality or effectiveness of the services provided. 453

There were unclear lines of

accountability within the hospitals, particularly after the 1974 reforms, after which no one
single person could be held accountable for the failures of a unit.
Within the NHS, the requirements for political accountability clashed with the managerial
and clinical accountabilities as constituted within that system. While the principle of localism
served desirable policy ends, the realities of the statist model and the political consequences
for governments in not being able to ensure effective accountability or to assert control over
the operations of the NHS 454 could result in the principle of localism being revisited in the
interests of greater control by the centre. This may particularly be so when it is coupled with
pre-existing centralist regulatory tendencies within the NHS and the British governance
model more generally. Reinforcing any centralizing, statist tendencies is the fact that the
government owns the bricks and mortar of the NHS, and hospital doctors are employees of
the state, with GPs and other primary health-providers being contractors to the state.
Despite a commitment in principle to corporatism, employers and contractors have the
power to create and enforce conditions of employment that regulate the conditions within
and upon which an employee performs their job or the terms of the contract with
independent contractors. Hence, the roots of a possible regulatory shift towards a greater
role for the state in assuring the effective regulation of the health system may perhaps be
seen.
With the exception of Québec, none of the Canadian health systems are statist in the same
way in which statism manifested in the British NHS. The structures of the Canadian system
make it quite clear that the federal government has limited power in the health arena, as,
outside of the specific areas discussed earlier and in the next chapter, its health policy and
regulatory influence is, in practice, limited to what it can negotiate or is prepared to negotiate
with the provinces/territories.
453
454

Likewise, although the provinces/territories have more
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regulatory leverage and responsibility, the lines between government, hospitals, and doctors
are negotiated with co-regulatory partners. This is not to say that the pressures for political
accountability were not as real and immediate as those experienced in the British system,
because the history of many Canadian elections illustrates concerns about the management
of health systems; it is to say, however, that the co-regulatory nature of regulation in this area
may afford more scope for circumlocution. It is also to point out that the role of the state,
again with the exception of Québec, as an actor within the health system is traditionally more
limited than the expansive role assumed by the British government.
Additionally, consumerism was a more potent force within the Canadian health systems, as
patients knew that doctors and hospitals were operationally independent of the state. Thus,
politicians at all levels were to some extent shielded from some of the accountability for
systems and individual failures, with patients looking towards the law to obtain redress and
remedies. This, of course, is not to say that similar considerations did not occur in the
British context – there, too, patients could and did seek legal redress; it is to say that the
more expansive role of the state in Britain creates a different dynamic.
The divergence in statism between the two jurisdictions may be further reinforced by trends
towards or away from centralization. Government control is also evident in the degree of
centralization seen in the organization of the health system.

Centralization has been

identified as a key variable shaping health systems, as increasing centralization has been
shown to lead to more cost controls and standardization within systems. 455 First, it is
important to note that a state can have highly centralistic tendencies, while at the same time
some elements of its system may be decentralized. 456 Levels of centralization may change
due to changes in political norms and structures, and for other reasons. There are also varied
contexts of decentralization. The constitutional level of decentralization is discussed in detail
in the next chapter.

In Canada, health is a provincial responsibility and inherently

decentralized, whereas in the British unitary state it is inherently centralized. This is overly
simplistic, as decentralization may also occur in operational and managerial contexts.
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Operationally, both jurisdictions were decentralized. Britain favoured regionalization, and
Canada localism, for service delivery. These are all variants of decentralization, and under
the initial model the NHS was perhaps less decentralized than the Canadian provincial and
territorial systems. However, the 1974 reforms to the NHS pushed decentralization further,
establishing layers of governance actors at the regional, area, district and community levels.
Importantly, these actors within the NHS were all government actors, created by and
controlled by the government. In Canada, local actors constituted many private providers
with, as discussed above, little in the way of organizationally dense funding mechanisms
through which to control operations. Having said that, operational decentralization was an
area of convergence between the systems.
In the managerial context, I suggest one sees more divergence. In the NHS, centralizing
tendencies were a policy legacy from the Second World War that shaped the structure of the
NHS. Despite the NHS having decentralized delivery systems, as Klein noted it tends
towards being one of the most centralized health systems in the industrialized world.457
Klein was referring to the heavy dependence on very rigid centralized planning, with even
the 1974 reforms placing a heavy emphasis on this. The Canadian systems did not rely on
central planning to the same extent.
If a health system’s logic is towards a degree of centralization in its management, combined
with statism, it may indicate a desire for control by the centre. This may mean that the
central state is more likely to employ hierarchical regulatory mechanisms, such as direct
regulation, in the traditional model. Co-regulatory systems acquire a different regulatory
logic that may encourage the continuance of government-facilitated or -supported regulatory
mechanisms that are not as coercive as direct regulation. This is not to say the direct
regulation would not be used, but the logic of the system may incline towards the
development and use of soft law mechanisms consistent with the ‘New Governance’
described in Chapter 1.
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Conclusion
The structures and logics of the respective health systems in each jurisdiction at the close of
the 1970s had some similarities, but also some marked dissimilarities. These dissimilarities
indicate the potential for future regulatory divergence in the face of a stressor that places
accepted institutions and practices in question.

The centralistic tendencies and statist

structure of the British NHS are indicators of a system whose regulatory logic may direct it
towards a more interventionalist regulatory framework if the implicit bargain inherent in its
corporatist structure was perceived to have failed.
Conversely, co-regulatory decision-making frameworks are deeply embedded within all levels
of the Canadian health system. The lack of statism inherent in the health systems in all
provinces and territories, except arguably Québec, and at the federal level, and the systemic
structures that preserve an independent, collegial and market-focused structure for healthcare
delivery, indicate the future maintenance of co-regulatory processes. This is, of course,
assuming that the corporatist bargain at the centre of the Canadian health system is
maintained through effective governance within hospitals and by the medical profession,
supported by governments and the public. However, it is not just the logic of health systems
that creates points of possible regulatory divergence, but also in governance systems more
generally. Accordingly, the next chapter examines differences in the broader governance
frameworks within each jurisdiction, including issues of constitutional frameworks, politics,
and differences in the habits of governance.
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Chapter 4
Constitutions, Politics, and Culture: The More Things Change, The More Things
Stay the Same

Introduction
In the early 1980s, Britain and Canada had similar regulatory frameworks for patient safety.
The contexts within which those regulatory frameworks were employed were, however,
marked by significant points of divergence in relation to the underlying logics and norms
informing regulatory systems. These divergences, as the path-dependency approach suggests,
may pose major constraints to future policy and program developments. 458 As shall become
clear in the next chapters of the thesis, these divergences would have consequences for the
shape of each jurisdiction’s regulatory framework for patient safety in the years to come. In
this chapter, I examine three facets of contextual differences: constitutions, politics, and
culture. Constitutional structures, political norms, or habits of governance, and the cultural
milieu can function as explicit or implicit constraints on future change. The intention here is
not to examine each facet in depth, as to do them full justice could be the subject of several
theses, but rather to tease out the most salient features of each dimension as it relates, or may
relate, to shifts in the regulatory arena post-1980.
My central argument in this chapter is that constitutional, political and cultural differences
between Canada and Britain influence the future development of patient-safety law. This is
not perhaps an altogether surprising conclusion, but is a point that warrants examination to
assess why and how those differences might affect regulation. One of the most significant
differences between the two jurisdictions is in respect of constitutional structures. It is
obvious from the discussion in Chapter 2 that differing constitutional structures may see
highly similar regulatory frameworks – again, this may not be a surprise considering that the
regulatory roots of one jurisdiction, on the whole, originated from the other. 459 But it is also
true that, in other contexts, one can see markedly dissimilar regulatory frameworks. A
question at the heart of this chapter is: how might constitutional structures affect the
Kay, supra note 47.
The influence of French law on law within Québec cannot be understated. It is also important to
acknowledge that Indigenous Canadians have a body of law and custom.
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direction and nature of regulatory change and, if so, what is its importance? In other words,
what kind of difference do constitutions make?
Within constitutional structures, political systems operate with their own norms of practice
or habits of governance. Although there are some similarities and shared political traditions
between Canada and Britain, there are, I suggest, some relevant differences that influence
how regulation is conceived and employed in each. Some of these differences are integrally
connected to constitutional structures, indicating the interconnectedness of these areas.
Another focus of this chapter is to ask: what are these differences and how might they
influence regulatory culture?
Within and outside constitutions and politics lies culture. Although ascribing culture and
values to a nation state is often speculative and risks gross over-generalization, culture
influences and in turn is influenced by politics and constitutions and ultimately may influence
the focus and shape of regulation. In this chapter, I also ask: what are the cultural factors
relevant to patient safety in each jurisdiction and how might they shape regulatory direction?
In developing this argument, in the first section of this chapter I examine constitutional
norms and practices in each jurisdiction. In the second section, I examine political systems
and norms; and in the third and last section, I review culture in the context of health,
regulation, and governance. In each section, I evaluate how the examined norms might
affect regulatory directionality.

The Influence of Constitutional Frameworks
It is generally assumed that it makes a difference whether a nation has a federal or unitary
structure in regard to public policy formation, policy output, and policy outcomes. 460 The
shape and structure of institutions may influence the capacity of political actors to act, their
perceptions of realistic policy alternatives, and their options and preferences. 461 Of the
jurisdictions, Canada is a federal state and Britain, unitary. Federal states differ from unitary
D. Braun, “Territorial Division of Power and Public Policy-making: An Overview” in D. Braun, ed., Public
Policy and Federalism, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 1 [Braun].
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states in that federal systems tend to have strong supreme or constitutional courts, high
barriers for constitutional amendment, and the power to govern is dispersed between
different levels of government. 462

In unitary states, national governments have more

immediate authority than they do in federal states, as other levels of government lack formal
or informal veto power against the actions of the central government. 463 In contrast to
federal states, some unitary states have unwritten constitutions or constitutions that are only
partially enacted in law. Unitary states are said to have fewer institutional constraints on
regulating and are more likely to initiate significant change. 464
Theories of federalism identify institutional factors as determinants of government activity
and policy-making. 465

Federal states may face more institutional constraints for policy-

making than unitary states. 466

Traditionally, the literature has been dominated by the

perspective that divisions in economic and political powers inherent in a federal structure
operate to preserve the status quo and constitute a barrier to change. 467

The British

constitutional scholar A.V. Dicey noted, for example, that federalism maintains “the status
quo in politics” and is therefore “incompatible with schemes for wide social innovation”. 468
A study of the development of social policy in Canada found evidence to support an
argument that federalism slowed the development of the welfare state and then acted as a
barrier to forces that sought to change it. 469 This position suggests that federal systems are
characterized by conflict and jurisdictional disputes, both of which promote delay. On this
view, federal structures are generally considered a hindrance to social policy-making because
of difficulties in achieving general consensus in a divided system. 470 In the Canadian context,
Tomblin noted:

Banting & Corbett, supra note 405.
Braun, supra note 460.
463 Ibid.
464 See, for example, D. Adams, “Canadian Federalism and the Development of National Health Goals and
Objectives” in D. Adams, ed., Federalism, Democracy and Health Policy in Canada (Kingston: Queen’s University
Press, 2001) 60 at 68 [Adams, “Canadian Federalism”].
465 See, for example, Gray, supra note 306.
466 Braun, supra note 460.
467 See, for example, Gray, supra note 306.
468 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: MacMillan, 1959) at 138-180 [Dicey].
469 K. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, 2nd ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1987) [Banting].
470 Maoni, “Federalism”, supra note 408.
461
462

108

Structural change does not always come easily (when circumstances change) because
old, inherited, over-lapping, societal and State traditions make it very difficult to
change direction. According to the logic of neo-institutional thinking, our complex
and divided federal system makes it possible for old identities, visions and boundaries
to survive and it limits what can be achieved, even when conditions change. 471
However, some quantitative comparative studies have shown that constitutional factors have
not been a relevant factor in explaining policy variation, although these studies have also
been critiqued for not sufficiently nuancing the differences between federal and unitary
states. 472 Hence, Braun asserts that differences between federal and unitary states should be
understood in terms not of outcomes, but in modalities of action, of organization of power,
and the games actors play. 473

In other words, constitutional structures may result in

differences in how governments approach and address problems rather than the objectives
and outcomes of government action.
Conversely, no lesser authority than Trudeau argued that federalism can enable radical
policies in a way in which unitary systems do not. 474 In federal systems, political parties with
new or even radical prescriptions for policy change may come into power in one jurisdiction,
although not in all, and can introduce a seed of policy innovation and change that may slowly
spread across the country. 475 An example of this is the Tommy Douglas government in
Saskatchewan, which introduced the first universal health insurance program.
The broad conclusion of an extensive literature review by Banting and Corbett is that
political institutions, such as constitutional structures, are never solely determinative of a
policy or regulatory direction, as institutional structures interact with other factors – for
example, ideology or economics – in a process of change, 476 but that the structures of some
political institutions mean that some policy and regulatory directions are easier to pursue

471 S. Tomblin, “Creating a More Democratic Health System” in T. McIntosh, P. Forest & G. Marchildon, eds.,
The Governance of Health Care in Canada: The Romanow Papers: Volume III (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2004) 280 at 287-288 [Tomblin].
472 Braun, supra note 460.
473 Ibid.
474 P. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1968).
475 Maioni, “Federalism”, supra note 408.
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than others. Therefore, in combination with other factors, constitutional structures may
constrain political responses and shape resultant regulation. It is important then to examine
how these structures might influence regulatory direction in each jurisdiction.

Canada
General Framework
The constitution of Canada divides legislative and executive power between federal and
provincial governments. 477

Pre-confederation Canada was a series of internally self-

governing colonies, administered by colonial authorities that were answerable to the
government in Britain. Accordingly, as Duncan et al note, British colonial rule of what is
now Canada created a number of semi-autonomous entities with an engrained ethos of local
reliance. 478 Post-confederation, the relationships between the provinces (and territories) and
the federal government have been shaped by that sense of independence, regional autonomy,
and geography.
Smiley notes that the Canadian Constitution contemplated a centralized federal system, as
what were then regarded as the major functions of government were vested in the federal
government. 479

However, as the role of government expanded as a result of the

transformation from a classic liberal to welfare state, the provinces’ and territories’ role and
functions under the Constitution have become increasingly central to the operation of the
modern state. This is due to the broad interpretation by the courts (and especially the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) of the provincial heads of legislative power to
encompass much of the legislative capacity needed to build the welfare state. 480

Banting & Corbett, supra note 405; Maoni, ibid.
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 &31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [Constitution Act,
1867; Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [Constitution Act, 1982].
The Constitution Act, 1867 created a federal union of several British colonies and defined much of the operations
and functions of government including its federal structure, and the operations of the House of Commons and
Senate and of the justice system. Sections 91-95 establish areas of federal, provincial and shared jurisdiction.
The Constitution Act, 1982 repatriates the Constitution from Britain, establishes the supremacy of the
Constitution, establishes the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and creates mechanisms for amending the
Constitution.
478 Duncan, supra note 369
479 D. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties (Toronto: McGill University Press, 1980).
476
477

110

Canada has been described as being a “very” federal state. 481 There is a greater degree of
decentralization in Canada than many other federal nations – perhaps, as Gray suggests,
reflecting Canada’s greater “cultural, economic and linguistic diversity”. 482

Governance

within Canada occurs along a continuum ranging from sectors where there is a large degree
of federal unitarianism to what might be termed disentangled sectors where each order of
government acts independently. 483 Much of Canadian politics is dominated by the politics of
federalism and inter-governmentalism. 484 As the Supreme Court of Canada noted:
The principle of federalism recognizes the diversity of the component parts of
Confederation, and the autonomy of provincial governments to develop their
societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. The federal structure of our
country also facilitates democratic participation by distributing power to the
government thought to be most suited to achieving the particular societal objective
having regard to this diversity. 485
From the outset, the question of how to balance the powers of the provincial (and more
latterly the territorial) governments and the federal government was contentious. As Maioni
notes, the division of powers in the Constitution Act 1867 486 and the Constitution Act 1982 487 set
the parameters for federal relations in Canada. 488 These Acts set up an environment marked
by continuing tension. This tension was manifest in a constitutional framework where a
tendency towards centralization, implied by the allocation of economic and residual powers
to the federal government, confronted a decentralizing tendency, evident in the broad
responsibilities over social affairs accorded to the provinces and territories. 489
M. Jackman, “Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Health Care in Canada” (2000) 8 Health L.J. 95 [Jackman];
Canada v. Attorney General, supra note 370.
481 See, for example, Gray, supra note 306; G. Skogstad, “Canada: Dual and Effective Federalism, Ineffective
Problem-Solving” in D. Braun, ed., Public Policy and Federalism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 57 [Skogstad].
482 See, for example, Gray, supra note 306 at 4.
483 T. McIntosh, “Introduction: Restoring Trust, Rebuilding Confidence – The Governance of Health Care and
the Romanow Report” in T. McIntosh, P. Forest & G. Marchildon, eds., The Governance of Health Care in Canada,
vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) 3 [McIntosh].
484 Ibid.
485 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 58.
486 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 477.
487 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 477.
488 See, for example, Maioni, “Roles and Responsibilities”, supra note 404. The division of powers is primarily
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Canada has gone through periods of centralization and decentralization in terms of the
exercise of political power, but the overall trend appears to be towards decentralization. 490
Centralization appeared to be a stronger force in the early 20th century from the 1930s to the
1950s, when “the centralist perspective was the dynamic initiating force in Canadian
constitutional politics. Centralism was never stronger than during this quarter century.” 491
This of course can be attributed to the need for cooperation between different orders of
government to address the challenges of the Great Depression and the Second World War.
This period gave way in the late 1950s and 1960s to an era of ‘cooperative federalism’,
‘collaborative federalism’, ‘executive federalism’, ‘accommodative federalism’, or ‘flexible
federalism’. 492 This era saw the provincial and territorial governments working with the
federal government employing various informal federal–provincial mechanisms of
accommodation (including Medicare).

Despite the emphasis on cooperation, however,

others wryly note that “Nevertheless, this ‘cooperative’ federalism results just as often in
competition and conflict as in cooperation and coordination.” 493
However, despite this ostensible cooperation, disagreements about the role of federal,
provincial and territorial governments were ongoing. This was especially so during the late
1960s and through the 1970s as a consequence of the rise of nationalist sentiments and the
election of a nationalist government in Québec in 1976, and the election of a Conservative
government in Alberta that was determined to challenge federal incursions into energy and
natural resources policy-making. 494 One provincial official was quoted by O’Reilly as saying:
At the heart of the matter … regarding roles and responsibilities is federal unilateral
intervention in provincial fields of social jurisdiction … This issue is not one of
Banting & Corbett, supra note 405.
P. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) at 62 cited in H.
Leeson, “Constitutional Jurisdiction over Health and Health Care Services in Canada” in T. McIntosh, P. Forest
& G. Marchildon, eds., The Governance of Health Care in Canada, vol. 3, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2004) 50 at 54.
492 H. Leeson, “Constitutional Jurisdiction over Health and Health Care Services in Canada” in T. McIntosh, P.
Forest & G. Marchildon, eds., The Governance of Health Care in Canada, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004) 50 [Leeson].
493 R. Pelletier, “Intergovernmental Cooperation Mechanisms: Factors for Change?” in T. McIntosh, P. Forest
& G. Marchildon, eds., The Governance of Health Care in Canada, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2004) 127 at 129 [Pelletier].
490
491

112

jurisdictional clarity; it is one of … federal interference with the priorities of
provincial governments. 495
The 1960s saw a period of decentralization where the balance of power moved to the
provinces and territories due to the federal government’s reliance on cooperation.
Conversely, it also saw the introduction of many of the pillars of the welfare state due to the
federal government’s willingness to use its spending power, a shift that might be considered
in the direction of centralization.
Subsequent federal attempts in the 1970s at prioritizing national cost-sharing programs, for
example Medicare, attracted accusations from some quarters of direct intrusion into
provincial jurisdictions (recentralization). 496 Generally, as O’Reilly noted, the provinces and
territories feared that any new delivery programs initiated by federal government were the
thin edge of the wedge of increasing federal power. 497 Centralization also attracted criticism
from provincial and territorial governments, as these governments believed that they had a
better sense of policy priorities because of their proximity to people and services and their
sensitivities to regional, local, economic, linguistic, and cultural differences. 498
Tensions also became manifest in respect of shared-cost programs, such as Medicare,
especially once the recession of the 1970s and changing economic policies saw the federal
government move to place limits on the levels of funding directed towards shared-cost
programs. 499 One issue was that the federal government might partially fund programs, but
the provincial and territorial governments responsible for implementing those programs bore
the blame for any or all failings, even those caused by funding shortfalls. 500 Certainly,
discord between the different governments is a characteristic of governance in Canada,
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particularly in the second half of the 20th century 501 – if nothing else because, as Pelletier
notes, “[i]t is not a genuine partnership between equals, but an uneven relationship between
politicians …” 502
A dominant feature of Canadian federalism is so-called executive federalism, which Skogstad
describes as:
… the norm and practice of consultation and negotiation among national, provincial
and territorial officials and ministers on matters of public policy where the interests
and responsibilities of the two levels of government overlap. 503
A reliance on the executive to create policy is also a characteristic of the Westminster
parliamentary model in which the executive plays a dominant role in governance. This is
manifest in the Canadian government system at the intergovernment level, with the
mechanisms of cooperative (or less cooperative) federalism concentrating power in the
hands of government ministers and officials. Some suggest that this type of system results in
Canadian citizens assuming the role of “spectators” in a dialogue occurring between the
members of the executive of two levels of government, 504 often shrouded in secrecy with
little transparency. Some note that the levels of disagreement between the two levels of
government are such that both sides engage in communication strategies intending to tell the
public their version of the disagreement in an attempt to leverage public support. 505 While
this does not result in citizen participation, it does inject a little more transparency, even if
self-serving, into the process.
With each province and territory having internal sovereignty, there are, not unexpectedly,
differences between them as to why, what, and how to regulate. As the Supreme Court
noted, differences between provinces “are a rational part of the political reality in the federal
process.” 506 Canada’s federal system may lend itself to less dramatic regulatory change and
Especially in respect of health, see Kenny, supra note 97.
Pelletier, supra note 493 at 147.
503 Skogstad, supra note 481 at 57.
504 Tomblin, supra note 471 at 290.
505 See, for example, ibid at 289.
506 Haig v Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, at 1047.
501
502

114

relative stability over time (of course these trends are not absolute.) 507 In some applications,
the slow pace of provincial reforms may function as a rough process of evidence-based
decision-making, as provinces get the benefit of ‘trying before they buy’ through watching
the experience of innovations in other provinces. It perhaps limits the national impact of
any knee-jerk regulatory changes made in response to local political imperatives. There are a
number of examples of this in the health context. The development of Medicare is a case in
point. The basic model was developed in Saskatchewan, adopted in a few other provinces,
and then was followed by federal enabling legislation (see discussion in Chapter 3). It was
subsequently adopted by individual provinces until all had implemented it. Regionalization
(discussed in Chapter 5) provides another example in the health context. This differs from
the previous example in that there was no federal greasing of the wheels; rather, health
system regionalization was adopted in various forms by one province after another, based to
a large extent by learning from and copying the experiences of other provinces. 508
Canadian Federalism and Healthcare
In respect of health, the Constitution Act 1867 is a reflection of its times, given that at the time
of its enactment health was seen as a personal responsibility and a private matter. 509
Although, except as subsequently discussed, health was not specifically addressed in the
Constitution Act 1867, it does not mean that no provision was made for these types of matters.
However, it also seems that the Constitution Act 1867 reflects the view that the continued
development of the infrastructure of a health system(s) was a priority that provincial
governments needed to support.

Under the Constitution, the provinces are allocated

responsibility for “the Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums,
Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine
Hospitals.” 510 More generally, provinces are also responsible for “all matters of a local or
private nature …” 511 , “property and civil rights …” (interpreted as including the regulation of
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professionals, including health professionals) 512 , and education. 513 The federal government
was assigned more limited responsibilities for health-related issues, reflecting the view that
health as a general legislative domain was not a matter of concern for the central
government. Accordingly, the Constitution gave the federal government the important but
specific responsibility for “Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine
Hospitals.” 514 Other broader powers came to be understood to have application to health,
particularly the criminal law, 515 the spending powers, 516 and (in limited circumstances) the
general peace, order, and good government power. 517 For the most part, the federal role has
been focused on public health under the criminal law power (dealing with matters such as
tobacco, firearms and hazardous substances) and on the use of the spending power to
achieve provincial participation in Medicare. The federal government delivers very little in
the way of health programs directly to Canadian citizens, other than its constitutional
responsibilities to provide services to First Nations and Inuit communities, the Canadian
military, prisoners in federal prisons, and ‘aliens’. 518
Outside of these specifics, the Canadian Constitution does not clearly distribute
responsibility for health to the provincial, territorial, or federal governments. Health is an
issue that is subject to negotiation between sometimes-competing interests according to the
nature or scope of the issue at hand and the political sensitivities at play. The Supreme Court
of Canada has concluded:
In sum ‘health’ is not a matter which is subject to specific constitutional assignment
but instead is an amorphous topic which can be addressed by valid federal or
provincial legislation, depending in the circumstances of each case on the nature or
scope of the health problem in question. 519
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Given the relative uncertainties in this area, and the tensions discussed in the previous
chapter inherent to the health insurance framework, it is perhaps not surprising that health is
often an area of great contention between the federal, provincial, and territorial governments
– so much so that some suggest that intergovernmental conflict, particularly over Medicare,
often obscures and distracts from other debates about healthcare in Canada, including such
matters as the quality and safety of healthcare in Canada. 520

As Maioni notes:

In effect, intergovernmental discussions in health care have become stymied by the
relentless spotlight on a statute that regulates fiscal transfer programs, making it
difficult if not impossible to coherently address issues of governance and long-term
sustainability in health care. 521
Johnson also notes that “many reforms and improvements, namely, macro-level policy
discussions, do not get done because of federal–provincial disagreement and deadlock.” 522
The relationship between the different levels of government in respect of health is mediated
through the mechanisms of collaborative federalism through regular conferences between
first ministers, deputy ministers, and officials. 523 Accordingly, the health system is also
characterized by executive federalism.
With the rise of a symbolic, high-stakes political game, health became an important
intergovernmental issue.

The governments responded in a predictable way, by

seizing control of the issue. As a consequence, the public and other interests likely
had fewer opportunities to control the health agenda or discourse. 524
Negotiations between these parties are generally conducted behind closed doors by the
executive branches of government.

The agendas of these regular meetings are rarely
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divulged, let alone the deliberations that occur during these meetings. 525 Pelletier examined
the agendas of the ministerial and deputy ministerial meetings occurring in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. He established that most of the items dealt with matters of public concern at
that time: tainted blood, health human resources, smoking, public health, homecare, and
medical equipment, indicating a degree of responsiveness. 526 The fact that, of all the safety
issues that could have been on the agenda, only public health and blood made it indicates the
centrality of those issues (see discussion in Chapter 6) and that for the Canadian public and
politicians the quality and safety of health services more generally were not a central concern.
It may of course also reflect the reality of the federal government’s limited responsibility for
the delivery and regulation of health services.
Canada’s federal system may lend itself to less dramatic regulatory change and relative
stability over time. 527 The last word might be left to Johnson, who is of the opinion that
“Federal–provincial relations, both harmonious and discordant, have facilitated and
constrained policy change” in Canadian healthcare. 528

Britain
Britain is a unitary state where national government makes policy for and regulates the
nation.

Constitutionally, there is no question of power-sharing with other levels of

government unless the central government chooses to do so.

While the Westminster

parliament can and from the 1990s did delegate powers to regional parliaments as it saw fit, it
may revoke such powers by a simple parliamentary majority at its pleasure and hence it
remains a unitary state. 529

Despite this devolution, the government did not delegate

responsibility for all aspects of governance to regional parliaments; it retained many key
powers at the national level. Primarily, the national devolved aspects of social policy and
other matters of local application or interest. While some powers were devolved to regional
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parliaments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, England is still governed in a unitary
manner by the central state.
Britain’s constitutional structure is further muddied by its membership from 1973 of the
European Community, which became in 1993 the European Union, a quasi-federal
supranational structure. 530 In the health context, the practical effect of this is that now
Britain’s sovereignty over health governance may be affected by the European Union’s
treaties and directives.
Directive. 531

An example from the post-1980 period is the Working Hours

Due to devolution throughout the 1990s, Britain obtained the vestiges of

federalism, while retaining a unitary status constitutionally.
The powers of a unitary state to enact abrupt policy (and regulatory) change are well
illustrated in the healthcare context, and indeed in social policy more generally. As discussed
in more detail in Chapter 3, in the years following the Second World War the introduction of
the welfare state and the NHS constituted significant, radical, and rapid changes to existing
norms of social policy. As significant, rapid, and radical were the, in some sectors, overnight
introduction of new governance norms by the Thatcher government in the early 1980s, some
of which are discussed in Chapter 5. In respect of these reforms, consultation was limited,
and many of these changes were simply rammed through parliament in the teeth of any
public opposition.

Outside of the social policy sphere, the introduction of the highly

unpopular poll tax by the Thatcher government provides another cogent example. The
introduction of a flat rate community charge levied upon all adults to replace residential
property taxes occurred forthwith as it benefited traditional conservative voters. 532 There

530 It is also important to note that in 1950 Britain became a signatory of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223, Eur. T.S. 5 [European Convention
on Human Rights], an initiative of the Council of Europe. Once in force, this convention enabled citizens to
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights if they believed their rights pursuant to that convention had
been infringed. It was not until 1998, with the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.) c. 42 that these
rights were incorporated into British law. See, for example, R. Horton, “Health and the UK Human Rights Act
1998” (2000) 356:9236 Lancet 1186 [Horton].
531 EC, Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time,
O.J. L. 307/18; EC, Council Directive 2000/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 2000
amending Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time to cover sectors and
activities excluded from that directive, [2000] O.J. L. 195/41; see discussion in McDonald, “Working to Death” supra
note 110.
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were widespread demonstrations and at least one riot in the weeks leading to the enactment
of the new tax, but it was duly passed on schedule in the teeth of any opposition. 533 It was
not, however, to last long. Mrs Thatcher lost her leadership of the Conservative Party (and
her Prime Ministership), in part due to this issue, and the tax was subsequently repealed by
her successor. 534
In respect of health, government in the late 1990s rapidly devolved the management of the
NHS to regional parliaments (with the exception of England), although the regulation of
health professionals through government-sanctioned self-regulation by the health
professions remains the purview of the national government. 535 The retention of the power
to regulate the health professions at the national level is significant, as it keeps a significant
degree of power to regulate the operations of the NHS at the national level – health
professionals, after all, are an integral part of the operations and functioning of the NHS.
The impact of devolution on the NHS is a matter of debate. This thesis examines the period
1980–2005, and it appears that only towards the end of this period, beginning from 2004, did
some differences begin to emerge in the organization and management of the four NHSs –
there was little change from the pre-established norms in respect of quality and safety. 536
Some attribute this relative stability in the post-devolution period to the substantial policy
inheritance of each NHS and the high level of coordination seen between the four regions.537
Stability was not a characteristic of the NHS prior to devolution (see discussion in Chapter
5).

Britain and Canada
In short, the different constitutional structures in each jurisdiction may, in accordance with
other factors, predispose a government to regulate or not. In Canada, a federal structure
may result in slow, incremental, negotiated change, which may involve reform by agreement
Ibid.
Ibid.
535 Health professional regulation remains a reserved power; see, for example, Scotland Act, 1998 (U.K.), c. 46,
Sch. 5, Pt II, Head G, G.2.
536 See, for example, K. Woods, “Health Policy and the NHS in the UK: 1997-2002” in J. Adams & P.
Robinson, eds., Devolution in Practice: Public Policy Differences within the UK (London: Institute for Public Policy
Research, 2002) 25 [Woods]; S. Greer, The Four Way Bet: How Devolution has led to Four Different Models for the NHS
(London: The Constitutional Unit, University College of London, 2004).
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and co-regulation at the intergovernmental level. It also may create an environment where
matters that can be the subject of intergovernmental agreement are few. These matters may
be ones where interconnectedness is crucial, such as the development of information
systems, public health (including the operation of the blood system), and questions about
levels of funding provided for health services – but also provincial governments operate in a
largely unitary fashion for matters that do not touch upon federal concerns or raise any
necessity for intergovernmental consistency.
In contrast with Canada, where most healthcare issues are either provincial or shared issues,
traditionally in Britain most healthcare issues have, at least until the 1990s, by definition,
been national issues, to be nationally regulated by a majority government in a unitary state if
required. Even with some devolution of powers from the 1990s, a long history of a
centralized service and regulation means that issues, especially in respect of quality and
safety, may not, at least initially, be regarded as truly regional or local. With few barriers to
initiating comprehensive regulatory change if a problem arises, a culture may be created in
which the enactment of such regulation is almost reflexive.
In the context of a comparative examination of patient-safety regulation, it might be
suggested that a comparison between Britain and Canada is asymmetrical. The constitutional
authority over healthcare is vested in the provinces, and some might say that the comparison
therefore should be between Britain, the unitary state, and the provinces as unitary entities of
governance. This may especially be argued given the possible parallels between the oversight
exercised over Britain by organs of the European Union and the Council of Europe,
including the European Court of Human Rights, and over the Canadian provinces by the
federal government of Canada and the Supreme Court of Canada. 538

In making the

distinction between a unitary state and a unitary entity, I highlight that provinces are not
nation states no matter how similar their constitutional structure to a nation. A further
complicating factor is that financing is a divided responsibility in Canada, while it is the

Woods, ibid.
See, for example, Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney-General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33; [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.)
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responsibility of the unitary government in Britain. The federal context in Canada cannot be
ignored. 539
Constitutions, although important, do not exist in isolation; they are embedded in a broader
governance context – the political life of each jurisdiction. What might be termed the habits
of governance in each jurisdiction provide a context that may also indicate current and/or
future divergence, and this is examined in the next section of this chapter.

Politics and Governance
Politics, and what may be termed the habits of governance, in each jurisdiction also warrant
examination as factors that might indicate the future directionality of regulatory choices –
after all, regulation is the product of the politics. 540 There are a number of similarities in
respect of the political norms and habits of governance in each jurisdiction, again not
surprisingly given that Canada was a British colonial possession; but there are also some
differences.
Although their constitutional make-up may be different, the political systems in each
jurisdiction are similar in that both are Westminster-style democracies. Moe and Caldwell
suggest that a Westminster government is an institutional arrangement that generally
establishes a democratically elected single party government headed by a strong leader, with
strong party discipline, to keep dilemmas of public choice at bay. 541 However, the tenets of
Westminster-style democracy may be moderated in some circumstances. As discussed in the
previous section, in Canada it may be affected by the impact of federalism, and in Britain by
its membership of the quasi-federalist European Union and its devolution of some powers to
regional parliaments.
Westminster-style democracy may also be moderated by the nature of politics in each system.
The Westminster model is predicated on a single-party government, and certainly the history
I thank Bill Lahey for this insight.
Kenny, supra note 97 at 68.
541 T. Moe & M. Caldwell, “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems” (1994) 150 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 171 at 189 [Moe].
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of each jurisdiction (in Canada at the provincial and federal levels) has generally seen the
election of single-party governments mostly functioning as majority, and more rarely
minority, governments.
While second chambers operate at the federal level in Canada and in Britain, there are
limitations on the ability of the British House of Lords (traditionally dominated by
conservative forces due to its, until recently, hereditary membership) to institute any veto,
delay, or unacceptable amendments to legislation, and any such attempts may be overridden
by the House of Commons. 542 The formal limitations on the Canadian Senate are only in
relation to constitutional amendments and originating bills relating to appropriations of
public funds. 543 However, informally the Senate’s weak legitimacy as a body appointed by
government means it does little in this regard. Hence, in Britain a majority government may
create regulation in spite of opposition from within and outside government. This is similar
to the pattern seen at the provincial level of government in Canada, at least in respect of
matters which are solely within provincial powers.
The degree of party discipline inherent in the Westminster system may also be a significant
point of difference. Across Canadian politics, one saw a high degree of party cohesiveness
and discipline, meaning that parliamentarians were required to vote along party lines. 544 In
contrast, while party discipline was reinforced in the British system, the oftentimes large
numbers of backbench members of parliament meant that party discipline on occasions
faltered and backbenchers could and did break from the determinations of their party. 545
While this tendency towards ill-discipline in Britain did not bring governments down, it
created a context where political positions were the subject of in-party contest. It also
created a situation where backbenchers had more freedom to raise issues of concern to their
electorates in public forums even if the issues did not align with formal party policy. In
Britain, members of parliament could play a more significant and public role than their

See Parliament Act, 1911 (U.K.), 1 & 2 Geo. V., c. 13 which allowed a delay of three parliamentary sessions or
two years before the House of Commons could override the House of Lords, amended to two parliamentary
sessions or one year in Parliament Act, 1949 (U.K.) 12, 13 & 14 Geo. VI., c.103.
543 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 477.
544 Maioni, supra note 384.
545 Ibid.
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Canadian counterparts in raising issues and making claims that fan the flames of scandal
(discussed further in Chapter 6).
The constitutional model in Canada often requires bargaining between provinces, territories,
and the federal government. 546 The features and conditions of Canadian policy-making at
the intergovernmental level emerged from this constitutional reality. 547 In some facets of
Canadian politics, the norms of the intergovernmental model are in part replicated. At the
provincial level, policy-making often, although not inevitably, proceeds through a process of
negotiations between the provinces and other key actors or stakeholders. In the health
context, for example, such negotiations proceed between the provinces and medical
associations. 548 Some commentators describe the current system of governance as having a
“… well deserved reputation for elitism, behind the scenes approach to interest group
politics, and concentrated executive-corporate power ...”. 549 Indeed, the system in Canada
often, although not invariably, involves what amounts to a process of co-regulation where
policy actors cooperate to create new rules within a specific context. 550
However, it is not only constitutional structures that shape habits of governance. In Britain,
there was a tradition of governments having a particular interest in resolving disagreement
through incorporating interest groups in the process of decision-making in a formal
manner. 551 Although the approach adopted in Britain never saw the levels of integration
displayed in true corporatist governance systems (for example Germany), 552 it was a great
deal more formalized than processes in Canada, and had a greater reach across sectors. It is
suggested that this greater degree of formal corporatism as a mode of governance in Britain
was the result of historical factors, including the rise to power of a social democratic
government (the Labour Party), and the strength of the organized labour movement. These
factors were not seen to the same extent in Canada, as while social democratic parties were
highly influential in some provinces, notably Saskatchewan, they had limited impact in others
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and only contained impact at the federal level because of their third-party status. 553
Additionally, organized labour remained comparatively weak in Canada, 554 whereas the
unions were a dominant and powerful force in Britain, at least until they were smashed by
the Thatcher government in the reforms described in Chapter 5. While there is a tradition of
accommodation within the health system in Britain, importantly such accommodation occurs
within a centralized framework as the maintenance of hierarchy has also long been a
characteristic of British governance structures. 555
Both jurisdictions support the legitimacy of government regulation in areas of social policy,
and indeed consider this a core role of government. 556 This commitment to statism may
emerge from post-war world-view Keynesian ideas about the role of the state in the
economy, the legacy of reconstruction, and the transition “from warfare state to welfare
state” 557 seen across much of the industrialized world. Both jurisdictions then are generally
statist (especially in comparison with the US) in that they agree that government could and
should be involved in matters of social policy. In the context of social policy, King notes:
Conservatives in the other four countries [Canada, Britain, France, and Germany] are
also not consistently anti-statist in attitude; on the contrary they often express a
highly exalted view of the role of the state in economic and social life. 558
But in only one jurisdiction (Britain), with the possible exception of Québec, does one see a
true statist culture. A characteristic of British culture, especially post-World War II, was to
favour the rights of the wider society over the individual person 559 and a belief in the efficacy
and effectiveness of centralized state planning. 560
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Conversely, in Canada, although statism is certainly a part of the ethos of governance, its
impact is varied, perhaps because of the proximity of the United States. It is commonly
suggested that the Canadian perspective on governance is encapsulated by a phrase contained
within the Constitution Act, 1867 561 referring to “peace, order and good government.” 562
Canada embraces the role of government in the working of its society and acknowledges its
legitimate role in maintaining order, a position similar to Britain. 563 But it is also suggested,
perhaps controversially, that there is a shared North American neoliberal vision manifesting
in a commitment to an individualistic social order. 564

It is further suggested that this

commitment acts to shape government regulation to focus on the rights and entitlements of
individuals, while also engaging with social policy concerns which touch upon the
community (usually in the context of ensuring equality).

Canada’s commitment to

individualism is seen in the emphasis on individual rights within social policy. For example,
the design of Medicare is that government finances what were to remain private transactions
between patient and health professional and/or health-provider. While this commitment is
not manifested to the extent of the libertarian extremes seen in the US, it was stronger than
was seen in Britain. The commitment to individualism in Canada was, however, tempered by
a concern for equality as a foundational core principle of governance in Canada. A concern
for equality is present throughout government policy, actions, and debates at all levels of
government, particularly in respect of health. 565
There is also some difference between the jurisdictions in terms of their organizational
density which can be differentiated by examining the level of market or state dominance. 566
Döhler suggests three ideal types of welfare state: 1) a mainly market-based model with no
comprehensive public health insurance; 2) a restricted market model with national health
insurance model where a sector of health-providers has retained market mechanisms; and 3)
a state-dominated model. 567 In respect of health, Canada fits within model two and Britain
model three, suggesting that Britain has a high level of organizational density, compared with
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Canada’s medium level.

This has implications for the nature and type of regulation

employed by the state, with greater regulation being required or likely when there is a greater
level of organizational density.
Some conclude that the lesson of examinations of British policy change is that strong
centralized state structures can sometimes lead to greater departures from the established
policy path – “… wholly new trajectories are made more easily possible by strong
structures.” 568 For health policy, the result could be radical change to established systems
and structures, if deemed politically necessary; and these comments are also applicable to
provincial governments in Canada, again with the caveat that the radical change must relate
to matters within provincial power. The logic of political norms may mean that, in Britain,
governance forms may incline towards what might be termed government paternalism, or
what became known in the Thatcher era as the ‘nanny state’. 569

Canada’s governance

structures may be more predicated on the empowerment of individuals, with a graduated
level of state regulation, often – at least in the health context – working closely with
responsible institutional actors.

Culture
Cultural approaches to public policy seek to explain stability and change in terms of the rise
and fall of cultures. Cultural approaches focus on incidences where a dominant culture that
sustains current policy (including regulatory) norms is subverted by a counter culture that
challenges policy and regulatory stability and promotes change. 570 These dynamics apply in
respect of regulation as much as they do in relation to other state activities. Culture is
important, as Licht et al note, because:
In addition to constraining the development of more specific institutions, the
prevailing informal institutions in a society may also serve as sources of motivation
for and justification of such institutions … Culture … operates as a constraint
Ibid.
D. Wilsford, “Path Dependency or Why History Makes it Difficult but Not Impossible to Reform Health
Systems in a Big Way” (1994) 14:3 J. Pub. Pol’y 251 at 265.
569 See, for example, R. Cottam, “Is Public Health Coercive Health?’ (2005) 366:9497 The Lancet 1592.
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because it encompasses the unwritten, unspoken rules of the game, and it
coordinates people’s epistemics and expectations. 571
Culture is another factor that may shape responses to issues and influence regulatory
directionality.
There are many definitions of ‘culture’, but there is also general agreement that key elements
of culture are shared values and beliefs. 572 According to Kenny, “values are understood to
be relatively enduring beliefs about the ends or goals of social institutions and the virtues
they ought to embody”, 573 and “[v]alues directly define what is desirable and create taken-forgranted perceptions of what is “natural” in social relations.” 574 Values may create political
communities and guide actions, and can unite or constitute a people. 575 Values do not
necessarily indicate preferences for particular institutions or structures – all values may do is
speak to which interest should be protected over another, not how that should be done. 576
Suggesting that a country has specific cultural traits becomes increasingly problematic when
it may be argued that many societies are less heterogenous and more diverse than they may
have been in the past – although a counter argument is that the forces of globalization to
some extent weaken cultural differences between nations. 577 Hence, the analysis in this
section focuses on emerging cultural trends that may be indicative of why societies choose
one policy direction (or form of regulation) over another. I then assess what can be
discerned about the different values and attitudes towards health and health services in each
jurisdiction. I discuss the movement to post-trust and risk societies, and the possible
implications of this for regulation.
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In terms of values associated with healthcare, there are some marked similarities but also
some divergences between Britain and Canada.

Both jurisdictions acknowledge the

efficiency of the market to manage market goods, but healthcare (or at least some forms of
healthcare) is understood to be a public good. 578 The question is the degree or the extent to
which these viewpoints are held. Any universal health funding program is concerned with
enabling the access of all users to certain forms or levels of healthcare and hence is
concerned, to a degree, with equality. The formation of the NHS was part of the enactment
of a comprehensive welfare state that was concerned with ensuring universal access to a
range of social services. In the health context, the NHS was designed to ensure universal
access to a minimum level of health services with a broader ambit of coverage than was seen
in Canada, for example, including dental services and long-term care. The process for
implementing the NHS saw the nationalization of health-facilities across the country to
provide a system where government funded, managed, regulated, and provided health
services. In Britain, there was no moral imperative based on concerns about equality to limit
economically privileged persons’ access to privately provided healthcare. Indeed, part of the
‘stuff their mouths with gold’ bargain at the inception of the NHS was a guarantee that the
consultants could retain the ability to treat private patients using NHS facilities. Britain
accordingly has a two-tier system, with a private system working in parallel with a public
system. In Britain, the acceptance of a parallel private system with its possibilities for queuejumping is an accepted logic of the system. A renunciation of the market in the provision of
healthcare is not a central value for the British public, as long as all can access services
through a public not-for-profit system, even if that involves delays or rationing. The NHS,
however, provides equal access to a broader range of services than in seen in Canadian
jurisdictions so its functional commitment to equality may be greater than is seen in Canada.
Canadian jurisdictions gradually enacted insurance plans so that governments funded
universal access to medically necessary medical and hospital services. Government funding
of access to other forms of health-related goods or services varied across the provinces,
resulting in less functional equality in terms of accessing a range of services than was seen in
Britain. Initially, the Canadian system was also two-tiered in that private services could be
provided by doctors and health facilities. It was not until the enactment of the Canada Health
578
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Act 579 in 1984 that a concern for equality within the relatively narrow sphere of medical and
hospital services became an overarching priority. The Medicare program was redesigned at
the federal level to limit the possibilities of private provision of so-called medically necessary
services in the provinces and territories (as discussed in Chapter 5). 580 Access to medically
necessary services was to be based on need, resulting in a one-tier delivery system within this
sphere. Other broad areas of health service delivery – for example, long-term care and
dentistry – continue to be largely market based.

The increasing resistance to private

provision of medically necessary services within Canadian health systems probably owes as
much to a reaction to the inequalities seen in the US as it did to commitments to equality. 581
But the concept of restricting private provision of medically necessary services, and hence a
renunciation of market values in this narrow sphere of healthcare provision, has become a
central value for Canadians. 582 As such Canada’s commitment to equality, at least insofar as
it relates to access to medically necessary services, is arguably greater than in Britain. In
respect of medically necessary services Canada has mandated equality, while the British NHS
displays, at best, limited inequality. 583 Equality appears to have different meanings in each
jurisdiction, meanings derived from its political and social contexts. For this reason, a
commitment to equality expresses itself differently in the institutional structures in each
country.
These differences also flow to the nature of the welfare state in each jurisdiction. While
Canada is clearly what Esping-Andersen’s typology terms a liberal welfare state, the
categorisation of Britain within the typology has been more questionable. 584

After the

Thatcher reforms, the case for Britain’s inclusion in the typology as a liberal welfare state is
stronger, prior to this the characteristics of the British welfare state straddled across the
liberal and social democratic models. This is a significant point because the liberal model
sees a greater emphasis on “individual initiative and opportunity, where social policy is more
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residual in nature and associated with the role of the market.” 585 Conversely, the social
democratic model focuses on the state provision of welfare, based on universalism, with a
significant engagement in the management of the labour market in respect of wage
bargaining and to reduce unemployment. 586 Britain, then, prior to 1980, had a welfare state
model which placed a lesser premium on individuals in favour of society more generally.
The role of the state in the British model was more paternalistic in its nature.
It is not just values associated with health services that may be important indicators of
change, but also general social values. It is posited by a number of theorists that a period of
cultural change is occurring, suggesting the emergence of a ‘post-trust society’ 587 where
individuals and communities are increasingly expressing distrust, or suspicion, of traditional
and established institutions of social order, such as governments, professions, religious
institutions, and other social edifices. Misztal, for example, described “the emergence of a
widespread consciousness that existing bases for social cooperation, solidarity and consensus
have been eroded.” 588 Societies, some argue, have moved from unconditional trust in the
actions of important social and policy actors to conditional trust or moderated distrust. 589
Giddens suggests that changes in the conditions of modernity, including globalization and
risk perception, create uncertainties that impact upon social trust. 590 Beck argues that the
rationality of modern society requires consideration of the possibility of future damage, both
as a consequence of our risk-taking actions and of the risk-taking actions of others, and this
involves trust or mistrust. 591 Furedi echoes this view and argues that the prevailing culture
exhibits an absence of trust in humanity and that people’s actions are regarded as at least
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potentially dangerous. 592 In contrast, O’Neil suggests that in actuality we trust more than, or
at least as much as we always have, but our trusting mechanisms have changed.593
Increasingly, trust is no longer unquestionably given but must be earned and maintained
through mechanisms of public accountability. Douglas suggests that this is a facet of a
culture increasingly driven by the need to assign responsibility or, as she would suggest,
attribute blame to any or all actions that result in harm. 594 As O’Neill and others note, the
instruments that mediate relationships between institutions and the public can foster trust or,
conversely, undermine it creating the conditions for mistrust. 595

As Rowe and Calnan

describe it:
changes in trust are driven by the dialectical relationship between trust, power,
governance and accountability, so that each affects the other in a continuing iterative
process. 596
How this dialectical relationship may have unfolded in Britain and Canada during the 1980s,
1990s, and early 2000s is discussed in subsequent chapters. Briefly, although the post-trust
trend affects both jurisdictions, I suggest it has had a greater impact in Britain. This is
because the widespread institution of audit mechanisms within the British public sector was
integrally tied to the widespread and wide-reaching incorporation of the principles of the
New Public Management (NPM) into the public sector and the creation of what Power
terms an audit society. 597 This, as discussed in Chapter 5, was also deeply embedded in the
NHS.

Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 6, widespread failures of the traditional

regulators (especially health professions’ regulators) within the health system in Britain
provoked mistrust of these actors and of existing regulatory frameworks.
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Some suggest that Canada, too, is influenced by the post-trust society paradigm, in that a
decline in deference to authority and a loss of trust in elected officials and in government
institutions may be increasingly observed. 598 In contrast to Britain, I suggest that trust in
what might be termed the deliverers of health services largely remained intact in Canada, but
the trust vested in the actions of provincial, territorial, and federal governments took a
beating from a public increasingly tired of the infighting over budgets and concerned about
the toll successive funding decreases and restructuring was taking on the ability of Canadian
health systems to provide quality care in a timely manner. 599
Sociocultural theorists also suggest that risk is an increasingly important cultural construct.
While sociocultural theorists are divided in how they theorize risk, they all, to a greater or
lesser extent, agree that risk has, to quote Lupton, “become an increasingly pervasive concept
of human existence in western societies” 600 which organizes, monitors, and regulates societal
actors. Theorists describe a transformation in human consciousness from seeing risks as a
matter of fate and faith to seeing risks as a consequence of human failure. 601 Beck, for
example, suggests that dangers and hazards are increasingly seen as humanly generated and
therefore as controllable. 602 Douglas suggests that these attitudes provide scope for a society
where someone must inevitably be to blame. 603 Perceiving risks as the consequences of
human failures has regulatory consequences. As discussed in Chapter 6, perceptions about
the scope and nature of risks to the public may influence regulation.

However, also

important are societal attitudes about responsibility for risk management, a question
integrally connected to questions of trust in institutional actors. The public perception of
risk may raise questions about the rightful role of government: is it government’s
responsibility to actively and aggressively regulate risk to protect its citizens? Or is risk
management a process that should be facilitated by government action in a co-regulatory
paradigm with institutional actors and individuals?
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Conclusion
After examining the governance systems in Britain and Canada, I adapt Marmor et al’s
conclusion that:
many of the core structural differences in national health care arrangements are the
product not of differences in fundamental social values but of differences in political
superstructure, of differing accommodations of clashing interests, and of the
historically contingent “accidental logics” of established social institutions 604
Constitutionally, Canada’s federal structure shares power between the federal government,
provinces, and territories. Intergovernmental governance often occurs through processes of
executive federalism – where policy-making and regulation occur through negotiation,
accommodation, and consensus. Even when it is clear that provinces or territories have
jurisdiction, reforms may occur in a slower, perhaps more considered, way as states and
territories learn from the experiences, and perhaps radical change, of others. As Canada is a
federal society, as well as a federal state, it is unsurprising that these norms should also flow
through to the provincial and territorial level where co-regulatory models – where
government reaches consensus and accommodation with key societal groups to co-regulate
practice – remain a common aspect of governance. Canada also has a tradition of lesser
organizational density in the regulation and management of social policy.
In Britain, unitary constitutional structures, coupled with a strong Westminster democratic
tradition, make for a culture where the enactment of regulation is relatively simpler. While in
practice government often preferred to reach some form of accommodation with other
actors, especially in respect of implementation – through the institution of quasi-corporatist
arrangements, notably with organized labour – there was also a tradition of state dominance
and centralization. A greater degree of organizational density was seen in Britain requiring
greater regulation. British public policy, especially in the health context, focused more
centrally on benefiting the population, rather than having an individual focus, hence was
more paternalistic in nature and resulted in a greater role for the state.

604

Marmor, supra note 546 at 4.

134

The contention in this chapter is that factors such as constitutional structures and political
and cultural norms create a background trajectory that constrains, or at least is highly
influential, in determining future choices about forms of regulation used to regulate certain
issues. These factors are not in and of themselves sufficient, however, to predicate change
and influence a process begun through a confluence of other factors – and it is these other
factors that are subject to examination in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. As I acknowledged
at the beginning of this chapter, to do justice to matters of constitutions, politics, and culture
could be the topic of several theses. While this chapter discusses some of these issues, it
does not pretend to do so in any depth; but the analysis in this chapter is sufficient to enable
me to assert that there are both some convergences and divergences in constitutional,
political, and cultural norms between the jurisdictions, and some of these divergences are
sufficient to provide a partial explanation as to why a particular regulatory direction may be
chosen in the future.
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Chapter 5
Mistrust, Markets, and Modernization: Moments of Change
Introduction
To recap the argument so far, the pre-1980 period saw a remarkable convergence between
Canada and Britain as to which regulatory instruments to employ in respect of patient-safety
issues. However, the design of the health systems and the constitutional, political, and social
norms in each jurisdiction were distinct, and this established conditions through which
divergences could emerge. In this chapter I examine the period from 1980–2005 and
evaluate how changes to accepted political norms may affect the design of regulatory
frameworks and use of regulatory instruments.
The beginning of the 1980s saw a transformation in the accepted norms of governance
within the public sector, a transformation that ultimately spread across the world. The label
affixed to these shifts was the New Public Management or NPM. The tenets of the NPM
resulted in reappraisals of the forms and functions of the public service in Britain and
Canada. The impact of the introduction of the NPM, and the scope and extent of its
introduction, on the management of patient safety within the health systems in Britain and
Canada requires evaluation. As Aucoin notes, “[c]hanges in public management are not
merely changes to administrative processes and practices; they are also changes to
governance itself.” 605 Put differently, the rise of NPM approaches mark shifts in political
norms. These shifts can provide the impetus for a fundamental re-evaluation of the purpose,
intent and necessity of regulation.
The central argument of this chapter is that the differing impacts of the NPM on the
management of patient safety in British and Canadian health systems constituted an
important point of divergence between jurisdictions in respect of regulating patient safety.
More specifically, the chapter asserts that the modes of governance of the NHS were more
deeply penetrated by the tenets of NPM, much more so than was seen in Canadian health
systems. In the NHS context, the principles of the NPM affected not only the management
of the NHS, but also clinical concerns with a resultant lessening in professional autonomy.
605

Aucoin, supra note 39 at 3.
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There were significant variations in the adoption of the NPM across Canadian governments,
attributable to the Canadian federal system. 606 Generally, the NPM was somewhat influential
in many Canadian health systems with respect to their management and financing. The
clinical realm remained largely untouched and professional autonomy preserved.
In the first section of this chapter, I offer a fuller description of the NPM. The second
section of this chapter analyzes events in Britain, focusing most attention on the
Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major in power from 1979 to
1997. It was the Conservatives whose ideological convictions saw the precepts of the NPM
deeply embedded into the British public sector. The section also briefly discusses the
approach of Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ government in power from 1997 which, to some
extent, modified some of the effects of the NPM on the NHS, but left undisturbed much of
its core structure. I turn then to an analysis of the impact of the NPM on Canadian health
systems in the third section of this chapter.
What is the NPM?
The NPM is associated with neoliberal economic theories that emanated from the Chicago
School of Economics in the 1970s. In general, these theories advocate a lessening of the role
of government, outside of monetary policy, a demand for good governance by governments
(e.g. fiscal conservatism, debt reduction, inflation control), and an advancement of the role
of free markets in governance.
Emerging from these general principles is a prescription for the management of the public
sector, now known as the NPM. A full analysis of the NPM is neither possible nor necessary
for the purposes of the argument being advanced in this chapter and in this thesis. However,
for definitional purposes a brief outline of many of the central operating premises of the
NPM must be made.

See, for example, K. Murray, “The Realignment of Government in the Provinces” in C. Dunn, ed., Provinces,
2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) 415.
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Economic stagnation, high unemployment, and increasing fiscal deficits in the 1970s and
1980s placed governments, to quote Campbell, “under stress”. 607 The stress fuelled debates
about sustainability of the welfare state internationally and about the proper role of the state
and the market in providing social services. 608 It raised questions about the hitherto accepted
economic theories of Keynesian economics that underlay the welfare state. 609 It is suggested
by some that economic stress resulted in the introduction of a new model to manage the
public sector – the NPM. 610 It is suggested by others that the dominance of the NPM can be
attributed to the rise of the ‘New Right’ political ideology and government. 611

Others

suggest that existent mechanisms for the governance of the private sector had proved
unsatisfactory or that new technology required new modes of management. 612 Whatever the
reasons for its influence, it proved a dominant force for changes to modes of governance
during this period.
While there is some disagreement as to exactly what constitutes the NPM because of the
many and varied contexts within which it has been applied, some general themes emerge. 613
To minimize the role of government and maximize the operation of the free market, one
sees the privatization or commercialization of many public enterprises that are deemed
outside the core business of government and the increased contracting out of public services
to private providers. One also sees the imposition of restraints on public expenditure so
debt may be curtailed and inflation contained, and so that state debt may be reduced. 614
Within the management of the public sector, one may also see the separation of policy
development from funding and delivery of services. This is closely linked to the concept of
regulatory capture, which is to say the possibility that regulators may be influenced by close
C. Campbell, Governments Under Stress, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) cited in Aucoin, supra
note 39.
608 Marmor, supra note 546.
609 In a nutshell, Keynesian economics embraces the role of government in the management of a mixed
economy to ensure that macroeconomic ends are achieved. For a more detailed explanation, there are a
number of books and articles on this theme; for example, J. Stein, Monetarist, Keynesian & New Classical Economics,
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
610 Aucoin, supra note 39, but see C. Hood, “The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s: Variations on a
Theme” (1995) 20:2-3 Acc. Org. & Soc’y 93 [Hood].
611 See, for example, C. Pollitt, Managerialism and tbe Public Services: Tbe Anglo-American Experience, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993) [Pollitt, Managerialism]. But see Hood, ibid.
612 See discussion in Hood ibid.
613 See, for example, Hood, ibid; Aucoin, supra note 39; Pollitt, Managerialism, supra note 611; C. Hood, “A Public
Management for All Seasons?” (1991) 69:1 Pub. Admin. 3 [Hood, “Public Management”].
614 See, for example, Hood, supra note 610; Aucoin, supra note 39.
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associations with the regulated, such that the regulators may not act in the public interest.
Regulatory capture may also arise if the elected ministers of state become subordinate to the
interests and agendas of the bureaucracy, raising the possibility of a ‘Yes Minister’ scenario. 615
Hence, contestability of advice and independence from partisan interests become key
concerns of the NPM.

One also commonly sees the introduction of private-sector

management practices into the public sector, including, for example, the increased use of
contracts and performance indicators, enhanced accountability mechanisms, and the
monitoring and oversight, not just of financial matters, but also of the effectiveness,
efficiency, quality, and responsiveness of service delivery. 616

Also one may see the

devolution of management authority within agencies or organizations. There is some tension
between some tenets of the NPM, for example, between the centralization inherent in any
contracting process and the decentralizing premise of devolution. 617
The principles and practices of the NPM spread across the world through the 1980s and
1990s, although in different forms and with different intensity in other Western democracies,
and this variance raises challenges when making comparisons between jurisdictions. 618
Christensen and Lægreid, for example, argue that the tenets of the NPM are filtered,
interpreted, and modified through national factors. 619

National factors include the

instrumental actions of politicians and administrators and the nation’s (or province or
territory’s) political–administrative history (its culture, style of governance, and traditions),
resulting in a variance between nations (and levels of government within federal states). 620
Some assert that both Britain and Canada are in the group of countries in which the NPM

This classic BBC comedy ran from 1980 to 1984 and portrayed a minister’s agenda for reform being
constantly thwarted by the machinations of the civil service. It was said to be Prime Minister Thatcher’s
favourite television program.
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had the greatest impact. 621 It is also generally agreed the NPM saw the greatest uptake in the
unitary governments of Britain and New Zealand. 622 Others contest that Canada had a high
uptake of the NPM, suggesting that, while it could not be said that Canadian governments
were unaffected by the tenets of the NPM, the impact of the NPM was generally somewhat
limited at both the federal and provincial/territorial levels. 623 This view acknowledges that
there were some provinces within Canada where the tenets of the NPM penetrated more
deeply, in particular Alberta and Ontario. 624 Accepting, for argument’s sake, that Canada and
Britain are in the group of countries where NPM had the greatest penetration into
governance structures, a closer examination of what actually occurred in these jurisdictions
illustrates considerable variations – despite the reforms being presented in similar terms and
supporting similar general administrative principles. 625

Britain
The Conservative Years
The election of the Conservative Thatcher government in 1979 marked the election of a
government fiercely committed to a particular ideology – that of neoliberalism, a market
driven approach to economic and social policy.

As a government, its primary policy

objectives were to revive market liberalism and to radically revise and roll back the role of
the state. The Thatcher government opposed ‘big’ government and state-led egalitarianism
and was deeply suspicious of the influence of the welfare state on society. 626 The impact of
the British economic crisis on the Conservatives was said to have “… produced a desire to
be seen to ‘stand up to’ vested interests and a mode of making policy that dismissed the
importance of consultation and compromise.” 627

To achieve these ends, there was a

movement away from the previous reliance on consensus-building mechanisms, such as royal

621 Hood, supra note 610; Christensen, supra note 617. However, see Aucoin, supra note 39, who argues that the
NPM was not all that influential in Canada.
622 Hood, supra note 610; Christensen, supra note 617. However, see Aucoin, supra note 39.
623 Aucoin, ibid. See also Canada, Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of
Commons (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993).
624 See, for example, E. Glor, “Has Canada Adopted the New Public Management?” (2001) 3 Pub. Manage.
Rev. 121 [Glor].
625 Christensen, supra note 617.
626 Hood, supra note 610.
627 Moran, “Policy Catastrophes”, supra note 616 at 425.
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commissions, as the basis of policy development, towards small, fast-acting task forces or
review panels drawn from the core executive, or from outsiders. 628
With a solid majority of votes in the House of Commons and Conservative domination of
the House of Lords, the Thatcher government had the capacity to pursue its chosen policy
direction. The only limitations were concerns for its prospects of re-election, concerns
blunted by its genuine ideological commitment to the reforms it was implementing. 629 In
pursuit of its objectives, “Thatcherites were convinced that a dramatic break with many
institutions and policies was necessary…” 630 In some contexts, however, the strategy of
government was to retain its institutions intact but to change their operational dynamics. 631
The extent of this break from existent institutions and policies is critical in appraising the
modes and instruments for subsequent regulation.
The vision of the Conservative government was of a strong centralized state with strong
individualistic consumers making decisions in a free marketplace. The emphasis was on the
role of government, not as a provider of services, but as policy-maker and regulator. To
employ a favoured metaphor: government was to steer, not row. 632 Klein notes the paradox
at the heart of this new governance agenda – to reduce the role of the state, the power of the
state had to be strengthened, because it remained a truism that free markets required
regulation, 633 and hence power was increasingly centralized in state agencies. Although
decentralization of service delivery in the NHS was continued and indeed developed in
subsequent reforms, such decentralization occurred in the context of greater controls
imposed by the central state, first in respect of financial matters and ultimately in regard to
performance, including the provision and governance of social services.
The NHS was not initially targeted by the Thatcher government for major reforms to its
structure or institutions, apart from limited reforms in 1982 that saw the partial
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reorganization and further decentralization of the regional system. This replaced the 90 Area
Health Authorities with 192 District Health Authorities (DHAs). This ensured that decisions
were made as close to the point of delivery as possible. The boards of regional health
authorities (RHAs) and DHAs reflected the ideological convictions of the government.
Boards comprised representatives of the senior management of the authority and nonexecutive members appointed by the Secretary of State (primarily on the basis of their
business skills). The formal representation of consultants, GPs, and nurses on governing
bodies was ended.

The reforms, at least in some senses, represented a revolt against

expertise, as there was less scope within the management of the DHAs for the role of the
expert (i.e. health professionals). 634 But the reforms may have also represented an attempt to
subsume one form of expertise (clinical) with another (managerial/technocratic). The NHS
also collaterally felt the impact of the general reforms through the imposition of constraints
to the global budgets allocated to the NHS. 635
The internal management of the NHS did, however, become a focus of government
attention. Sir Roy Griffiths, a prominent businessman, was charged to lead a team of
businessmen to review NHS management practices to determine how its internal efficiency
could be improved. Its 25-page report provided to government in 1983 was a catalyst for
much change. At the heart of its recommendations was the wry observation that “In short if
Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS today she
would almost certainly be searching for the people in charge.” 636 It recommended the
introduction of clearer management structures and of performance targets against which
managers would be held accountable. 637 The Griffiths Review also criticized the NHS’s
consensus management structure, suggesting that too many people were involved in
decision-making resulting in significant decision-making delays, and suggested that decision-
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making processes should be rationalized. 638 The NHS was said to lack direction, despite the
issuance of many directives. 639 Further, the review identified that it was uncertain whether
the NHS produced the right kind of services and whether the quality of such services was
adequate, as little or no quality evaluations occurred. The review noted in particular that
outputs were not measured, there was little or no clinical or economic evaluation of service
provision, and that the NHS did not know how well it was meeting the needs and
expectations of the people it served. 640 It recommended that service provision and resource
usage be evaluated.
While the focus of the review was on managerial issues, its reference to evaluating clinical
services was a marked departure from traditional practice, where clinical matters within the
NHS had been the sole responsibility of the medical profession. 641 That these questions
were even raised was perhaps a first step towards placing some limitations upon the power
of the medical profession within the NHS, in effect enhancing the power of the state. 642 The
review’s recommendations, to review and restructure management systems to appoint
managers at every level of the NHS to provide leadership and enhance accountability, were
consistent with the NPM ideology that was more broadly being imposed upon the public
sector at that time. 643
The implementation of the Griffiths recommendations was government’s effort, for the first
time, to measure and assess managerial performance. 644 However, managers continued to
play a constrained role in an institution where a parallel management and operations
structure remained in place for the medical profession. Despite the Griffith review, attempts
to build a unified management structure within the NHS foundered, and the relationships
between managers and clinicians did not fundamentally alter. 645 The review resulted in the
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introduction of performance indicators to enable the comparison of the relative performance
of NHS Trusts; it was thought that this might lead to pressure by management to change
clinical behaviour. 646 Performance measures, at least in respect of measuring throughput,
were adopted in the mid-1980s, but the activities of doctors generally remained outside of
the managerial purview. 647 After the Griffith review, managers still lacked the necessary
information, and perhaps the will, to challenge clinical dominance, 648 although it is also fair
to say that the emphasis on and strengthening of managerial power within the NHS
increasingly was seen to weaken the power of the professions. 649
By its third term in office, the Thatcher government was prepared to undertake more serious
reforms, propelled in part by what Klein described as the political perception that the
medical profession had breached its “implicit concordant” or its bargain with the state. 650
The terms of the implicit bargain were that the medical profession would remain quiescent
about changes to the NHS in return for the retention of managerial and clinical autonomy.
Prime Minister Thatcher may have viewed the sustained criticism by doctors of the
budgetary limitations imposed upon the NHS under the Thatcher government as an implicit
revocation of the concordant. 651
Accordingly, in 1987, a review of the NHS was undertaken by a small working group chaired
by the Prime Minister and including four cabinet ministers and two policy advisers. In a
break from the tradition of accommodation and corporatism, there were no formal terms of
reference, limited consultation, and no representation from the medical profession or from
the management of the NHS. 652 What emerged from the review was a commitment to the
establishment of an internal market within the NHS. 653 This was consistent both with
neoliberal ideology concerned about regulatory capture (discussed in more detail later) and
note 287 and General Medical Council v Roylance (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 311 [Roylance]. See also Tuohy, “Logics”
supra note 35.
646 Harrison & Schulz, supra note 352 at 198.
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with reforms that had been or were being implemented in other parts of the British social
services system. These reforms to the NHS were based to a large extent on the work of an
American economist, Alain Enthoven, who had earlier critiqued the NHS for, in his view,
failing to reward efficiency and innovation. 654 This failure to institute appropriate incentives
resulted, according to Enthoven, in a system that encouraged hospitals to export patients,
while not rewarding hospitals (usually teaching hospitals) that imported patients. 655
General practitioners were always weakly controlled by government and hence had limited
accountability within the NHS because of their status as independent contractors. The
Conservative government, cognisant of this problem, imposed a new contract in them in
1989. 656 This strengthened their accountability to the state by requiring them to carry out
certain contractual obligations. Family Health Service Authorities could monitor the terms
of these contracts, as well as oversee referral and prescription patterns.
Working for Patients, a White Paper issued by government in 1989, and incorporated into the
NHS and Community Care Act 1990, set out the framework for reform. 657 The framework
included a split between purchasers and providers of services. Henceforth, District Health
Authorities (DHAs) would purchase health services from hospitals and other providers.
General practitioner fundholding was also introduced, where GPs with large practices (over
11,000 patients) could be allocated a budget to purchase health services (hospital and other
community services) for their patients, as well as to pay for their own services. This would,
in theory at least, create an internal market which would see competition on the basis of
price and quality for funding. Hospitals could remain directly managed by a DHA or
convert to NHS Trust status. NHS Trust status would give hospitals greater operational
control as they would no longer be overseen by Regional Health Authorities and a further
decentralization of the health system to the local level. In addition, NHS Trusts would hold
the contracts of consultants who worked there, although pay would remain centrally
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negotiated. This potentially gave the NHS Trusts greater control over medical professionals.
On the other hand, NHS Trusts were required to include medical professionals in their
governance structures, as a condition of gaining self-governing status, reinforcing the
accommodation with the profession. The state gave with one hand and took away with the
other trying to manage the relationship with doctors so as to avoid a direct confrontation
with the medical profession while implementing highly controversial reforms.
The introduction of the internal market was, at least in theory, also designed to clarify the
responsibilities of some actors and strengthen accountability. 658 Klein notes that the internal
market reforms aimed to transform the relationship between players in the market from trust
to contract. 659 Importantly, contracts are also a tool that gives more formal and hierarchical
control to the contractor, as part of the contractual process involves setting precise targets
and expectations around service provision, service quality, and accountability. 660

Some

suggest that, at least initially, service agreements generally did not play a significant role in
respect of judgements about clinical quality or appropriateness, as the quality-focused
standards within those agreements were largely procedural; for example, they addressed
matters such as waiting times. 661 While this is, or was, a correct view and some contractual
terms were and are procedural, the development of systems to monitor not just outputs (i.e.
number of hip surgeries performed) but also outcomes (i.e. rates of post-surgery infections
of those undergoing hip surgery) has enabled service quality to be monitored more
comprehensively.
The White Paper also heralded the introduction of medical audit processes within the NHS.
Medical audit was defined in the White Paper as “a systematic, critical analysis of the quality
of medical care, including the procedures used for diagnosis and treatment, the use of
resources, and the resulting outcome for the patient”. 662 From 1989, the Department of
Health supported the development of medical audit practices within trusts and DHAs by
U.K., Department of Health, Working for Patients (London: HMSO, 1989) [Working for Patients].
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providing £40 million per annum in earmarked funds for five years. 663 From 1990, as a
matter of policy, all doctors within the NHS were required to take part in systematic
processes of medical audit. The medical audit models initially established within the NHS
were described by Harrison and Pollitt as an internal medical model, controlled by the
profession, not by NHS management. 664 Thus, medical audit, to some extent, represented
the continuation of the accommodation between the medical profession and the state,
whereby the profession retained control and autonomy of the practice of its profession.
However, in this case the state put mechanisms in place to ensure that processes were in
place to audit service quality and to that extent the autonomy of the profession was limited
as the state required compliance. Monitoring would take place retrospectively, be conducted
by doctors, and aimed at modifying behaviour by education. It would also be confidential,
with only aggregate data passed to managers. 665
Clinical guidelines would be increasingly used to guide practice, although enforcement would
rest with the profession, not line managers. 666 Increasingly, it was written into contracts that
providers must have established procedures for clinical audit, or that all medical staff must
participate in audit; and some contracts particularized specific topics to be addressed by audit
programs. 667 However, such contractual provisions may have been ineffective as, in general,
at least in early iterations of contracts, there were no sanctions available for breaches, and any
monitoring of compliance tended to be retrospective, reactive, and paper based. 668 Tuohy’s
conclusion was that “[c]ontracting, then, did not generally provide a vehicle for the
monitoring of clinical performance …”. 669 However, the increasing sophistication of such
contracts, and the development of better information systems, suggests that, increasingly,
contracts may have become a vehicle to monitor clinical performance.
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Although these reforms established a market element into the structure of the health
services, they still preserved to some degree the clinical arena as an autonomous zone for
collegial decision-making (at least by members of the medical profession). Tuohy suggested
that as a result there was little real change in the balance between state actors and the medical
profession: “[t]he resilience of traditional patterns of relationships among the actors in the
British health care arena derived from the centrality of trust-based relationships in the
functioning of the system.” 670 Others note that quasi-market competition did in fact, over a
period of time, transform the relationships between medical professionals, patients, and
managers, as the service agreements negotiated under this model addressed the issue of
effectiveness and quality. 671

Additionally, a significant effect of Working for Patients was to,

“persuade the medical profession to accept more collective responsibility for the way in
which individual members exercise their craft.” 672 The signal sent to the medical profession
is that they have bounded autonomy when actions are taken because the state required it and
when there are audit and oversight mechanisms in place to monitor compliance.
As discussed above, the possibility of capture was a focus of the NPM. The corporatist
structures within many sectors of the British public sector were a cause of great concern to
the conservative governments. As discussed in Chapter 3, the structure of the NHS, with its
formal accommodation with the medical profession in the process of decision-making, was
such as to automatically raise the hackles of the Thatcher government. Reforms to the NHS
constituted the third wave of the Thatcher government’s global attack on corporatism in
government – the first being reforms to industrial relations, the second to education. 673
Indeed, a hallmark of the Thatcher era is said to be its attacks on the power of established
professional groups (as well as local authorities). 674 It is notable that many of these groups
were traditionally opposed to the Conservative party or threatened its power. 675 However, it
was not just self-interest that drove these reforms; it was also ideological conviction. Indeed,
the trust formerly vested in the medical profession to act in a manner consistent with the
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public interest was now in question because of concerns about capture – in this instance, that
the private commercial interests of the medical profession were outweighing the public
interest. 676

These concerns were particularly seen in respect of the operations of the

professional regulatory bodies. As Davies notes: “[t]here was no doubt, however, that the
statutory bodies were a thorn in the side of a New Right government …”. 677 The political
costs of any direct confrontation with the medical profession were potentially so great that
the Conservative government chose not to do so, despite its ideological commitments.
But Davies suggests that a confrontation did in fact occur, albeit through an indirect attack
on the power, privileges, and autonomy of the medical profession. 678 This occurred by
strengthening the accountability mechanisms implicit in employment relationships,
promoting audit and risk management within the NHS, and establishing regional education
bodies through the NHS and Community Care Act 1990. 679 The impact of the reforms was
summed up by Klein:
[T]here is a new emphasis on holding clinicians and others accountable for their
performance. A system hitherto based on trust – on the view that consultants and
others, by the very nature of their professional status, can be trusted to manage
resources put at their disposal – is turning into a system where justification is
required. … The NHS has always relied on trust; hence, of course, the inadequacy of
so much information in the past. If clinicians and other health professionals can be
trusted to do the best for their patients, why bother to collect information about their
activities?” 680
However, any changes to government-sanctioned self-regulation by the health professions
were, at this time at least, relegated to the sidelines of reform.

In some senses, they may

have been deemed unnecessary. Klein notes:
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One of the hallmarks of the Thatcher government was precisely that it challenged the
power of the trade unions and the professions. In a sense, the medical profession was
given warning that it no longer had a veto on public policy and that more rigorous
self-regulation was the only alternative to greater managerial control. 681
Another general focus of the NPM was to make government institutions, particularly in the
social services, more responsive to their users – who were re-branded during this period as
‘consumers’ or ‘clients’.

For Conservative governments, such responsiveness was an

important characteristic of the private-sector norms they were trying to instil in the public
service. 682

The re-branding, if you will, of social and health services as products, has

attracted a number of powerful critiques. 683 It has been suggested that the use of business
language (such as ‘provider’ and ‘consumer’) to describe healthcare tapped into a widely
shared cultural understanding of what the public expected from a business in terms of
service, quality, and safety. 684 The public’s increased expectations are coupled with legal
rights and remedies if products or services are unsatisfactory. 685
It is a chicken-and-egg question as to whether these changes – instituted as part of an
ideological shift – presaged, accompanied, or were the result of an accompanying shift in
social or cultural values. This cultural shift could be seen in trends towards consumerism
and, in the health context, in the transformation in the nature of healthcare relationships.
Patients moved from being passive recipients of treatment and care, paternalistically offered
by medical professionals, to partners in a care-and-treatment relationship with a medical
professional. The public was no longer ready to accept passively what was given to them;
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consumerist rights began to dominate public discourse. 686 Consumerist values of difference
and choice are “increasingly accepted by a self-reliant ‘contented majority’ confident that
they can control their own lives.” 687
The Conservative government’s approach saw the replacement of the public service ethics
with a new managerialist doctrine where the citizen became a consumer and managers ran a
business accountable through a market-like process, rather than democratic accountability. 688
But, as Bauman notes, consumer rights in a contract culture are fundamentally out of step
with many of the values that underpin the welfare state, such as democratic accountability. 689
As such, these trends imply a revision, not only of the management practices of the public
sector in its dealing with consumers, but also of regulatory frameworks and accountabilities.
In the health context these trends translated into pressure to institute regulatory reforms to
enhance the rights of patients in their dealings with the NHS and health professionals to
make the latter more responsive to patient concerns (complaints). The introduction of the
NHS Patients Charter by the Conservative government in 1991 is a case in point. The
charter contained broad guarantees at the level of principle, in addition to ten rights and nine
standards of practice, many of which related to waiting times or service quality. Although
the charter had no legal force, it was bolstered by the introduction of performance measures
to try to ensure that the charter was meaningful. Providers were required to produce annual
reports containing data about how they met, or did not meet, the standards.

But a

consequence of this focus on quality and responsiveness to consumers may be that, as Klein
notes, the power of the healthcare workers had to be ‘smashed’.

690

The move to ensure

responsiveness and service quality seems to have further reinforced the impetus for
enhanced power, control, and oversight over the medical profession within the NHS.
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‘New Labour’
The year 1997 saw the election of the Blair Labour government. Symptomatic of the degree
of integration of many of the tenets of the NPM into governance norms was that many of
the reforms instituted by the previous Conservative government were retained and even
strengthened by the Labour government, as part of its ‘third way’. The ‘third way’ was an
attempt to marry the economic policies of the ‘New Right’ with some of the social policies of
the Left. One of the intentions of the third way was to focus on being pragmatic, not
ideological.
In the health context, the advent of the Labour government saw “both rhetorical emphasis
and practical action … now firmly located around issues of health care quality …”. 691 A
number of reasons have been suggested for this switch of focus. These include: increased
evidence of what works in clinical practice; widespread variations in clinical practice and
outcomes; a number of high-profile failings of care (discussed in Chapter 6); the emergence
of data systems that enabled closer monitoring of performance; the need to contain costs;
and, perhaps above all, the necessity for a new government to find an issue “around which to
articulate public concern over the NHS which could serve as a focus for health care
reform.” 692 The Labour government also encouraged the development of social consensus
through extensive consultation requirements structured into policy development processes –
a process that has been termed ‘open governance’. 693
The underlying principles of these reforms remained very similar, however, to those
underlying the Conservative government reforms: to increase the mechanisms for control
over clinical matters to enhance and improve performance and strengthen accountability
mechanisms within the NHS. Again, the logic was towards centralization, to support a
strong, accountable state.
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The new government did remove some of the elements of the internal market, and health
authorities, trusts and GPs were encouraged to collaborate rather than compete. 694 In other
respects, Labour took the internal market a step further by developing primary care
organizations (PCOs), consortia of general practices, which could enter into service
agreements with providers of hospital and community care services. The 1997 White Paper
also emphasized the importance of accountability for the quality of performance outcomes
as measured by performance indicators. 695 It introduced the concept of clinical governance,
essentially an accountability framework for clinical practice, and required NHS Trusts and
PCOs to introduce clinical governance mechanisms. 696
The Health Act 1999 enacted the reforms heralded in the White Paper. 697 The new regulation
was interventionalist in nature in contrast to the previous “light touch” used to address
clinical matters. 698 The intervention is for the most part focused on clinical care. 699 ‘Quality’
was a watchword of the reforms, and the Act created a duty of quality:
It is the duty of each Health Authority, Primary Care Trust and NHS trust to put and
keep in place arrangements for the purpose of monitoring and improving the quality
of health care which it provides to individuals. 700
This meant that every NHS Trust must institute a clinical governance framework. As part of
clinical governance, they must have policies for managing risk and improving quality,
including reinvigorating clinical audit, strengthening risk-management procedures,
mechanisms to implement the National Service Frameworks, National Institute for Clinical
Excellence Guidelines, frameworks for staff to report concerns about poorly performing
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colleagues, and development courses. 701

National Service Frameworks (NSF) were

developed for major care areas; they were essentially evidence-based guidelines for clinical
practice. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was established in 1999 to
set standards and create guidelines for quality healthcare. The NSF and the activities of
NICE also undermined clinical autonomy in that the professions no longer had a monopoly
over setting the standards for the profession; instead, these processes were centralized in
government agencies. Acceptance and uptake of these guidelines was auditable by the
Commission for Health Improvement, as well as being a relevant consideration in any
litigation.

The advent of clinical governance has been heralded as representing a

“fundamental shift in the relationship between the state and the medical (and other health
care) professions.” 702
Pursuant to the reforms, the clinical performance of NHS Trusts would be henceforth
evaluated by a newly established Commission for Health Improvement, a non-departmental
government body. 703 Its responsibility was to provide advice and information to NHS Trusts
and PCOs, review their arrangements to monitor and improve quality, and conduct
investigations of the management, provision, or service quality. 704 In part, it did this through
a regular process of inspections. Klein notes:
These instruments [NSF and the Commission for Health Improvement] pose a
potentially major threat to the medical profession. They challenge the notion at the
heart of medical autonomy: that performance can be judged only by peers. 705
This Labour initiative was heralded as “the latest of many attempts in the NHS to exercise
greater managerial control over clinical activities” 706 and as “revolution” in the way that the
British medical profession was regulated. 707 It was, however, also a logical extension of the
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previous government’s move to impose private-sector governance requirements onto the
public sector and thereby to increase accountability. In so doing, it imposed another layer of
governance requirements, focusing on clinical performance, upon the NHS and upon those
who work there.

In short: “the government appears to take the view, however, that the

profession cannot be trusted to perform this work without the oversight of government
regulators.” 708 In addition to this, Davies suggests “It is the cost factor that explains the shift
from a self-regulatory paradigm to an interventionalist, managerial one.” 709 He notes that
the proportion of NHS resources allocated to dealing with negligence claims was increasing.
It was suggested that it might be more cost effective to weed out poorly performing doctors
than to absorb the increasing costs of legal action. 710
The National Clinical Assessment Authority (NCAA) was established by regulation in 2001
as a special health authority. 711 Its purpose was to provide support to health authorities,
primary care trusts, hospitals and community trusts facing concerns about the performance
of an individual doctor or dentist by providing advice, carrying out assessments, and offering
education and mediation services. This was another mechanism used to strengthen the
powers of NHS management to address concerns about professional performance. In
creating a parallel process, government avoided the necessity of revisiting governmentsanctioned self-regulation. The program’s functions were explicitly linked to the GMC’s
performance-related assessment powers, 712 which constituted additional implicit pressure for
the GMC to undertake its performance-related functions adequately as this independent
agency was, so to speak, looking over its shoulder.
There was a third round of reforms occurring from 2001–2003 based on two reports: Building
a Safer NHS for Patients: Implementing an Organisation with a Memory 713 and A First Class Service:

Ibid. at 446.
Ibid. at 447.
710 Ibid.
711 The National Clinical Assessment Authority (Establishment and Constitution) Order 2000, S.I. 2000/2961.
712 J. Allsop, “Regaining Trust in Medicine: Professional and State Strategies” (2006) 54:4 Curr. Socio. 621
[Allsop, “Regaining Trust”].
713 U.K., Department of Health, Building a Safer NHS for Patients: Implementing an Organisation with a Memory,
(London: Department of Health 2001) [Building a Safer NHS].
708
709

155

Quality in the New NHS. 714 One key action was to establish a National Patient Safety Agency
(NPSA) in 2001 with a mandate to prioritize patient safety within the NHS. 715 Although this
agency had few ostensible powers, it instituted a number of programs that aligned with NHS
goals, with tighter scrutiny of safety and quality issues within the NHS, including the
reporting of adverse events.
The National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 slightly reorganized the
health system again by giving Primary Care Trusts broader purchasing authority and
renaming Health Authorities as Strategic Health Authorities. The Act also focused on
patient and community participation in public decision-making in the NHS by establishing
patient forums for each NHS Trust and Primary Care Trust, and a Commission for Patient
and Public Involvement in Health. The commission’s mandate was to provide advice about
arrangements for public involvement in decision-making and to oversee and support the
patient forums.
The theme of mistrust of the health-professional regulators continued under the Labour
government. Government had made it clear that professional regulatory bodies were on
notice that they must improve their performance:
Recent events have dented public confidence in the quality of clinical care provided
by the NHS. The challenge for the professions is to demonstrate that professional
self-regulation can continue to enjoy public confidence. 716
Perhaps this form of associational self-regulation – i.e. the imposition of pressure to try to
compel improved performance from self-regulatory actors 717 – was deemed insufficient, as
government subsequently added a layer of meta-regulation above the mechanisms of
government-sanctioned self-regulation.

Meta-regulatory mechanisms are where a

government agency is given an extended mandate or is created to oversee the exercise of
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government-sanctioned self-regulatory regulatory powers to ensure that they are exercised in
the public, not private, interest. 718 Meta-regulation is then ideologically consistent with the
NPM as it guards against regulatory capture and can be considered an expression of distrust,
or at least concern, that the regulatory actor(s) in question are no longer “responsible” 719 or
“virtuous” political actors. 720

In particular, the government established the Council for

Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (originally known as the Council for the Regulation of
Health Care Professionals) (CHRE) to oversee all health-professional regulatory agencies
within Britain. 721
The Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 established the
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (the Healthcare Commission) and
abolished the Commission for Healthcare Improvement and the National Care Standards
Commission (both agencies only having been established in 1999 and 2000 respectively). 722
The Healthcare Commission, similarly to its predecessor, audits and oversees the operations
of NHS facilities to encourage improvement in the provision of healthcare by and for NHS
bodies. 723 The Act also established NHS Foundation Trusts, a status to be achieved by NHS
Trusts with an exemplary record of quality and performance. Foundation Trust status
confers even greater autonomy on management and the community. Section 45(1) of the
Act strengthens the quality duty previously established in the Health Act 1999 to have general
application across the NHS: “It is the duty of each NHS body to put and keep in place
arrangements for the purpose of monitoring and improving the quality of health care
provided by and for that body.”
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The tenets of the NPM comprehensively penetrated the NHS under successive governments
and fundamentally altered its governance arrangements. The key difference between the
Labour and Conservative governments was the degree to which they embraced
marketization, but in other respects reforms remained largely consistent with the tenets of
the NPM. In so doing, the reforms were consistent with the internal logic of the NHS, as
they contributed to the maintenance and expansion of control by the centre.

This is

irrespective of the greater devolution and decentralization from regional to district to local
levels of responsibility during this period, as the devolution was accompanied by the
imposition of increasingly detailed financial, managerial and clinical expectations upon all
actors within the NHS. Recentralization was re-branded as rational public policy. 724 These
contractual expectations were subject to monitoring, auditing, and evaluation by state
agencies, supplemented by public reporting of results.
It is the degree to which the NPM affected clinical autonomy that is the most striking
divergence between Britain and Canada. In Britain, the Conservative government, at least,
was deeply suspicious of professional control as it threatened the supremacy of the state, in
the sense of determining the priorities for the health system and delimiting the budget for
healthcare. But for all governments fears of capture by a powerful interest group were at the
heart of many of the reforms to the NHS. Hence, a key part of the reforms instituted as part
of the implementation of the NPM was to create mechanisms to control and limit the
autonomy of the professions. These mechanisms included the end of formal corporatist
arrangements within the NHS, a greater oversight and control of doctors by NHS
management, specific accountabilities for budgetary and clinical decisions and clinical
outcomes, as well as specific performance expectations, including compliance with
government-generated standards for practice.
It has been suggested that the commitment to mechanisms of audit and accountability seen,
not just within the NHS but across the British public sector, has resulted in the emergence in
Britain of what Power calls an “audit society” where the regulatory preoccupation is to
T. Marmor, “Fads in Medical Care Policy and Politics: The Rhetorics and Reality of Managerialism” (Lecture
presented as part of the Rock Carling Fellowship Annual Lecture, 2001) cited in C. Tuohy, “Agency, Contract
and Governance: Shifting Shapes of Accountability in the Health Care Arena” (2003) 28:2-3 J. Health Pol. 195
[Tuohy, “Agency”].
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monitor performance. 725 A distinctive factor of the emerging regulatory state is the declining
willingness to trust social actors to comply with rules and a resort to more open scrutiny,
inspection, and audit; hence, the growth of the audit society and the increased resources
devoted to audit and accountability. 726

Canada
As noted earlier, there are some challenges with assessing the degree of penetration of the
NPM in federal states, due to the multiple layers of government: in Canada thirteen
provincial or territorial governments and the federal government (fourteen jurisdictions in
total). For the purposes of the argument in this chapter, I am assessing the degree of
penetration of the NPM into the management of health systems, so there will only be a
limited analysis of the federal level. 727 Analysis of events in the federal sphere will only occur
to the extent that tenets of the NPM influenced the Medicare program.

As a global

comment, Canadian health systems showed both structural and institutional stability, and no
major policy change like the institution of the NHS’s internal market occurred. 728

Federal Government
At the federal level, in 1979 elections brought to power, as a minority government, the
Progressive Conservative Party headed by Joe Clarke. Some commentators noted: “Before
his victory on 22 May 1979, Clarke sounded like a Canadian counterpart to the ‘iron lady’
[Thatcher]”, but the reality was anything but – attributable to the minority status of his
government. 729 During its brief stint in power, the Clarke government commissioned Justice
Hall, the architect of Medicare, to review Canada’s health insurance programs. This review
occurred as a result of sustained criticism from the Liberals of the Progressive Conservative’s
policy of tolerance of extra-billing. Thus the review was designed to shore up support for
the government and, as such, political considerations required the use of a consensus-
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building device, like an external review, undercutting commitment to the full gamut of NPM
reforms. The review’s scope was somewhat limited, in that although Justice Hall was to
review health insurance programs, the implicit limits were to undertake such a review within
the current regulatory framework.

The Clarke government’s commitment to NPM

foundered in the face of political reality, despite a persistent minority view that provincial
insurance programs should be repealed in favour of a market-based system similar to the US
system. 730 A market-based system was, unsurprisingly, roundly rejected by Justice Hall, who
said Medicare should be sustained. He was also critical of the trappings of the market-based
system that had been retained – for example, extra billing – and suggested that fees should be
independently determined and any form of user-pays system should be resisted. 731
By the time Justice Hall reported back, the Clarke government was but a memory, and a
Liberal government, led by Pierre Trudeau, was back in power. Trudeau introduced only
some of the elements of the NPM, as part of a program of ‘rational management’, focusing
primarily on the risk of ministers being captured by bureaucrats. 732 Certainly, there was no
interest in opening Medicare to the free market. Federal and provincial relations remained
strained on healthcare, due to general tensions on constitutional reform and other matters
(discussed in Chapter 3), perceptions that the federal government was not assuming its fair
share of the burden, and resistance from some to the recommendations of the Hall
Report. 733 The tensions were exacerbated when the Trudeau government moved to limit its
financial exposure to ever-increasing Medicare costs by moving from 50/50 cost-sharing to
block grants, 100 per cent cash transfers were replaced by a mixed system of cash transfers
and tax points, and the introduction of an escalator. 734
Discord over the direction of the Medicare program continued, with some provinces,
particularly Alberta, strongly advocating for a more user-pays model in line with the tenets of
the NPM that advocate a greater reliance on market mechanisms and increasing privatization

729 C. Campbell, Governments Under Stress (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) cited in Aucoin, supra
note 39 at 11.
730 Gray, supra note 306.
731 Ibid.
732 Aucoin, supra note 39.
733 Gray, supra note 306.
734 Lahey, supra note 306.

160

of services formerly provided by government. In 1983, the Alberta government acted on
those convictions by raising Medicare premiums by 47 per cent and announcing the
introduction of a $20 per day charge for in-patient hospitalization. 735 The actions of the
government of Alberta were said to have spurred the federal government into action, with
constitutional law experts asserting that the federal government could legitimately enforce
compliance with the conditions of the hospital and medical insurance programs. 736
In 1983, the Trudeau government published a white paper, Preserving Universal Medicare, that
focused on the issue of imposing user charges on patients. 737 The White Paper suggested the
introduction of new legislation to rationalize and strengthen the current legislation in this
area, arguing it would preserve Medicare by ensuring its basic principles. 738 The Canada
Health Act (CHA) was introduced and passed unanimously in 1984. 739

Five principles

underpinned the shape of the Medicare scheme. It rejected a market base for the provision
of doctor and hospital services, by requiring the health insurance program in each province
or territory to be managed by a non-profit authority accountable to government 740 and by
discouraging extra billing and user charges by threatening non-payment of the equivalent
amount of the federal contribution. 741 The ban on extra billing struck at a part of the
medical profession’s autonomy by removing a symbol of their fiscal independence.
However, other than adherence to the five conditions of portability, public administration,
universality, comprehensiveness, and accessibility, the CHA does not prescribe how health
services ought to be delivered within the provinces. 742 The impact of this, especially given
the high-profile nature of the extra-billing debate, was to draw a line under the possibility of
importing free-market principles unless the government concerned was prepared to deal with
the (no doubt considerable) public fall-out.
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The CHA also, in a manner of speaking, confirms the existent forms of accommodation as a
mechanism of governance in health systems across Canada. For example, s. 12(2) of the
CHA notes that disagreements between provinces and negotiating bodies from the
profession over payment schedules should be referred for binding arbitration. In so doing, it
acknowledges that formal accommodation with the medical profession will continue, hence
Tuohy’s comment that “ … although the passage of the Canada Health Act constituted an
undeniable symbolic defeat for the medical profession, there were significant tangible and
structural gains for the profession as the result of the legislation.” 743

While the CHA

removed flexibility in respect of billing, the CHA did not address other aspects of
professional autonomy such as location, scheduling, labour and other inputs, volume, and
mix of services. In enacting the CHA, the focus of the federal government appeared to be to
defend the boundary between the private and the public sectors – a course of action
anathema to strict interpretations of the NPM. 744 Reaffirming central responsibility for
national standards in respect of the public financing of doctor and hospital services gave the
Trudeau government an opportunity to preserve it and leave the provinces to negotiate the
practicalities with the still-powerful medical profession. 745
A Progressive Conservative majority government was elected and held office between 1984
and 1993, led by Brian Mulroney and later Kim Campbell. These governments pursued a
range of organizational and managerial changes, but “in comparison to the other three
systems [Australia, New Zealand, and Britain], Canada appeared to fall short of the mark.” 746
The impact of NPM-style reforms in respect of the CHA was limited to the progressive
constraint of financial contributions under the Medicare program, in the interests of paying
off debt, a process commenced in the late 1970s by the Trudeau government. 747

For

example, total federal contributions declined from 40 per cent in 1975 to 33 per cent in 1994,
and changed from 100 per cent conditional cash payments to, in 1974, about 50 per cent in
the form of unconditional tax points. 748
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The 1993 election of the Liberals, under Jean Chrétien, saw the new government undo many
of the NPM-style reforms initiated by the Mulroney and Campbell governments and, in the
health context, its focus again was to defend the boundaries between private and public
sectors. 749

But it also continued the program of fiscal austerity, with the Chrétien

government’s 1995 budget unilaterally reducing federal contributions to the provinces. 750 It
announced a National Forum on Health in 1994 to “develop a new vision for Canada’s
health system for the 21st century.” 751 But the development of the forum was marred by
federal–provincial disagreement, with the provinces unhappy at what they saw as a
continuing federal incursion into provincial powers. 752 Ultimately, the forum was boycotted
by the provinces, although some sent observers along to various meetings. The forum’s
1997 report was a solid endorsement of the structure of Medicare – funding for medically
necessary services, single-payer model, the five principles, and partnership. 753 As with the
Hall review, “[i]n short, the National Forum on Health, unlike the review of the NHS in
Britain … solidly endorsed the structural balance and the institutional mix of the existing
system.” 754
Somewhat reversing the fiscal austerity that was a characteristic of the NPM (a reversal also
seen in Britain), by 1999 the federal government agreed to restore federal funding for
Medicare to 1995 levels. 755 In return, the provinces agreed to allocate all that funding to
‘core’ healthcare services and programs and expressed their commitment to the Medicare
principles. All provinces except Québec also entered into a social union framework with the
federal government. The framework saw the provinces reiterate their commitment to the
principles of Medicare, refer disagreements to a dispute-resolution mechanism, 756 and the
federal government committed to only introducing cost-sharing programs with the
agreement of at least six provinces. 757 This represented what one might term the last gasp of
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NPM at the federal level in the health context. Subsequent federal-level reviews of the
Medicare program (Kirby and Romanow) were not solely motivated by NPM-related
concerns. 758 In the context of patient-safety-related reforms, it is also interesting to note that
these reports focused primarily on issues of access to services and sustainability. The Kirby
Report did, however, recommend the responsibility for funding medical services be devolved
to the regional level. While this recommendation has not been actioned, it may constitute a
threat to professional autonomy as fee negotiations for medical services have traditionally
occurred at the provincial level and hence may threaten the nature of the bargain with the
medical profession. 759

The Provinces
After the introduction of the CHA in 1984, the provinces, on the whole, complied with the
requirements in the CHA to eliminate, or limit, extra billing and/or user charges. Post the
CHA, Ontario experienced significant challenges negotiating with the medical profession,
unhappy with losing extra-billing privileges and with the compensation on offer from the
province. 760 This resulted in a strike. But despite some provinces disagreeing with the CHA,
the political stigma of being seen to not comply with the Medicare principles appeared too
politically risky for provincial governments, in the face of continued public support for
Medicare. 761
The 1990s saw the ideological differences between provinces cast into greater relief. Some,
like Ontario and Alberta, had governments committed to the neoliberal ideology that
underpinned the NPM and which included reducing the role of the state in the funding and
organisation of healthcare. Others remained resistant to the NPM and determined to retain
an expansive role for the state in ensuring access to healthcare. These differences mainly
emerged in the context of disagreements about Medicare.

758 Canada, Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians – The
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In the 1990s, in the context of broad governmental agendas at both federal and provincial
levels to reduce deficit spending (a key element of the NPM), governments embarked on
measures to contain public health expenditures. 762 After first trying, and failing, to control
medical budgets i.e. payments to doctors, provinces reduced hospital budgets by instituting
case-based funding to encourage efficiency. In addition, in the mid-1990s, all provinces
instituted a program of hospital restructuring, including hospital closures and the reduction
of bed numbers.

763

The 1990s saw most federal and provincial governments adopt an

NPM-driven agenda, at least in terms of its fiscal aspects. 764 Governments across Canada
agreed that balancing the budget was an absolute priority, and cutting taxes and paying down
debts were essential to economic growth. 765 The period 1992–1997 saw substantial cuts to
program spending by the federal government and by provincial governments. 766

Some

provinces passed anti-deficit laws, and from 1992 provinces reduced health spending, a trend
reversed in 1997. 767 In the health context, real per-capita spending decreased by 7.2 per cent
from 1990–1996, while total per-capita spending increased by 1.7 per cent. 768
The most remarkable change was state-led horizontal restructuring – or regionalization. 769 In
all provinces bar Ontario, forms of regional structures were established to manage the
hospital sector. Ontario resisted the regionalization trend. 770 While it did establish district
health boards, they were advisory and had no budgetary power.

This changed the

organizational structure of the health system in Ontario but did not significantly change how
it operated. 771 In Ontario, hospitals continued as self-governing bodies, so the relationship
between the state and hospitals did not really alter. 772
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In all other provinces, power was devolved from provincial health ministries to regional
bodies, including the discretion to allocate health resources (within a global budget allocated
by the provincial health ministry), and some planning and policy functions. 773 The regional
bodies could either directly assume the responsibility for the operation of hospitals or could
contract with the hospitals for service provision. 774 Either way, the regional bodies could
establish performance targets, strengthen accountabilities, and increase monitoring.
However, the changes in governance norms when the state imposed a centrally planned
structure on local hospitals meant that hospitals lost autonomy. As Lavis notes, “[t]his
change of governance altered a key element of the core bargain with hospitals: their
autonomy as private institutions.” 775 Although regionalization involved devolution from the
provincial ministries of health to quasi-independent regional bodies, the process of requiring
such structural change involved an assertion of government power. 776

Implementing

legislation reinforced the accountability of the regional bodies to government. 777 In no
instance did the responsibility of a regional board include anything related to the
management of doctors 778 – hence Lavis’s conclusion that “[r]egionalization also had little
apparent effect on the core bargain: physician services were excluded from regional funding
envelopes in every Canadian province.” 779
By the mid-1990s, there was a sense that Medicare could be in jeopardy. 780 A 1996 Ontario
poll showed that 46 per cent of respondents believed that the quality of care at their local
hospital had worsened over the previous year. 781 This may have been due to the bad press
resulting from overcrowded emergency rooms, long waiting lists, crises in cancer care,
restructuring, and hospital closures. 782 These factors “caused much public confusion and
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cynicism.” 783 The governmental debates about Medicare became increasingly acrimonious
and dysfunctional, which also acted to undermine public confidence in the system. 784 As the
Romanow Commission’s interim report put it: “Canadians are tired of the finger-pointing
and ‘hollering from a distance’ while both parties squabble over fundamental directions and
funding.” 785 The general unhappiness with the system still has at its heart concerns over
physical access to healthcare services. 786
The accommodation with the medical profession that underpins the medical aspects of the
health insurance schemes in each province was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Some
attribute the stability of the structures of Canadian health to the nature of the long-term
accommodation between the state and the medical profession, an accommodation
established on even more favourable terms than the accommodation at the heart of the
NHS. 787 Central to this accommodation was the commitment to maintain professional
autonomy in exchange for acquiescence to the introduction of health insurance programs in
each province. Where the introduction of the tenets of the NPM in Britain saw a sustained
assault on all aspects of the medical profession’s interface with the health system (fiscal,
managerial, and clinical), this pattern was not repeated in Canada. With the exception of a
brief period in Ontario (discussed further below), the ideologically based suspicion of the
medical profession as a quasi-union and/or an agent of regulatory capture did not seem to
exist in Canada and did not compel reforms to anywhere the same extent as occurred in
Britain. Equally, medical professionals in Canada were never on the same footing vis-à-vis
the state as their British counterparts as they were at best agents of government. Hence,
Canadian doctors had much more independence than their British counterparts being neither
independent contractors in a contractual relationships with the state nor employees. While
some professional autonomy was indeed curtailed in Canadian jurisdictions in the name of
fiscal responsibility, the managerial and clinical spheres of professional autonomy remained,
for the most part, untouched. Attempts to curtail professional autonomy did create some
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strain between the state and the medical profession in Canada, with the profession opposing
what they perceived as state attempts to gain control over physician supply, scope of
coverage, payment mechanisms, and clinical protocols. 788
The Medicare wars of the late 1970s and 1980s in which the medical profession confronted
the federal and some provincial governments, as well as consumer and public interest groups,
pointed to a change in the nature of the accommodation with the medical profession within
Canada and its relationship with the state and the public. One doctor noted: “The physician
must realise that he is no longer the total master of his destiny and that he cannot speak with
absolute authority, especially in matters pertaining to health care delivery.” 789 Governments
during this period were more willing to “flex their legislative muscle to take unilateral action
if necessary, but more typically to establish a ‘shadow’ within which their negotiations with
the profession would proceed.” 790
As discussed in Chapter 3, Canadian doctors, or their agents, negotiated a fee schedule for
the reimbursement of services on a fee-for-service basis. Generally, it is notoriously difficult
to contain the growth of fee-for-service models because of built-in incentives for
professionals to increase utilization to maximize their incomes – something that has
significant consequences for budgets. 791

In the 1990s era of fiscal constraint, highly

influenced by the tenets of the NPM, this proved somewhat problematic for governments,
and the first small steps were taken to try to address the issue. Thus, in the 1990s the terms
of the accommodation between the state and the profession were progressively elaborated to
constrain the entrepreneurial discretion of doctors. 792

Limitations on extra billing have

previously been discussed, but there were other ways in which the state sought fiscal control
or at least influence over the medical profession.
The initiatives first focused on issues of over-utilization of or over-billing Medicare. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s some provinces established committees to review the utilization
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profiles of individual doctors to determine whether they were over-billing Medicare. 793 The
bodies all were reactive in nature, responding to extreme outliers rather than conducting
regular audits. With one exception (Québec), the bodies were set up under the aegis of
professional bodies. For example, in Ontario, the utilization body was administered by the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO), and in British Columbia, the British
Columbian Medical Association; only in Québec was utilization review considered the proper
responsibility of government. It is perhaps telling that opinion polls in Québec indicated
higher levels of support for state activism than in any other region in Canada 794 and, as
discussed in Chapter 3, the statist tradition is strongest in that province. With the exception
of Québec, the mechanisms employed to address this issue respected and retained the
autonomy of the profession to self-govern.
The question of the fees that doctors could charge was traditionally negotiated between the
profession and the province. The nature of the relationships between these parties varied
across Canada. For example, British Columbia, Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba used a
collective-bargaining model which saw the employment of increasingly confrontational
tactics. Relations were particularly adversarial in British Columbia where a populist political
culture, a polarized partisan environment, and an adversarial human relations system
combined to create discord. 795 The British Columbian government was the first to try to
establish control over the distribution of doctors by refusing to issue billing numbers to
doctors seeking to practise in areas deemed over-serviced. A successful challenge was made
to this policy on the ground that it impeded mobility rights. 796 In Ontario, the relationship
between the state and profession was closer, going beyond medical remuneration.
Relationships were reasonably collegial in most of the other provinces. 797 Québec was again
alone having a highly formalized and structured process for negotiations. These processes
Ibid.
Ibid.
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of negotiation did not do much to contain budgets, so most governments acted unilaterally
to institute a global budget for the payment of doctors, thus capping, to an extent, utilization.
But once these global budgets were established, the details still had to be negotiated with the
professions. In parallel with the introduction of global budgets, many provinces determined
that the relationship between the provinces and the medical profession needed to be
formalized (as had been the case in Québec since the 1980s). In the 1990s in Alberta, British
Columbia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Prince Edward
Island, bipartite joint management committees with equal representation from government
and the medical profession were established. 798

The committees formalized the

accommodation at the heart of the Canadian health systems, cemented the corporatist nature
of the management system within Canadian health systems, and arguably expanded the
influence of the medical profession in policy-making.

These management committees

negotiated fee structures for the provision of medical services within global budgets, newly
introduced to try to contain utilization. 799

In Britain, action was taken to remove

corporatism due to fears of capture; in Canada, the corporatist bargain was formalized and
strengthened.
Although the focus of much attention was indeed fees and utilization, so as to contain cost
overruns, increasingly clinical effectiveness and quality became an issue of concern for
governments. However, in Canada incursions by the state into clinical care were fiercely and
on the whole successfully resisted. Professional bodies sought to pre-empt government
intervention in the area of developing clinical guidelines, but most governments chose to
establish joint profession–government taskforces or specialized arms-length bodies to
develop them. 800 In Québec, issues of clinical effectiveness, including the formulation of
practice guidelines, were dealt with by the professional regulatory body. 801 In Ontario, joint
committees were developed between the province and the profession to deal with aspects of
practice other than utilization, including the formulation of clinical guidelines. The Task
Force on the Use and Provision of Medical Services was established in Ontario in 1988. It
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issued two guidelines, but in 1991 was replaced by a joint management committee. Also in
Ontario, an Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences was established to conduct research to
assist with developing clinical guidelines, but it was never really effective because of the
physician-services budget cap and budget reductions. 802

The 1995 election of an

ideologically driven Conservative government in Ontario, with a deep distrust of unions, saw
government assume unprecedented powers in respect of the schedule, supply, and
distribution of physicians. 803

After some conflict, the parties agreed to establish joint

committees in respect of matters like clinical guidelines.

In Saskatchewan, the Health

Services Utilization and Research Commission was established in 1992 at arms length from
government, with significant professional engagement, to produce clinical guidelines. 804
While these bodies may have produced guidelines there was no monitoring of uptake, or any
requirement by the state to incorporate guidelines into professional practice. Governments
may have seen guidelines as a method to standardize practices and improve quality.
However, clinical guidelines played a minimal role in clinical practice in Canada; but the
mechanisms to develop them proved a source of conflict, as the profession saw any attempt
by the state to develop them as an incursion into professional autonomy. 805 The monitoring
of medical performance remained firmly with hospital medical staffs and the profession
more generally.
While governments’ concerns about fiscal issues compelled them, to some extent, to place
constraints on the medical profession’s autonomy, they chose to use mechanisms that
maintained, to a large extent, the corporate bargain struck with the profession. Attempts by
the provinces to assume a greater role in regard to clinical effectiveness and quality were
broadly ineffective, with the medical profession retaining its autonomy in this area. While
the lack of strong anti-professional ideology generally seen in Canada may have been one
factor mitigating against the reduction of clinical and managerial autonomy, there are also
other possible explanations. These include that the form of NPM embraced in the context
of Canadian health systems tended not to be strongly preoccupied with the possibilities of
third-party capture by the medical profession, whereas the converse was true in Britain. But
Ibid.
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an explanation may also go back to the logics of the system established during the founding
of health insurance programs, where doctors are not employees or contractors of the state,
and their agency relationship with government creates a sustained logic of anti-intervention
in areas where the profession can legitimately claim expertise.
During this period, many governments commissioned reviews of their health systems. 806
These reviews predominantly focused on issues related to access, funding, and sustainability.
There were a number of common themes emerging from these reports, including advocating
a move to community care, reallocation of functions between healthcare personnel,
decentralization of decision-making to regional councils, and a broadening of focus of the
health system to adopt a ‘determinants of health’ approach. 807 The focus was primarily on
restructuring in the hospital sector through increasing horizontal integration, reducing bed
numbers and, to some extent, building capacity for community-based care. 808 Traces of
NPM ideology can be found in several of these reports and was particularly evident in the
significant differences between the reports as how the desired outcomes should be
achieved. 809
As for the provinces, no matter what the strength of the ideological conviction about NPM
was within particular provinces, “[n]one, however, called for or embarked upon major
structural or institutional change to its health care system”, 810 and no report raised radical
alternatives to the basic model. 811 The closest to do so emerged from Alberta in 2001 and
focused on issues of efficiency, choice, and responsiveness – all NPM tenets – to make an
argument for greater penetration of the market into healthcare. 812

However, its

recommendations were not pursued. In general, Canadian health systems withstood the lure
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of market incentives and managed care which led to substantial modifications of the health
systems in other countries. 813
The reviews occurring in the 2000s (two at the federal level and three provincial reviews –
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Québec – again with the exception of Alberta), suggest that the
neoliberal agenda and the NPM concerns have waned and evidence-based decision-making is
gaining ground. 814 Thus the focus, while still overwhelmingly on access and determinants of
health, has been broadened to also include concerns about effectiveness and quality. Four of
the reports recommended the creation of independent quality agencies to monitor and report
about quality and effectiveness-related issues. 815

Quality agencies were subsequently

introduced in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario. 816
In Canada, reforms based on the NPM were important in the health system context, insofar
as they touched upon maters of fiscal control. Hence, there was great penetration of the
tenets of the NPM in terms of the impositions of budgetary constraints and controls. The
processes of regionalization saw increased control by the centre at the expense of local
actors, and the imposition of contracts and other mechanisms to monitor and require
performance by hospitals.

It is clear, however, that despite a few relatively timorous

attempts, there was no serious incursion into clinical autonomy; and indeed, that the
corporatist accommodation with the profession was, to a certain extent, strengthened. The
greater impact of an NPM-inspired renegotiation of the accommodation with the medical
profession was in the context of fiscal policy and medical entrepreneurialism.

Conclusion
While the full spectrum of the tenets of the NPM became deeply embedded in the
governance of the health system in Britain in terms of financial, managerial, and clinical
issues, the same could not be said for Canada. In Canada, despite the ideological convictions
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of some governments, in the context of the health system the impact of the NPM was
limited primarily to matters relating to budgets and expenditure. The clinical autonomy of
the medical profession was never seriously threatened, and in fact the logic of the system
promoted the further development of the corporatist system through joint working
committees addressing a range of issues. The impact of the NPM was a turning point that
marked a change in the logic of governance within the NHS that had significant implications
for the British approach to patient-safety regulation. The logic of the systems in Canada
remained largely intact, and the NPM did not prove a pivotal turning point in that system.
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Chapter 6
Dead Babies and Deviant Doctors: Scandals and Regulatory Realignments

Introduction
The last chapter argued that broad shifts in political norms shape the context of regulatory
changes. This chapter considers a second contextual dimension that promotes regulatory
realignment, namely, the emergence of scandals. Two emblematic images are particularly
potent in fostering regulatory realignments: infant fatalities and deviant doctors, cases that
epitomize the threat posed to the most vulnerable on the one hand, and the responsibility
imposed on the most trusted on the other. These images are sadly redolent of many of the
scandals discussed in this chapter.
That critical events drive change is not a new insight. 817 The policy literature indicates that
health-related scandals that resonate in the public consciousness can precipitate a cycle of
regulatory shifts. 818 Scandals may lead to public inquiries, public inquiry may result in new
safety measures, and new safety measures result in novel or increased regulation. 819
Fundamentally, regulation as Moran describes it “is the response to the now instinctive
reaction that ‘something should be done about it’. ” 820 Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock concur:
Emotions are aroused by news of serious injury or tragic death, especially where there
are large numbers of victims. The power of accidents to command attention and
arouse emotion in turn has social consequences. Accidents create expectations and
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demands for action. Not only must some response be made; it must be seen to be
made. 821
If the public comes to believe that regulatory agencies are not sufficiently responsive to
scandals, before or after the scandal emerges into the public spotlight, regulators may lose
the public’s trust. Without trust, regulatory actors may lose legitimacy. 822 The impetus to
legitimize the health system and regulators within that system is an integral objective of
regulatory change in this context.
Canada and Britain each saw major health scandals between 1980 and 2005, but with respect
to the cases in question, there was no straightforward or consistent pressure for regulatory
change. In Britain, as Alaszewski and Coxon note, the cycle of scandal, inquiry, demand for
change, and resultant reform has been particularly evident in health and welfare services. 823
In Canada this is not the case. This divergence needs explanation. The central argument
developed in this chapter is that differences between Britain and Canada offer significant
insights into how a scandal shapes or does not shape major regulatory changes. There is
much more to the story than conventional regulatory theory would suggest.
A more nuanced analytical framing is necessary to classify scandals. More specifically, I
suggest scandals should be classified, not in terms of their nature, but in relation to the
extent to which they: 1) raise public and political perceptions about risk and its management;
2) illustrate a perceived threat to trust in the health systems and to actors within that system;
and 3) engender concerns that accountability mechanisms have failed. In the cases where all
three factors are evident, public and political demands for greater regulatory control will
result in the enactment of regulatory reforms.

Scandals that are contained, that are

effectively managed by traditional actors, and where accountability functions are perceived to
be reasonably effective, will not result in demands for state dictated regulatory change,
although alternate types of transformation might ensue. Based upon the development of this
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scandal matrix, I conclude that scandals in the NHS were of a particular character that
created a powerful mandate for change in the regulatory framework of the health system.
This resulted in a system of greater controls and a movement of real regulatory powers from
professions and institutional actors to the state and newly created state agencies. In contrast,
in Canada, scandals generally did not align with the scandal matrix and therefore the
traditional regulatory framework from 1980 remained largely intact.
What the comparative analysis in this chapter illustrates is that scandals might be necessary,
but not wholly sufficient, precipitators of state directed regulatory change. In rare cases,
some scandals alone are a sufficiently powerful force to create an impetus for change. But
most often the achievement of significant regulatory change requires additional compelling
political and/or policy rationales – some of these were discussed in the previous chapter. 824
Scandals may give government the moral authority to act swiftly and comprehensively to
create new regulatory frameworks or to significantly renew and revise existing frameworks. 825
In the absence of scandals or the risk of them, risk is not brought to life for the public, there
is reduced external pressure for change and there is a lesser likelihood of regulatory
change. 826
In developing this argument, this chapter begins by discussing the analytical orientation
informing the analysis used in this chapter, which builds upon the existing literature on
scandals and public policy, and in particular what we know about approaches to examine not
just why scandals can cause reforms but how the nature of scandals may drive the form of
any subsequent law reform.

I then describe and analyze health-related scandals between

1980 and 2005 in Britain and Canada. Scandals were identified from analysis and reports in
the secondary literature and the media. 827
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Analytical Orientation: Dissecting a Scandal
A scandal is an event that had national impact, inasmuch as that event was externally
investigated, was covered by the national media, and discussed in the relevant professional
and/or academic literature. There may have been other events giving rise to local scandals,
but my interest is how public discourse is framed in relation to a scandal that receives major
attention and debate.

Researchers have presented theories as to why events become

scandals, and while this question is not the focus of this thesis, it must of necessity inform
analysis as to the circumstances in which scandals contribute to regulatory change.
Best suggests that three layers of actors must make claims to transform events into
scandals. 828

The event must enter into public discourse through the actions of people

drawing upon the nature of the event to generate public concern. Best suggests that the first
claims are made by victims and interest groups (primary claim-makers), the second by the
media (secondary claim-makers), and the third by the public (tertiary claim-makers). 829
Without the engagement of all layers of claim-makers, to a greater or lesser extent, an event
does not become a scandal.

Conversely, counterclaims-makers, powerful players with

institutional interests to protect, also play a significant role in Best’s typology, as they try to
limit events from developing into scandals or to mute their force by making a series of
counterclaims about the event, or participants in the event, to protect their own interests.
These techniques include: 1) mobilizing denial; 2) suggesting that violations are minor or
understandable from a perspective of expert knowledge; 3) placing the blame on a solitary
bad apple; and 4) instituting reverse deniability processes.

Reverse deniability is when

superiors blame subordinates and subordinates protect superiors by not passing on
information either in the belief that superiors do not need to know or that the issue can best
be managed at a lower, more expert level. 830 In a nutshell, Best suggests that the impact of
scandals on public perceptions is the result of issue mobilization by claim-makers, a
mobilization that often, although not inevitably, involves contestations with counterclaimsmakers.
media; the cases were discussed in prominent journals of the professions, including health management journals
and the like.
828 J. Best, Threatened Children: Rhetoric and Concern About Child Victims (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990)
[Best].
829 Ibid.
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Other theorists working from a risk-analysis perspective also try to explain why there are
differences in the way in which risks are conceptualized and responded to, both within
differing domains of risk within a single state, or in the same domain of risk between
states. 831

For example, the Social Amplification of Risk Model (SARF) suggests that

information about events is communicated between a variety of actors in ways that elevate or
diminish its significance, depending upon that person’s/institution’s interests, the current
social-political–cultural environment, and so on. 832

Issue mobilization is undoubtedly a

central reason why events or incidents become scandals. Certainly, the role of patients,
families, the media, and public inquiry processes have been critical in focusing attention on
scandals within the NHS. Similar patterns can be seen in Canada.
While these typologies are useful in explaining why events become scandals, the next step is
to explain why some scandals result in policy change and others do not. Some approaches
examine the nature of the scandal to determine characteristics that are more likely to see that
event act as a fulcrum for demands for policy change. 833 These approaches suggest that a
number of factors determine whether a scandal will act as a driver for policy change,
including: 1) the numbers harmed or killed; 2) the identity of the victims (i.e. their degree of
vulnerability); 3) whether the incident shatters established preconceptions about, for
example, health-providers; 4) whether there has been a pattern of conduct over time; and 5)
whether an independent inquiry has been constituted as a result of these actions. 834 The
SARF model, described above, also attempts to explain this, but it has been critiqued for not

Butler & Drakeford, supra note 817.
R. Kasperson et al., “The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual framework” (1988) 8:2 Risk Anal. 178
[Kasperson, “A Conceptual Framework”]; O. Renn, “Risk Communication and Social Amplification of Risk” in
R. Kasperson & P. Stallen, eds., Communicating Risks to the Public: International Perspectives (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Press, 1991) 457 [Renn]; R. Kasperson & J. Kasperson, “The Social Amplification and Attenuation
of Risk” (1996) 545 Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 95 [Kasperson, “Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk”]. See
also N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic, eds., The Social Amplification of Risk (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003) [Pidgeon].
832 Murdock, Petts, and Horlick-Jones suggest six major sets of players within the field of action: government
and state agencies; opposition parties; campaigning groups; corporations; scientific and expert communities;
and the media, although they do not assume that these actors’ privileged positions are fixed, or indeed
monolithic. G. Murdock, J. Petts & T. Horlick-Jones, “After Amplification: Rethinking the Role of Media in
Risk Communication” in N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic, eds., The Social Amplification of Risk (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 156 [Murdock, “After Amplification”].
833 Butler & Drakeford, supra note 817; Stanley & Manthorpe, supra note 818.
834 Ibid.
830
831

179

engaging with the political elements of this question. Gowda notes these types of analyses
are “fundamentally a political account of how people and societies deal with risks and riskrelated incidents.” 835 Further, Gowda suggests that scandals may not cycle into regulatory
change “simply because the salient risk incidents which result in problem identification are
not coupled with politically viable solutions that would result in significant policy action.” 836
As Gowda suggests, models such as SARF must be accompanied by an appreciation of
political, policy, environmental, and contextual factors.
Some regulatory theorists posit a link between risk perception, trust, and policy acceptability,
and there is some empirical evidence to support this assertion. 837 In the introductory chapter
to this thesis, I built upon this policy change cycle by suggesting that a concern for effective
accountability is also a relevant (and conceptually different) part of this cycle, particularly in
the context of health-related scandals. In this chapter I build upon this to develop a
classificatory scheme for analysing scandals. There are three elements that contribute to
policy acceptability: 1) discourses about risk and how risk is framed in relation to scandal; 2)
how public trust in health professionals, health system regulators, the health system and
patient safety regulation is defined in relation to scandal; and 3) the adequacy of
accountability regimes within which a scandal is located. Accountability, as is discussed later
in the chapter, is a key variable in health policy. A combination of concerns about risk, trust,
and accountability may result in a perception that current policies are not acceptable and that
greater regulatory controls on the health system and its actors are both necessary and
desirable.

Scandal Classification
The policy cycle, described above, trust-risk-accountability-acceptability, provides a basis
upon which to classify scandals and their regulatory impact.

A consideration of risk

perception requires the analysis of the incidence and aggregation of scandal, its scale,
location, and nature, who was affected, how the scandal was communicated to the public,
and the responses, if any, to the scandal. A consideration of trust involves examining

835
836

Gowda, supra note 824 at 306 [original emphasis].
Ibid at 313.
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societal attitudes and the narratives of scandal – what these scandals tell the public about
whether and to what extent to trust health professionals, hospitals, other health-providers
and systems, and regulatory actors. A consideration of accountability involves analysis of
whether existent accountability mechanisms (prospective and retrospective) created the
conditions for effective accountability. At the last, I examine any resultant demands for
greater control that may emerge from scandals, specifically considering what, if anything, was
deemed to need greater control, by whom, and how.

Risk
A risk “is not a static, objective phenomenon, but is constantly constructed and negotiated as
part of the network of social interaction and the formulation of meaning.” 838 At a cultural
level, sociocultural theorists suggest that an understanding of the concept of risk in modern
Western societies is central to an understanding of how those societies function. While
sociocultural theorists are divided in how they theorize risk, they all, to a greater or lesser
extent, agree that risk has, to quote Lupton, “become an increasingly pervasive concept of
human existence in western societies” 839 which organizes, monitors, and regulates societal
actors. Giddens describes a transformation in human consciousness from perceiving risks
as a matter of fate and faith to seeing risks as a consequence of human failure: “it is a society
increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety) which generates the notion of
risk.” 840
The concept of ‘risk’ must also be central to any consideration of healthcare and healthcare
delivery. It has long been recognized that there is a risk of harm to persons who receive
health services. Although it was not until the 17th century that mathematical theories of
probability and modern scientific techniques developed, researchers throughout history have
linked adverse health effects to different types of hazardous activities, principally by way of
observation. 841 The risks associated with the provision of health services were ‘objectively’
confirmed by empirical analysis after the development of statistics and epidemiology, first in
For a general overview, see discussion in Poortinga, supra note 64.
Lupton, supra note 5 at 29.
839 Ibid at 25.
840 Giddens, “Risk Society” supra note 6 at 27.
841 Covello, supra note 5.
837
838
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the 19th century in respect of hospital/health- professional-acquired infections, 842 then in the
late 20th century in respect of adverse events in hospitals. 843 Individuals and groups have
historically employed a number of regulatory strategies to manage such risks, most saliently
the development and use of the common law and direct regulation through law-making. 844
But knowing of the objective possibility of risk and hearing a narrative of risk play out in the
lives of real people are two different things. The narratives told in scandals bring risk to life
for the public in a manner which cannot be matched by an empirical study as such studies
lack emotive power. A higher consciousness, or perception, of risk may result in demands
that the perceived risk be subject to greater control, often through regulation.

Incidence and Aggregation of Scandals
As a preliminary comment, to promote systemic change in long-established institutional and
regulatory structures, aggregation may be an important factor. Scandals may, on aggregate,
foster a greater perception of the risk that problems occur within and across systems, and are
not one-off, aberrant events. A caveat to this, however, is that the nature of some single
scandals is so compelling that these individually may result in significant regulatory change.
For example, Dr Harold Shipman, a British GP, was convicted of the murder of fifteen
patients and is believed to have murdered as many as 245, becoming one of the worst serial
killers in history. 845 As an event to raise public perceptions of the risks associated with
healthcare, this case was unparalleled. Dr Shipman’s actions and the systemic failures of
people and systems around him to identify concerns about his practice prompted, among
other things, changes to the regulatory frameworks around dispensing narcotics and death
certification. The impact of this scandal on its own was significant in respect of increasing
public perceptions of risk and ultimately resulting in significant regulatory change.
An aggregation of scandals may raise risk perceptions and promote a fundamental reappraisal
of the established regulatory framework. The larger the numbers of scandals, and therefore

Ayliffe, supra note 67.
See, for example, Baker, “Adverse Events”, supra note 2; Brennan, “Adverse Events” supra note 2; Wilson,
“Quality”, supra note 2; Vincent, “Adverse Events”, supra note 2; Schioler, supra note 2; Davis, supra note 2.
844 See, for example, Covello, supra note 5.
845 U.K., The Shipman Inquiry, Death Disguised (London: HMSO, 2002) [Shipman Inquiry, Death Disguised],
online at: The Shipman Inquiry <http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/>.
.
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the extent of scandals across different subsectors or locations of care, the greater the
perception that risk attaches to systemic failures in the way in which that sector is regulated.
I identified seventeen scandals within the NHS between 1980 and 2005, the details of which
are set out in Table 1. Table 1 graphically illustrates the sheer volume of scandals during this
period and their nature.
Table 1 Scandals in the National Health Service 1980 – 2005
This table describes where the event occurred, a brief description of the event, whether or not there was an
inquiry, and if so the mechanism(s) through which those inquiries were constituted. Many of the events listed
in the table were also examined as part of a coronial process.
Year
1979–80

Events
Rampton Special
Hospital 846

Mid–late
1980s

Contaminated
blood 847

1991

Ashworth Special
Hospital 848

1991

Beverly Allitt 849

1992

Christopher
Clunis 850

Event Description
Allegations of large-scale ill-treatment and
brutality against patients in a forensic
psychiatric facility
Thousands were infected with HIV and
hepatitis C because of contaminated blood
supplies.

Allegations that patients in a forensic
psychiatric hospital were mistreated,
including that a patient died after a beating,
and other patients were sexually or
physically assaulted
A nurse, Beverly Allitt, was convicted of
murdering four children, attempting to
murder three others, and the grievous
bodily harm of six others in the children’s
ward at Grantham and Kesteven Hospital.
Christopher Clunis, a mental health
patient, killed a member of the public,
Jonathan Zito, in a chance encounter in
London.

Inquiry
(1980) Independent inquiry
convened by the Secretary of
State for Social Services
(1995) Discussed in the
House of Commons and the
House of Lords
(2002) Internal review
(2007–2009) Public inquiry
(convened and funded by
private interests)
(1992) Independent inquiry
convened by the Secretary of
State for Health
(1994) Independent inquiry
convened by the Secretary of
State for Health under
section 2 of the National
Health Service Act 1977 [NHS
Act] (held in private)
(1994) Private inquiry
commissioned by the North
East Thames and South East
Thames Regional Health
Authority

U.K., Committee of Inquiry, Report of the Review of Rampton Hospital, (London: HMSO, 1980) [Rampton
Inquiry].
847 The Archer Inquiry, Independent Public Inquiry Report on NHS Supplied Contaminated Blood and Blood Products
online: The Archer Inquiry <http://www.archercbbp.com/report.php> [Archer Inquiry].
848 U.K. Committee of Inquiry, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Complaints about Ashworth Hospital, (London:
HMSO, 1992) [Ashworth Inquiry, 1992].
849 U.K., Department of Health, The Allitt Inquiry: Independent Inquiry Relating to Deaths and Injuries on the Children's
Ward at Grantham and Kesteven General Hospital, (London: HMSO, 1994) [Allitt Inquiry].
850 U.K., J. Ritchie, Report of the Inquiry into the Care and Treatment of Christopher Clunis, (London: HMSO, 1994)
[Ritchie Inquiry].
846
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Year
1993

Events
Richard
Neale 851

Event Description
Dr Neale, gynaecologist, was struck off the
medical register in Ontario, Canada, after a
patient died, but gained registration in
Britain and continued to practise. There
were allegations that he was incompetent.

1996

Kent and
Canterbury
Hospitals Trust 852
Rodney Ledward 853

Allegations that cervical screening practices
were inadequate which resulted in 90,000
cervical smears being re-examined.
Allegations that Dr Ledward,
obstetrician/gynaecologist, provided
inadequate treatment over a 16-year period.

1996

Bristol Royal
Infirmary 854

1997

Ashworth Special
Hospital 855

1997

Royal Devon and
Exeter Hospital 856

Allegations that the treatment provided to
children undergoing paediatric cardiac
surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary
between 1984 and 1995 was inadequate.
Allegations that patients misused drugs and
alcohol, had access to pornography, and
one patient was an active paedophile
within the Personality Disorder Unit.
Allegations that breast cancer screening
practices were inadequate

1998

Dr Peter Green 857

Dr Green, GP, was convicted of nine
counts of indecent assault against patients.

(2001) Commission for
Health Improvement inquiry.

1998

Dr Clifford
Ayling 858

Dr Ayling, GP, was convicted of 12
charges of indecent assault relating to ten
patients.

(2004) Report of a modified
statutory inquiry called by the
Secretary of State for Health
(held in private).

1996

Inquiry
1) (1993–1994) internal NHS
inquiry
2) (2004) Report of a
modified statutory inquiry
called by the Secretary of
State for Health (held in
private).
(1997) Report of an
independent inquiry
1) (1996) NHS internal
disciplinary inquiry
2) (2000) Report of a
modified public inquiry
convened by the Secretary of
State for Health (held in
private).
(2001) Report of an
independent public inquiry
established pursuant to the
NHS Act.
(1997) Report of inquiry
convened under section 84 of
the NHS Act.
(1997) Internal inquiry by the
Royal Devon and Exeter
Hospital Trust.
(1997) Independent inquiry
by the Chief Medical Officer
convened by the Secretary of
State for Health

U.K., Committee of Inquiry, Committee of Inquiry to Investigate How the NHS Handled Allegations about the
Performance and Conduct of Richard Neale (London: HMSO 2004) [Neale Inquiry].
852 W. Wells, Review of Cervical Screening Services at Kent and Canterbury Hospitals NHS Trust (London: NHS
Executive, 1997) [Wells Inquiry].
853 U.K., Committee of Inquiry, An Inquiry into Quality & Practice Within the National Health Service Arising from the
Actions of Rodney Ledward (London: Department of Health, 2000) [Ledward Inquiry].
854 BRI Inquiry, “Learning From Bristol”, supra note 287.
855 U.K., Committee of Inquiry, Ashworth Special Hospital: Report of the Committee of Inquiry, (London: HMSO 1999)
[Ashworth Inquiry, 1999].
856 U.K., K. Calman & Department of Health, Breast Cancer Services in Exeter and Quality Assurance for Breast
Screening: Report to the Secretary of State (London: HMSO, 1997) [Royal Devon Inquiry].
857 U.K., Commission for Health Improvement, Investigation into Issues Arising from the case of Loughborough GP Peter
Green, (London: Stationery Office, 2001) [Green Inquiry].
858 U.K., Committee of Inquiry, Committee of Inquiry to Investigate how the NHS Handled Allegations about the
Performance and Conduct of Clifford Ayling (London: HMSO, 2004) [Ayling Inquiry].
851
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Year
1998

Events
Dr Harold
Shipman 859

Event Description
Dr Shipman, GP, was convicted of the
murder of 15 patients. The public inquiry
concluded he murdered a total of 200
patients and suspected he murdered a
minimum of 45 others.
Allegations that organs from deceased
children were retained without the
knowledge or consent of their families

1999

Royal Liverpool
Children’s
Inquiry 860

1999

Drs Kerr and
Haslam 861

Dr Kerr, psychiatrist, was convicted of
indecent assault of a female patient, and Dr
Haslam, psychiatrist, was convicted of
indecent assault on four female patients.

2005

Stoke Mandeville
Hospital 862

Over 30 patients died in two separate
outbreaks of the bacterium Clostridium
difficile in Stoke Mandeville Hospital in
2003–2004 and 2004–2005.

Inquiry
(2005) A public inquiry
commenced in 2000 under
the Tribunals of Inquiry
(Evidence) Act 1921.
(2001) Report of an
independent confidential
inquiry called by the Secretary
of State for Health under the
provisions of section 2 NHS
Act.
1) (1997–1998) NHS internal
investigation
2) (2005) Report of a
modified private statutory
inquiry called by the Secretary
of State for Health under
sections 2 and 84 of the NHS
Act.
(2005–2006) Healthcare
Commission inquiry under
section 52 (1) of the Health
and Social Care (Community
Health and Standards) Act 2003
on the request of the
Secretary of State for Health

Figure 2 (below) illustrates how many of the scandals set out in Table 1 clustered within a
five to ten year time period, thus amplifying the effect of the aggregation of scandals.
Specifically, the figure highlights that the period 1995–2000 saw the emergence of eleven
scandals: three in 1996; two in 1997; three in 1998; and two in 1999. This resulted in a fairly
constant barrage of negative publicity about the health system. However, the effect of these
scandals was not limited to this time period. While the period 1995–2000 saw the emergence
of eleven scandals, the period 2000–2005 saw the completion of nine public inquiries,
ensuring that the scandals were kept in the public spotlight and embedded in public
consciousness. These inquiries often lasted for months, if not years. For example, the
Shipman Inquiry commenced in 2000 and was completed in 2005. Scandals that resulted in
859 U.K., The Shipman Inquiry, online at: The Shipman Inquiry <http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk/>
[Shipman Inquiry].
860 U.K., The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry, Report of the Royal Liverpool Children's Inquiry, (London:
Stationery Office, 2001) [RLCH Inquiry].
861 U.K., Committee of Inquiry, The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry: Final Report (London: HMSO, 2005) [Kerr/Haslam
Inquiry].
862 U.K., Healthcare Commission, Investigation into Outbreaks of Clostridium difficile at Stoke Mandeville Hospital,
Buckinghamshire Hospitals NHS Trust (London: Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, 2006)
<http://www.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/Stoke_Mandeville.pdf> [Stoke Mandeville Inquiry].
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public inquiry processes and that were held in public were prime tabloid and news fodder in
which the faces and voices of patients, or their families if the patients had died, could be
heard. Even for those inquiries held in private, witnesses could choose to speak with the
media, and ultimately their stories were told when the inquiry reports were publicly released.
Figure 2 Incidence of Scandals within the NHS 1980-2005
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6
Inquiry reports released 19802005
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Note that one scandal, contaminated blood, did not result in a public inquiry during the
period of this review. 863
In Canada, the picture is very different. During the period 1980–2005, I identified five
scandals relating to patient safety in the health system, and these scandals are described in
Table 2. These scandals were few in number and dispersed in time (with intervals of six,
three, four, and nine years between scandals). The relative infrequency of these events
suggests that any aggregate effect to create a perception of a risk that there were broad
systemic fissures within safety regulation in the health system requiring reform was likely to
be minor at the very best, but, more likely, I suggest there was no aggregate effect.

863 A privately funded and commissioned public inquiry into the contaminated blood scandal commenced in
2007 after continued government refusals to commission an inquiry.
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Table 2 Scandals in Canadian Health Systems 1980 – 2005
This table describes where the event occurred, its date, a brief description of the event, whether or not there
was an inquiry, and if so the mechanism(s) through which those inquiries were constituted.
Years
1981

Events
Hospital for Sick
Children (HSC),
Ontario 864

Event Description
35 babies/children die at the HSC
from suspected digoxin poisoning.
A nurse is arrested but discharged
for lack of evidence at a
preliminary hearing

Inquiry/Mechanism for Inquiry
1) Independent inquiry pursuant to the
Public Hospitals Act (Ont.) (1983).
2) Centre for Disease Control review
commissioned by the Department of
Health.
3) Commission of Inquiry under the
Public Inquiries Act (Ont.) (1984).

Mid1987

Blood
contamination 865

Approximately 2,000 people are
infected with HIV/AIDS and
others with hepatitis C because of
contaminated blood supplies.

1) Report of the sub-committee on
Health Issues of the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Health and
Welfare, Social Affairs, Seniors and the
Status of Women (1993)
2) Commission of Inquiry under Part 1
of the Inquiries Act (commenced 1993;
completed 1997).
3) Criminal charges filed against key
institutions and individuals in 2005. 866

1990

Sexual abuse 867

Allegations of inadequate
complaint-handling by the College
of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario (CPSO) in respect of
allegations of sexual abuse by
physicians

1) Taskforce on Sexual Abuse by
Physicians (1991) (Ont. CPSO)

1994

Manitoba paediatric
cardiac surgery 868

12 children die during or after
paediatric cardiac surgery at the
Winnipeg Health Sciences Centre
(WHSC), Manitoba

(2000) Coronial inquest

Ontario, Hospital for Sick Children Review Committee, Report of the Hospital for Sick Children Review Committee,
by Justice C. Dubin (Toronto: The Committee, 1983) [Dubin Inquiry]; Ontario, Royal Commission of Inquiry,
Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry Into Certain Deaths at the Hospital for Sick Children and Related Matters
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1984)[Grange Inquiry].
865 Canada, Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada, Final Report, (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 1997) [Krever Inquiry].
866 The Canadian Red Cross subsequently pled guilty to distributing contaminated blood supplies and a charge
of criminal negligence was dropped. Several doctors involved in the management of blood supplies and a
pharmaceutical company also faced various criminal charges, including most seriously charges of criminal
negligence. In 2008, a judge found the defendants not guilty, concluding that the defendants had acted
responsibly and appropriately in carrying out their responsibilities. R v Armour Pharmaceutical Company [2007]
O.J. 3733 (Ont. S.C.) [Armour].
867 Taskforce on the Sexual Abuse of Patients, The Final Report of the Taskforce of the Sexual Abuse of Patients,
(Toronto: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 1991) [TSAPP].
868 Manitoba, Winnipeg Provincial Court, The Report of the Manitoba Paediatric Cardiac Surgery Inquest: An Inquiry
Into Twelve Deaths at the Winnipeg Health Sciences Centre in 1994, by Associate Chief Judge Murray Sinclair
(Winnipeg: Provincial Court of Manitoba, 1998) online: Paediatric Cardiac Inquest
<http://www.paediatriccardicinquest.mb.ca> [Sinclair Inquest].
864
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Years

Events

Event Description

Inquiry/Mechanism for Inquiry

2003

SARS 869

An outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in
Toronto kills 44 people in 2003.

1) (2003) National Advisory Committee
on SARS and Public Health (federal
government) (Naylor Report)
2) (2003) Standing Senate Committee on
Social Affairs, Science and Technology
3) (2003–2004) Expert Panel on SARS
and Infectious Disease Control (Ontario)
(Walker Report)
4) (2003–2007) Commission of Inquiry
under section 78 of the Health
Protection and Promotion Act (Ontario)
(Campbell Commission)

Scale of the Scandal
The numbers of victims, and therefore the scale of the event, generally result in a greater
impact upon the public because the risks to the public as patients are brought to life, both in
terms of their perception of risk and the need for any reform. Although the unnecessary
death of one person affects that person’s family and friends and the health professionals
involved, it is rare that a single death makes an impact upon public perceptions of the risks
associated with the provision of health services – at least to the point of widely expressed
public outrage. One life lost unnecessarily is bad, but the loss of multiple lives through
malice or negligence illustrates risk and enhances risk perception. All but one of the scandals
in Canada and Britain involved multiple patients.
In Canada, the scale of the scandals varied. The impact of the transmission of HIV/AIDS
and hepatitis C through blood supplies resulted in approximately 2,000 recorded HIV
infections. 870

SARS also touched hundreds of patients and health professionals within

Ontario, although only some of the 40 or so deaths were thought to have been associated

Canada, National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, Learning from SARS: Renewal of Public
Health in Canada, (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2003) [National Advisory Committee, SARS; Canada, Standing
Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Reforming Health Protection and Promotion in Canada:
Time to Act: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, by M. Kirby & M.
LeBreton Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 37:26
(Ottawa: The Senate, 2003) [Senate, Reforming Health Protection]; Ontario, Expert Panel on SARS and Infectious
Disease Control, For the Public’s Health: A Plan of Action. Final Report of the Ontario Expert Panel on SARS and
Infectious Disease Control, (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care; 2004) [Expert Panel of SARS];
Ontario, The SARS Commission, The SARS Commission - Spring of Fear: Final Report, (Toronto: Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care, 2006) [Campbell Commission, Final].
870 Krever Inquiry, supra note 865.
869

188

with mismanagement. 871 The two hospital cases from Canada (HSC and WHSC) involved
less than fifteen patients at each location. 872 The allegations that the CPSO had ineffectively
dealt with sexual abuse complaints involved multiple patients. The Taskforce on Sexual
Abuse of Patients by Physicians (TSAPP) heard 303 detailed reports of sexual abuse of
patients by doctors and other health professionals. 873

Although these events were all

significant in terms of the numbers of victims, the intervals between these cases probably
limited their aggregate effect on risk perception.
Many of the scandals in Britain had far-reaching impacts upon patient populations. The
blood-contamination scandal saw 1,500 HIV infections recorded. 874

Ninety thousand

cervical-screening tests were reread at Kent and Canterbury, affecting many thousands of
patients. 875

Dr Harold Shipman is suspected of killing around 245 of his patients. 876

Hundreds (possibly many hundreds) of children and families were affected by a decade of
paediatric heart surgery procedures, with morbidity and mortality rates for some procedures
outside the norm, 877 and the many thousands of families across Britain discovered that some
health professionals and hospitals had retained organs or tissue from the bodies of deceased
children and adults without the knowledge or consent of families (an audit disclosed 54,000
retained organs across the NHS 878 ).

Eight hundred allegations of brutality exposed at

Rampton Hospital were said to have involved 100 nurses. 879 An epidemic of Clostridium
difficile, a hospital-acquired infection (HAI), at Stoke Mandeville Hospital killed, or was the
probable cause of death, of 90 patients across three hospitals, and had infected more than
1,170 patients in the course of an eighteeen-month outbreak. 880 Thirteen children were
murdered or harmed at Grantham and Kesteven Hospital by Nurse Beverly Allitt. 881
National Advisory Committee, SARS, supra note 869; Expert Panel, SARS, supra note 869; Campbell
Commission, Final, supra note 869.
872 Dubin Inquiry, supra note 864; Sinclair Inquest, supra note 868.
873 C. Robinson, “Sexual Misconduct: The Canadian Experience” in J. Bloom, C. Nadelson & M. Nottman,
eds., Physician Sexual Misconduct (London and Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Publications, 1999)
[Robinson].
874 Archer Inquiry, supra note 847.
875 Wells Inquiry, supra note 852.
876 Shipman Inquiry, Death Disguised, supra note 845.
877 BRI Inquiry, “Learning from Bristol”, supra note 287.
878 U.K., Department of Health, Report of a Census of Organs and Tissues Retained by Pathology Services in England
(London: Stationary Office 2000) [CMO Census]; RLCH Inquiry supra note 860.
879 Rampton Inquiry, supra note 846.
880 Stoke Mandeville Inquiry, supra note 862.
881 Allitt Inquiry, supra note 849.
871
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Upwards of 40 patients were thought to have been affected by the actions of Dr Ayling 882 –
and the list goes on. Scale reinforces risk perception – the more victims, the greater the
perception that there are risks to everyone who receives health services and that those risks
must be managed.
Again, aggregation plays a role in amplifying the perceived risks. While it might be expected
to find greater numbers of those affected by these scandals in Britain, especially given the
population differences between Britain and Canada, the numbers were exponentially higher
in Britain than in Canada on aggregate – potentially creating a perception that the risks to
patients were more widespread in Britain. In 2005, the British population was estimated to be
60,209,500, 883 and the Canadian population was estimated to be 32,299,500. 884

Locations of Scandals
The locations of the scandals (geographically and sectorally) may also contribute to risk
perception. The geographic location of events may suggest that scandals are localized in
effect or that there are profound systemic failings across a country. The sectoral location
may suggest that one facet of the health system is failing – for example, public health. Of the
five Canadian scandals, one focused for the most part on the handling of complaints about
sexual abuse by a regulatory agency in Ontario; two occurred in children’s hospitals in
Ontario and Manitoba; and two were essentially public-health-related issues around the safe
provision of blood services (national) and responding to the emergence of a new infectious
disease (Ontario and national).
Geography may be particularly important in Canada.

In Chapter 4, I noted that

constitutional structures may be an important variant of regulatory directionality within
Canada. It has been suggested that Canada’s constitutional structure may have contributed
to scandals having highly localized impacts. 885 With thirteen health systems within Canada,
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each governed by different regulatory frameworks, it is easy to see how events occurring in
one jurisdiction can be discounted by others as being a problem peculiar to that health
system and that regulatory framework. For example, looking at the WHSC scandal, it is
possible that the small size (one surgeon) of Manitoba’s paediatric cardiac program,
compared to other, larger programs in other provinces, may have been a distinguishing factor
in the eyes of policy-makers and regulators in other provinces. 886 The Canadian centres of
political gravity are the eastern provinces of Ontario and Québec, and, increasingly, include
the western provinces of Alberta and British Columbia. Events in ‘have-not’ provinces,
including Manitoba, may cause a ripple in public and political consciousness, but not a tidal
wave. One commentator noted in respect of the WHSC scandal: “If it had happened in
Toronto then it would have had a much bigger impact, but people outside of Manitoba just
said ‘well that’s Winnipeg for you’.” 887
Notably, three of the four Canadian scandals had their loci in Ontario, the supposed centre
of Canadian political gravity. But these scandals, too, could be localized. For example, the
HSC murder allegations were regarded within and outside Ontario as the work of a bad apple
– a once-in-a-lifetime event that was unlikely to occur again and which did not require a
fundamental reappraisal of regulatory frameworks. 888 Even the results of the Dubin Inquiry
into the operations of the HSC were highly localized in impact to the HSC, as the inquiry
concluded there were major problems within the systems of the HSC, not more generally. 889
Interestingly, while the HSC was required to revise its processes in light of the inquiry’s
recommendations, no other hospital in Ontario was required to take similar steps, although
many of the recommendations were generally applicable to other hospitals. 890 The Dubin
Inquiry was, after all, commissioned to improve public confidence in the HSC, not in the
health system more generally. 891
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Conversely, the concerns about the operations of the CPSO, and especially the
recommendations made by the TSAPP, which one would have thought to be highly
localized, in fact had a national impact. 892 The work of the TSAPP and associated publicity
associated with its operations and findings spread across the country with other provinces,
such as British Columbia, Alberta, Québec, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and New
Brunswick, establishing committees to review the issue. 893 In these, and other Canadian
provinces and territories, changes to the legal framework in that province resulted, or policy
statements or guidelines were developed on that issue. In Canada, blood was a national issue
as the blood system involved cooperation between federal, provincial, territorial, and nongovernmental actors. SARS was somewhat localized in that its direct impact was limited to
British Columbia (which had the second-highest number of cases) and Ontario.

The

subsequent inquiries were national in scope as they focused on systems to ensure effective
collaboration between federal, provincial/territorial and local government actors.
Not surprisingly then in Canada it was the public-health-related cases, blood and SARS, that
seem to have raised the greatest public perception of risk. These cases raised issues about
the adequacy of federal, provincial, and territorial cooperation, the allocations of resources
(fiscal and human) to this traditionally under-funded sector, and decision-making at the
policy level, rather than any reflections upon the quality of clinical care. The blood-system
scandal graphically highlighted risks and was a catalyst for change in how that sector of the
health system was managed, but the Krever Inquiry’s scope was limited to that sector. 894
While the Canadian Supreme Court in its comments about “restoring public confidence in
our system of health care” 895 made a conceptual leap from blood system to health system, this
was not a leap made by many others. Although the implications of the blood scandal, and
the Krever Inquiry, were to elevate safety as the core principle to drive decision-making
within the blood system, its impact was not felt in the health system more generally. Two of
the other cases, HSC and WHSC, were centred in paediatric services in hospitals. However,
the effect of the HSC case was limited by an effective counter-narrative that raised
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uncertainty as to whether any wrongdoing had actually occurred, and the limitation of the
inquiry’s relevance to the HSC. 896 So what we see on reviewing the Canadian cases is limited
geographic dispersal, as well as sectoral limitations, diluting any aggregate effect.
The picture is different in Britain.

There, one scandal concerned public-health-related

services (blood); three involved general practitioners (family medicine); five involved the
provision of mental health services, all but one within hospitals; and the remaining eight
scandals involved hospitals. In contrast to Canada, the preponderance of British scandals
were associated with the provision of primary and acute health services within the NHS.
Although the scandals were geographically dispersed, the dispersal occurred in a much
smaller country, with a more compact population, a national health service, and within a
unitary political state, thus mitigating the impact of geography. The majority of the British
scandals – and notably all but one of the many scandals that occurred at the high point in
incidence from 1997 to 2005 – were located where the vast majority of the population would
expect to receive health services themselves: hospitals and general practices (the outlier
involved a forensic psychiatric hospital). This could have brought risk to life for the public,
as these are ordinary sites of care accessed by millions each year. Therefore risks were more
likely to be regarded as not isolated or not restricted to one ‘bad’ hospital or ‘bad’ doctor, but
universal and inherent in the system.

The Narrative of Scandals
Considering the narratives of scandal is vital as narratives raise perceptions of the level and
degree of risks faced by the public. In Canada, although the deaths of children at the HSC
began as murder, they ended in continuing uncertainty as to whether the children had indeed
been murdered, had died as the results of errors or accidents, or had sustained a natural
death. The issue around the events at the HSC became more one of a miscarriage of justice
in the context of concerns about the performance of police and prosecution services. 897 The
impact of the Grange Inquiry was to divert attention from systemic issues within the HSC,
the Ontario health system, and Canadian health systems more generally, as the inquiry
focused attention on the miscarriage of justice that occurred when Ms Nelles, a nurse, faced
896
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murder charges after a manifestly rushed and, according to the Grange Inquiry, inadequate
investigation. 898 As discussed above, although the Dubin Inquiry found that there were
significant problems within the HSC, particularly in respect of drug errors, patient safety, and
communication between staff and patients, the impact of that inquiry was restricted as there
was no acknowledgement in the inquiry or by the Minister of Health that similar problems
could affect other Ontario hospitals. 899
In 1990, public attention in Ontario focused on the perceived failures of the CPSO to
adequately address complaints of sexual abuse and to impose appropriate penalties on
doctors who acted in a sexually inappropriate manner towards their patients. 900 The concerns
about the CPSO were in the context of its role to receive, investigate, and address complaints
about doctors. The TSAPP concluded that the CPSO had done a poor job of investigating
and hearing complaints of sexual misconduct and that often penalties were viewed as being
too lenient, reflecting an over-identification with the physician. 901 The risks highlighted by
this case were twofold: that patients might be at risk of sexual abuse by physicians, and that
the regulatory body responsible for managing complaints might be ineffectual as it did not
create the conditions for prospective and retrospective accountabilities and therefore did not
act in the public interest.
The SARS scandal raised concerns about the adequacy of the readiness and ability of systems
and systems managers to respond to pandemics, and ineffective coordination between
agencies, but it did not raise concerns about clinical care and treatment per se. One inquiry
noted, “[t]he problems of SARS were systemic problems, not people problems” 902 and
“hospitals did their best within the limits of their lack of preparation, their generally
inadequate infection control systems and their inadequate worker safety systems. Inevitably
they made mistakes in the fog of war against an invisible enemy.” 903 As Wilson put it:
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[S]everal reports, including that of a national advisory committee, described critical
problems with the structure and functioning of the public health system. These
problems were identified as playing an important role in the extent of and the harm
caused by the SARS outbreak. 904
In other words, deficiencies in the management of the public health system in Ontario were
said to have led to harms to patients and to the health professionals working with those
patients. 905 Specifically, the Campbell Inquiry noted:
SARS showed Ontario’s central public health system to be unprepared, fragmented,
poorly led, uncoordinated, inadequately resourced, professionally impoverished, and
generally incapable of discharging its mandate. The SARS crisis exposed deep fault
lines in the structure and capacity of Ontario’s public health system. 906
These findings were not altogether surprising given other public-health-related scandals that
had occurred within Canada in areas outside of the healthcare system (for example, the
contamination of the water system in Walkerton, Ontario), and the earlier Krever Inquiry
into the blood system. The Krever Inquiry into the blood system in Canada reached four
broad conclusions that: 1) the multiplicity of organizations involved in the blood system
resulted in poor coordination; 2) the response to emerging scientific evidence that viruses
may be transmitted through blood lacked urgency; 3) the eight-month delay between the
approval of a HIV test in the US and its approval in Canada resulted in 97 Canadian
recipients receiving blood or blood products infected with HIV/AIDS; and 4) doctors and
the general public had received insufficient information about risks associated with
HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. 907 As a consequence of the blood scandal in Canada, there was a
significant regulatory shift in the regulatory frameworks that supported the Canadian blood
systems from private to public provision, with the explicit priorities being safety and
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accountability. Both cases placed a spotlight on and elevated risk perceptions about the
governance of the public health sector, but neither the blood scandal nor the SARS scandal
raised concerns about clinical care per se or about the governance of the health system more
generally.
It was really only the WHSC case that raised risk perceptions about clinical care and the
governance of the health system in the Canadian context. Contemporaneous to the public
discovery of the problems with the paediatric cardiac surgery program in Bristol, at the
WHSC twelve children died and other children experienced serious complications during or
after undergoing paediatric cardiac heart surgery in 1994. 908 Overall, Justice Sinclair found
the evidence suggested that “the Pediatric Cardiac Surgery Program at the Health Sciences
Centre did not provide the standard of health care that it was mandated to provide.” 909
Given the context – a newly appointed and inexperienced surgeon performing delicate,
highly specialized surgery – it was possible to characterize the scandal as a one-off failure of
effective governance by the WHSC and thus localize public perception of any risks.
Seven of the British scandals raised allegations that nurses and doctors had committed
serious criminal offences involving numbers of their patients: everything from physical abuse
and mistreatment, to sexual abuse and assaults, and serial murder. Through the processes of
criminal prosecution and a commission of inquiry, it was established that Dr Harold
Shipman was one of the world’s worst serial killers, suspected of killing approximately 245 of
his patients via lethal injection during his 27-year career as a GP. The scope and scale of his
criminal offending against patients was and is unprecedented. Nurse Beverly Allitt was
convicted of the murders of four of her child patients, the attempted murders of three
others, and six instances of causing grievous bodily harm via lethal injection or smothering,
all within a fifteen-day period. Justice Burnton, after hearing Allitt’s appeal against her
sentence, commented “[b]y her actions, what should have been a place of safety for its
patients became not just a place of danger, but if not a killing field something close to it.” 910
The inquest concluded that one child died from natural causes, the deaths of three children were
unexplained, three children died after undergoing surgical procedures that should not have been attempted, and
the deaths of five children involved some form of mismanagement, surgical error, or misadventure and were
possibly preventable.
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Dr Ayling, GP, was convicted of twelve counts of indecent assault against ten patients, was
acquitted of nine charges, and a further fourteen were ordered to lie on the file. Other
complainants subsequently emerged. The allegations made against Dr Ayling involved what
one complainant described as “brutal and sadistic” 911 internal examinations, chaotic practice,
overuse of forceps, sexualized and inappropriate comments, voyeurism, excessive and
prolonged breast and vaginal examination, often using bare hands, and inappropriate
touching during examinations in his 27-year career as a GP. Dr Kerr, psychiatrist, was
convicted of one count of indecent assault against a patient and found not guilty of four
other counts of indecent assault and two of rape; twelve charges were left on the record
because the jury could not reach a decision. 912 Sixty-seven patients gave evidence to the
public Kerr/Haslam Inquiry alleging Dr Kerr would expose himself and ask patients to
perform sexual acts upon him or have intercourse, sometimes suggesting it was part of their
treatment, 913 during the 23 years he was in practice at York. Dr Haslam, a psychiatrist who
worked with Dr Kerr, was convicted of four counts of indecent assault; a rape conviction
was overturned on appeal.

Several other complainants came forward during the

Kerr/Haslam Inquiry. The Manzoor Inquiry (internal NHS inquiry) suggested that Dr
Haslam used grooming techniques on his patients and concluded that he “had taken
advantage of his position as a doctor to sexually exploit the complainants who were
vulnerable patients.” 914 Dr Green, GP, was found guilty of nine counts of indecent assault
against five patients, including one teenage patient. He was found not guilty on a further
nine counts of indecent assault against four male patients and their female partners who
claimed that he had asked them to have intercourse or arouse each other while he watched.
It subsequently emerged that there were 21 other allegations of indecent assault by Dr
Green, sometimes involving the administration of drugs, but a further trial was not
pursued. 915 The patients had performed sex acts in front of the doctor, thinking that they
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were involved in fertility research. 916 There were also two scandals where endemic abuse of
patients by staff was alleged inside forensic psychiatric facilities. 917

In aggregate, these

scandals create a highly troubling picture of rampant and serial criminal conduct by health
professionals against patients on a level hitherto unimagined, and raise risk perceptions.
Most of the other scandals in Britain involved substantiated allegations of inadequate clinical
performance and/or conduct. For example, concerns were raised and substantiated about
surgical procedures performed by two paediatric cardiac surgeons, Mr Wishart and Mr
Dhasmana, who had unacceptably high mortality and/or morbidity rates over a ten-year
period. 918 Dr Richard Neale, an obstetrician and gynaecologist, faced allegations in relation
to his conduct and competence. 919 He had been removed from the medical register in
Canada before commencing practice in Britain. While working for the NHS, he received a
police caution over an incident in a public toilet involving voyeurism.

Generally, the

allegations against Dr Neale involved what the Neale inquiry termed:
high-risk activity coupled with a lack of sound judgement and reliability; a willingness
to obscure and disguise certain negative aspects of conduct and performance and a
general reluctance to address areas of difficulty and problematic behaviour. 920
Dr Neale’s patients were generally not provided with important information about failure
rates and complications, and his attitude was found to be arrogant. However, the inquiry
also concluded that allegations that Dr Neale was a butcher and a consistently incompetent
surgeon were unfounded. Dr Ledward was another obstetrician and gynaecologist who
faced allegations that he had provided consistently inadequate treatment over a 16-year
period, allegations later substantiated by the Ledward inquiry. 921
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There were also narratives of misread slides and scans at hospitals across Britain resulting in
the potential misdiagnosis of hundreds and perhaps thousands of women. 922 The Royal
Liverpool Inquiry determined that the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital (RLCH) had
retained 2,080 children’s hearts, other organs from more than 800 children, and 400 foetuses,
some of which were used for research, but most of which were simply stored, all without the
knowledge and consent of parents. 923

It also emerged that some children had been

“systematically stripped of their organs” through the malpractice of one pathologist, Dr van
Velzen. 924 The aggregate effect of these British scandals was to suggest again that many
doctors had conduct and/or competence issues and posed a risk to patients. These scandals
raised perceptions of risk.
However, analysis of scandals associated with hospital-acquired infections raise some
questions. By the end of the 1990s, the incidence of hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) was
to cause concern in both jurisdictions. The incidence of, for example, methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus bacterium (MRSA) in NHS hospitals rose from three per cent in 1991 to
37 per cent in 1999 – “epidemic levels”. 925 In one hospital in Québec, the incidence of
Clostridium difficile bacterium (another form of HAI) reached 13.8 per cent in 2003, up from
4.7 per cent in 1991–92. 926
Yet only in Britain did HAIs cause a scandal. In 2004–2005, an outbreak of Clostridium difficile
killed, or was the probable cause of death of 90 patients across three hospitals in the
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust where it had infected more than 1,170 patients
over the course of eighteen months. 927 Also, an outbreak of the same bacterium at Royal
Devon and Exeter NHS Trust in early 2005 infected 265 patients and caused 23 deaths.
Public inquiries were convened and highlighted organizational factors that contributed to the
spread of HAIs – for example: high bed occupancy rates; increasing movement of patients
within and between hospitals and other healthcare facilities; high nurse-to-patient ratios; the
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increasing use of health technologies; 928 and, more controversially, government policies. The
inquiries also highlighted flaws in existing regulatory systems, particularly when one set of
policy priorities (waiting list management) conflicted with another (infection control to
ensure patient safety), and where the unintended consequences of adherence to one desired
policy outcome caused a deleterious effect on the other. 929

Governments assigned

responsibility to the policies of previous governments, whose commitment to the free
market saw cleaning of hospitals and other health facilities contracted out to the most
competitive private-sector operator, operators who often did not train their employees about
the requirements for hospitals. 930 Government did not deny that waiting lists policy may
have contributed to the infection, but noted that NHS Trusts should be able to meet quality
and safety targets. 931 The scandals placed the role of government as a policy-maker squarely
in the spotlight and highlighted the difficulties faced by the management of NHS Trusts in
reconciling conflicting policy objectives. 932
Contrast this with events in Canada, where a similar outbreak of HAIs resulted in the deaths
of thousands of Canadians but did not raise the question of scandal. Doctors at just one
hospital in Sherbrooke, Québec, lost 100 patients from HAIs in an eighteen-month period. 933
The Québec Health Ministry stated that 1,270 people died from Clostridium difficile between
April 2003 and March 2004. 934 Researchers estimated that 2,000 deaths may have occurred
during this outbreak, although this figure was strongly contested by the Québec
government. 935 An infection-control specialist from Québec stated that it was “the worst
epidemic of hospital-acquired infections that we’ve had.” 936

The Canadian events also

demonstrated failures in infection-control capacity, attributed by some to a lack of
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investment in hospitals, meaning that facilities were old and difficult to clean, and patients
shared rooms and bathrooms – encouraging the spread of disease. 937 At least one critic
attributed the lack of government action to the fact that most of the deaths were elderly
patients, 938 a factor that may have also contributed to a relative lack of public interest in the
issue. There was no inquiry, and limited public discussion.
The scope of the scandal does not seem to be a relevant distinguishing feature, as it appears
more patients died in one hospital in Québec than in the three hospitals that were the focus
of scandal in Britain combined. Perhaps the explanation as to why HAIs became a scandal
in one jurisdiction and not another is as simple as risk perception. By 2005, when HAI
became an issue of grave public concern, the British public expected problems within the
NHS, and such events were almost automatically categorized as scandals. Perhaps also the
British government was so conditioned by the multiplicity of scandals within the NHS that it
had to be seen to be directly responding. In so doing it reinforced that the HAI outbreak
was a scandal and contributed to risk perception.

Victims of the Scandal
The identity of the victims may also be relevant; the more vulnerable the victims are
perceived to be, the greater the scandal 939 and the greater the impetus for policy change. I
also suggest that the more similar the victims are to the public at large, the greater the
empathy felt by the public, thus creating a heightened risk perception. To some extent, in
healthcare all patients are vulnerable. There is seldom a balance in knowledge and expertise
between health-provider and patient. For example, the Ayling inquiry noted:
With limited or no previous information of similar situations, it was hard for patients
to know whether what they had experienced was normal or justified – “I was young
and inexperienced and I had nothing to compare this treatment to.” “I did not make
a complaint, because although I found these examinations unpleasant, I did not
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realise that they were unnecessary. Ayling was the only doctor I had visited for
contraceptive advice.” 940
Nor can a patient necessarily control what is done to their body or the quality of the
medications, products, and devices that form part of their treatment. The patient must place
complete trust in the provider of health services and in the safety of health-related products.
To trust is to place oneself at risk – in the health context, the risk of incompetence and the
risk of malice. The narratives that emerged from some scandals graphically illustrated this.
The most shocking was the actions of Dr Harold Shipman, who murdered many of his
mainly elderly patients through the administration of a lethal injection in their homes or in
his surgery. The Shipman Inquiry believes that patients consented to the administration of
what they thought was an innocuous injection, perhaps of a vitamin, and instead received a
lethal dose. 941 They trusted their doctor and in doing so were placed at fatal risk.
In many scandals in Britain, vulnerability was evident in terms of the nature of the
relationship between patient and doctor. Historically, this relationship was characterized by
its hierarchical nature, with many members of the medical profession adopting a paternalistic
attitude towards many or all of their patients.

Patients were generally expected to

unquestioningly follow their doctor’s instructions.

The nature of this relationship has

evolved and changed over the course of the later part of the 20th century, with law playing a
role in changing medical norms. The development of the doctrine of informed consent has
been an important factor in changing the nature of the relationship moving towards a
partnership between doctors and patients, as has the rise of consumerism.
But legal change may precede cultural change – some patients remain deferential, and
informational and/or hierarchical asymmetries remain. Some patients in Britain, especially in
the 1970s and 1980s, held the view that they could not or should not challenge a professional
as to his or her conduct or competence. As the Ayling inquiry put it, “there was a general
reluctance amongst patients to challenge a professional. Doctors, as skilled professionals,
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were widely thought to ‘know best’.” 942 Many patients also feared that their complaints or
concerns about a doctor, a highly respected member of society, would not be taken seriously.
The Ayling inquiry noted: “The fear that patients had, that their word would not be believed,
was not unjustified.” 943

The Green inquiry noted that “even in the inappropriate

circumstances occurring in consultations between Peter Green and some of his patients, it is
difficult for patients to question their GP – particularly so when people involved are
young.” 944
Thousands of people in Britain and Canada were infected with HIV/AIDS and/or hepatitis
C through receiving blood or blood products, or because of their relationship with people
who had become infected from blood. 945 Those who received blood or blood products were
vulnerable. They may have received them because their life depended upon it – those, for
example, who received blood after a traumatic accident, after difficult childbirth, or who had
severe haemophilia – and had no real choice if they wanted to live. Others received blood
because it improved their wellbeing, notably those with mild to moderate haemophilia. Some
did not know that they had received blood at all and therefore could not make a choice.
Even if there was prior knowledge, patients were generally not told about the possible risks
of viral transmission and so did not have information to make a choice to refrain from using
blood products. 946
Those who interacted with infected persons were also vulnerable – they had no idea that a
blood-borne virus could be transmitted to them via shared bodily fluids. The true scale of
the tragedy and the perception of the risks were highlighted by those cases where a virus was
transmitted between spouses or from mother to newborn child. 947 Although haemophiliacs
as a group sustained perhaps the most harm from blood-borne viruses, all of those who were
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unlucky enough to have a major accident, give birth, or undergo major surgery during this
period were potentially exposed to the associated risks of receiving blood. Risks to the
population as a whole were vividly brought to life by these events, as was the perception of
the vulnerability of the population as a whole when receiving health services.
However, victim identification may also have a converse affect. Although cases involving
children often invoke greater public outrage, other factors may also play a role. The child
patients at the WHSC were, for the most part, members of visible minorities, particularly
from First Nations communities, or from lower-income families. 948 Many families lived in
remote communities. One of the whistleblowing nurses noted that she had said to another
colleague:
one of these days this is not going to be an aboriginal child, this is not going to be a
child from up north, it is going to be an upper middle class white family that has the
ins into the medical system and is going to know that this shouldn’t have happened
… 949
Justice Sinclair noted, at least in respect of the first three deaths:
the victims of these tragic events were from families of the least powerful in society.
None of the families of the children who had died to this point were in a position to
be able to influence large institutions … it seems clear that if any of the deaths
involved a family that had more social-economic standing … events might have
proceeded differently. 950
This contention is perhaps overstated, as some of the families of patients in Bristol certainly
had more socio-economic standing than those in Winnipeg; and in Bristol the problems
continued for ten years. It seems likely then that the socio-economic status of the patients
Hesitation to Scandal” in E. Feldman & R. Bayer, eds., Blood Feuds: AIDS, Blood and the Politics of Medical Disaster
(New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 350 [Marmor, Dillon & Scher].
948 Sinclair Inquest, supra note 868 at 205; S. Armstrong, “The Crying Shame” Chatelaine (March 2001) 86 at 88
[Armstrong].
949 Sinclair Inquest, ibid at 204.
950 Ibid at 205.
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and their families had little impact upon internal processes, but socio-economic standing, age
(some parents were very young), and ethnicity may have had an impact upon how the
scandal was transmitted to the public and thus influenced risk perceptions.
The sense that those who sustained harm in these scandals were ordinary people facing
situations and circumstances that they might also face and who may not be able to shield
themselves from intentional or unintentional harm may have amplified perceptions of risk.
Again, the aggregate effect of these scandals may mean the victim identification was
experienced more strongly in Britain than in Canada.

Scandal Communication
How scandals are communicated to the public is an important factor in elevating an event to
a scandal, according to Best, who writes of three layers of communicators:
victims/families/interest groups; the media; and the public. 951 But communication is also an
important factor in illustrating and amplifying risk perception.

I suggest that some

differences can be seen between the jurisdictions on this front.

In the five Canadian

scandals, only one, the contaminated blood scandal, saw patients and families playing an
active role, in conjunction with interest groups like the Haemophilia Society and the media,
to communicate the scale and nature of the risk to the public at large. These groups and
individuals began by battling for compensation, but their role evolved into a broader one –
they ultimately sought to hold individuals and systems accountable for harm and to achieve
real changes in the systems that had failed them. 952 It is noticeable that this was one of the
two scandals in Canada which resulted in wide-ranging reforms across jurisdictions.
Although, in Canada and Britain, individuals and interest groups, notably the respective
haemophilia organisations, were involved in raising the public profile of this issue and could
be characterized as blood activists, 953 it appears that in Canada individuals played a more
salient role in engaging public attention on this issue. These individuals were characterized
by their high visibility in the media, their vulnerability (many were cross-infected by their
Best, supra note 828.
M. Orsini, “The Politics of Naming, Blaming and Claiming: HIV, Hepatitis C and the Emergence of Blood
Activism in Canada” (2002) 35:3 Canadian J. of Political Science 475 [Orsini].
953 Ibid.
951
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spouses with the result that a whole family could be infected), and their eloquence and
openness about the consequences of their infection. 954 They provided human faces to the
tragedy. Activists also stressed that they just happened to be the ones in hospital receiving
blood, and in doing so emphasised the random nature of the events and of the vulnerability
of all patients. 955
Groups granted official standing in the inquiry were also accorded greater standing and
credibility by the media and by the public. 956 Particularly prominent was the Canadian
Haemophilia Society which, although initially supportive of the Canadian Red Cross (CRC),
increasingly became more critical of the CRC and of the conduct of politicians and
government regulators. 957 A branch of this organization called for a public inquiry as early as
1985. 958
In some respects, the fractured blood system in Canada may have been politically
advantageous for activist groups, as some argue that the opportunities for social movements
to influence policy and regulation increases with the dispersal of political decisions. 959 In the
Canadian blood system, decisions were dispersed across the federal and provincial/territorial
tiers of government and between government and non-governmental actors. Some activists
worked solely within their provinces; others worked nationally and provincially. Success in a
province or federal arena could create cracks in federal/provincial solidarity enabling greater
access, as did the tensions and rivalries between and among the two tiers of government. 960
In contrast, in the unitary political system in Britain, if government wanted to limit or
exclude the involvement of social movements in policy-making, it could – and in Britain it
did – by offering humanitarian assistance to the afflicted, while denying that the systems had
been mismanaged so as to cause patient harm. It appears that while unitary governments can
be quick to institute reforms they can be equally as quick and effective in stalling them.
For example, Janet Connors, a Nova Scotian blood activist who contracted AIDS from her deceased
husband, Randy, a haemophiliac who received blood or blood products contaminated with the AIDS virus.
Marmor, Dillon & Scher, supra note 947.
955 Orsini, supra note 952.
956 Ibid.
957 See, ibid. for example.
958 Ibid.
959 Ibid.
960 Ibid.
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Likewise, running counter to the arguments advanced in Chapter 4 that change in federalist
states is generally can be slow with provinces taking the opportunity to learn from each
other, this example indicates that in areas of shared jurisdiction reforms can occur rapidly if
activist groups exploit the vulnerabilities in the system.
The SARS scandal demonstrated that it is not necessarily victims, families, and interest
groups working with the media that can raise risk perception and therefore create impetus
for regulatory change. Increased risk perception occurred on two fronts in the SARS
pandemic. On the first front, SARS raised risk perceptions about pandemics. Secondly, the
pandemic raised concerns that the public might be at greater risk because of perceptions that
the governance responses were inadequate. Because of the nature of that event – i.e. the
necessity for quarantine – patients and families played a limited role in public advocacy.
Advocacy in respect of this scandal occurred more from health professional groups and
pubic health workers and associations. However, in this case, the more potent force raising
risk perceptions and ultimately impelling regulatory change was arguably international
embarrassment. The World Health Organization’s travel ban, justified or not, was imposed
because of publicly expressed concerns that Canadian authorities were not doing enough to
combat the transmission of SARS. 961 It sent a signal to the world, and to the Canadian
public, that governance arrangements for emergent pandemics in at least one Canadian
province (the province most greatly affected by SARS) were inadequate and coordination
with federal authorities was generally ineffective. 962
In other Canadian cases also, there was a lesser involvement of patients and families in
communicating their concerns than was evident with the blood systems scandal. In
Winnipeg, parents played a fairly traditional role – some called for a public inquiry and/or
appeared before the inquest, and their lawyers made public comments on the inquest report
and review and implementation reports.

Some also commenced litigation proceedings.

Their faces and voices may have been heard in Manitoba, but they did not have a national
presence, and did not challenge the structures of the health system in such an overtly political
way with the avowed intention of compelling significant and substantive changes, as did the
961
962

Campbell Commission, Final Report, supra note 869.
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parent pressure groups that arose from the events in Bristol. The nurses involved in raising
concerns in Winnipeg did form a quasi-interest group, with some visibility in national
media. 963 However, their focus was the very real problem of nurses’ subordination and
silencing within a hierarchical health system. 964 Their story illustrated problems with the
culture of healthcare, particularly its sexism, but their advocacy of systemic change was
directed at changing institutional and professional cultures, rather than reforms to regulatory
frameworks.
In Britain, patients and families, in conjunction with the media and newly formed interest
groups, effectively mobilized public opinion in respect of many of the scandals; particularly
notable are the cases involving children. In Bristol, some of the parents of children who
underwent paediatric cardiac surgery adopted an advocacy role with the specific intention of
challenging institutional and systemic norms to promote real change in the health system.
They formed pressure groups – for example, the Bristol Heart Children’s Action Group and,
during the end stages of the inquiry, the Constructive Dialogue for Clinical Accountability –
these groups were highly visible and influential. What characterized these groups was the
presence of individuals who were educated and articulate and highly motivated to influence
policy and to protest against the injurious experiences they or their loved ones had been
through. 965 They effectively used the media to make their claims, illustrate the risks, and to
sustain public pressure on the government. For example, television networks showed images
of parents laying tiny coffins outside the GMC’s headquarters in London. 966 Their status as
‘victims’ was a powerful emblematic force. However, parents were not united. A parental
group, the Bristol Surgeon’s Support Group, was also formed, providing a counter-narrative
that the surgeons were scapegoats for the wider failures of the NHS. However, this counternarrative was less visible and had a lesser impact in the media, particularly given that the
surgeons were being disciplined by the GMC for negligent acts.

963 For example, they appeared in a feature article in Chatelaine, a national women’s magazine. Armstrong, supra
note 948.
964 C. Youngson, “Winnipeg’s Pediatric Cardiac Inquest – A Nursing Perspective” (1999) 17:4 Can. Oper.
Room Nurs. J. 7 [Youngson].
965 J. Allsop, K. Jones & R. Baggott, “Health Consumer Groups in the UK: A New Social Movement?” (2004)
26:6 Sociol. Health Illn. 737 [Allsop, Jones & Baggott].
966 G. Scally, “Deaths in Bristol have Changed the Face of British Medicine” (2001) 165:5 CMAJ 628 [Scally].
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The revelations of organ retention at the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital saw the
emergence of more advocacy groups.

These were comprised family members of the

deceased, and played an important advocacy role in the context of the inquiry but also in
respect of subsequent events, especially the Summit on Organ Retention and on the
workings of the Retained Organs Commission. 967 The families of the Shipman victims
played an equally effective advocacy role, as did the women affected by the breast and
cervical screening programs scandals.
The blood contamination scandal was really the only event in Britain where a different
pattern could be detected. An analysis of this event demonstrates that primary (interest
groups such as the Haemophilia Society and victims), secondary (media), and tertiary claimsmakers (particularly members of the House of Lords) actively engaged the public, raising a
highly salient issue involving the deaths and injury of thousands of people. Yet, a powerful
counter-narrative was raised by successive governments so that governments remained
resolute in refusing to convene a public inquiry. Perhaps the most significant difference
between this event and other events within the NHS in this period was that successive
governments steadfastly asserted that those who ran the blood system did everything that
was reasonable in the face of an uncertain emergent risk. Governments refused to admit, or
even acknowledge, the possibility that these events were anything other than inevitable,
although regrettable – a conclusion supported by an internal review. In contrast with
Canada, the continued refusal by the British government to countenance a public inquiry
somewhat limited the opportunities for victims and activist groups to bring the issue to the
fore. It also limited their impact, as their role was not sanctioned or affirmed by a public
inquiry process, and the existence of a scandal was not affirmed by the performance of a
public inquiry.

An analysis of these scandals generally confirms that communication

strategies contribute to risk perception.

CMO Census, supra note 878; U.K. Retained Organs Commission, online: Department of Health
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20060802143339/nhs.uk/retainedorgans/>
[Retained
Organs
Commission].
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Responses to Scandal
Some suggest that “responses to the risk event actually define the risk itself” where the risk is
previously unknown. 968 The actions taken by authoritative social actors, such as government,
are, as MacGregor phrases it, “in a sense, regenerative and len[d] additional credence and
validity to concerns already being expressed in the media.” 969 Externally, the law and legal
instruments play a peculiar role in risk perception. The highly public interaction between the
risk(s) and legal processes that result from the manifestation of that risk may heighten public
perceptions of the risk and its seriousness. 970 Put another way, if a specific event results in a
death or deaths, the choice of the mechanism(s) used to address the acts or omissions that
contributed to that death sends a message to the public about how they should perceive the
seriousness and significance of the act and what the level of risk associated with that act is.
The criminal law is the penultimate symbol of societal condemnation of an act or practice, as
it generally comprises offences that are mala in se (‘evil in itself’) and which therefore
incorporates moral denunciation of the act and punishment of the offender. It speaks
volumes if criminal charges are laid, as it can increase public perceptions of the seriousness
of the risk. That so many British cases saw a police investigation and/or successful criminal
prosecution sent a message to the public about how they should perceive risk.
Counter signals can also be sent, and this was seen in the two of the scandals in Canada that
attracted criminal charges (Nurse Susan Nelles was charged with murder after the events at
HSC; and the CRC, doctors who worked for the CRC, the regulator, and the manufacturers,
Armour Pharmaceuticals, were charged with criminal negligence after the blood scandal).
While the laying of charges indicated the societal abhorrence of the alleged acts or omissions,
in general, these charges were not sustained. The charges against Ms Nelles were dismissed
at a preliminary hearing due to insufficient evidence, amid concerns that there had been a

M. Poumadère & C. Mays, “The Dynamics of Risk Amplification and Attenuation in Context: A French
Case Study” in N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic, eds., The Social Amplification of Risk (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 209 at 209 [Poumadère].
969 D. MacGregor, “Public Response to Y2K: Social Amplification and Risk Adaptation: Or ‘How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Y2K’ ” in N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic, eds., The Social Amplification of Risk
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 243 at 261 [MacGregor].
970 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy, supra note 817.
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miscarriage of justice. 971 After a long trial, the doctors and the pharmaceutical company
associated with the blood scandal were found not guilty on all charges. Madam Justice
Benotto of the Supreme Court of Ontario concluded that:
… the conduct examined in detail for over one and a half years confirms reasonable,
responsible and professional actions and responses during a difficult time. The
allegations of criminal conduct on the part of these men and this corporation were
not only unsupported by the evidence, they were disproved. 972
Only in relation to the CRC were criminal charges successful, and then only in part. In 2005,
the CRC pled guilty to distributing contaminated blood; in return, charges of criminal
negligence were dropped. The CRC made a public apology, was fined $5,000, and donated
1.5 million Canadian dollars to a scholarship and research fund for those affected by the
blood scandal.
In respect of the HSC case, the impact of unsuccessful criminal proceedings – coupled with
continued uncertainty raised by a counter-narrative which questioned whether murders had
actually occurred (despite the Dubin Inquiry’s findings to the contrary) – somewhat
transformed the public’s risk perception. The perception of the risk went from children
being murdered by a health professional to the risk of what the Grange Inquiry deemed
inadequate police investigations and prosecution proceedings, in short, of a miscarriage of
justice. 973 The blood charges had a more equivocal effect on risk perception, as the charges
and subsequent trial occurred so long after the events in question that it did not really
contribute to risk perception.
Legal responses, such as the coronial inquest seen in Winnipeg, are different again, and their
symbolic effect is more muted. An inquest is, after all, a relatively routine inquiry into the
cause of a particular individual(s) death and any factors that contributed to that death. On
the other hand, the establishment of an independent inquiry, seen in all but one of the
Ms Nelles subsequently sued the police and the Attorney-General for malicious prosecution. Grange
Inquiry, supra note 864.
972 Armour, supra note 866 at para. 305.
973 Grange Inquiry, supra note 864.
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scandals in Britain, and in three out of the five scandals in Canada, confirms that an event is
out of the ordinary and of sufficient importance that ordinary mechanisms of
inquiry/investigation, such as inquests, are not sufficient to address all the issues. 974 In
general, an independent inquiry is commissioned because, justified or not, there is a
perception that there has been some failure to act or there were deficiencies in the actions
that were taken. Thus, to commission a public inquiry, whether to occur in public or in
private, sends a signal that the public should perceive there was an unusual risk of harm.
Characterizing many of the scandals examined within this chapter is the multiplicity of
official responses to their emergence. In all but one of the scandals, there was some form of
external inquiry or review process, but these were accompanied by other mechanisms which
also played a role in constituting the risk as discussed throughout this section of the chapter.
For example, Dr Shipman’s conduct saw a police investigation, GMC processes, and a public
inquiry. The conduct of Drs Neale, Haslam and Kerr resulted in internal NHS inquiries,
GMC processes, police investigations, and public inquiries. In Ontario, the SARS pandemic
saw a number of reviews or inquiries from a federal-government-commissioned National
Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, a review by the Standing Senate
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology Review, an Expert Panel on SARS and
Infectious Disease Control (Ontario government), and a Commission of Inquiry under
section 78 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act (Ontario). A multiplicity of internal and
external inquiry processes may further reinforce the sense that there was a risk and the risk
may continue and therefore need management.
The incidence, scale, scope, and nature of the risks apparent from the British scandals were
different separately and in aggregate from the Canadian scandals. Taken together, the British
scandals arguably illustrated a higher perception of the extent of the risk – risks associated
with the provision of health services, but also in relation to the regulation of those services
and that system. Conversely, in Canada, the incidence, scale, scope and nature of the risks
were less evident in aggregate and separately, with the exception of public health related
scandals.

974
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Trust
Trust is, and has always been, a cornerstone of the relationships within the health system and
between patients and health-providers, institutional and individual. 975 In the health system,
actors that provide health services, or that are representatives of those who do – for
example, the health professions – have moral, ethical, and legal obligations through the
common law, and at times legislation, to provide services to those who use health services
with reasonable care and skill. These obligations form the basis of the public trust in those
actors. At the macro-systems level, in both Britain and Canada, health services are a public
good, substantially funded and/or provided, managed, and regulated by the state, or by
policy actors to whom that state has delegated authority. Public institutions, government or
otherwise, generally have a duty to act in the public interest. Public trust, or distrust, of the
effectiveness of these institutions in protecting the public from harm is a significant factor in
determining the acceptability of current regulatory arrangements to manage risks. When
governments delegate authority to other actors at the macro and meso levels, they generally
do so trusting that actor to act in the public interest towards the public good. At the micro
level, patients put their future wellbeing, and sometimes their lives, in the hands of health
professionals and health-providers trusting that those professionals will provide services with
reasonable care and skill and will ultimately act in such a way that maximizes their wellbeing.
These micro-level trust relationships may influence macro-level trust, and vice versa,
although such interactions are complex. 976
Reflecting the normative status of a social value like trust, there are differing views about
what constitutes ‘trust’ or ‘distrust’. In a recent review of the literature, Kramer and Tyler
noted at least sixteen definitions of trust. 977 I adopt the sociological approach that considers
that trust relates to expectations and beliefs we have as social actors about the future or
contingent actions of other actors. 978 Accordingly, trust emerges from social relationships
and the obligations that flow from these relationships, 979 but is not limited to relationships

Calnan, supra note 69; Sharpe, supra note 70; McLeod, supra note 70 at 186.
See, for example, Misztal, supra note 71; Calnan, supra note 69 at 353-354.
977 R. Kramer & T. Tyler, Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996)
[Kramer]; Misztal, supra note 71; B. Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1983) [Barber].
978 Misztal, ibid; Rowe, supra note 62; Barber, ibid; N. Luhmann, Trust and Power (Chichester: Wiley, 1979).
979 Misztal, ibid. at 21.
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between individuals. Individuals and societies can have trust relationships with systems,
government, and institutions. 980 As Barber puts it: “[t]o talk about the nature and meaning
of social phenomena such as trust is to define their functions and dysfunctions in terms of
social relationships and social systems.” 981
Braithwaite describes the established typologies of trust expectations as falling within three
recurring themes. 982 She describes the first as inferring trustworthiness from one’s emotions
or values; the second as a matter of rational assessment; and the third is the notion of trust as
performance. It is the latter that arguably has the most resonance in health systems. Barber
focuses his analysis of trust in health systems on performance considered through the lens of
professionalism.

Claims to professionalism from health-providers, systems, institutions,

professions, and individuals are the basis of their legitimacy. Barber states that in this
context, trust is created and maintained by the expectations we have of the conduct and
performance of professionals, noting:
The most general is expectation of the persistence and fulfilment of the natural and the
moral social order. Second is expectation of technically competent role performance
from those involved with us in social relationships and systems.

And third is

expectation that partners in interaction will carry out their fiduciary obligations and
responsibilities, that is, their duties in certain situations to place others’ interests before
their own. 983
Barber’s formulation has attracted some criticism; notably, Misztal argues that Barber’s
distinction leaves unspecified the social mechanisms that generate trust and that it is:

See, for example, V. Braithwaite & M. Levi, eds., Trust and Governance, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1998) [Braithwaite & Levi].
981 Barber, supra note 977 at 19.
982 V. Braithwaite, “Communal and Exchange Trust Norms: Their Value Base and Relevance to Institutional
Trust” in V. Braithwaite & M. Levi, eds., Trust and Governance (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) 46-74
at 49 [Braithwaite, “Communal and Exchange Trust Norms”].
983 Barber, supra note 977 at 9.
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too normative and optimistic in its assumption that people internalize a ‘collectivityorientation’, which leads them to be more concerned with others’ interests than with
their own. 984
What Misztal overlooks is that society holds all professionals, and indeed all providers of
health services, to higher normative standards. This is due to the serious consequences of
improper role performance, and to external factors that require professionals, and healthproviders, to internalize an orientation that has at its heart requirements to place the interests
of others above one’s own interests. These external factors include rigorous codes of ethics
for health professions, where obligations of non-maleficent and beneficent conduct are
critically important, legal doctrines creating, in Canada, fiduciary obligations and duties, and
other obligations and duties that require professionals to place others’ interests above their
own.
This does not mean to say that Barber’s taxonomy should be accepted uncritically. 985
Because of the context in which it was formulated, the third component of Barber’s
expectations – fiduciary obligations and duties – is necessarily specific to the professions. Its
narrow ambit, in that fiduciary obligations only arise in the context of the interactions
between a health professional and his or her patient, and the fiduciary relationship is not
accepted in all common-law jurisdictions, 986 is too limiting. It is especially limiting when the
focus of analysis goes beyond health professionals and the health professions to include a
variety of other systemic actors who cannot be characterized as having fiduciary
relationships. What these actors have in common is that they generally have legal, ethical,
and moral obligations to act in the public interest and to prevent, or at least minimize, the
possibility of harm. Barber’s taxonomy can be reframed 987 to state that, within health
systems, the public’s trust rests upon the belief that all actors will perform their roles with
Misztal, supra note 71 at 23.
Rowe, supra note 62 at 377.
986 See discussion in P. Milchalik, “Doctors’ Fiduciary Duties” (1998) 6 J. L. Med. 168; P. Bartlett, “Doctors as
Fiduciaries” [1997] Med. L. Rev. 193. That doctors are in a fiduciary relationship with their patients is accepted
in Canadian law; see Stamos v. Davies (1985) 52 O.R. (2d) 10, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 507 [Stamos]; G. Robertson, “When
Things go Wrong: The Duty to Disclose Medical Error” (2002) 28 Queen’s L.J. 355 [Robertson, “When Things
Go Wrong”]. In Britain, such a doctrine is not accepted; see Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985]
AC 871 at 884 per Lord Scarman [Sidaway].
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competence, and will carry out their obligations, responsibilities, and duties (fiduciary or
otherwise) to place others’ interests before their own or to act in the public interest by
preventing or minimizing risks of harm.

Thus an individual’s, or indeed a society’s,

motivation to trust is based on expectations and beliefs and the context within which the
decision to trust or distrust is made. 988 Accordingly, this section reviews trust in this broader
context examining role performance and whether actors exercise their functions in the public
interest, rather than in a self-interested manner.

Societal Attitudes
Some scholars identify a societal movement towards what they term ‘post-trust’ societies 989 –
at least insofar as societies are increasingly expressing distrust, or suspicion, of traditional and
established institutions of social order, such as governments, professions, religious
institutions and other social edifices. Misztal is one of many to describe “the emergence of a
widespread consciousness that existing bases for social cooperation, solidarity and consensus
have been eroded.” 990 Societies, they argue, are moving from unconditional trust in the
actions of important social and policy actors to conditional trust or moderated distrust. 991
According to scholars such as Mechanic, this trend can be seen in some health systems,
claims that are to some extent backed by empirical data. 992 A generalized mistrust of certain
actors may be reinforced by specific scandals that create a perception that certain actors
either can or cannot be trusted.

Duration of the Scandal
Duration may be an important factor in reinforcing trust or creating mistrust in governance
systems. Retrospective examinations of scandals that have unfolded over a long time period
often raise many questions. How could the conduct have continued for so long? Why did
no-one intervene earlier? Why did systems not identify problems? 993 Why did systems
and/or individuals not respond effectively to problems? Was there a cover-up?

See, for example, R. Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002).
See, for example, Lofstedt, supra note 61.
990 Misztal, supra note 71 at 3.
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An analysis of scandals that occur over a long duration generally expose a series of missed
opportunities, where systems and individuals could have intervened but, for whatever reason,
did not, or where interventions were unsuccessful. 994 Generally, it seems, then, that the
longer the duration of the event and the more missed opportunities to intervene that are
exposed, the greater the perception that actors and systems failed, creating conditions for
mistrust. The argument goes that if the regulatory system(s) had been working effectively,
problems ought to have been identified and dealt with in a more timely way. The argument
might continue that the actors did not act as they put institutional, professional, or selfinterest ahead of the welfare of patients and the public interest, and thus are not worthy of
the trust vested in them.
The Canadian scandals were of a relatively limited duration before some form of definitive
intervention occurred, with no event lasting for more than five years, and three out of the
five lasting less than one year (see Figure 3). Many of the scandals in Britain, especially the
more prominent scandals, were subsequently discovered to have been of long duration, and
subsequent investigations determine missed opportunities to intervene. Figure 3 illustrates
that a majority of the British events that became scandals were subsequently determined to
have been occurring for over five years before definitive action was taken.
Figure 3 Comparative Duration of Scandals
Note that the duration of some events is estimated. The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry is considered as one scandal.
5
4
3

Britain

2

Canada

1
0

< 6mnths

< 1 yr

1-5 yrs

5-10 yrs

11-20 yrs

> 20 yrs

At the extreme, public inquiries in Britain established that Dr Shipman had been murdering
his patients for a 27-year period; and Drs Ayling, Kerr, Haslam, and Green had been
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involved in sexualised conduct with patients, including sexual assaults, for respectively 27, 24,
23, and thirteen years. 995 Higher than normal rates of surgical complications from paediatric
cardiac surgery in Bristol occurred for approximately eleven years, whereas only eleven
months was to pass at WHSC before high complication rates in its paediatric cardiac surgery
program were such that surgery was suspended. The relatively short duration of most
Canadian scandals may illustrate more effective governance systems – systems worthy, then,
of the trust reposed in them by the public. Duration can be one factor, especially in
aggregate, that can contribute to the mistrust of certain regulatory and other actors. That so
many events could go on for so long in Britain indicates, among many other things, a failure
in regulatory systems such that trust in those systems can be undermined.

The Narrative of Scandal
As discussed in the context of risk perception, the narratives of scandals are important, as
they can graphically illustrate reasons why the public should mistrust certain actors in the
health system. In Britain, the narrative of scandals, separately and in aggregate, was sufficient
to create a rationale for the public to mistrust key actors, in particular members of the
medical profession and regulatory bodies. In Canada, two scandals resulted in the conditions
for mistrust of public-health-related systems and actors, but in general trust in other actors
remained at the traditional (or pre-scandal) levels. In this section of the chapter, the impact
of scandals is examined in some detail to determine what the narrative of a scandal may tell
the public about the level of trust they should accord health professionals, health-providers,
and the health professions and regulatory bodies, especially those associated with selfregulation.

Health Professionals
The relationship between health professional and patient is based on trust. The patient trusts
health professionals to act in the patient’s best interest. The scandals that occurred in
Britain, singly and in aggregate, illustrated instances where health professionals did not act in
the best interests of patients and betrayed that trust. In aggregate, the British scandals
demonstrate reasons for the public to mistrust health professionals.
995Shipman Inquiry, Death Disguised, supra note 845; Ayling Inquiry, supra note 858; Green Inquiry, supra note
857; Kerr/Haslam Inquiry, supra note 861.
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Deceit and Deception
Although using the terms ‘deceit’ and ‘deception’ to describe the conduct of health
professionals may attract criticism, the actions of some health professionals in actively
withholding information has been characterized as such by some patients and families. 996
Withholding information has been a particular issue in a number of the British scandals, but
plays a lesser role in Canadian cases.
In Britain, that health professionals were perceived to have withheld information was a focus
of concern in respect of organ retention investigated in both the Bristol and RLCH inquiries.
Some characterized the failure by the health professionals concerned to provide information
to parents as a form of deceit. 997 The day the RLCH Inquiry report was to be issued, the
Guardian reported that “The medical profession is bracing itself for a wave of revulsion and
distrust from the public.” 998
Other scandals, too, raised concerns about information disclosure by health professionals.
In the Bristol case, at least one of the doctors concerned, Dr Dhasmana, admitted that he
had difficulties with certain types of procedures and had sought retraining. The families of
prospective patients were not told of his difficulties. 999 The Neale Inquiry concluded that Dr
Neale’s patients were generally not provided with important information about failure rates
and complications. 1000
In Winnipeg, too, parents were denied certain key information so they could make truly
informed decisions about their child’s care.

The inquest noted that parents lacked

information about the experience of the surgeon and the team, information about surgical
risk that was program-specific, and, for those whose children underwent surgery after 14
May 1994, the withdrawal of services by anaesthetists. 1001 The inquest concluded that they

RLCH Inquiry, supra note 860.
Ibid.
998 S. Boseley, “Organ Horror Report Outcry” The Guardian (30 January 2001)[Boseley], online: The Guardian
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/jan/30/health.alderhey>.
999 BRI Inquiry, “Learning From Bristol”, supra note 287.
1000 Neale Inquiry, supra note 851.
1001 Sinclair Inquest, supra note 868.
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ought to have been told this information. Not only were parents not told of the lack of
experience of the surgeon, and of the team in working with the surgeon, but the inquest
suggested parents were, in effect, misled by comments implying that their children could not
be in better hands because of the surgeon’s credentials and the strength of the program. 1002
What might be termed misleading and deceptive conduct, coupled with failure to provide
information to the parents about concerns about the program’s performance, is not a
combination calculated to inspire trust in health professionals and health-providers.
Some of the public-health-related cases also illustrate issues with information disclosure. In
both jurisdictions, the contaminated-blood scandals illustrated failures in information
sharing. Although it was known in regulatory and medical circles that transfusions carried
with them risks – not just of transfusion-related side effects but also of the communication
of infectious diseases – this information was not effectively communicated to the public. 1003
While in some immediately life-threatening cases patients would have had no choice but to
receive blood, for at least some haemophiliacs blood was provided only to enhance their
wellbeing, their conditions not being life-threatening. If these patients had information
about likely or even possible harms, they may have chosen to avoid blood. Equally, those
who received blood in an emergency situation, if told of the risks after receipt of blood, may
have chosen to protect their partners from any person-to-person transmission

In both

jurisdictions, then, the blood system events contributed to what has been described as a
“common sense of violation of deeply held social beliefs about responsible medical
practice.” 1004 A perception that health professionals have been deceitful undercuts the basis
of the social contract between medicine and the state, and between patients and health
professionals – relationships based upon trust.

Incompetence
Many of the British cases illustrated concerns about the professional competence of health
professionals, whereas only one Canadian case, WHSC, really raised issues of professional
Ibid.
Justice Burton concluded that the public at large was entitled to expect that blood would be free from
infectious agents. There were no warnings or publicity by the regulators of the possibility, and the medical
profession seldom shared that information with patients. A v. National Blood Authority, supra note 964 at para.
80.
1004 Marmor, Dillon & Scher, supra note 947 at 353.
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competence of health professionals in a clinical context. It is recognized – and, I suggest, on
the whole accepted – that doctors and other health professionals will make mistakes from
time to time. What the competence-related scandals illustrated was that for some doctors
lack of competence was endemic, posing greater risks to patients and raising issues of trust.
After all, if a heath professional has ethical, legal, and moral obligations to act in the interests
of patients, it would seem obvious that an incompetent health professional should not
provide treatment that places patients at risk. Doing so violates the trust patients place in
that health professional.
In both the key screening cases from Britain, and in the other cases where allegations of
screening errors arose, allegations were made that doctors lacked competence – allegations
confirmed by subsequent inquiries. For example, the Royal Devon and Exeter inquiry found
there were “serious faults” in screening and that the radiologists concerned failed to “provide
the standard expected of consultants involved in mammographic screening.” 1005 The scandal
at Bristol is widely felt to have been a turning point in Britain in terms of the public’s trust in
health professionals. Commentators variously noted: “Bristol is different. It is different
because the scandal marked the moment when many people’s trust in doctors first wavered
significantly”; 1006 “[t]he deaths in Bristol have changed the face of British Medicine”; 1007
“[t]he disaster at Bristol Royal Infirmary is a defining moment for health and social care”; 1008
and the editor of the British Medical Journal wrote, “All changed, changed utterly.” 1009 Alan
Jones, a member of the Bristol Children’s Heart Action Group, stated, “this is the end of the
age of the doctor is right. We have to now question and get correct answers on doctors’
ability and performance.” 1010
The scandal at Bristol was followed by other scandals raising concerns about the competence
of doctors – Drs Ledward and Neale also faced allegations that they lacked competence in

1005 Anonymous, “Dobson Orders Breast Screening Review” BBC News (3 Nov 1997) [Anonymous, “Breast
Screening Review”], online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/21241.stm>.
1006 D. Sandford, “Why Bristol is so Important” BBC News (18 July 2001), online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1443081.stm>.
1007 Scally, supra note 966.
1008 A. Alaszewski, “The Impact of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Disaster and Inquiry on Public Services in the
UK” (2002) 16:4 J. Interprof. Care 371 at 371.
1009 R. Smith, “All Changed, Changed Utterly” (1998) 316 BMJ 1917.
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their professional practice. Although the Neale inquiry concluded that Dr Neale was in fact
a generally competent surgeon, it also noted that Dr Neale’s career showed:
high-risk activity coupled with a lack of sound judgement and reliability; a willingness
to obscure and disguise certain negative aspects of conduct and performance and a
general reluctance to address areas of difficulty and problematic behaviour. 1011
Generally, the British scandals provided a narrative of endemic incompetence on the part of
several doctors. In the one Canadian case that related to allegations of a lack of clinical
competence, WHSC, the focus was on the competence of Dr Jonah Odim, a paediatric
cardiac surgeon who had been working in Winnipeg for eleven months. The position at
Winnipeg was Dr Odim’s first role as a consultant paediatric cardiac surgeon. The inquiry
concluded that the appropriate standard was not met, primarily because of some overconfidence about skills, expertise, and experience. This scandal can be distinguished from
the narratives of incompetence seen in Britain. Dr Odim was relatively new to surgical
practice, as opposed to being an experienced doctor. The events occurred during an elevenmonth period as opposed to decades.

In addition, the inquiry determined there were

significant failures on the part of the WHSC to induct, train, and adequately support Dr
Odim. One swallow does not make a summer, and in Canada one scandal in relation to one
doctor does not indicate a broader problem.

Abuse of Position
The issue of a health professional abusing his or her position was front and centre in many
of the British scandals. In the RLCH scandal, Dr van Velzen, a pathologist, was said to have
‘stripped’ the bodies of many dead children of their organs for research purposes – without
the knowledge or consent of parents and in excess of his capacity to actually conduct any
research on them. 1012 The pain experienced by parents who believed that they had buried
their child – but who were forced to rebury their child’s remains, sometimes several times
over, as the haphazard system kept discovering more retained organs – cannot be imagined.

Anonymous, “Bristol: Parents Reaction” BBC News (18 July 2001) [Anonymous, “Bristol: Parents
Reaction”], online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1444830.stm>.
1011 Neale Inquiry, supra note 851 at 17.
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The chair of the GMC’s disciplinary panel hearing concluded, “He [Dr van Velzen] has
undermined the trust placed in medical practitioners to such an extent it has damaged the
medical profession as a whole.” 1013
All three of the forensic mental health scandals related to allegations that staff, either through
violence, abuse, or peculation, abused their position. 1014 These gross types of abuse of
position were also seen in many of other scandals, especially in regard to the sexual
exploitation or abuse of patients by Drs Kerr, Haslam, Green, and Ayling. All of these cases
illustrated that a profound breach of trust had occurred. To cite but a few examples of the
discourse around trust that these scandals provoked, the Kerr/Haslam inquiry concluded,
“In most if not all cases, the effect upon the women of the breach of trust that occurred has
been devastating.” 1015 In respect of Dr Green, the judge at his criminal trial stated that his
“behaviour was a ‘wicked betrayal’ of the trust placed in him by patients.” 1016 The Ayling
Inquiry noted that his conduct “…broke the boundaries of the trust and integrity patients
have the right to expect from their doctor.” 1017
The Canadian sexual abuse scandal highlighted the preponderance of sexual abuse by
medical professionals against patients, but primarily focused on the CPSO’s response to
complaints. 1018 The rapid response of the CPSO refocused the debate onto the positive
steps being taken by the profession.
The cases where health professionals are alleged to have murdered their patients, of course,
create conditions for mistrust. Three scandals, two British and one Canadian, related to
suspected mass murders of patients. In Britain, nurse Beverly Allitt murdered child patients
in her care – a case described as “an example of one of the most flagrant instances of

U.K., The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry, Report of the Royal Liverpool Children's Inquiry, (London:
Stationery Office, 2001).
1013 H. Carter, “Former Alder Hey Pathologist Struck Off” The Guardian (21 June 2005), online: The Guardian
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1015 Kerr/Haslam Inquiry, supra note 861 at 4.
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professional abuse of power by a very disturbed and evil minded health care worker.” 1019 In
Canada, allegations that children had been murdered in the ward of a Toronto hospital saw
murder charges laid against a nurse. Although several reviews concluded that the children
had been murdered, many doctors and administrators from HSC advocated that there had
been no murders, and this counter-narrative created uncertainty for the public. Couple this
uncertainty with a focus on the miscarriage of justice that had occurred, and one can see that
any focus of mistrust was in the direction of police and prosecution services.
It is fair to say that the case of Dr Shipman shook Britain and shook the world. While in the
past there had been instances where doctors had been involved in the deaths of multiple
patients and research subjects 1020 – for example, the Nazi doctors – Dr Shipman’s murders
of his patients make him one of the worst serial killers in history. By being willing to make
house calls, by offering to pick up medications for patients, he created the illusion that he
was a caring, trustworthy doctor – the reality was profoundly different. The Shipman
Inquiry noted:
As a general practitioner, Shipman was trusted implicitly by his patients and their
families. He betrayed their trust in a way and to an extent that I believe is
unparalleled in history. 1021
Pringle argues that the Shipman scandal, and other similar scandals:
fundamentally challenge the core values of the doctor-patient relationship. If a
patient cannot trust their GP not to deliberately harm them then how can they trust
their doctor not to avoid accidental harm? 1022
Ultimately, serial killers, and serial abusers of patients are extremely rare. The relationship
between GPs and their patients is often very personal, and so trust in one’s individual doctor

G. Brykczyńska, “Implications of the Clothier Report: The Beverly Allitt Case” (1994) 1:3 Nurs. Ethics 179.
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is likely to rebound. However, the fact that a doctor and indeed other health professionals
can intentionally murder is now branded into public consciousness in Britain. The doctor as
a serial killer narrative is one that is extensively discussed by the media and other forums.
It is not always the case that a narrative of a scandal could create the conditions for mistrust.
The SARS scandal did not shatter preconceptions about health professionals. Indeed, if
anything, the scandal reinforced the narrative that health professionals act beneficently and in
service of the public good. Some health professionals died or became seriously ill because
they chose to continue to provide care for patients despite the risks to themselves. All of the
inquiry reports focused on the narrative of heroic health workers who succeeded in spite of
the system, not because of it, and at great personal cost. For example, the National Advisory
Committee wrote:
The SARS story as it unfolded in Canada had both tragic and heroic elements.
Although the toll of the epidemic was substantial, thousands in the health field rose
to the occasion and ultimately contained the SARS outbreak in this country,
notwithstanding systems and resources that were manifestly suboptimal”. 1023
In this scandal, health professionals providing care for patients were seen to have more than
held up their end of the social contract with the public.
Overwhelmingly, the narratives about the conduct of health professionals from Britain
emphasized the many breaches of the trust relationships between patients and health
professionals. The narratives coming from the Canadian scandals were fewer in number,
limiting the aggregation effect. Generally, some form of counter-narrative or other concern
limited the perception that competence or conduct were significant issues.

Hospitals, Other Health-Providers and Health Systems
Health professionals are not the sole actors in the health system. Many of these scandals also
illustrate reasons why the public might come to distrust other actors, including hospitals,
non-governmental actors, general practices, and departments of health.

Many of the
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scandals illustrated that actors had failed to do their duty, creating the conditions for mistrust
of those actors and/or those systems.
As discussed earlier, the Dubin Inquiry’s findings about the HSC found that there were
problems with the HSC’s systems, particularly in respect of drug errors, patient safety, and
communication between staff and patients. 1024 However, the impact of these findings was
overshadowed by the continued focus on the forthcoming criminal proceedings and a public
fight over the government’s refusal to release the Centres for Disease Control Review and
the later Grange Inquiry. 1025 The counter-narrative that there had in fact not been any
murders further diverted attention from the hospital. The combined effect was to divert
attention from systemic issues within HSC and to counteract the creation of conditions for
the mistrust of the system more generally.
The inquest into events at the WHSC concluded “the Pediatric Cardiac Surgery Program at
the Health Sciences Centre did not provide the standard of health care that it was mandated
to provide.” 1026

The inquest noted specifically that systemic problems “related to the

structure of the HSC, in particular to hospital policies and procedures … Weaknesses in all
these areas led to problems in the procedures and outcomes of the program.” 1027 The
inquest also concluded that there has been evidence in front of regulators to suggest that
Manitoba lacked the population to sustain a high-quality, full-service paediatric cardiac
surgery program and that this meant a greater risk of adverse outcomes, particularly in
respect of more complicated procedures. 1028 Although the inquest acknowledged that there
were benefits to patients being treated within the province, it found that policy-makers had
to weigh these against the increased risk of adverse outcomes. It seems then that the
continuation of the surgical program, in the face of expressed doubts about its viability and
the province’s/WHSC’s level of commitment to the program, smacked of hubris on the part
of the province and the WHSC. The hubris lay in the desire to provide the most advanced
services within the province, while overlooking the true costs and consequences of such a
National Advisory Committee, SARS, supra note 869 at 12.
Dubin Inquiry, supra note 864.
1025 Grange Inquiry, supra note 864.
1026 Sinclair Inquest, supra note 868 at 465.
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decision. Such decision-making sends a signal that decision-makers are not necessarily
making decisions to fund, and therefore provide a service, based solely on safety – other
considerations, more political in nature, may be important determinants of a decision. The
thought that the safety of patients may be traded for political or institutional self-interest is
not calculated to imbue the public with trust in decision-makers.
However, the Manitoba government’s response was swift and comprehensive. It established
a Review and Implementation Committee to consider the recommendations flowing from
the inquest.

The committee made 53 recommendations which sought to “identify

institutional arrangements and procedures that would provide Manitobans with a stronger
guarantee of competent, safe and ethical healthcare in the future.” 1029

The committee

emphasised that it was concerned with “restoring trust and confidence in institutions which
played a central role in those events.” 1030 The committee noted that as a consequence of the
inquest “there are growing demands for greater transparency, greater public input, greater
responsiveness and strengthened accountability at all levels within Manitoba’s complex and
dispersed health care system.” 1031 This type of response may restore trust although, as can be
seen in Britain, such a response may also create conditions for further mistrust. Possibly the
difference is in the mechanisms employed. In Britain, regulators and policy-makers imposed
prescriptive monitoring and audit requirements, whereas the Manitoban reforms were
designed to foster co-regulation.
In Ontario, there was a perception that poor management of the first outbreak of SARS
created an opportunity for the virus to re-emerge to infect more patients and staff. Dr
Richard Schabas, Chief of Staff at York Central Hospital in Toronto, was quoted as saying,
“SARS I [first wave of SARS in Canada, 13–25 March 2003] was not avoidable. We were
struck by lightning. Everything after that was.” 1032 There was a further perception key
systemic actors focused on restoring Toronto’s international image to remedy the damage
resulting from the World Health Organization’s travel advisory (recommending against travel
Manitoba, Review and Implementation Committee, Report of the Review and Implementation Committee for the
Report of the Manitoba Pediatric Cardiac Surgery Inquest (Winnipeg: Manitoba Health, 2001) [Review and
Implementation Committee].
1030 Ibid at 125.
1031 Ibid at 126.
1032 Quoted in National Advisory Committee, SARS, supra note 869 at 40.
1029

227

to Toronto) rather than on maintaining precautions: “health care workers have complained
that authorities dropped their vigilance in May in a rush to proclaim Toronto safe after the
initial outbreak of SARS.” 1033 The primary focus of the inquiries were on systemic failures at
the provincial and federal levels.

Although the performance and actions of hospitals

attracted some scrutiny, the Campbell Commission concluded hospitals were not to blame,
being themselves victims of the system. 1034 The commission noted:
hospitals did their best within the limits of their lack of preparation, their generally
inadequate infection control systems and their inadequate worker safety systems.
Inevitably they made mistakes in the fog of war against an invisible enemy. 1035
Generally, the effect of this was to suggest that hospitals were let down by governments and
reinforced systemic mistrust about the governance of the public health system at the
provincial and federal levels.
Events in the blood systems in each jurisdiction in the mid to late 1980s identified systemic
failings that raised concerns about the trust vested in certain actors. At that time, blood
systems in Canada were operated by a non-governmental humanitarian charitable
organisation, the CRC, with limited involvement by provincial and federal regulators. In
Britain, the blood system was part of the NHS and services were provided, managed, and
funded by the NHS on a regional basis. In both jurisdictions, the actions and omissions of
various systemic actors, providers, and regulators were scrutinized, resulting in a largely
unflattering picture emerging of the conduct of providers and regulators of blood systems.
Although both the NHS and the CRC had legal, ethical, and moral obligations to act in the
public interest and to safeguard the interests of those who were the ultimate consumers of
blood and blood products, in some respects it appears that the sense of betrayal experienced
by Canadians was greater than that in Britain. The CRC had a sterling reputation among
Canadians, providing programs and services that benefited the most vulnerable Canadians,
and had a proud record of service during World War II.
1033
1034
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International Red Cross – one of the world’s most respected humanitarian agencies assisting
people caught up in conflict or disaster. Many Canadians had donated money or blood to
the agency, had volunteered their services, and some had received assistance from the CRC
at times of peace or war. The CRC was supposed to be above the fray, in terms of politics,
resources, costs, and profits. Because of the CRC’s status, it is possible that the expectations
of and for the CRC appeared greater than those in respect of the NHS, and the
consequences for public trust more profound. Gilmore and Sommerville noted:
Public attention given to the Krever Commission reflected and contributed to a
widespread sense of dismay regarding the blood system. The sense of trust and pride
it had evoked was shattered by revelations of incompetence and apparent
indifference on the part of those responsible for its operation. 1036
The CRC, which before the blood scandal, “was, by many accounts, one of the country’s
most venerated institutions” 1037 or, more narrowly, one of Canada’s “most revered
institutions in the healthcare field”, 1038 bore the brunt of this mistrust. When a group or
institution associated with altruism is seen by the public to have failed and to have failed in
such a manner that members of the public suffered serious harm, the sense of betrayal might
be magnified. 1039 Bayer and Feldman note:
In the course of conflicts over blood, long-established convictions about the moral and
political status of the institutions responsible for the blood supply were shattered.
Symbols of altruism and national solidarity, such as Red Cross societies, became targets
of escalating criticism. 1040
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This loss of trust may particularly arise when the institution seems unresponsive to emerging
issues. The CRC did not take steps to limit at-risk groups and individuals from donating
blood and was, according to some, slow to introduce testing procedures. Also, the public
may lose faith when a trusted actor, suspected of causing harm, vehemently opposes calls for
an independent public inquiry and resists any admission that they might have been at fault.
Post-event emergence, the CRC and other actors continued to publicly downplay the
scandal. 1041 Even when the Krever Inquiry was underway, governments and later the CRC,
as Justice Gomery put it, “vigorously opposed” how the inquiry was conducted – actions not
calculated to imbue the public with great trust in those institutions. 1042 A further sense of
betrayal may set in when an institution like the CRC makes public statements that infection
rate was negligible and the deaths inevitable. 1043 Victims, interest groups, and members of
the public were further irked that the CRC, a respected humanitarian organization, refused to
apologize for its actions until 2005 when it did so as part of a plea bargain in the context of
criminal proceedings. Picard also suggests that another factor that caused the public to lose
trust in the CRC was its failure to institute a call-back system to identify those who had
received blood to limit re-transmission to family members. 1044
So great in fact was the criticism and the mistrust that it was not tenable for the CRC to
retain its role in the blood system even before the Krever Inquiry reported back. As the
Krever Inquiry progressed, there developed a sense, especially among politicians and
bureaucrats, that the Canadian blood system had been so deeply tainted by the scandal, and
that trust in institutional actors had been so badly diminished, that there was really no other
option than to completely redesign the blood system.

Accordingly, a new cross-

provincial/territorial (excluding Québec) quasi-independent body to manage the blood
system was created with oversight (at least in the short term) by an independent body. 1045
The system’s new operating principles were very clearly designed to restore and retain public
trust and confidence in the system – safety was and is the first priority, and accountability the
second.
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The British blood system at the time of its blood scandal had been regionalized and faced
similar problems. A lack of coordination mechanisms between regions resulted in decisionmaking in those systems being subject to regional priorities. Canada at least had one
provider of blood in the CRC, with relatively consistent direction from a national directorate,
albeit with some room for provincial innovation. In both countries, the management of
blood systems was subject to the priorities of government, which at that time were very
much focused on cost-cutting or at least maintaining health budgets at current levels. 1046 It
would be overstating matters considerably to suggest that regional NHS blood centres were
‘venerated’. Lacking the same reputational status as the CRC, any failings by regional NHS
centres would likely not elicit, to the same degree, the levels of mistrust directed at the CRC.
In refusing to convene an inquiry, in repeatedly assuring the public that the NHS had done
no wrong and that the infections were an unfortunate unavoidable consequence of progress,
in showing compassion by providing public assistance and by taking swift action to centralise
the blood system, government was seemingly able to contain or withstand any mistrust that
the problems may have caused.
In the British screening cases, it was clear that management systems in the affected facilities
were ineffective in that they could neither identify nor respond appropriately to concerns
about the quality of the outcomes of the screening process, particularly as related to
individual performance, even over a long period of time.

The inquiries identified

opportunities to develop systems for effective quality assurance and to intervene earlier in
respect of individuals whose competence was in question. The many events that occurred
within screening programs were considered to have had a significant impact on public trust.
Some commentators noted that “some serious clinical failures – for example, in breast and
cervical cancer screening programmes – have been widely publicised and helped to make
clinical quality a public confidence issue.” 1047 In 1998, the National Screening Committee
noted:
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Events in recent months in the breast and cervical screening programmes have
rightly highlighted the high expectations we have of our national screening
programmes and how public confidence can be quickly undermined when questions
are raised about quality, effectiveness and reliability.” 1048
Chiam noted that screening programs assisted in reducing cancer death rates but that
scandals “must inevitably undermine women’s confidence in cervical screening programmes,
if not in the NHS as a whole.” 1049
In Britain, scandals highlighted ineffective internal management within the NHS. Particularly
relevant in respect of the maintenance of trust was the apparent inability of the NHS as an
institution to have in place mechanisms to identify and respond to performance or conduct
issues. The Wells Inquiry, for example, noted the failure of management to respond to signs
of poor-quality work because of confused lines of accountability for quality assurance. 1050
The Royal Liverpool Inquiry identified flagrant violations of the Human Tissue Act 1961 and
failure by the Trust and the University of Liverpool to undertake adequate oversight of
services and employees and to respond appropriately to complaints and audits. 1051 In regard
to the retained organs scandal, the Health Secretary was quoted as saying:
The days have gone where the NHS could act as a secret society. It cannot operate
behind closed doors. It cannot keep patients in the dark. It has to actively earn the
trust of patients in life and it has to actively seek the consent of relatives in death. 1052
The Bristol Inquiry, too, concluded that the systems in place in Bristol were fundamentally
flawed. It noted:
It is an account of a time when there was no agreed means of assessing the quality of
care. There were no standards for evaluating performance. There was confusion
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throughout the NHS as to who was responsible for monitoring the quality of care. It
is an account of a hospital where there was a ‘club culture’; an imbalance of power,
with too much control in the hands of a few individuals … And it is an account of a
system of hospital care which was poorly organised. It was beset with uncertainty as
to how to get things done, such that when concerns were raised, it took years for
them to be taken seriously. 1053
The Bristol Inquiry was one of the first inquiries to lay bare the inability of the NHS to deal
with performance or conduct related issues. In that case, concerns had been formally raised
with the chief executive officer (CEO) in 1990 about excessive mortality in the paediatric
cardiac surgery program.

From that point, there was a series of meetings, much

correspondence, the presentation of audit findings, communications from the Department of
Health, and so on. Events came to a head after the 1995 death of Joshua Loveday when the
issue of excessive death rates reached the media. Hence it took five further years for hospital
management to address concerns about excessive death rates, not assisted by the fact that
one of the surgeons was medical director of the hospital, and the club-culture endemic in
that institution protected him. The CEO intimated to the inquiry that in his view it was
inappropriate for management to intervene in surgical practices. 1054 The GMC had earlier
found the CEO, who was also a registered doctor, to have committed professional
misconduct for his failure to take action and deregistered him. The disciplinary committee
noted:
Your own evidence demonstrates that you chose, over a long period, to ignore the
concerns which were being brought to your attention, preferring to leave these
matters to the consultants concerned. Yet, faced with information suggesting that
children were being placed at unnecessary risk, you took no adequate steps to
establish the truth. 1055
In Bristol, as in Winnipeg, the continuation of the paediatric cardiac surgery program was a
matter of considerable prestige – or hubris in both cases. In Bristol, as was the case in
1053
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Winnipeg, the patient base served by the program was insufficient to maintain the skills of
the surgeons. Also, again with parallels to Winnipeg, there had been concerns expressed
about the viability of the service, but these concerns were trumped, as in Winnipeg, by
political considerations. Although the surgeons in Bristol were senior and experienced at
adult cardiology, they too had limited experience with paediatric cardiology, a fact known to
decision-makers and other regulators.

As in Winnipeg, the Department of Health did not

escape criticism for a decision to fund the service at Bristol despite potential safety issues,
and for failing to effectively monitor and evaluate the services, especially once they had been
advised of the empirical evidence that supported claims of excessive deaths.

Not

surprisingly, the Bristol families emphasized the need for a fundamental reappraisal of the
health system. Maria Shortis, chair of Constructive Dialogue for Clinical Accountability,
stated, “The report certainly demonstrates the need for a radical transformation due to the
systemic failure of the NHS, that allowed Bristol to develop into an avoidable tragedy.” 1056
The inquiry into Dr Neale similarly indicated significant failings within the NHS, especially
given that he was employed in 1985 despite being deregistered in Canada after the death of a
patient. Dr Neale had falsified his CV, although he was registered to practise in Britain. In
1988, the Yorkshire Regional Health Authority (YRHA) was advised by police of the
Canadian deregistration and commenced a limited internal review. At this time, the YRHA
believed that Dr Neale had been treated unduly harshly by the Canadian authorities, were
satisfied with his clinical competence, and took no action. 1057 The Neale Inquiry concluded
that this review “did not show sufficient regard to the protection of his UK patients.” 1058
Subsequently, in 1991, Dr Neale received a police caution after an incident in a public toilet,
during which he provided the police with false information. He was given a formal written
warning by the YRHA. 1059 In 1993, Dr Neale’s Canadian deregistration, and the public toilet
incident, became public knowledge and some clinical complaints were received. Dr Neale
was provided with what the inquiry termed “pastoral support” for a period. Complaints
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about Dr Neale’s conduct, especially collegiality and professionalism, increased and a
severance agreement was negotiated, including the provision of a reference. The Neale
Inquiry concluded:
It is my judgement that between 1985 and 1997 there were systems failures within
the employment and complaints procedures within the NHS, and very importantly,
failures within other professional bodies upon whom the NHS was dependent.” 1060
While internal NHS mechanisms were ineffectual, at least in the Neale case formal review
processes were, eventually, convened – such was not always the case in some of the other
scandals.
The Ledward Inquiry also noted failures in NHS systems relating to employment,
complaints, audit, appraisal, and review. 1061 The Allitt Inquiry concluded there had been lax
hiring processes and less than rigorous internal reporting mechanisms. 1062 The Kerr/Haslam
Inquiry noted a lack of rigour in recruitment and appointment processes, poorly developed
disciplinary processes, an over-reliance on defensive legal advice, and a management style
that was consensus based, which meant that managers were less likely to be proactive in
terms of performance review and oversight. 1063 It concluded:
administrators felt powerless, and devised mechanisms to protect themselves, rather
than the patients or those who raised concerns … sadly some of the failure arose
because it was easier, perhaps professionally safer, to do little or nothing at all. 1064
Similar problems were also noted in inquiries relating to general practitioners. The Green
Inquiry concluded: “Peter Green’s patients were failed not only by him but by a system that
allowed a credible person to do incredible things to patients to whom he owed a duty of
care.”

1065
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patients, and fudged accountability”

1066

and stated that “at the heart of the matter lay an

NHS culture that did not listen to, or treat complaints inquisitively.” 1067
The Ayling Inquiry concluded “there were persistent concerns about Ayling’s practice
throughout his career – and on very few occasions were those concerns fully investigated or
properly followed through.” 1068 Nurses reported making complaints to management and
being told nothing could be done. Serious concerns about sexualized conduct were not
followed up, and his other employers were not advised of the incidents or the reasons for the
non-renewal of his contracts. In addition, some key actors within the NHS, such as the
Local Medical Committee, the Family Health Services Authority, and the Poorly Performing
Doctors Committee, chose to provide counselling rather than to take any definitive action.
There were concerns within the NHS about Dr Ayling’s professional proficiency, in
particular around his delivery practices, but also about his penchant for conducting internal
examinations without gloves or chaperones. But despite this concern, there was no audit of
his practice and no systematic supervision. There were also concerns among the consultants
that Dr Ayling’s full-time general practice, two clinical assistantships, after-hours cover, and
family planning sessions were affecting his ability to carry out his professional
responsibilities; but these concerns were never raised with him. The Ayling inquiry further
noted a lack of coordination between various health organizations. 1069

The consistent

themes running through the majority of the inquiries in Britain were that systems within the
NHS were consistently ineffectual and ineffective. This was not a recipe calculated to inspire
trust in the NHS; rather, the opposite.
That distrust may have been further fostered by the conduct of some NHS Trusts who,
rather than take action against a doctor with performance and/or conduct issues, chose to
‘export’ the problem. ‘Exporting’ a problem was a solution with certainty of outcome:
‘Exporting’ a problem ensured that a doctor causing concern no longer worked
within one’s own organisation, but did not address wider issues of protecting future
Ibid.
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1068 Ayling Inquiry, supra note 858 at 31.
1069 Ibid at 90.
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patients; and it encouraged an attitude to ‘work around’ a problem rather than
tackling it vigorously. 1070
The Ayling Inquiry noted that within the NHS “the expedient use of a rolling contract
became a mechanism to disguise the lack of action in addressing the real problems that they
had found.” 1071 Expedience topped public protection.
In Dr Ayling’s case, his contract as a clinical assistant in obstetrics and gynaecology at Thanet
and Kent & Canterbury Hospitals was not renewed after a serious untoward incident in
1987, and also because of general concerns about his delivery techniques. He was, however,
given a clinical assistant position in colposcopy in that same hospital for a further year until
that contract was terminated after a complaint of sexually inappropriate conduct. In 1993,
after a serious complaint relating to an incident for which Dr Ayling was subsequently
convicted of indecent assault, the William Harvey Hospital did not renew Dr Ayling’s
contract. After a serious complaint was made in the context of Dr Ayling’s work in family
planning clinics, the Director of Public Health at East Kent Health Authority took what she
described as “the easy way out” and took Dr Ayling’s name off the list of locums and said he
was not to cover family planning clinics again. 1072
But Dr Ayling was not the only problem doctor to be exported. In the face of a number of
concerns about Dr Haslam’s conduct, the NHS essentially adopted a similar approach to that
taken with Dr Ayling – they let the conduct be someone else’s problem. Dr Haslam was
encouraged to resign from the NHS and move to private practice – where he allegedly
sexually abused at least one other patient. The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry noted if the NHS
believed in 1988–89 that Dr Haslam was a danger to women:
we do not believe that the NHS should simply have washed their hands, and said
nothing or done nothing … Whatever the legal position the NHS had a moral duty to
ensure that such patients [existing NHS patients who could be referred to Dr Haslam
for private treatment] were not exposed to a possible risk of harm that the NHS
1070
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managers had already foreseen. It would be disgraceful if the NHS was merely allowed
to wash its hands of a suspect doctor, without at least taking some steps to protect
existing and future patients. 1073
A similar pattern can be seen in respect of Dr Kerr.

The allegations were old, the

investigation was taking a long time, and he was due to retire. It was easier just to let Dr
Kerr retire with a letter of thanks for his “valuable contribution” to the NHS, 1074 rather than
pursue investigations.
Dr Neale, too, was ‘exported’ after the negotiation of a severance agreement. In his case, the
Trust felt that there were no grounds for a successful lawful dismissal, and they had no
indications that there was significant concern about clinical competence – to the contrary, his
clinical competence had been attested to by a range of colleagues. The inquiry concluded in
respect of this decision:
We consider that the Trust was in an impossible position in the circumstances …. In
deciding to negotiate Richard Neale’s departure from the Trust, it took the pragmatic
course. We find that it was the choice of the lesser of two evils. It was the system
within which the Trust was operating which made it difficult to deal effectively with
problem doctors without damage to the viability of the hospital service. … the
unfortunate consequence of the Trust’s decision was that it looked after the interests
of its own patients to the detriment of the protection of the wider public. 1075
In these scandals, weak NHS systems to address concerns about conduct or performance led
to NHS Trusts abrogating their responsibilities to act in the public interest – a recipe for
mistrust.
So what the narrative of the scandals tells us about the respective health systems in each
jurisdiction is markedly different. In Britain, there is a uniformity in the narrative, such that
Ibid at 86.
Kerr/Haslam Inquiry, supra note 861 at 369.
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it suggests an NHS in every area and every context is worthy of mistrust because it has
demonstrated an inability to safeguard the public interest. In contrast, the lesser number of
Canadian scandals have been limited through sectoral, institutional, or geographic boundaries
and thus the level of distrust was not sufficient to challenge the regulatory consensus.

Professional Self-Regulation
The next narrative to be considered is what the scandals illustrated about professional selfregulation. Self-regulation, whether based on professionalism or government sanctioned
through legislation, depends upon the self in question being “responsible political actors”, as
Kagan and Scholz put it, or “virtuous’ actors”, as Braithwaite describes it. 1076

If the

prevailing regulatory culture is neither “responsible” nor “virtuous”, the social contract
between profession and the state/public will have been breached, creating conditions for
mistrust.

On this front, too, a significant divergence may be seen between the two

jurisdictions.

In Britain, the many scandals illustrated a deficit in the practices and

mechanisms of professional self-regulation both in respect of what Paul terms “the internal
morality of the profession” 1077 and the profession’s legislative responsibilities. In Canada, the
scandals illustrated professions that, on the whole, responded and acted appropriately and
were generally responsive to public concerns.

Self-regulatory activity in Canadian

jurisdictions was more robust than in Britain and arguably maintained the public trust.
A key facet of the internal morality of the professions, especially in terms of the social
contract, is the will to act as self-regulatory actors. In the context of patient safety, this
means that all individual members of the profession must be active in ensuring that their
profession and their members act to protect the public. The narratives of scandal illustrate
much about how members of professions internalize their responsibilities and whether they
maintain the trust of the public in their capacity to self-regulate.
In Britain, as noted above, many of the events leading to scandal were of a long duration.
When the inquiries came to examine whether there had been opportunities along the way to
intervene, they discovered that there had indeed been many missed opportunities. Some of
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these were due to the systemic issues within the NHS systems, discussed above, and some
with the processes of regulatory actors, specifically the GMC, discussed below; but often it
was because health professionals failed to recognize concerns, failed to act upon those
concerns, or failed to act effectively.
Conversely, in Canada, there were few illustrations of lapses in the internal morality of the
profession, and those that did occur were markedly different from scandals in Britain. At the
HSC, the Dubin Inquiry identified some problems with the systems at HSC that contributed
to a delay in identification of the murders, but the internal morality of the professions was
not put seriously in question.

In Ontario, the TSAPP commissioned research that found

that many professional colleagues did not report to the regulatory body suspected sexual
abuse of patients by colleagues. 1078 At the WHSC, from the beginning of Dr Odim’s (the
new surgeon) tenure nurses and anaesthetists expressed concern about the practices of the
surgeon and the high death rates within the program. Ultimately, the anaesthetists withdrew
their services from the program, citing high death rates. These actors continued to raise
concerns until the program was shut down, although the inquest noted that many were
reluctant to explicitly specify that they believed the surgeon was not competent. 1079 As Dr
Odim was a junior surgeon restarting a highly specialized program, there was some
professional tolerance and acceptance by other surgeons of a learning curve to explain away
problems with surgical outcomes. 1080 In addition, the problems were also attributed to
interpersonal difficulties between medical specialities. Despite this, an inter-profession and
inter-speciality review committee (including the surgeon) was struck to review cases and
practices. The collegiality of the review process was judged by the inquest to be somewhat
problematic as it precluded full and frank discussions in the interests of being seen to be
collegial. Although the inquest criticized the timeliness and effectiveness of the WHSC’s
response, it took only eleven months after Dr Odim had commenced practice for paediatric
cardiac surgery to be halted. Contrast this with the Bristol case, where it took eleven years
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for action to be taken to shut down the surgery program. Professional self-regulation at
WHSC was perhaps not optimal, but it certainly did not wholly fail either.
It was otherwise in the majority of the British scandals. In the British screening scandals,
misreading of slides or scans had occurred over relatively long periods of time, in some cases
as much as five years. There were indications that other health professionals had suspicions
or had known that the individuals in question had problems, and either protected them or
failed to raise their concerns with colleagues or management. 1081
The retained organs scandals in Britain also illustrated problems with the internal morality of
medicine.

Inquiries established that organ retention after autopsy was a standard

professional practice, often occurring without the knowledge or consent of families. 1082 This
illustrated a disjunction in perspectives about retaining organs for medical research between
parents and the public and the medical profession. Or, as Campbell and Willis put it, “the
inquiries [Bristol (the interim report) and Royal Liverpool] revealed unbridgeable differences
in understanding between the professionals and the bereaved families.” 1083

For many

medical professionals, the retention of body parts and tissues after autopsy “formed an
essential part of medical education and research.” 1084 Thus, medical professionals saw the
bodies of deceased patients as serving a functional purpose 1085 in the public interest – the
public interest being continuing scientific and medical progress. Organs were retained as
tools to be employed for the greater good. 1086 The big picture of scientific progress meant
that less, if any, attention was paid to the fact that for families the body remained the
embodiment of the deceased person 1087 and ought to be treated with the dignity and respect
that the person should have been accorded in life.
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Doctors noted that families were not informed in detail about post-mortem and organ
retention practices out of a “simple and understandable wish to spare them further anguish
and distress at the time of bereavement.” 1088 This paternalistic position, at odds with the
development of informed consent, was adversely commented upon in both the RLCH
Inquiry and the interim report of the Bristol Inquiry. These inquiries suggested that the
profession’s position on organ retention was characterized by arrogance and detachment as
well as by a paternalism that may have masked a professional reluctance to undertake the
informed consent process. 1089 Discussions with bereaved persons, and perhaps particularly
parents of deceased children, about autopsies and the retention of organs for teaching
and/or research are difficult. But that these discussions are difficult is no reason not have
them. 1090
In contrast, parents used such terms as “grave-robbing”, “body-snatching”, and “desecrated”
to describe what had happened to the bodies of their children. 1091 Respecting the human
body after death is, in most cultures, recognized as important for the wellbeing of the person
in the afterlife, but also for the wellbeing of families and friends in this life. 1092 This yawning
chasm between perspectives prompted calls for immediate law reform, given the profession
had evidently proved incapable of self-regulating the practices of its members in accordance
with public sentiment and robust medical ethics. A representative from the advocacy group
Parents Who Interred their Child Twice was quoted as stating:
Guidelines are not enough. It has been proven that they have been ignored. Selfregulation by the medical profession has been shown to be inadequate. We must
have changes in the law. 1093
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This statement is significant in that it emphasises a marked distrust of the accepted regulatory
paradigm of self-regulation. The implication is that the medical profession has not been a
responsible regulator and thus more control mechanisms need to be implemented to require
good practice from the profession.
The Green Inquiry illustrated that over the course of a thirteen-year period, 23 individuals or
organizations had knowledge of concerns about Dr Green’s sexualized conduct. 1094 Dr
Green’s practice partners were subsequently criticized by the inquiry for uncritically
accepting his word that nothing had occurred, in the face of serious allegations of sexualized
conduct; and an NHS committee referred them to the GMC for failing to report concerns
about Dr Green.

The Bristol Inquiry also illustrated that many health professionals,

including senior medical administrators, were aware of concerns about high death rates in
some procedures, and yet little action was taken for a number of years, despite the valiant
efforts of a whistleblower. 1095
The Shipman Inquiry determined that Dr Shipman had been murdering his patients with
relative impunity since 1971, accelerating in numbers and incidence since 1992. As the court
hearing the criminal proceedings noted, “the fact that deaths occurred over a long period
without detection is suggestive of a breakdown in those checks and controls which should
operate to prevent such a tragedy.” 1096 One of the significant areas of concern identified in
the Shipman Inquiry, in common with many of the other inquiries, was that professional
colleagues either did not identify or did not respond to concerns that they may have had
about a colleague’s professional conduct or performance. While a colleague could always
report concerns, many were reluctant to do so because the prevailing professional culture
suggested that it was “improper to criticise or deprecate the conduct of a fellow professional.
The culture was that it was ‘not done’.” 1097 The inquiry noted that by 1993, the GMC had
made it clear that it was the duty of doctors to report to an appropriate authority any concern
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they might have about a colleague’s treatment of a patient(s) if it gave rise to concerns about
patient harm. 1098

The Shipman Inquiry was told that, despite the GMC’s direction,

professional culture did not really change until after the events at Bristol when the GMC
took disciplinary action against doctors who failed to act on information that death rates
among paediatric cardiac patients were too high.
Although eventually (after 27 years) a doctor did report concerns about Dr Shipman to the
coroner, the Shipman Inquiry noted a number of other instances where it believed there had
been a failure by doctors and other health professions to report concerns. It highlighted
particularly the case of Mrs Overton, who died after spending fourteen months in a
persistent vegetative state. Dr Shipman had injected her with a large bolus dose (i.e. direct
injection) of diamorphine, a drug that was contra-indicated for her as she had asthma.
Doctors and nursing staff at the hospital believed Dr Shipman had made a mistake in giving
Mrs Overton the drug and in giving her an excessive dose, administered incorrectly, yet noone reported their concerns. One of the doctors proffered the excuse that he did not know
how to report concerns about a GP within the NHS and did not report his concerns to the
GMC as he thought it would not take action without more information. This doctor also
suggested he had concerns about professional etiquette, i.e. he believed that it was
unprofessional to disparage your colleagues in line with earlier professional practices. Last,
the doctor believed the family should raise concerns as her son, a doctor, knew she had
received morphine; however, the family were not told of the dosage or its means of
administration. 1099
The inquiry also focused on a period in 1993 when, on fourteen occasions, Dr Shipman
prescribed 30 mg ampoules of morphine for patients – a dose too large to treat heart attack
victims and too little to treat cancer patients, but a perfect dose to murder someone who had
not developed a tolerance for morphine. 1100 A professional double-check on the prescribing
practices of doctors was meant to be performed by pharmacists – a form of co-regulation
where pharmacists work with doctors, and other prescribers, to protect patients.
Ibid.
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Pharmacists have legal and ethical obligations to patients to raise concerns about doctors’
prescriptions or prescribing practices. In regard to Dr Shipman’s unusual prescription of
morphine in 1993, the pharmacist concerned did not identify, let alone raise, issues about Dr
Shipman’s prescribing practices then or at any other time. Nor did she question the fact that
he inevitably picked up prescriptions of controlled drugs for his patients. The Shipman
Inquiry concluded that the pharmacist’s professional judgement had been compromised by
her trust in Dr Shipman. A co-self-regulatory process reliant on the professionalism of
doctors and pharmacists failed – and failed over a long period of time. It is suggested that
“together with the Bristol children’s heart surgery debacle, the Shipman case has shaken
public confidence in the medical profession and is likely to lead to widespread reform.” 1101
Dr Ayling was another case that illustrated a multiplicity of failings by health professions to
effectively self-regulate when professionals knew that Ayling’s conduct was sexualized, yet
took no action or took insufficient action. The Ayling inquiry noted that patients raised
concerns with other health professionals seeking validation and reassurance. 1102 Instead,
many of these health professionals in effect “recast what they heard into explanations which
they could find acceptable and in so doing, deceived themselves and failed their patients.” 1103
The reason for doing this was rooted in the internal morality of the profession. The Ayling
Inquiry noted:
A trust in the integrity, honesty and good faith of a doctor was, and remains, a
fundamental element of the relationship between patient and doctor. It was a basic
and deep belief, shared by doctors and patients alike, that doctors acted in the
patient’s best interests. Clear and convincing evidence could be needed, before this
belief would be questioned – either by patients and other staff members who they
might approach. 1104
Speaking of procedures in the early 1980s, a witness before the Ayling Inquiry commented:
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… I felt that the procedures were more heavily weighted in favour of the doctor
rather than the patient. This was rooted in the predominant culture of the time of
‘doctor knows best’, the presumption of the effectiveness of self-regulation and an
inherent professional defensiveness when challenged.” 1105
The Ayling inquiry established that Dr Ayling’s unprofessional – and in some cases criminal
– conduct probably occurred over 27 years during which time there existed many
opportunities to prevent his actions. 1106 The inquiry established that the earliest ascertainable
complaint about Dr Ayling dated from 1971 when a patient complained to a consultant that
Dr Ayling had an erection during her post-natal examination and mismanaged the birth of
her child. Serious concerns began to emerge from nursing and midwifery staff about Dr
Ayling’s behaviour towards female patients and his clinical management between 1975 and
1988, and these concerns were described by some witnesses as “widespread”. 1107 To some, he
was known as “Fingers Fred” or “Fingers Ayling”. 1108
The neighbouring general practice kept records of patient transfers from Dr Ayling’s
practice, including the patients’ reasons for doing so. Between 1985 and 1998, there were 44
patients on their records whose reasons for transferring, in the opinion of the Ayling Inquiry,
warranted further examination or investigation. 1109 One of the GPs gave evidence to the
inquiry that he took no action about Dr Ayling because he was concerned about the possible
repercussions. In response, the inquiry wrote:
it seems to us that Dr Pickering’s continued assertion that the possible damage to his
reputation and the interests of his family outweighed any consideration of the harm
that might come to patients’ emotional wellbeing was at worst to verge on the
culpable and at best to rely on a selective interpretation of GMC guidance. 1110
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The inquiry concluded:
that the failure of the practice as a whole to report the litany of complaints to any
relevant bodies was a major factor in Ayling being able to continue practising over
such a long period. In particular, it was the preference for informal approaches to
colleagues rather than taking the step of reporting to a relevant body such as the
FHSA or GMC that led to such a lack of action. 1111
The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry also noted concerns about professional self-regulation. Dr Kerr
practised for 24 years before his retirement, and Dr Haslam for 23 years.

The inquiry

concluded that, in respect to both Dr Kerr and Dr Haslam, “the overall picture is one of
failure, or missed opportunities, over a number of years.” 1112 The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry
noted:
The story that has emerged is not one of a deliberate conspiracy by healthcare
professionals knowingly acting to conceal sexual misdemeanours (or worse) of two of
their consultant colleagues … but for a complex of reasons … many nonetheless
ignored warning bells or dismissed rumours and some chose to remain silent when
they should have been raising their voices. 1113
A journalist noted:
The four cases [Kerr–Haslam, Ayling, Shipman, and Neale] are very different, but
what they have in common is the devastation visited on patients and families, the
profound deafness of medical professionals to complaints about colleagues and the
repression of NHS whistleblowers. What shines through is the ease with which the
deep trust placed in doctors was breached. 1114
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The British cases illustrated a medical profession that was reluctant to self-regulate even
when the conduct or performance of colleagues placed patients at risk – behaviour that
created mistrust of the profession’s willingness to self-regulate without compulsion and
oversight by other actors.

Legislative Responsibilities for Self-Regulation

Government-sanctioned self-regulation grants professions legal authority to self-regulate
members of that profession pursuant to an implicit social contract, one term of which is that
the profession will ensure its members act in the public interest. Part of the explicit grant of
powers is the ability to determine professional standards related to competence and conduct,
and the authority to discipline its members in furtherance of the safety of the public and the
integrity of the profession.
In the Canadian scandals, the performance of the regulatory actors was an issue in two
scandals, but paled into insignificance compared to what the British scandals illustrated about
the GMC. In Winnipeg, the inquest report directed a mild rebuke towards the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba (CPSM). Despite the highly public nature of the
concerns about the competence of Dr Odim, no investigation of his competence had been
initiated by the CPSM as of 2000, about six years after the scandal became public. For a
body that was supposed to act in the public interest to ensure physicians are publicly and
professionally accountable for public safety, such an omission to act was curious indeed. No
investigation occurred because the CPSM’s rules required a complaint be laid before it before
such an investigation could be commenced. Justice Sinclair recommended that the CPSM
review its practices in this regard so that it could initiate an investigation without a
complaint. 1115
Significant disquiet was expressed in 1990 about the perceived failures of CPSO to impose
appropriate penalties on doctors who acted in a sexually inappropriate manner towards their
patients. In that year, the disciplinary committee of the CPSO exonerated a doctor of sexual
1115 In addition to Justice Sinclair’s recommendation that the college review his report, six complaints were
received by the college post-inquest and an investigation was commenced. The investigation was unsuccessfully
challenged by the surgeon on the grounds of undue delay. Odim v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba
[2004] 2 W.W.R. 370; 174 Man. R. (2d) 312. No disciplinary action was taken.
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abuse, a doctor who used a so-called psychotherapy technique called ‘pelvic bonding’ on a
patient. 1116 At that time, the CPSO was still applying a variant of the common-law Bolam
test in its disciplinary procedures.

Thus, if what Justice McNair in Bolam termed “a

responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art” 1117 gave evidence that a
particular practice was appropriate, even if it was a minority opinion, the doctor would not
be found to have fallen below the expected standard of practice. The CPSO sought and
deferred to the opinion of a few laypersons (because no doctors could be found to defend
the use of this ‘treatment’) that the ‘treatment’ was reputable.

The CPSO’s decision,

unsurprisingly, resulted in a “public uproar” 1118 as it appeared the CPSO had placed the
interests of the profession and/or the individual doctor above the interest of the patient and
the public interest.
Robinson attributes the CPSO’s subsequent decision to convene the TSAPP to public
embarrassment, as well as subsequent representations from action groups. 1119 The formation
of the TSAPP was associational self-regulation in action – a self-regulatory body impelled by
public pressure to recognize a possible problem and take action to both confirm it and devise
solutions. The TSAPP concluded that the CPSO was doing a poor job of investigating and
hearing complaints of sexual misconduct. For example, in 1990 the CPSO undertook 43
investigations into suspected sexual abuse. Fourteen cases proceeded to discipline, two were
found to be professional misconduct, and in those two cases neither doctor lost his licence
to practise. 1120

If a complaint did go to hearing, often penalties were seen as lenient,

amounting to little more than a slap on the wrist, reflecting an over-identification with the
doctor. 1121 When the disciplinary committee did impose a serious penalty, it was invariably
overturned by the courts. 1122

1116 Where a patient is required to place their face in their therapist’s genital area ostenisbly to remind the
patient of the security experienced as a child while hugging his/her parent.
1117 Bolam, supra note 185.
1118 Robinson, supra note 873.
1119 Ibid at 128.
1120 Ibid at 127.
1121 Rogers, supra note 901.
1122 Ibid.
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Subsequently, the CPSO sought and gained amendments to the Regulated Health Professions Act
– the umbrella legislation that governs the regulation of health professions in Ontario. 1123
These changes instituted a zero-tolerance policy for sexual abuse, defined what the term
means, instituted mandatory reporting of suspected sexual abuse by professional colleagues,
and the withdrawal of a health professional’s practising licence became the mandatory
penalty for particularly serious cases. Consequently, in 1993 the CPSO conducted 127
investigations (more than double the number it investigated three years before) into
complaints of sexual abuse. Fifty-nine cases involving sixteen doctors proceeded to
discipline; nine doctors were found to have committed professional misconduct and seven
had their licences revoked. 1124 However, in 2007 Rogers critiqued the long-term effect of the
changes on practices within the CPSO.

She noted “several locations of institutional

resistance which interfere with the protection of the public and which undermine the intent
of the zero tolerance legislation.” 1125 These included an implicit requirement of independent
corroboration, the criminalization of the process, reliance on psychological expertise to
pathologize the complainant and exculpate the defendant, and a narrow technical
interpretation of the provisions and guidelines. 1126 She noted that between 1994 and 2005,
only 5.53 per cent of sexual abuse complaints proceeded to discipline. 1127

In addition,

Rogers noted a tendency to reconceptualize complaints about sexual abuse as acts of clinical
ineptitude (which essentially is what appears to have occurred in Britain in respect of Dr
Ayling). Rogers’ overall conclusion was that the:
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and the Province of Ontario both
showed early leadership in seriously responding to sexual abuse of patients by
doctors. … it is deeply disturbing that that the momentum of this important initiative
has been undermined in its implementation. 1128
The work of TSAPP and associated publicity had an impact across the country, with other
provinces, such as British Columbia, Alberta, Québec, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan,
Regulated Health Professions Act S.O. 1991 c. 8 as amended by S.O. 1993 c. 37 [RHPA].
Robinson, supra note 873.
1125 Rogers, supra note 901 at 357-58.
1126 Ibid at 358.
1127 Ibid at 358.
1128 Rogers, supra note 901 at 398.
1123
1124
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and New Brunswick, establishing committees to review the issue.

In these and other

Canadian jurisdictions, there resulted changes to the legal framework in that province or
policy statements or guidelines on that issue. Regulatory bodies in Canada arguably retained
public trust and respect by acting quickly, even if this was under pressure and in the face of
scrutiny of the public. When self-regulatory actors act promptly on evidence of public
disquiet, self-regulation is seen to work. By instituting these changes to the regulatory
framework, along with education for the profession and the public, it can be argued that
Canadian regulatory authorities created an environment where complaints were more likely
to be made by patients, colleagues were more likely to express concerns, and the grey areas
around sexual abuse were more likely to be clarified for health professionals.

As a

consequence sexual abuse was less likely to be overlooked. They also rebuilt trust in the selfregulatory process by affirming that the regulatory agencies were willing and able to make
substantive changes to the legal framework within which they and their registrants operated
and to place the public interest ahead of the interests of the profession. In short, Canadian
regulatory bodies demonstrated that they were accountable to the public – that they were
responsive, responsible, and virtuous regulators. 1129
This may have been reflective of a change in professional culture where Canadian health
professions were less dominated by a so-called ‘old guard’ and more attuned to changing
societal norms. Contrast this with the position in Britain where professional bodies sent
mixed messages about what conduct constituted sexual abuse and what did not, and there
was therefore a lack of clarity surrounding the issue at least until the late 1990s. Dr Haslam
(later convicted of four counts of indecent assault against patients) wrote an open letter on
behalf of the Society of Clinical Psychiatrists to the British Medical Journal in 1992 arguing
that sexual relations with a patient are not always harmful. 1130 The GMC and the health
professions in Britain were aware of developments in Canada and elsewhere, but took no
action to address the issue.
There was a perception that key actors within the GMC were resistant to changes to protect
the public when those changes would be unpopular with the profession. The GMC was

1129

Some suggest that this effect was not to last; see, for example, Rogers, supra note 901.
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considered to be dominated by an entrenched group of the ‘old guard’, whereas in Canada
the medical profession was progressive, certainly in comparison. For example, the Canadian
Medical Association set up a Gender Issues Committee in 1990, indicating awareness by and
within the profession of the importance of gender issues. 1131 It also appears that attitudes of
deference to doctors lingered in England until the late 1990s, whereas significant changes to
the doctor–patient relationship were occurring in Canada from the late 1980s and early
1990s, as well as in the way in which the community regarded sexual abuse. Feminism was
said to have played an important role in this cultural change.

By the late 1980s and early

1990s, sexual harassment and sexual abuse had become a significant issue in Canadian
society. 1132 In the health context, in the 1990s female patients in Canada were increasingly
showing a growing preference for treatment by female physicians. 1133 There was also
increasing feminist criticism of male domination of psychotherapy and medicine in North
America. 1134
This arguably more-effective, regulatory self-governance may also be seen in respect of two
episodes connected with two prominent British scandals. Dr van Velzen, the pathologist
who attracted infamy in the RLCH Inquiry, moved to a position in a Canadian hospital in
1995. Dr van Velzen was fired from that position in 1998, not because of concerns about
organ retention, but because of concerns about clinical competency. 1135 On 7 May 1999, Dr
van Velzen formally consented to the issue of a written reprimand from the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia for falling below acceptable standards of clinical
practice. 1136
Similarly, Dr Richard Neale fell afoul of Canadian regulatory processes before he
commenced his career in Britain. In 1977, Dr Neale performed a high-risk surgery on a
Cited in P. Kennedy, “Kerr/Haslam Inquiry into Sexual Abuse of Patients by Psychiatrists” (2006) 30
Psychiatric Bulletin 204.
1131 Anonymous, “Several Issues Dominate Agenda of Meeting of CMA’s Gender Issues Committee” (1993)
148:1 CMAJ 69 [Anonymous, “Several Issues Dominate Agenda”].
1132 D. Shaw, “Sexual Involvement Between Physicians and Patients: Regulations are not a Panacea” (1994)
150:9 CMAJ 1397.
1133 S. Thorne, “Women Show Growing Preference for Treatment by Female Physicians” (1993) 150:9 CMAJ
1396.
1134 Ibid.
1135 RLCH Inquiry, supra note 860.
1136 Ibid.
1130
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patient, against the advice of a senior colleague. The patient died, and Dr Neale lost his
privileges at that hospital. A subsequent investigation by the College of Physicians and
Surgeons of British Columbia said that Dr Neale should withdraw from practice or undergo
further training. Dr Neale chose the latter option and completed further training in Ontario.
In 1980, another patient died after receiving an elective induction of pregnancy from Dr
Neale. Dr Neale was asked to withdraw his name from the roster at this hospital, and in
1982 the CPSO commenced an investigation into Dr Neale’s management of this case. In
late 1984, Dr Neale sought voluntary deregistration and returned to Britain. Despite this, the
CPSO proceeded with its disciplinary proceedings in his absence and concluded that his lack
of competence, and his subsequent alteration of medical records, to be serious professional
misconduct.

His name was erased from the medical register.

The Canadian systems

recognized that Dr Neale’s conduct placed patients at risk, and disciplinary measures were
instituted to ensure public safety.
The focus in Britain was on the GMC, whose many perceived failures resulted “… in calls
for the GMC, a self-regulating body, to be scrapped.” 1137 The scandals disclosed a raft of
failures by the GMC, both prospective and reactive. Davies notes:
in simple terms, the GMC … made no effort to look for it [misconduct]. They
simply waited passively for complaints to be brought to them and … even then they
were often unwilling to act. 1138
In Britain, the Kerr/Haslam scandal was one of many which created conditions for the
distrust of the GMC’s commitment to policing the profession and acting in the public
interest. 1139 From 1996, the GMC received multiple complaints from doctors, the York NHS
Trust, and patients about Dr Haslam’s conduct relating to sexual abuse of patients.
Investigations into some of these complaints were commenced by the GMC. In 1997, the
GMC wrote to the NHS inquiring whether recent newspaper articles about a police

R. Syal, “GMC ‘hit squad’ to Speed Rulings on Misconduct” Telegraph (16 July 2000) [Syal], online: The
Telegraph <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/1348739/GMC-hit-squad-to-speed-rulings-onmisconduct.html>
1138 Davies, “Self-Regulation”, supra note 19.
1139 Kerr/Haslam Inquiry, supra note 861.
1137
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investigation into a psychiatrist related to Dr Haslam. In August 1997, the NHS advised the
GMC that the police had concluded their investigation into Dr Haslam without laying
charges and that the NHS had commenced an internal investigation. In January 1998, the
GMC was informed of the NHS’s heightened concerns about Dr Haslam. In March 1998,
the GMC received the interim internal NHS review report and in June the final report, both
of which suggested concerns about his sexually inappropriate conduct had been sustained.
After receiving the NHS review, the GMC’s lawyers said that the report alone could not
form the basis of a disciplinary hearing because the standard of proof required for the GMC
was the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt (as opposed to the civil standard of
balance of probabilities). The GMC investigations into multiple complaints continued until
February 1999, when Dr Haslam voluntarily withdrew his name from the register and the
GMC’s proceedings ceased. A doctor who raised concerns about Dr Haslam was quoted as
saying:
I have found the GMC to be opaque and uninterested … it is also worth saying that
if Haslam has not sued the Sunday Times, he would have got away with it. None of
these procedures actually did anything to stop what happened. … Nobody says
anything about the human rights of patients.

They really do not seem to be

considered in this at all. … I am very well aware of the total failure to deal with
medically qualified sociopaths … I would like to believe that in the future the GMC
will take complaints seriously, as I do not believe they did so here. 1140
The doctor continued, “I am still quite convinced that a highly intelligent and manipulative
abuser would be able to get away with it again.” 1141 The GMC, according to the NHS, “did
nothing … the risk to patients could only be stopped if his [Dr Haslam’s] registration was
taken away … patient safety could only be guaranteed by the GMC.” 1142 The Kerr/Haslam
Inquiry concluded:

Ibid at 403.
Ibid at 408.
1142 Ibid at 407.
1140
1141
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when patients and the NHS are speaking with the same voice, it is to be hoped and
expected that the GMC will heed criticisms and put their house in order. If not, their
house must be put in order for them. 1143
The Kerr/Haslam Inquiry’s conclusions in relation to the GMC amount to a form of
associational self-regulation – where a policy actor places pressure on another actor to
encourage or compel it to meet its responsibilities, in this instance as a governmentsanctioned self-regulator. 1144
In another case, the GMC was unaware of any problems with Dr Ayling’s practice until
advised of two serious complaints by the East Kent Health Authority (EKHA) in March
1998. In June, the GMC requested further information from EKHA. In September,
concerned about the apparent lack of action by the GMC, EKHA wrote to it urging
expedited action. However, the GMC halted its investigation in November pending the
criminal proceedings.

In the meantime, Dr Ayling’s bail conditions permitted him to

continue to practise. The GMC did not act to suspend Dr Ayling from practice while on bail
– and, as the Ayling Inquiry noted, it is difficult to argue that they should have secondguessed the High Court, which expressly permitted Dr Ayling to continue to practise. After
his conviction in January 2001 on twelve counts of indecent assault, the Interim Orders
Committee of the GMC suspended Dr Ayling’s licence for eighteen months.

It was not

until June 2001, six months after Dr Ayling’s conviction, that the GMC removed Dr Ayling’s
name from the medical register. A journalist noted, post the publication of the Ayling and
Kerr/Haslam inquiries:
The GMC has already moved to defuse criticism by publishing proposals for reform,
including appointing an equal number of lay and medical members to investigative
panels and a tougher code of conduct. That appears to be enough to avert threats to
abolish the GMC. 1145

Ibid at 407.
McDonald, “Working to Death” supra note 110.
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In yet another example, in 1993 the GMC received a complaint about a research project run
by Dr Green which involved the use of a relaxant and sexual role-play; it is not clear whether
the GMC took any action in response to that concern. 1146 In July 1997, the Leicestershire
Health Authority forwarded to the GMC serious concerns about Dr Green’s conduct, and at
this time, again according to the inquiry report, the GMC was already investigating another
complaint against Dr Green. Almost one year later, in June 1998, the GMC suspended Dr
Green from the medical register. Because the GMC investigation “took some time to
proceed”, the trust made an application to the NHS tribunal to suspend Dr Green from the
NHS medical list in November 1997. 1147 There was some betrayal of trust evident in that the
GMC could not or would not act speedily in the public interest to prevent Dr Green from
practising until charges were laid. A commentator noted: “As details emerged, many people
were surprised both that he could continue to practise, and to continue to practise on his
own.” 1148
After it was disclosed that Dr Neale had been deregistered in Canada in the 1980s, the
question was asked: “How could Richard Neale have been allowed to practice at all, let alone
for so long?” 1149 The inquiry determined that the GMC was advised by the Medical Council
of Canada in 1985 or early 1986 that Dr Neale had been deregistered in Canada. A Canadian
colleague of Dr Neale also advised the GMC of Dr Neale’s deregistration in 1985–86 and
was told that if a doctor was registered in good standing, then that doctor’s standing in a
foreign country was no concern of the GMC’s. 1150 The GMC took no action to review Dr
Neale’s registration status in Britain and retained no records of these notifications. In 1988,
the Yorkshire Regional Health Authority (YRHA) became aware that Dr Neale had been
deregistered, and contacted the GMC to advise it of Dr Neale’s history. They were told that
such a matter was not within the GMC’s jurisdiction. In 1988, the police also contacted the
GMC about Dr Neale’s deregistration. They were told that because Dr Neale had not
committed any offence in Britain, the GMC would not take any further action. 1151 In 1991,
the police advised the GMC that Dr Neale had received a police caution and explained the
Green Inquiry, supra note 857.
Ibid at 1.
1148 Ibid at 2.
1149 Neale Inquiry, supra note 851 at 13.
1150 Ibid at 36.
1151 Ibid at 50.
1146
1147
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circumstances in which it was made, including that Dr Neale had provided false information.
A representative of the YRHA discussed the issue with the GMC and was advised that the
GMC “could take no action on the basis of a Police caution.” 1152 Although the GMC could
have opened an investigation, no action was taken and the GMC had no record of the letter
from the police or the discussion with YRHA. In March 1998, the regional director referred
concerns about Dr Neale to the GMC and sent out an alert letter about Dr Neale within the
NHS. It was not until 1999 that the GMC took action to suspend Dr Neale’s registration.
The inquiry noted:
evidence was obtained that confirmed that not only had the General Medical Council
been fully aware of his history in Canada, but had chosen deliberately not to act on
this in 1986 and subsequently. … How such a situation can ever be acceptable or
fair must now be considered with urgency … 1153
The media concluded this “… again calls into question the ability of the GMC to police the
medical profession effectively.” 1154
The Bristol Inquiry did not directly consider the role of the GMC, but it noted:
All professional bodies charged with responsibility for disciplining their members
must constantly keep in mind that they do so on behalf of the wider public. The trust
granted to them is that they act in the public interest to preserve and maintain the
safety and quality of healthcare provided to patients. To acquire the public’s
confidence and trust, these professional regulatory bodies must let the public in, to a
degree not hitherto contemplated. … But the pace of change is not fast enough and
the public’s patience is running out. The professional bodies must be more flexible in
their approach to what constitutes misconduct and practice that warrants disciplinary
action; they must deal with cases as far as possible at a local level and they must have
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Women’ ”], online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/787709.stm>.
1152
1153

257

available a range of actions to meet the problem before them which both serve the
interests of the public and the needs of the professional. 1155
The Shipman Inquiry also “disclosed a raft of flaws in professional governance.” 1156 Dr
Shipman is believed to have commenced his murderous course in 1971. In 1975, he first
came to the attention of regulatory authorities when the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate
and the West Yorkshire Police Drugs Squad noted that abnormally large quantities of
pethidine were being obtained by the practice in which Dr Shipman worked. An inspector
made a series of recommendations aimed at addressing deficiencies in the management of
controlled drugs. In late September 1975, Dr Shipman’s colleagues discovered he was
addicted to pethidine, dismissed him from the practice, and reported his conduct to the
requisite authorities. In 1976, Dr Shipman pled guilty to eight specimen criminal charges –
three of obtaining a controlled drug (pethidine) by deception; three of unlawfully possessing
a controlled drug; and two of forging a prescription – and was fined. The GMC noted the
convictions and decided not to refer the matter for disciplinary action due to his addiction,
for which he had received apparently successful treatment, and to good conduct reports
obtained from his current employer. 1157 The Department of Health did not issue an order
under section 12 of the Misuse of Drugs Act to restrict his access to controlled drugs. There
were suggestions from some quarters that, had the GMC acted differently when it received
notification of Dr Shipman’s 1976 convictions, many of the murders may have been
prevented.

The inquiry determined that in 1976 the Penal Cases Committee and the

Disciplinary Committee took the view that doctors who abused drugs should continue in
practice until they were rehabilitated, and that acts of dishonesty associated with drug abuse
were part and parcel of that person’s addiction and did not point to general dishonesty. 1158
The GMC received three other complaints about Dr Shipman’s conduct after 1976, but no
action was taken on them because none of the complaints suggested a “fundamental
problem in the GP’s practice.” 1159 The inquiry concluded that even a full investigation by the
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T. Richards, “Chairman of Shipman Inquiry Protests at Lack of Action” (2006) 332 BMJ 1111.
1157 Shipman Inquiry, Safeguarding Patients, supra note 1097.
1158 Ibid.
1159 Dyer, “Tighter Control” supra note 1101; see also Shipman Inquiry, Safeguarding Patients, supra note 1097.
1155
1156

258

GMC of each of these complaints would not have disclosed the extent of Dr Shipman’s
wrongdoing, and an investigation would likely have resulted in a low-level penalty, such as a
reprimand. 1160 When Dr Shipman was arrested and charged with fifteen counts of murder,
the GMC did not believe that it had the statutory authority to suspend a practitioner from
practice until that practitioner had been convicted of a criminal offence, and did not impose
a suspension (Dr Shipman was, of course, not in a position to practise as he was in custody –
but perception is all).
Perhaps the key failing in all these cases, from a public interest perspective, was the GMC’s
reactive stance. The GMC did not actively monitor the competence and conduct of doctors;
rather, it waited for complaints. Davies notes, “in simple terms, the GMC … made no effort
to look for it [misconduct]. They simply waited passively for complaints to be brought to
them and … even then they were often unwilling to act.” 1161 In respect of Dr Shipman,
while the inquiry noted that it was not reasonable for the GMC to foresee that personal drug
abuse would lead to mass murder, it was reasonable to foresee that a history of personal drug
abuse may lead to deficiencies in patient care. Accordingly, the inquiry concluded that the
GMC’s approach focused too much on the interest of the doctor and placed insufficient
emphasis on the public interest in determining whether the doctor posed a threat to his or
her patients during the course of his or her rehabilitation. 1162
Indeed, the GMC admitted in evidence to the Shipman Inquiry that its procedures generally
had “failed … to meet the reasonable expectations of patients and the public.” 1163 Smith, in
an editorial on the Shipman Inquiry, noted that:
The General Medical Council (GMC) has been submitted to a highly detailed
forensic examination and found severely wanting. It has broken its contract with the
public – to protect patients in exchange for the privilege of self-regulation. 1164
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He further stated, “if it [the GMC] is to command public and parliamentary confidence then
the council must put patients and the public first.” 1165 The inquiry concluded that the GMC
as regulator of the medical profession had not in the past been successful in its primary
purpose of protecting patients, having at times acted in the interests of doctors at the
expense of patients. 1166 The GMC’s general defence was that at the relevant time it lacked
appropriate statutory powers. Yet most of the issues of concern to the inquiry did not arise
because of a lack of power but rather from the manner in which the GMC chose to exercise
its powers. 1167
The extent of the loss of trust in the GMC as a regulator was evident by some of the
submissions received by the Shipman Inquiry that suggested that the GMC should no longer
be permitted to regulate the profession. 1168 That lack of trust could not have been remedied
by the inquiry’s somewhat tepid endorsement of the GMC as a regulator. While the inquiry
did not recommend that the GMC lose its regulatory powers to govern the profession, it
reached some fairly damning conclusions about the GMC – that it had failed to act in the
interests of patients, instead acting in the interests of doctors, and that this failure was due to
the culture within the GMC, a culture that had not radically changed since the GMC was
formed in the mid-1800s. It also concluded that, although the GMC may take action when
the need to do so was pointed out to it, on the whole the GMC had not been able to identify
and act upon its shortcomings. 1169
The Shipman Inquiry suggested that the GMC’s culture might change and public
accountability enhanced if its members were appointed rather than elected by the profession,
as persons who are appointed may see themselves, as the Shipman Inquiry put it, as
“servants of the public interest.” 1170 It also concluded that the GMC should be more directly
accountable to Parliament for the manner in which it exercises the powers gifted to it by
Parliament.

Both steps would mean that while the statutory façade of self-regulation

remains, professional autonomy is limited by greater government control and oversight. The
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Shipman Inquiry highlighted a submission from the Tameside Families Support Group
which was bewildered that, as phrased by the inquiry, “the State should apparently have
abdicated its responsibility for monitoring GPs.” 1171 According to the Shipman Inquiry, the
explanation for the abdication, was that:
there was a strong belief, apparently shared by Government, that the medical
profession itself provided the best (indeed the only) means of imposing high
standards of clinical care and professional conduct on doctors and of monitoring
those standards. It believed that it would do so rigorously. 1172
One Canadian commentator wrote in the aftermath of the Shipman case:
The GMC, which has a disciplinary role similar to our Royal Colleges, now faces
imposed reform or even the loss of its power to punish bad doctors. Meanwhile, a
root and branch re-writing of the rules on physician monitoring will make British
family doctors the most heavily scrutinized on earth. 1173
Smith, then editor of the British Medical Journal, summed it up nicely when he wrote:
It [the GMC] is reactive rather than proactive, prefers that doctors should be trusted
rather than held accountable, places consensus before leadership, is driven by
expediency and compromise, and in the last analysis will put fairness to doctors
ahead of patient protection. 1174
What the narratives of scandals illustrate about government-sanctioned self-regulation is that
it in Britain it was profoundly inefficient, ineffective, ineffectual, and self-interested in Britain
in terms of the internal morality of the profession and its performance of its regulatory
powers. In short, professional self-regulation had well and truly earned its status as being
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worthy of mistrust. In Canada, the few scandals illustrated that professional self-regulation
was not a perfect instrument but that many health professionals subscribed to a form of
internal morality. It also demonstrated that regulators were sufficiently responsive to public
concerns, in tune with public sentiment, and concerned about public safety and professional
integrity that self-regulation remained a viable artefact.

The actions of regulators had

generally maintained public trust.
On the whole, the narratives of the British scandals created the conditions for the mistrust of
health professionals, health professions, professional regulatory actors, and the management
and structures within the NHS.

The narratives of the Canadian scandals created the

conditions for mistrust of the Canadian blood system, the Ontario public health system, and
the federal role in public health, and, to a more limited extent, some facets of the
management of the Manitoban health system. But, with the exception of the blood scandal
and to some extent SARS, these events were sufficiently localised that any mistrust did not
disturb the fundamental assumptions underlying the Canadian health systems. Even the
mistrust of these actors was transient in the face of rapid and comprehensive responses to
scandals.

Accountability
Accountability is another determinate of policy and regulatory acceptability, hence the need
for control mechanisms. Mulgan notes that ‘accountability’ has emerged as a complex and
chameleon-like term which performs all manner of analytical and rhetorical tasks. 1175 Rowe
and Calnan note:
changes in trust are driven by the dialectical relationship between trust, power,
governance and accountability, so that each affects the other in a continuing iterative
process. 1176
At its core, accountability is associated with the process of being called to account by an
interested or affected authority for one’s actions or inaction. 1177 To frame it another way, it
1175
1176

R. Mulgan, “ ‘Accountability’: An Ever Expanding Concept?” (2000) 78:3 Pub. Admin. 555 [Mulgan].
Rowe, supra note 62 at 379.

262

is about actors who are responsible for a set of activities answering for their action or
inaction. 1178 Accountability mechanisms are generally conceived as processes external to the
body or person being held accountable. Accountability implies some form of hierarchy in
that an actor has the authority or the right to hold a person or agency accountable. 1179 Not
only can answers be demanded, but sanctions may be imposed. 1180 For many, sanctions are
considered crucial as they give ‘teeth’ to accountability. 1181 Legal and regulatory sanctions
offer the most ‘teeth’; however, there are also other forms of sanction that may be as
effective – for example, public exposure. 1182

But the mere existence of sanctions is

insufficient without application – something that requires enforcement.

A lack of

enforcement, or selective enforcement, means that agencies or individuals are not in fact
accountable. 1183 Sorrell argues that “it is not the publication of the standards but the enforcement
of the standards that matters to whether trust is well placed.” 1184
Day and Klein note that the concept of accountability began with individual actors in a
simple society, and its forms are currently challenged by institutions existing in complex
societies. 1185

Traditionally, accountability mechanisms focused on holding individuals

accountable based on the presumption of individual agency. Indeed, this presumption of
individual agency furnishes the fabric of both law and medicine. 1186 Latterly, there have been
suggestions that the individualized focus of accountability mechanisms should be revised,
with greater attention paid to accountability at the systems level. 1187 Research into errors
indicates that there is often a complex range of factors that contribute to errors over and
above that of individual agency, and thus the simple model of causation that seeks out socalled ‘bad apples’ is inadequate in the face of increasingly complex causative factors that

Mulgan, supra note 1175.
See, for example, Emanuel, supra note 73.
1179 Mulgan, supra note 1175; Day & Klein, supra note 451.
1180 Mulgan, ibid.
1181 Brinkerhoff, supra note 75; Mulgan, supra note 1175.
1182 Brinkerhoff, supra note 75.
1183 Ibid.
1184 T. Sorrell, “Safety, Accountability, and ‘Choice’ after the Bristol Inquiry” in S. Clarke and J. Oakley, eds.,
Informed Consent and Clinician Accountability: The Ethics of Report Cards on Surgeon Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007) 52 at 55 [Sorrell].
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contribute to errors. 1188 There is also a perception that it is not just to hold an individual
accountable where there is no moral blameworthiness on the part of that individual because
of systemic faults. 1189
Recently, some accountability mechanisms have been designed to focus on the acts or
omissions of systems. 1190 This is not unproblematic. Some point to the possibility that
locating accountability outside of individuals minimizes the role of individual agency and
diminishes the prospective functions of accountability by creating a perverse incentive
towards poor performance. 1191

Others suggest that notions of systemic failure may

constitute a shield for human misfeasance. 1192 It is a transition that does not occur without
straining some basic social understandings. At a cultural level, Douglas would suggest that,
to quote Lupton, “in contemporary western cultures, every death, every accident and every
misfortune is ‘chargeable to someone’s account’ – someone must be found to be
blamed.” 1193 As individuals and as a society, we want a human face to hold accountable
because, in the absence of that personal locus for blame, there may be no meaning, certainly
if the push for accountability is driven by a desire for retribution for harm caused. 1194 There
are, of course, circumstances in which sanctions can serve a dual purpose: retribution and
remedy, a remedy which may restore trust in the fairness, compassion, and legitimacy of the
actor(s) being held accountable. 1195 Conversely, accountability measures may, as O’Neill
notes, further damage trust. 1196 Placing this in context, it might be said that whereas in the
past accountability relationships in health were between the patient and the health
professional, the “democratisation of social provision” 1197 of healthcare results in more
complex accountability relationships between patients, health professionals, health-providers,
and governments, but also with the public, who are both recipients of services and its
funders.
Sharpe, supra note 70; J. Reason, Human Error (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) [Reason].
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Accountability may be retrospective or prospective in nature. Much of the focus of attention
on accountability is often on mechanisms that retrospectively attempt to assign responsibility
or, as Douglas would have it, blame after the fact. 1198 Holdsworth, for example, describes
accountability as “the obligation to lay oneself open to criticism.”1199 However, accountability
also has an important prospective role. Accountability processes may result in a normative
guide to conduct. 1200 Mechanisms for accountability, by specifying the obligations of actors
within that sphere, may orient everyone towards compliance and, optimally, towards a
culture of improvement in practices and processes. 1201

However, these ends may be

conflicting, as retrospective accountability with its focus on the loci of ‘blame’ may be at
odds with prospective accountability, which emphasizes learning from mistakes and positive
incentives to improve. 1202
In the health context, Emanuel and Emanuel suggest that at times a single “key word” comes
to dominate discussions within a particular sphere to both organize related ideas and as a
shorthand expression for an entire perspective to the extent that any discussion seems
incomplete without that term, and they suggest “accountability” has become such a word. 1203
Although the relationship between the state and the health professions appears, as Tuohy
notes, hedged around with formal accountability mechanisms, at its essence it has
traditionally been based on collegiality and trust. 1204 If retrospective accountability
mechanisms are perceived to have been ineffective or unresponsive, then there are grounds
to call for a review of the existing regulatory framework so as to make actors more
accountable.
This section particularly examines the retrospective accountability mechanisms that
responded to patient safety scandals experienced in Britain and Canada, as prospective
Day & Klein, supra note 451.
Douglas, supra note 5.
1199 D. Holdsworth, “Accountability and the Obligation to Lay Oneself Open to Criticism” in R. Chadwick, ed.,
Ethics and the Professions (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994) 42 at 42 [Holdsworth].
1200 Emanuel, supra note 73.
1201 Sharpe, supra note 70; Oakley, supra note 75.
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accountability has been discussed in the context of trust in the previous section of this
chapter. There are a variety of retrospective accountability mechanisms which perform
different roles and send different messages to the public. In all inquiry processes related to
healthcare, there is an element of moral judgement as to whether individuals, and often
systems, have: 1) provided services of the expected standard; 2) acted in the interests of their
patients and the public; and 3) acted in compliance with accepted standards of conduct. 1205
The criminal law is the penultimate symbol of societal condemnation of an act or practice,
as it generally comprises offences that are mala in se (‘evil in itself’) and which therefore
incorporates moral denunciation of the act and punishment of the offender – as previously
mentioned, the criminal law was used in respect of some of the scandals discussed in this
chapter most notably in the conviction of Dr Shipman. Police investigations also occurred
in respect of Drs Neale and van Velzen, although charges were not laid. 1206 In Canada,
criminal charges were laid against four doctors, the CRC, and a pharmaceutical company in
respect of the contaminated blood scandal. 1207 In laying these charges, Superintendent Rod
Knecht stated:
The Canadian public needs to have confidence in their public institutions … The
Canadian public has the right to expect the safest blood and the safest blood
products possible. This is fundamental to the health, safety and lives of everyone
living in Canada. 1208
In at least this instance, the criminal law was seen as a public accountability mechanism that
might restore trust, but as discussed in Chapters 2 and 7, it can also be used to ensure
accountability when other mechanisms are perceived to have failed.
Government-sanctioned self-regulatory actions are a form of mala prohibita, but prohibition
by one’s profession, not the state. In the Ontario sexual abuse scandal, concerns expressed
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about the CPSO in respect of the manner in which it dealt with complaints of sexual abuse
arose because the CPSO’s ineffective policies and processes denied patients and the public
accountability. 1209 In taking immediate steps to institute a review of its practices, CPSO
showed that it perceived that it was, at least to some extent, accountable to the public for its
actions. The measures taken by other medical regulators across Canada to institute changes
to policies and practices also demonstrated an acceptance that they were accountable to the
public.
In Britain, much of the concern expressed about the GMC was because its processes failed
to ensure that patients could hold doctors accountable, and there was no real mechanism
through which the public could in turn hold the GMC accountable for that failing. An
example of failures to ensure accountability could be seen in the Kerr/Haslam scandal. In
1998, after an internal NHS inquiry found Dr Haslam to have sexually exploited some
patients, and while he was under investigation by the GMC, he asked for voluntary erasure
from the medical register. 1210

In 1999, the Preliminary Proceedings Committee (PPC)

decided to charge Dr Haslam but to offer him the option of voluntary withdrawal from the
register, irrespective that it was investigating other complaints about him. 1211 Once a doctor
was removed from the register, the GMC’s position was that no disciplinary proceedings
could proceed. 1212 A voluntary removal from the register effectively preserved a doctor’s
reputation and denied affected patients an opportunity for accountability before that doctor’s
peers. 1213 The GMC permitted Dr Haslam to voluntarily withdraw from the register, and all
proceedings and investigations against Dr Haslam immediately ceased.
In this instance, the GMC appeared to put the interests of Dr Haslam – and perhaps also its
own convenience in regard to the investigations and disciplinary proceedings it would have
otherwise had to undertake – ahead of the interests of complainants. Arguably, the GMC
also sacrificed the public interest in failing to ensure that those given public privileges are
also held accountable for any violations of public trust. Although it kept no records of its
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decision-making processes, the GMC explained its decision by suggesting that voluntary
withdrawal was a speedy way to remove a doctor from practice – an action ultimately, in its
view, in the public interest. 1214

While it may have been expedient, such action

understandably undermined trust in the regulator entrusted to holding its registrants to
account. A complainant was quoted by the inquiry as saying:
Having regard to all that had gone before the GMC’s conduct was little short of
incredible. A show of support for patients which amounted to nothing less than a
concerted and determined decision not to investigate what were by then universally
well known accounts of Haslam’s abuse; a steadfast refusal to respond to those who
had made complaints in the past; complete disregard for the safety of patients.
Those patients who thought that doctors would stick together and cover for one
another could scarcely have guessed that if and when a doctor did take the complaint
forward, then it would treated in such an off-hand manner by the very authority
charged with regulation of the medical profession. 1215
Another patient wrote:
Whilst I appreciate that he [Dr Haslam] is no longer able to practice, he is still
carrying out the posturing role of pillar of the community, social secretary of one of
the University colleges and actively involved in the Schizophrenia Association. It
would appear that the matter has been conveniently swept under the carpet and a
man who used his position to systematically abuse vulnerable patients has once again
got away scot-free and failed to have been called to public account. Even if this is
not the case, I feel personally cheated of any justice and feel that once again there has
been a cynical disregard for the suffering of the patient. 1216
The GMC’s decision attracted much condemnation from within the health system, too.
Representatives of the NHS and the President of the Royal College of Psychiatrists wrote to
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express their concerns about the decision. 1217

Dr Kerr was also allowed to voluntarily

withdraw from the register, attracting similar condemnation. However, in that case approval
was granted after receipt of medical advice that Dr Kerr’s physical and mental condition
meant he was unfit to plead. As noted by the inquiry, “fairness and natural justice left the
GMC with no other option than to accept the application for voluntary erasure, thereby
ensuring public safety.” 1218

On the whole, however, the GMC’s practices appeared to

undermine mechanisms to hold doctors accountable to individuals and to the public.
Further examples are legion. The Shipman Inquiry examined in detail the pre-Shipman
mechanisms through which the GMC dealt with complaints about conduct. 1219 It found that
complaints were first filtered by GMC staff, and those that were deemed appropriate were
then screened by a medically qualified member of the GMC (after 1990, they were jointly
considered by a medically qualified member and a layperson –the screeners). 1220

The

screeners forwarded appropriate cases for review by the PPC. The PPC in turn forwarded
appropriate cases for consideration by the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) (no more
than five per cent of those initially received reached the PCC). 1221 The PCC would hold a
public hearing, and if the doctor had been convicted of a criminal offence or if serious
professional misconduct (SPM) was established, would consider whether action on
registration was necessary.
The Shipman Inquiry identified a number of significant problems with this process. First,
there was no generally agreed definition of what SPM was.

Until 1985, the GMC’s

professional conduct guide said that SPM was not concerned with errors of diagnosis and
treatment. From 1985, the GMC would only examine errors of diagnosis and treatment
when there was such disregard or neglect of professional responsibilities that it amounted to
SPM. 1222

The inquiry determined that until the late 1980s–early 1990s, the GMC was

primarily concerned with misconduct, i.e. dishonesty, drug abuse, indecency, improper
relationships with patients, breach of confidence, and disregard of professional obligations
Ibid.
Ibid. at 265.
1219 Shipman Inquiry, Safeguarding Patients, supra note 1097.
1220 Ibid.
1221 Ibid.
1222 Davies, “Self-Regulation”, supra at note 19.
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(e.g. refusing to provide treatment). 1223 Allegations of incompetence or negligence (even
serious negligence) were regarded by the GMC as matters for the civil courts. 1224 There was
little consensus about what types of negligent conduct would amount to SPM, and thus little
consistency in application.
The second problem was in the filtering, screening, and review processes. 1225 The initial
filtering process was designed to weed out those cases that did amount to SPM – difficult
when it was not defined – or where the complainant had not exhausted local complaints
processes, unless the doctor was an evident danger to patients. About 65 per cent of
complaints were closed at this point. 1226 Screeners were required to refer a matter on to the
PPC unless they considered the matter “need not proceed further”, and for many years there
was no guidance as to what that meant. In practice, the inquiry heard, until the mid-1990s,
cases would be closed unless there was a positive reason to proceed, which, as the inquiry
noted, reversed the statutory test. 1227

A series of judicial review proceedings were

successfully heard in the mid-1990s to reverse this. 1228 The inquiry noted that processes to
standardize the application of the correct test had not been altogether successful, some
screeners being remarkably resistant to changing their practices to comply with the law. 1229
The PPC’s statutory function was to consider whether a case “ought to be referred for
inquiry” to the PCC or the Health Committee. As was the case with the screeners, the PPC
exercised a wide discretion. Research commissioned by the GMC in the 1990s was highly
critical of the PPC’s processes, suggesting they lacked transparency, consistency, and
fairness. 1230 Due to the fact that there was no definition of SPM, there were considerable
disagreements within the PPC as to what SPM was. Often, the PPC would form an opinion
and use that opinion to conclude whether a case ought to be referred. Two judicial review
proceedings of the PPC’s processes found that under the legislation the question of whether
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conduct was SDM was for the PCC to determine, not the PPC or any other body. 1231 Thus,
complaints processes privileged the interests of doctors over the interests of patients and the
public interest.
The third problem, according to the inquiry, was a lack of investigation. 1232 No investigation
of any sort occurred until the complaint was referred to the PCC. Some complaints were
filtered or screened out because there was insufficient information to determine whether the
allegation might amount to SPM – thus, many cases were closed due to a lack of evidence
when the GMC had made no effort to gather any. 1233

The onus was placed on the

complainant to prove the complaint, rather than a self-regulating profession acting to
undertake a review of concerns raised about the conduct or performance of one of its
members. The profession’s social contract with the public/state was predicated on the belief
that the profession would effectively police its members to ensure, at the very least, their
retrospective accountability and to protect the public interest in ensuring, as much as is
possible, the continuing safety of patients when receiving health services. Clearly, in respect
of the GMC, the obverse was true and had been for some considerable time.
But it was not just government-sanctioned self-regulatory mechanisms that denied
accountability; NHS processes and systems could be as bad. One of the criticisms of the
GMC’s Bristol disciplinary proceedings is that they focused only on three individual health
professionals and a specified number of patients. 1234

Complainants had no real

accountability mechanisms through which to examine the broader operations of the NHS,
other than through instituting civil proceedings.

Within NHS systems, there were

accountability structures surrounding financial matters, but few effective accountability
mechanisms in relation to conduct or competence of staff, and particular latitude was given
to doctors. Such accountability mechanisms for doctors that did exist were mechanisms
such as the ‘three wise men’, 1235 the Poorly Performing Doctors Committee, or the Local
Medical Committees that were collegial peer-driven mechanisms. Complaints mechanisms
Ibid.
Ibid.
1233 Ibid.
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were ineffectual, although recourse could be had to the Health Commissioner, who was not
permitted to investigate clinical matters. Aside from pursing a negligence claim, until the
Roylance case it was difficult to hold hospital management accountable for anything other
than financial decisions. 1236

However, Roylance is only applicable to registered health

professionals acting as administrators. 1237
The scandals demonstrated that in Britain the public inquiry was the only mechanism
through which affected parties could get retrospective accountability in terms of hearing the
narrative of events, determining responsibility of actors, and seeking remedial action. The
establishment of an independent commission of inquiry confirms that an event is indeed out
of

the

ordinary

and

of

sufficient

importance

that

ordinary

mechanisms

of

inquiry/investigation, such as inquests, are not sufficient to ensure accountability. 1238 BlomCooper (who managed more than a few British commissions of inquiry) suggests the
“compelling reason” why independent inquiries are established is “the assuaging of public
revulsion or repugnance that will not be satisfied by the traditional methods of remedial
action.” 1239 Others have suggested that public inquiries amount to “putting the state on trial”
– a form of accountability.1240 An independent inquiry is both a response to a scandal and, as
discussed earlier, a confirmation of a scandal’s wider importance.
The decision to convene a public inquiry is not made lightly – perhaps because of the signals
it sends to the public, as well as the expense and potential embarrassment to the government.
Only five of the scandals examined in this chapter were not subject to at least one public
inquiry (with the Green and Stoke Mandeville scandals in Britain being subject to a public
inquiry undertaken by a statutory investigation body rather than an ad hoc inquiry).
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In Canada, the scandal at the WHSC was the subject of an inquest, albeit an extraordinarily
thorough one. 1241

In controversially deciding to institute a coronial investigation, the

Manitoban Minister of Health stated to the Legislature:
the position I have taken in discussions with the families is that I feel that the inquest
route, as ordered by the Chief Medical Examiner, is the route that is there. It is for
this purpose. 1242
In referring to the fatal inquiry process as a “route that is there”, the minister made a number
of implicit claims. Using an existent route, a standard mechanism, reassures the public that
although an inquiry is warranted, standard mechanisms are sufficient to comprehensively
address concerns. In some respects, it is a utilitarian appeal as well which sends the message:
‘We have a mechanism. It is designed for this purpose; let it work’. The minister emphasized
that the purpose of an inquest was “ ... to get to the truth so that we can make decisions
about how best to look after the children of this province in the future.” 1243 In the face of
some doubts as to whether the inquest process could comprehensively address systemic
issues, the minister asserted that an inquest process had “the capacity and scope and
breadth” to examine all of the actors involved, whom he specified as including the hospital,
the doctors, the Chief Medical Examiner’s office, and the government. 1244 Although the
inquest fulfilled many accountability functions, in that individuals and systems were
retrospectively held to account by having to publicly answer for their actions or omissions,
some parents still perceived the process as inadequate. 1245
In Britain, the decision not to hold a public inquiry into contaminated blood attracted much
criticism. Lord Morris of Manchester stated in the House of Lords:
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That no public inquiry has yet been held into a medical disaster on this scale –
leaving 95 per cent of patients with the devastating complications of two lifethreatening viruses – is without precedent in the modern era.” 1246
Given the enormous number of inquiries into the NHS during this period, Lord Morris’s
comment raised some important issues about why that event was not subject to a public
inquiry constituted by government. Government’s response to that question was to say that:
“There has been no negligence; it is one of those tragedies. There is no need for a public
inquiry,” 1247 and that “The Government does not accept that any wrongful practices were
employed at the time and does not consider that a public inquiry is justified.” 1248 Private
bodies subsequently commissioned a public, non-statutory inquiry some twenty years after
the events in question . 1249
The importance of public inquiries as accountability mechanisms can be seen very strongly in
the British context, where in respect of the Allitt, Bristol, Shipman, Ayling, Kerr, and Haslam
scandals, family and patient groups lobbied both for the commissioning of public inquiries
and to influence their form, some going so far as to commence judicial review proceedings
when they deemed an inquiry to be held in private would deny them effective
accountability. 1250 Patient lobbying was also seen in the appointment and functioning of the
Canadian blood case because, as Gilmore and Sommerville noted:
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the blood system was governed by committee, consensus, and liaison between federal
and provincial government departments and the CRCS [Canadian Red Cross
Society]. … No mechanism existed to ensure public accountability. 1251
No mechanism, except that is, for a public inquiry. After the commissioning of the Allitt
Inquiry as a public inquiry to be held in private, parents unsuccessfully sought a judicial
review of this decision. 1252 They suggested that, because of the inquiry’s private nature,
health service employees and the public could not be sure that “all the lessons that might
have been learnt will be learnt.” 1253 In their view, the inquiry as constituted was insufficient
to assure public accountability. Ultimately, parents attacked the inquiry as being a “coverup” in its focus on individual clinicians as opposed to hospital management. 1254 After the
inquiry concluded, some parents challenged the inquiry as a violation of article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (the right to life, including the duty to investigate
suspicious deaths), a challenge that was also unsuccessful. 1255
In Britain in 2001, the Secretary of State for Health announced the formation of three
independent statutory inquiries to be held in private, in respect of Dr Clifford Ayling, Dr
Richard Neale, and Drs William Kerr and Michael Haslam. Patients and families were
unhappy about the private nature of the inquiries and, after making representations to the
Secretary of State commenced judicial review proceedings to achieve public inquiries into the
allegations against Dr Ayling and Dr Neale. 1256

The Secretary of State made some

concessions about the form of the inquiry, saying interested parties (i.e. patients or their
representatives) would be permitted to attend the inquiries and could raise issues, but the
media and the general public would continue to be excluded due to concerns about
confidentiality, particularly given the subject matter of two of the inquiries. These judicial
review proceedings were ultimately unsuccessful.
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A group of relatives, friends, and media groups also applied for judicial review of the
Secretary of State’s decision to hold the public inquiry into Dr Harold Shipman in private. 1257
In reviewing the Secretary of State’s decision, the court noted a number of factors that
seemed to point towards the establishment of a full public inquiry. First, it is standard
practice to hold a public inquiry after a major disaster. In the Shipman case, there had been a
loss of public confidence, there was uncertainty about how many of his patients were
murdered, checks and controls may have been insufficient or have failed, and therefore a
public inquiry would be appropriate. 1258

Second, there were known advantages to

undertaking inquiries in public. Third, the families wanted the inquiry to be public, and the
Secretary of State’s statement in the House of Commons about the nature of the inquiry
could have given rise to a misunderstanding that it was to be held in public (a legitimate
expectation argument).

Fourth, there was what in the court’s view amounted to a

presumption that an inquiry should be held in public; and, lastly, a public proceeding
commands greater public confidence, and in the circumstances of the Shipman case, “the
restoration of confidence is a matter of high public importance.” 1259 Accordingly, the court
determined that the Secretary of State’s decision to hold the Shipman Inquiry in private was
irrational and the Secretary of State was required to reconsider his decision. 1260
In both the commissioning and response to public inquiries, ministers frequently emphasised
how these mechanisms served important roles in terms of accountability. For example, in
response to the Grange Inquiry into the events at the HSC, the Attorney-General of Ontario
observed: “The one and only goal of the Commission was to achieve the highest possible
level of public accountability with respect of the deaths and the prosecution,” 1261 and that the
inquiry’s “deliberations and findings, … will underline the importance of the accountability
of society’s great institutions to the people whom they serve.” 1262 And from Britain, when
the Secretary of State announced the formation of the Shipman Inquiry, he acknowledged
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that systems of regulation and self-regulation would have to be strengthened. 1263 He further
stated:
He [Shipman] preyed on some of the most vulnerable members of our society. He
broke the trust of his patients in the most dreadful way imaginable. Having betrayed
the trust of his own patients, Harold Shipman should not be allowed to break the
trust that exists between family doctors and their patients. The action that I have
outlined today is intended to strengthen that bond of trust. 1264
Even when an inquiry was commissioned, some actors did not appear to embrace the
concept that actors who received public funds should actually be held publicly accountable
for their decisions. For example, the necessity for the Dubin and Grange Inquiries was
questioned by the HSC. 1265 The institutions that comprised the blood system in Canada
continued to deny the need for an inquiry and contested the inquiry’s processes. 1266
Accountability was a concept, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) supported.
Although ten years earlier the Ontario Court of Appeal prohibited the Grange Inquiry from
naming names and making findings that could be the basis for civil or criminal
proceedings, 1267 the SCC held that the Krever Inquiry was free to assign blame. 1268 The SCC
distinguished the Grange Inquiry, noting that it was investigating specific events involving
specific actors during a criminal investigation, whereas the Krever Inquiry was conducting a
wider systemic review. 1269 The SCC noted that there are different normative standards
against which a failure may be measured, i.e. moral, political, and legal. While it was clear
that a commission of inquiry may not reach conclusions in terms of civil or criminal liability,
an inquiry was well within its mandate to conclude that there had been failures to comply
with expected standards. 1270 The SCC viewed public inquiries as critical processes to ensure
that government, and other public actors, are held to account.

U.K., H.C., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 343, col. 907-919 (1 February 2000) (Alan Milburn).
U.K., H.C., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 343, col. 907-919 at col. 909 (1 February 2000) (Alan Milburn).
1265 Dubin Inquiry, supra note 864; Grange Inquiry, supra note 864.
1266 Krever Inquiry, supra note 865.
1267 Re Nelles and Grange (1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 210 (C.A.).
1268 Canada v. Blood System, supra note 895.
1269 Ibid.
1263
1264
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An analysis of inquiry processes generally illustrates that in most cases a public inquiry was
the only mechanism through which affected parties and the public could gain accountability.
That the systems in place prior to the appointment of an inquiry were, on the whole,
insufficient to assure accountability seemed to point to a need, again in most circumstances,
to establish further mechanisms to ensure accountability.

Control
Increased perception of risks, accompanied by a mistrust of key institutional actors, and
perceptions that current accountability mechanisms are ineffective, may result in increasing
demands for greater control of actors and activities within a sector. Barber describes this
phenomenon as “the increasing desire of the less powerful of all kinds to have a little more
control over those whose greater power vitally affects them.” 1271 This control is generally
obtained through the employment of regulatory or quasi-regulatory instruments. Many
assert that an increasing desire for control has been a characteristic of governance in Britain
since the 1980s. Power’s landmark research into the British governance system, for instance,
highlights the increasing use of audit as a mechanism of control. 1272 Other studies from
Britain highlight the growth of regulation within government during this period. 1273
The combined effect of the events in Britain was to create public and political demands for
greater control over key actors and over the system more generally. As is discussed in more
detail in the next chapter, the 1990s and 2000s saw the implementation of various systems of
oversight and control within the NHS, and more broadly within the health and welfare
systems in Britain, bringing to mind Power’s description of the Audit Society. 1274 The shift
in regulatory emphasis is moved from a reliance on the health professions and the sector to
self-regulate towards a greater use of direct and meta-regulatory mechanisms.

This is

demonstrated by legislative requirements that independent government agencies create
standards, monitor, audit, and evaluate health professionals and health-providers. This shift
also sees the increased use of meta-regulation through an increased use of independent
Ibid.
Barber, supra note 977 at 132.
1272 Power, supra note 597.
1273 For example, C. Hood, C. Scott, O. James, G. Jones and T. Travers, Regulation Inside Government: WasteWatchers, Quality Policy and Sleaze-busters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
1270
1271
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oversight mechanisms reviewing the operations of government-sanctioned self-regulatory
actors, as well as a curtailment of their powers and a greater involvement of parallel
government mechanisms to assert control.
The converse – a largely unaffected perception of risk, sustained trust, and effective
accountability mechanisms – may result in much more limited demands for greater regulatory
control, as can be seen in the Canadian systems. Although the blood scandal did in fact
result in control moving from a non-governmental actor to a governmental agency, in
general the other scandals provoked lesser responses. While in Manitoba patient-safetydirected reforms have occurred subsequent to the WHSC scandal, these reforms have
proceeded on the basis that the core regulatory assumptions of self-regulation should be
maintained and any new regulatory initiatives should be designed to support professionals
rather than coerce them. It is for the most part a similar story in other provinces/territories.
The SARS scandal resulted in the Canadian public health system undergoing, as Wilson
describes it, “… a process of transformation in response to the outbreak and management of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).” 1275 Canada’s public health system certainly saw
structural change, especially the development of better coordination mechanisms, and
investment at the provincial and federal levels, but demands for greater control were not
strong in other parts of the health system. 1276 Change has occurred incrementally, primarily
spearheaded by professional organizations, with a greater reliance on self-regulation and coregulation.

Conclusion
The sheer numbers of scandals in the NHS in Britain, and their frequency, particularly in the
later part of the 1990s and early 2000s, have an accumulated force when it comes to
explaining the impetus for significant change within the regulatory framework supporting the
NHS in Britain. That so many scandals occurred within such a short period of time across
all facets of the NHS, from hospitals to general practice to public health, was an indicator
Power, supra note 597.
Wilson, “Structural Reform”, supra note 904 at 345.
1276 C. Beach et al., eds., Health Services Restructuring in Canada: New Evidence and New Directions (Kingston: John
Deutsch Institute for Public Policy, 2005).
1274
1275
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that there were serious systemic problems with the NHS, but more particularly with the way
the NHS was regulated. That so many of these scandals occurred over a long period of time
with, at best, ineffectual action by those responsible for policing the conduct of health
professionals and hospitals, further reinforces a sense that these actors could not be trusted
and that existent accountability mechanisms were ineffective. It is difficult to make counterclaims that events are aberrations in an essentially sound system and that existing regulatory
arrangements are strong, when independent inquiries are, one after another, finding serious
problems with those systems. It is also difficult to sustain an argument that change is not
required in such circumstances.
The impact on the public of a multitude of negative findings about the safety and quality of
the health system and, accordingly, deficits in existing regulatory structures entrusted with
monitoring that system are also clearly evident. Risks are highlighted, trust in institutions –
particularly those entrusted with regulating the NHS – diminishes, and demands for real
prospective and retrospective accountability increase. Davies suggests that the impact of
scandals within the NHS was to cede “moral high ground to government.” 1277 Government
could proceed with the changes they were ideologically inclined to make (discussed in the
previous chapter) irrespective of and in the face of any dissent from hitherto key institutional
players. This accords with the conclusions reached by Butler and Drakeford that “scandals
do not appear in a policy vacuum; rather they develop in very particular contexts at very
particular times.” 1278 Stanley and Manthorpe agree that “inquiries may chime with debates
and policy initiatives, and may be picked up as examples for the need for reform.” 1279 The
impact of these scandals made it difficult for these institutional actors, especially the medical
profession, to oppose any government reforms, having been fairly comprehensively
discredited by the scandals.

Any opposition could have been portrayed as being self-

interested, rather than as being in the public interest. Significant reforms to the existing
regulatory framework occurred because of a change in political norms (discussed in the
previous chapter) and because events drove change – each informed each other, and as a
result the impetus was towards further control.

1277
1278

Davies, “Regulating the Health Care Workforce”, supra note 825 at 56.
Butler & Drakeford, supra note 817 at 1.
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Conversely, in Canada, events played a significantly lesser role in regulatory change. While
the blood scandal and SARS could be described as being significant in terms of regulatory
change, this change was narrowly construed and limited to specific subsectors within the
system, i.e. blood and public health. The events in Canadian health systems on the whole did
not illustrate bedrock failures in current regulatory configurations, did not undermine trust in
most regulatory actors or indeed in most actors, and accountability mechanisms were, in
general, reasonably effective. Ultimately, though, one key factor explaining the difference is
that there were few significant events in Canada. Dwyer summed up the situation in Canada
nicely in saying, “Like Britain’s system in the 80s and 90s, our [the Canadian] system has
never gone seriously wrong — as far as we know. There is no public pressure to change it,
and so nobody will.” 1280 Lacking any evidence in the form of a number of scandals, the
impetus for significant reforms to what seems to be a generally satisfactory system is
lessened.
In this, and the previous chapter, I have asserted that changing political norms, combined
with the impact of events, have created the conditions for a change to the regulatory
consensus in Britain. Scandals are important, but real change may still not result unless these
scandals occur at a time of policy receptivity where there is an opportunity to move in a
different regulatory direction. 1281 This movement may include a flight from institutions or
organizations that have become a focus of public disenchantment or positive mistrust. 1282 In
contrast, I assert that relative political stasis and a relative absence of scandals within health
systems have resulted in adherence to the regulatory consensus, albeit with incremental
modifications, in Canadian health systems.

The next chapter describes the regulatory

framework in place in each jurisdiction in 2005 and measures divergence or convergence
with the 1980 frameworks.

Stanley & Manthorpe, supra note 818 at 6.
Dwyer, supra note 1173.
1281 Tuohy, “Logics” supra note 35.
1282 Butler & Drakeford, supra note 817.
1279
1280
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Chapter 7
Trust but Verify vs Trust and Collaborate: New Directions in the Regulation of
Patient Safety

Introduction
The last two chapters of this thesis critically assessed two factors: political norms and
scandals, and their impact on the pre-1980s convergence in respect of patient safety
regulation. In these chapters, I argued that the effect of political norms and scandals resulted
in Britain diverging from its pre-1980s regulatory framework for patient safety. I also argued
that the lesser impact of these factors in the Canadian context saw its regulatory framework
remain largely congruent with the pre-1980s model, displaying only incremental changes.
This chapter revisits the framework first introduced in Chapter 2. That Chapter illustrated
how, by 1980, a discernable convergence could be seen in Britain and Canada about the
legitimate scope of state regulation of patient safety. A mix of regulatory instruments was
considered appropriate and there was a high degree of faith that health professionals and
health-providers would self-regulate. In Chapter 2 the elements of the pre-1980s regulatory
convergence were demarcated.
There were five essential elements. The first element saw governments retain the ultimate
power to sanction individual health professionals through the use of the criminal law (a tool
of very limited use in Canada). The second element of the pre-1980 convergent frameworks
in Britain and Canada enabled patients to seek fiscal redress for harm through instigating
civil proceedings against health-providers and health professionals.

By bringing civil

proceedings, patients invoked the retrospective and prospective functions of regulation by
litigation to establish and enforce standards for professional practice.

This was

supplemented with the third element, the government-sanctioned self-regulation of many of
the professions that provided health services. Government-sanctioned self-regulation was
designed to allow the professions to set standards in respect of qualifications for practice and
to ensure the accountability of members both to the public and to the profession. In return,
the public gained some basic consumer information and protection.

Limited direct
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regulation of safety and quality issues associated with facilities was the fourth element of the
regulatory framework, although there was still significant autonomy accorded in practice to
facilities, as regulatory attention was primarily, almost exclusively, focused on input
regulation.

The fifth element saw government retain the capacity to determine how

significant an issue of patient safety was in general, or in regard to specific cases, by using its
investigatory powers associated with public inquiries and coronial inquests.
Both Canada and Britain adhered to this basic framework. Minor divergences could be seen
in the historically slightly higher use of the criminal law as a regulatory mechanism against
health professionals in Britain, and the institution of slightly more prescriptive or expansive
mechanisms of direct regulation in Britain. These divergences, though, were matters of
emphasis rather than significant cleavage. In subsequent chapters, I argued that factors
specific to the context of each jurisdiction resulted in a divergence in the scope, extent and
purpose of the employment of regulatory instruments in this area after 1980.
The pre-1980s regulatory frameworks in this area were premised, as Mello et al put it: “an
unparalleled faith in the ability of medical professionals [and other health-providers] to
regulate themselves.” 1283 But in Britain, changes in political norms and the impact of scandal
in the period 1980-2005 were such that trust was now qualified – the approach summed up
in Reagan’s phrase “trust but verify”. In Canada, with few scandals and less dramatic shifts
in political norms in the same period, traditional patterns of trust towards key governance
actors remained largely undisturbed; verification was not required. In 2005 while both
jurisdictions remain nominally convergent with the pre-1980s frameworks, in that they
employ criminal law, civil proceedings, government-sanctioned self-regulation, direct
regulation, and public inquiry processes, in 2005 the manner, extent, and scope of instrument
use in the jurisdictions had diverged. A greater reliance on meta-regulatory mechanisms is
also seen in Britain.
This chapter extends the analysis of the character of regulatory regimes, begun in Chapter 2,
by examining the regulatory frameworks in place in each jurisdiction in 2005. The purpose
of this chapter is to identify and assess the degree of divergence between the two
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jurisdictions with respect to the shape and scope of the regulatory frameworks in Canada and
Britain, as well as an exposition of how each element within that framework is employed. In
the first section, I provide an overview of key claims established in Chapter 2. Using the
analytical framework in Chapter 2 I then evaluate evolutions in the five governance
mechanisms outlined in that chapter: criminal law; civil proceedings; government-sanctioned
self-regulation; direct regulation; and public inquiry processes. Government sanctioned selfregulation is broadened in this chapter to become professional regulation, recognising that
the regulation of health professionals may encompass government-sanctioned self-regulation,
associational self-regulation, meta-regulation, and direct regulation mechanisms.

A new

category of meta-regulation is established as a distinct and more widely applied technique of
regulatory governance.

Regulatory Convergences and Divergences
As a preliminary comment, during this period patient safety became a focus of policy, if not
regulatory, attention. In Britain, there were a number of White Papers or other government
reviews raising the issues of patient safety and healthcare quality (discussed in Chapter 5), in
addition to the seventeen public inquiries that occurred during this period (discussed in
Chapter 6). Government set the agenda for action in Britain.
Although in Canada some federal, provincial, and territorial first ministers and deputy
ministers’ meetings discussed healthcare quality, safety and quality were not a primary focus
of their attention, and matters were discussed but seldom implemented (see discussion in
Chapter 5). In 2001, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada recognized
that patient safety was a serious issue confronting Canadian health systems. It convened a
one-day workshop to discuss the issue and consequently formed a National Steering
Committee on Patient Safety. After broad consultation with various stakeholders, including
governments, the committee issued a report proposing a national integrated strategy to

1283

Mello, “Fostering Regulation”, supra note 5 at 375.
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improve patient safety. 1284 The 2003 First Ministers’ Accord on Health Care Renewal stated
that:
[T]he implementation of a national strategy for improving patient safety is critical.
Health Ministers will take leadership in implementing the recommendations of the
National Steering Committee on Patient Safety. 1285
While the steering committee’s work was supported by Canadian governments, it was a
strategy initiated, created, driven, and led by the professions. And, for the most part, this is
the pattern seen in the governance of patient safety in Canada, where the activities of the
professional groups and health system administrators are supported by the actions of the
state. Most of the provincial regulatory reforms relating to patient safety (with the exception
of those relating to the health professions) occurred after the national strategy was
formulated and after the accord.

Criminal Law 1286
The criminal law is and always has been the ultimate sanction that a state can impose upon
an individual or institution to condemn their conduct and to hold them to account for
actions or omissions that were not in the public interest. 1287 As discussed in Chapter 2,
although rare, in both jurisdictions there is a long history of criminal charges (manslaughter
or criminal negligence causing death or grievous bodily harm) 1288 being brought against
health professionals for negligent professional practice. 1289 The use of criminal charges is

1284 National Steering Committee on Patient Safety, Building a Safer System: A National Integrated Strategy for
Improving Patient Safety in Canadian Health Care, (2002) online: RCPSC
<http://rcpsc.medical.org/publications/building_a_safer_system_e.pdf>.
1285 Canada, Health Canada, 2003 First Ministers' Accord on Health Care Renewal, (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2003).
Online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/deliveryprestation/fptcollab/2003accord/index_e.html>.
1286 Analysis in this section has been previously published in McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1287 Ibid.
1288 In Britain, the charge is manslaughter by gross negligence and in Canada criminal negligence causing death
or criminal negligence causing grievous bodily harm where the victim does not die. Criminal negligence and
manslaughter are broadly equivalent.
1289 McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113; Ferner, supra note 119.
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held to have an important prospective effect in that it is said to encourage improved
standards of practice and thus is an important tool to create prospective accountabilities. 1290
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the practice of laying criminal charges against doctors 1291
for alleged negligence in their professional practice has dramatically increased in Britain,
while remaining at low levels in Canada, both in terms of numbers of charges and in terms of
convictions (see Figure 4). 1292

In Britain, 44 doctors were charged with manslaughter

between 1980 and 2005. In contrast, in Canada only nine doctors have been charged with
either criminal negligence causing death or the lesser charge of criminal negligence causing
grievous bodily harm. 1293 Higher relative numbers are to be expected given that Britain has
both a higher population 1294 and greater numbers of registered health professionals than
Canada. As McDonald notes, even taking these differences into account, doctors are more
likely to face criminal charges in Britain. 1295 Doctors are also more likely to be convicted in
Britain which has a conviction rate of around 30 per cent 1296 versus a 6.67 per cent rate in
Canada. 1297

H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) and
H.L.A. Hart, “Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility” in A.G. Guest, ed., Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence: A Collaborative Work, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 29.
1291 There is no hard data about charging rates for those from other health professions in either country.
1292 A minor spike in the Canadian figures does not indicate an upwards trend, but rather four physicians being
charged in respect of one incident – the quality of Canadian blood supplies in the 1980s. The Canadian Red
Cross pled guilty to distributing contaminated blood supplies and a charge of criminal negligence against it was
dropped. Four doctors involved in the management of blood supplies and a pharmaceutical company also
faced various criminal charges including, most seriously, charges of criminal negligence. In 2008, a judge found
the doctors not guilty, concluding that the defendants had acted responsibly and appropriately in carrying out
their responsibilities. Armour, supra note 866.
1293 If the British figures included grievous bodily harm, the figures would most likely be higher.
1294 In 2005, the British population was estimated to be 60,209,500 and the Canadian population was estimated
to be 32,299,500. U.K., Statistics, supra note 883; Canada, Statistics, supra note 884.
1295 McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1296 Ferner, supra note 119.
1297 McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1290
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Figure 4 Physicians Facing Serious Criminal Charges 1298 for Alleged Negligence in
Professional Practice: Comparison of Charging Rates in Britain and Canada 1980-2005. 1299
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What explains these differences? At the global level, some suggest that the increased rates of
criminal charges faced by British doctors are linked to changes in the social and cultural
order in that country – the evolution of the risk society, the post-trust society, and the blame
society – resulting in demands for greater accountability. 1300 While explanations that point to
profound transformations in the social order have their attractions, it would be
oversimplifying the matter to suggest that changes to the social and cultural order provide a
complete explanation of the shift. Canada, as another developed country, a former colonial
dependency of Britain, a member of the British Commonwealth, and a country which
moreover is a close geographical neighbour of the US, would not be immune from the
general currents of change to social and cultural orders 1301 – and yet the rates of criminal
charges faced by doctors in Canada remain low. 1302 It appears then that changes to the social
and cultural order may be situationally specific. In other words, although societies may
indeed be seeing changes in the social and cultural order in a general sense, the expression of
that change may be felt differently in different situations and jurisdictions depending upon
the levels of risk perception, the decrease in trust, and concerns about effective
accountability.

1298 This means manslaughter or criminal negligence causing death or criminal negligence causing criminal
bodily harm.
1299 Data for this figure was obtained from McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113 and Ferner, supra note
119.
1300 See discussion in McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1301 See discussion in Chapter 4.
1302 McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
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Quick suggests that what he terms “fallout” in Britain, from the scandals discussed in
Chapter 6, may contribute to public and media pressure for justice to be seen to be done, a
pressure felt most acutely by the police and the prosecutorial service. 1303 In addition, the
Shipman 1304 and Allitt 1305 cases may have resulted in a climate where the British police
scrutinize patient deaths more carefully and are more likely to be called in by hospitals,
relatives, or the coroner.

In fact, the increased likelihood and importance of police

investigations into patient care within the NHS has been explicitly recognized with the
finalization, in 2006, of a memorandum of understanding between the police, the NHS and
the Health and Safety Executive about the investigation of serious patient safety
accidents. 1306 Included within this memorandum are explicit guidelines for when a NHS
Trust should involve the police.
As discussed in Chapter 6, this pressure seems absent from the Canadian context, with the
events in the health sector not resulting in damage to the public trust in social institutions
within the Canadian health systems to anywhere near the same extent as in Britain. 1307 Nor
did the events that occurred in Canada suggest that traditional modes of accountability, such
as actions in negligence or disciplinary actions before health professional bodies, were
inadequate to safeguard the public interest.
There are also more prosaic explanations. One of these is that rates of prosecutions in
Britain appeared to increase after the Crown Prosecution Service was established in 1986. 1308
But what Quick saw when he investigated more deeply was that charging patterns for
medical manslaughter in Britain since 1970 are geographically mal-distributed. 1309 Quick
postulates that increased charging rates within one geographical area may be a sign of
increased prosecutorial confidence in that region due to successful prosecutions in the past.
Quick, “Prosecuting”, supra note 123.
Shipman Inquiry, supra note 859.
1305 Allitt Inquiry, supra note 849.
1306 U.K., National Health Service, Association of Chief Police Officers, & Health and Safety Executive,
Memorandum of Understanding Investigating patient safety incidents involving unexpected death or serious untoward harm: a
protocol for liaison and effective communications between the National Health Service, Association of Chief Police Officers and
Health & Safety Executive (2006) at 1. Online: Department of Health
<http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_412
9918>.
1307 See, for example, McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1308 Quick, “Prosecuting”, supra note 123.
1303
1304
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This confidence may be particularly important as there is a generally low conviction rate for
medical manslaughter vis-à-vis manslaughter more generally. 1310 In other words, past success
predicates future action.
In contrast, criminal charges in Canada are geographically dispersed and occur across time
(Table 3). 1311

While the Criminal Code is federal law, prosecution occurs at the provincial

level making the system somewhat similar to the regionalism seen in Britain in terms of
geography, but without the impact of a national prosecution agency. The impact of a federal
system is perhaps likely to result in differences between provinces about whether to lay
charges, and little cross-provincial learning.

The low success rates in Canadian

prosecutions 1312 presumably are likely to discourage rather than encourage criminal charges
from being laid within each province. As noted by McDonald:
The outcome of the most recent case, where four doctors were acquitted after facing
charges of criminal negligence and public nuisance relating to the management of the
Canadian blood system, may further discourage prosecutions for criminal
negligence. 1313
The blood prosecutions were highly public and highly publicized, prosecutors had expressed
great confidence in the strength of their case going into the trial, yet there was a complete,
and some might say crushing, acquittal. 1314

Ibid.
Ibid.
1311 McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1312 Due to one guilty plea, 6.67 per cent of Canadian prosecutions have been successful. McDonald,
“Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1313 McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1314 Armour, supra note 866.
1309
1310
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Table 3 Case Distribution in Canada.
Province

Number of physicians
charged
Alberta
1
British Columbia 2
Manitoba
1
Ontario
6
Québec
5

Dates of cases
1972
1935, 2005
1995
1939, 1992, 2005
1962, 1972, 1976, 1984

Past successes may encourage future action, especially when the courts indicate that the
ambit of cases where gross negligence may be found should be widened. Critics suggest that
some of the recent convictions are inappropriate given the nature of the events in question
which, while negligent, did not, in the opinion of critics, amount to gross negligence. 1315 In
many cases, the convictions related to medication errors – what Reason would term mistakes
or slips, and lapses. 1316 Some argue mistakes, slips, and lapses are more properly addressed
through other mechanisms, such as civil liability, because moral culpability is generally at the
lesser end of the scale. 1317 This is particularly so because the evidence suggests that mistakes,
slips, and lapses are more likely to be caused or contributed to by systemic factors within the
environments in which they work. There also seems to be a sense that the British courts
may be conflating the seriousness of the outcome with the degree of negligence displayed –
something that the Canadian courts have been careful to avoid. 1318

At least one Canadian

court, while refusing to bring a guilty verdict in respect of a nurse charged with criminal
negligence causing death, has also made explicit reference to policy considerations – that the
use of the criminal law for medication error cases may inhibit open disclosure and hence
learning about error – an outcome that is not in the public interest. 1319
In summary, while the use of the criminal law remains a common part of the regulatory
framework in both jurisdictions its employment in Britain has spiked, from the middle of the
1990s. Although its use is still relatively rare in absolute terms, the increasing employment of
the criminal law in Britain focuses attention on the issue of patient safety. The use of the
See, for example, Holbrook, supra note 21; McCall Smith, supra note 119; McCall Smith, “Negligence”, supra
note 119; Merry, supra note 21.
1316 Reason, supra note 1188.
1317 See discussion in McCall Smith, “Negligence”, supra note 119; Merry & McCall Smith, supra note 21;
McDonald, “Criminalisation”, supra note 113.
1318 McDonald, ibid.
1315
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criminal law indicates that the state recognizes there is a real public interest in ensuring the
safe practice of health professionals and that it is increasingly willing to use its most coercive
powers to safeguard the public interest and to create very real incentives for health
professionals to comply with standards of practice.

Civil Proceedings
In both jurisdictions, the ability of a patient to bring civil proceedings if they sustained harm
as the result of receiving health services remained a core part of the regulatory framework. A
key difference between the jurisdictions, identified in Chapter 2, was the approach adopted
by the courts. In Canada, the courts created a distinction between matters connected to
technical skill and expertise (to which deference is afforded to professional opinion) and
conduct which can be evaluated by the layperson, 1320 and introduced the concept of
informed consent. 1321 In contrast, until the late 1990s, British courts repeatedly rejected any
advancement of the traditional standard that doctor knows best. 1322 However, this position
was relaxed somewhat after the 1998 Bolitho case, where the court held that in rare
circumstances it would be wrong to decide a matter in accordance with professional opinion
that is “not capable of withstanding logical analysis.” 1323

While not approaching the

Canadian standard, this approach does allow the courts to make a choice between two sets of
conflicting expert opinion based on which seems most logically probative. 1324 However,
although heralded as a significant change to the approach in Britain, some commentators
suggest that it appears to have made little real difference to the approach adopted by the
courts. 1325
One of the barriers to the institution of civil proceedings for clinical negligence has been that
patients lacked the knowledge that an adverse event had in fact occurred. 1326

In both

R. v Omstead [1999] O.J. 570.
Woolf, supra note 186.
1321 Hopp v Lepp, [1980] S.C.J. No. 57, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192 (S.C.C.); Reibal v Hughes, [1980] S.C.J. No. 105, [1980]
2 S.C.R. 880 (S.C.C.).
1322 Woolf, supra note 186.
1323 Bolitho v. City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 (H.L.) at 243 [Bolitho]. See also Woolf, ibid.
1324 Woolf, ibid.
1325 Harpwood, supra note 181; J. Gilmour, Patient Safety, Medical Error and Tort Law: An International Comparison
(Ottawa: Health Canada, 2006) [Gilmour].
1326 Harpwood, supra note 181; Gilmour, ibid.
1319
1320
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jurisdictions, the common law adapted to this reality by creating what amounts to an
disclosure obligation created as part of tort law, where health professionals are required to
disclose to their patients adverse events associated with their treatment or care. 1327 This
obligation has been suggested to arise from informed consent, or consent in the British
context, the fiduciary nature of the treatment and care relationship, fraudulent concealment,
or battery. 1328 In any event, this development in the law resulted in patients being more likely
to know that an adverse event has occurred. It appears that disclosure requirements do not
result in larger numbers of claims being brought – as claim patterns in Canada remained
fairly static in the period in question. 1329
In both jurisdictions, the 1980–2005 period saw a review of the tort system. In Canada, the
Pritchard Report was commissioned in the late 1980s by the Conference of Deputy Ministers
of Health in response to a perceived malpractice crisis. 1330 It recommended the maintenance
of the current tort system, with the addition of a no-fault compensation scheme for injuries
resulting from preventable adverse events. In the event, no changes to the system resulted.
Gilmour notes that generally proposals for procedural reform of negligence claims in the
Canadian context have been directed at controlling the costs of such proceedings and
awards, not towards reducing adverse events. 1331 A steady decline in the frequency of claims
against doctors has been reported, and payment levels were reported to have been reasonably
stable in the period 1999–2004. 1332 Aside from the continuing development of the common
law, little change is seen in the systems for civil proceedings in Canada.
In Britain events have taken a somewhat different turn, with a greater focus on centralizing
litigation risk and managing litigation processes to increase fairness and justice, while at the
same time addressing the issue of patient safety and healthcare quality. Prior to 1990, each
DHA was responsible for managing its own litigation risk and employees were responsible
1327 See Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 A.C. 134 [Chester]; Stamos, supra note 986; Kueper v. McMillan (1986) 30 D.L.R.
(4th) 408, 37 C.C.L.T. 318 (N.B. C.A.); Shobridge v. Thomas (1999) 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 73 (B.C.S.C.). See also
Robertson, “When Things go Wrong”, supra note 986; T. Faunce & S. Bolsin, “Fiduciary Disclosure of Medical
Mistakes: The Duty to Promptly Notify Patients of Adverse Healthcare Events” (2005) 12 J. Med. & L. 478.
1328 Robertson, “When Things go Wrong”, ibid.
1329 See Gilmour, supra note 1325.
1330 J. Pritchard, Liability and Comprehension in Health Care (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990)
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for defending themselves. The government’s 1990 introduction of the NHS indemnity
aimed to clarify the position of the NHS and resulted in it assuming legal responsibility for
claims of clinical negligence against its employees. 1333 Strickland notes that the expansion of
NHS responsibility and the increasing threat of negligence claims widened the ownership of
clinical risk, making it an institutional, and a systemic, responsibility. 1334 Such claims would
no longer be viewed outside of their systemic context. This was an important step given that
placing the focus on an individual can protect an unsafe system from scrutiny, preclude that
institution from learning and improving its systems for the provision of treatment and
care. 1335

Claims increased dramatically in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and then

stabilized. 1336
The system was further centralized in 1995 when the National Health Service Litigation
Authority (NHSLA) was established to manage negligence claims against the NHS. 1337 The
NHSLA handles negligence claims through a number of different schemes. The most
relevant is the post-1 April 1995 claims program. This is risk pooled, so that NHS Trusts’
fiscal contributions are assessed on the basis on the adequacy of their risk management
standards and claims history. The sliding scale rewards NHS Trusts whose policies are
adequate and whose practices reduce the incidence of adverse events. A second scheme
covering events arising before 1995 is not risk pooled and is funded by the Department of
Health. The NHSLA’s role was also to improve claims processing within the NHS. It has
done this through encouraging mediation, explanations, and apologies, controlling costs,
conducting pilot project for the speedy resolution of low-value claims, and so on. 1338 The
NHSLA was to defend unjust claims robustly, promptly settle justified claims, and contribute
to incentives to reduce claims by improving cost-effective clinical and non-clinical risk
Ibid.
R. Seth, “NHS Indemnity for Medical Negligence its Implications” (1991) 15 Psychiatric Bull. 79;
Harpwood, supra note 181.
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Elsevier, 2005) 61.
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management processes. 1339 As such, the NHSLA’s activities were aimed at claims resolution,
but also constituted a form of associational self-regulation by offering rewards to NHS
Trusts that performed well at controlling incidence, or at least managing it, so that civil
claims were not made. 1340 It was a process that aimed to contribute to improving patient
safety as much as it could be expected to do, as well as providing timely compensation to
those who sustained harm.
Despite the efforts of the NHSLA, Lord Woolf’s 1999 review of civil litigation concluded
that the legal system failed to meet the needs of applicants, especially in the context of
clinical negligence cases. 1341 In the context of medical malpractice, there were lower success
rates, less cooperation between parties, and unmeritorious claims pursued and clear-cut
claims defended for too long. 1342 Lord Woolf noted:
[T]he medical profession and NHS administration must demonstrate their
commitment to patients’ wellbeing by adopting a constructive approach to claims
handling. It must be clearly accepted that patients are entitled to redress, and that
professional solidarity or individual self-esteem are not sufficient reasons for resisting
or obstructing valid claims. 1343
He further noted that patients were entitled to expect explanations and apologies, and
litigation should be preserved as a last resort. Most of his proposals to reform the court
system were accepted by government, but these were largely procedural aimed at speeding
and rationalizing the claims process within the civil proceedings system. 1344
A further review of the civil litigation system in the context of clinical negligence occurred in
2003 as a response to a recommendation of the Bristol Inquiry that the civil proceedings

U.K., Department of Health, The National Health Service Litigation Authority: Framework Document (London:
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system should be replaced with a no-fault system for clinical negligence. 1345 The Chief
Medical Officer (CMO) conducted the review, which focused on improving safety and
quality standards as well as preventing litigation. 1346 Although it noted significant problems
with the current system, it rejected the institution of a no-fault system, largely because of
cost. It recommended the introduction of several programs, including one focused on birth
damages and the institution of what was termed an NHS Redress program to more
effectively manage low value (under £20,000) claims. Part of this program would involve an
investigation, the provision of an explanation, action to prevent recurrence, as well as
compensation and the provision of a package of care. It also recommended increasing the
use of mediation and the establishment of a statutory duty of candour.
An NHS Redress Bill was introduced in 2005 to implement some of the CMOs
recommendations, especially the development of a program to deal with lower-value claims
outside of the court system. This was to reform clinical negligence processes, but only in
respect of a cohort of claims (those of lower value). The program for birth-related injuries
and the institution of a statutory duty of candour were not proceeded with. Patient redress
investigations were to be monitored by the Healthcare Commission, and the program was to
be administered locally, but eligibility determinations and compensation were to be the
responsibility of the NHSLA, retaining a degree of centralization. A further limitation was
that those accessing this program must qualify for liability in tort. Civil litigation was to be
precluded if compensation was accepted. The Bill was ultimately passed into law in 2006,
but with amendments. 1347
Comparing the two jurisdictions, it was largely business as usual in Canada, whereas in
Britain regulators reflected upon how the litigation system impacted upon patient safety and
quality. There is no doubt that some of the impetus for reforms in this area were associated
with fiscal considerations as well as concerns for justice, but a key focus was on how best to
use the litigation system to leverage safety and quality improvements. Three important
BRI Inquiry, “Learning from Bristol”, supra note 287.
U.K., Department of Health & L. Donaldson, Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting out Proposals for
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factors were: the NHS indemnity, which placed responsibility with the NHS Trusts for the
actions of employees and centralized concerns about patient safety within an institutional
framework; the creation of a centralized agency to manage litigation; and risk pooling
arrangements that provided incentives for trusts to institute appropriate risk management
and safety and quality procedures. The combined impact of these factors was to create
further incentives for the NHS as an organization to coherently address and manage the
cause of litigation – poor-quality care.

Voluntary Self-Regulation
Accreditation continued to play an important role in the Canadian context in respect of
hospitals and other facilities with accreditation rates continuing to grow and thousands of
facilities gaining accredited status. 1348

Professional Regulation
The premise of professional regulation, as seen in the 1980 consensus, was that the
professions could be trusted and sanctioned by government to self-regulate as they were
“responsible political actors” 1349 or “virtuous” actors. 1350 But as argued in the previous two
chapters, changes to political norms in Britain, coupled with events that shook trust in the
professions (the medical profession in particular) as regulators, resulted in that premise being
contested. The accepted framework of government-sanctioned self-regulation was in some
senses strengthened and was bolstered by associational self-regulatory strategies and metaregulatory mechanisms. In Canada, the traditional model was modernized to somewhat
increase state control. Two provinces introduced forms of meta-regulation. In this section I
first discuss government-sanctioned self-regulation, then associational self-regulatory
strategies, followed by meta-regulation.
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Government-Sanctioned Self-Regulation
The traditional government-sanctioned self-regulatory framework for health professionals
focused on two elements: registration and retrospective Fitness to Practise (FTP)
mechanisms (i.e. examinations of the conduct and performance of health professionals in
response to complaints about their practice).

By 2005, a third element was added –

prospective FTP procedures determining whether all registered professionals are competent
to practise prior to any complaint or concern being raised. In addition, these regulatory
stages must be considered in the context of the broader governance arrangements impacting
on how the regulatory bodies exercise their power.
As the regulation of health professions is a provincial responsibility under the Canadian
Constitution, 1351 the framework for such regulation differs from province to province. In
2005, most provinces retained the traditional model, similar to that described in Britain,
where registration was through a process of certification and in some cases also licensure,
and the primary focus was on retrospective FTP mechanisms for health, at times
performance, and discipline.

Each province had increased lay representation in the

governance of the professions. There was limited accountability to provincial governments
and limited oversight. However, in four provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and
Québec), health professional regulation had been subject to regulatory modernization, and
the analysis in this section therefore focuses on these provinces.
How to best regulate the health professions has been examined by a number of reviews and
commissions in both jurisdictions over the years. Between 1980 and 2005, there were no
British reviews directly examining government-sanctioned self-regulation. However, several
of the inquiries into scandals within the NHS system examined, either in passing or directly,
government-sanctioned self-regulation, primarily in the context of an examination of the
GMC’s governance of the medical profession. The most notable of these inquiries from this
perspective was the Shipman Inquiry which, in 2004, examined the GMC’s processes in
some detail. 1352 All examinations of government-sanctioned self-regulation occurred during
this period in the context of governance scandals involving the GMC.

1351
1352
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Conversely, Canadian reviews of government sanctioned self-regulation primarily seem to
have come about in the context of a concern for regulatory modernization. In 1994,
Alberta’s Ministers of Health and Labour established the Health Workforce Rebalancing
Committee to review the province’s system for regulating health professions.

The

committee’s final report in 1995 developed guiding principles for a new regulatory system,
stating it must: protect the public; be flexible about scopes of practice; be transparent; be fair;
and must support the efficient and effective delivery of health services. 1353 Based largely on
the recommendations of the committee, the government introduced the Health Professions Act
(HPAA) in 1998, and in December 2001 the HPAA was proclaimed in part. 1354

The

transitional phase to regulation under the HPAA saw each profession becoming regulated
under the HPAA when government approved profession-specific regulations, and the
profession’s schedule in the HPAA was proclaimed. By the end of 2005, there were still
professions, such as the medical profession, who were not regulated by the HPAA. 1355
British Columbia commissioned two reviews of health professional regulation: a Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Health Care and a review by the Health Professions Council
(HPC). The Seaton Commission on Health Care in British Columbia concluded, in its 1991
report, that the system for the regulation of health professionals was rife with inconsistencies
between the health professions recommending the creation of a consistent framework. 1356 In
1994, the minister asked the HPC to review scopes of practice and the legislative framework
for all recognized health professions. The HPC’s 2001 report, Safe Choices, made a number of
recommendations in respect of changes to the regulatory structure for health professions in
British Columbia, many of which basically related to the use of umbrella legislation to ensure
consistency of regulation between professions. 1357

The HPC also recommended that a

Alberta, Alberta Health Workforce Rebalancing Committee, Principles and Recommendations for the Regulation of
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process should be put in place to provide general oversight of the regulatory boards’
performance. The HPC concluded that reserved titles served an important function, as they
enable patients to distinguish the qualified from the unqualified, and those who are regulated
from those who are not. The HPC concluded that a regulatory framework of overlapping
scopes of practice and narrowly defined reserved acts enhances a number of policy ends,
including: the creation of a system offering greater choice and accessibility; reducing
paternalism by enabling informed choice; and enhancing interdisciplinary practice. The HPC
noted that some acts present a significant risk of harm, and provision of these particularly
dangerous acts should be limited to members of specific professions who are qualified to
perform them; not all registrants would necessarily be qualified to undertake the reserved
acts assigned to that profession. It further noted that it should be the responsibility of the
profession to determine who is qualified and competent to perform that function.
Ontario, too, commissioned a review of health professional regulation. 1358

The Health

Professions Legislation Review (HPLR) resulted in significant changes to the process for
regulating health professions in Ontario in the late 1980s. 1359 This was followed by a review
by the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC) of the new framework.
HPLR’s report noted that Ontario had earlier moved to a licensing system based on
exclusive scopes of practice. The review highlighted a number of deficiencies including that
the exclusive scopes of practice were too broad, ill-defined, included acts that other
professions could undertake, and created tensions and reduced cooperation between the
professions. 1360
In response to HPLR’s recommendations, government introduced a new framework for
regulating Ontario’s health professionals in the form of the Regulated Health Professions Act,
1991, 1361 as well as 21 profession-specific Acts. Ontario considers itself to be a “… leader in

The Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council was also asked to further review the system in 2006, a
period outside the scope of this thesis.
1359 Ontario, Health Professions Legislation Review, Striking a New Balance: a Blueprint for the Regulation of Ontario’s
Health Professions, (Toronto: The Review, 1989).
1360 Ibid.
1361 RHPA, supra note 1123.
1358

299

the regulation of health professions.” 1362 In Ontario, umbrella legislation, the Regulated Health
Professions Act, 1991 (RHPA), provides a common framework for regulating health
professions governed by the Act. The model also uses profession-specific Acts to address
issues relating to individual professions.

These Acts include a brief scope of practice

statement that describes the profession, provides title protection provisions, and sets out a
list of which, if any, controlled acts the profession is authorized to perform.
Québec, on the other hand, did not undertake a formal review, but in 1999 the minister
responsible for professional legislation announced an action plan to update the professional
system. The minister established a number of working groups that furnished reports guiding
legislative reforms, reforms implemented in 2002. 1363

They intended to ensure more

flexibility in the processes for regulating health professionals, including the creation of
overlapping scopes of practice.
Registration
Beginning with registration, the traditional model is certification, where an authority certifies
that an individual has satisfied particular educational and training requirements which are
judged relevant indicators of competence to perform a range of professional services. 1364
This model does not stop others from providing the same services, but non-professionals
cannot identify themselves with the title reserved for the exclusive use of the professional
group (also called ‘right to title’ or ‘reserved title’ regimes). 1365
A more recent innovation in regulation has been the introduction of licensing models.
Under a licensing model, only licensed professionals are legally entitled to provide health
services of a particular description to patients. 1366 Licensing can create an exclusive scope of
practice or a non-exclusive scope of practice, combined with controlled acts (acts which

Ontario, Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, Regulation of Health Professions in Ontario: New
Directions, (Toronto: Health Professions Advisory Council, 2006) at 1 [Health Professions Regulatory Advisory
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create risks to patient safety so only certain people are permitted to undertake them). An
exclusive scope of practice authorizes a profession to exclusively carry out the functions
specified in the scope of practice. Another profession may only perform activities in another
profession’s scope of practice with explicit legislative authorization. 1367 A non-exclusive
scope of practice authorizes a professional to carry out the functions specified in the scope
of practice for members of that profession. The regulatory framework anticipates that there
would and should be a degree of overlap between professions in terms of functioning and
that this is desirable. Certification is less restrictive and prescriptive than licensing.
Britain continues to use certification processes for all applicants for registration in all
regulated health professions. Registration authorities certify that applicants are in good
physical and mental health, have attained the qualifications necessary for registration, are of
good character, and have paid the requisite fees. Apart from the ability to place conditions
on registration and provide specialist registration, there was no real attempt to limit or define
a health professional’s scope of practice through the processes of registration. Alberta,
British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec adopted hybrid certification/licensing models (and
this is generally the case across Canada). They all used non-exclusive scopes of practice with
a prescribed series of controlled acts. 1368

Title protection is afforded titles in British

Columbia and, in a limited fashion, in Ontario and Québec. 1369

Prospective FTP
Prospective FTP processes involve the creation of mechanisms to ensure the competence
and fitness to practise of all professionals throughout their professional life. The activities of
the GMC in this regard are discussed in the associational self-regulation section below. In
summary, in Britain, while by 2005 processes of revalidation of competence had not yet been
put in place, work was proceeding to institute prospective FTP processes.
In Canada, prospective FTP processes are present in each of the four modernized
jurisdictions, although they differ in their requirements. In Alberta, regulatory bodies are
required to establish continuing competence programs within five years of commencing
1367
1368
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regulatory activities under the HPAA. 1370 Continuing competence programs generally assess
the registrant’s current professional competence through processes such as patient and peer
assessment. In Alberta, continuing competence programs must create mechanisms to enable
registrants to maintain and develop their competence, and in this respect it may amount to a
requirement to undertake continuing professional development and report on it, rather than
any real external assessment of performance. Some profession-specific legislation in Alberta
authorizes some regulatory bodies to use practice visits (inspections and assessments of
professional practice) as part of their continuing competence programs. Registrants are
required to cooperate with practice visits. 1371 If there are concerns, the regulatory body may
recommend remedial action or refer the matter for investigation as a complaint. 1372
In British Columbia, regulatory boards were also required to establish continuing
competency requirements. 1373 In its review, the HPC noted that the professions had a
responsibility to ensure quality practice, but also accepted that mandatory continuing
education does not significantly alter the behaviour of health professionals. The HPC agreed
that it should be up to the professions to determine the appropriate means of ensuring
quality practice.
Ontario, too, requires regulatory boards to develop continuing competence mechanisms, but
these are more prescriptive than in British Columbia. The Code requires each regulatory
board to make regulations establishing a quality assurance program, which was defined as, “a
program to assure the quality of the practice of the profession and to promote continuing
competence among the members.” 1374 There is considerable flexibility to develop programs,
so there is some variability. 1375 Through regulations to their profession-specific acts, the
CPSO developed a quality assurance program that includes peer assessments, physician
reviews, and physician enhancement programs; and the College of Pharmacists a program
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that includes random practice reviews and remediation and the maintenance of a continuous
learning portfolio. 1376
Competence is said by the Conseil Interprofessionnel du Québec to be a “fundamental value
of the professional system” of which the “professional orders are the guardians and
promoters.” 1377 Theirs is a twofold role: to set standards regarding admission into the
profession so as to verify the competence and integrity of candidates; and to ensure these are
maintained throughout the person’s professional life. The continuing competence system in
Québec has both proactive and reactive elements. Proactively, members of a profession
must in some circumstances comply throughout their professional life with specific training
requirements prescribed by regulation. 1378 In addition, to “ensure that professional activities
are being practiced at the expected quality level”, the regulatory boards are to verify the
continuing competence of registrants through an inspection process. 1379 Each regulatory
board was required to establish a Professional Inspection Committee (PIC) to supervise the
practice of the profession through inspections of records, medications, poisons, substances,
equipment, and so on, but the legislation does not specify any form of actual performance
review. 1380 Within Canada, Ontario’s requirements were clearly the most developed in the
sense of prospectively assessing performance; all other programs were limited.

Retrospective FTP
For many professional bodies, especially the GMC, the traditional regulatory focus was on
input regulation, with output regulation only occurring in respect of ‘deviant’ members of the
profession. Parry and Parry have noted that, for the medical profession in Britain what
constitutes ‘deviance’ evolved over time. Initially, the focus of regulatory action was on
‘quacks’ and sexual conduct, then competition and self-promotion, and then drink and
drugs. 1381 The GMC, in particular, traditionally had very little interest in intervening in any
matter that relates to clinical negligence, deeming it a matter for the courts, even though the
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courts do not have the power to stop a health professional from practising. 1382 The GMC
was traditionally of the opinion that few, if any, cases of clinical negligence could constitute
serious professional misconduct (SPM), a class of misconduct that it considered was limited
to wilful or at least reckless conduct. 1383

As discussed in Chapter 6, screeners and

committees within the GMC determined which cases went to discipline based on their
perception of what might constitute SPM. The courts traditionally deferred to the GMC’s
discretion on this matter as long as the regulatory processes were fair. 1384

It was not until

1985 that the GMC formally recognized that some forms of negligence could form the basis
of a charge of SPM, but its 1994 internal training manual appeared to indicate the
opposite. 1385 It appears that in practice there was a high threshold for finding SPM and
negligence allegations were almost routinely omitted from proceeding through FTP
processes until the late 1990s when, confronted by a number of scandals, the GMC changed
its practices. Particularly important in this regard, were the allegations of clinical negligence
made in respect of the Bristol surgeons. 1386
During this period, non-disciplinary FTP processes were developed to allow for health and
performance assessments, creating three paths through which a complaint to the GMC could
travel. What is evident from exhaustive examinations of the GMC processes by Stacey in the
1980s 1387 and Davies in 2007 1388 is that it was not so much the regulatory framework that was
problematic, but rather its operationalization by the GMC. It appears that the process was
captured by the interests of the profession: screeners and assessors routinely acted outside
their powers and applied the wrong legal tests to determine whether a matter ought to
proceed or not, and there was no oversight of the FTP processes by the GMC. 1389 Even the
increasing involvement of lay persons in the FTP processes did not make a significant
difference.
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Partially in response to the Shipman case, in 2001 the GMC proposed new FTP procedures
said to provide greater protection for patients and the public, while remaining fair to doctors.
In this new process, instead of three types of FTP procedures, the process reverts to the old
model where all FTP matters are considered by the same process.

The preliminary

examination by GMC staff was to be made more flexible, and complaints would not be
automatically closed if local complaints processes are still being pursued.

A team of

investigators would be employed by the GMC to gather evidence at the initial stage, with
advice from lawyers. Once information is gathered, the case was to be examined by two case
examiners to decide whether it should proceed to a hearing or be resolved through the issue
of a warning. To ensure independence, the FTP panel will be comprised of non-members of
the GMC. The Shipman Inquiry suggested a number of amendments to the proposal to
ensure greater independence of the FTP panel, and to ensure there were standards against
which to make decisions to refer on or not. 1390 The Shipman Inquiry concluded:
they [the new mechanisms] are capable of providing a much improved method of
protecting patients from doctors who might harm them. The success of the new
procedures depends to a large extent upon the will and determination of the GMC to
make them operate for the benefit of patients rather than, as the old procedures
often operated, for the benefit of doctors. 1391
Some immediate changes were made through legislation, notably the government
empowered the Interim Orders Committee of the GMC to impose an interim suspension in
the public interest or in the interest of the doctor. 1392 In addition, since 2000, the GMC has
had a statutory duty to disclose to an employer or Primary Care Organization (PCO) that a
complaint has reached a certain point in its processes. 1393
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Retrospective FTP processes in Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec generally
include health, performance, and disciplinary processes. They are designed more efficiently
than the processes seen in Britain, with fewer individuals and committees making decisions.
It is difficult to know how these processes are working in practice. It is clear that the
CPSO’s processes in this regard were the subject of adverse comment in the TSAPP
report. 1394 While it is clear that the CPSO took action to strengthen its prospective measures
in respect of sexual abuse, i.e. increased education, clearer standards, reporting requirements,
and so on, according to some commentators it is less clear that governance culture within the
CPSO, and perhaps other regulatory bodies, actually changed. 1395

Governance and Accountability
A key issue is how regulatory bodies are governed and how they are held accountable. In
Britain and in Canada, lay representation increasingly became a part of governance processes
within the regulatory bodies. 1396 There were also moves, in both jurisdictions, to increase the
accountability of the regulatory bodies to the public. A side effect of this was arguably to
constrain the power of the professions.
In terms of the broader governance framework of British health regulatory bodies, a primary
accountability measure is the requirement to publish at least once a year a statistical report
that, “indicates the efficiency and effectiveness of the arrangements it has put in place to
protect the public from persons whose fitness to practice is impaired.” 1397 All regulatory
bodies are also required to submit an annual report detailing the exercise of its functions and
its financial statements to the Privy Council (PC), which in turn tables the reports in both
houses of Parliament. 1398 There is provision for the Privy Council to intervene if it considers
that a regulatory body has failed to perform any functions which the PC believes it ought to
have performed. 1399 The PC may also order an inquiry into any matter connected with the
council’s exercise of its functions. 1400 These provisions were intended to strengthen the
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accountability of the professions by enabling early intervention and “occasional independent
scrutiny.” 1401
Subsequent to the period under review in this thesis, the government has had the
opportunity to respond to the recommendations and findings of the Shipman, Ayling,
Kerr/Haslam and Neale inquiries and has recommended further reforms to the processes for
government-sanctioned self-regulation. 1402 Apart from moves to introduce prospective FTP
mechanisms and a strengthening of accountability to the state, there have been few
developments in the framework surrounding government-sanctioned self-regulation in
Britain. Scandals called into question how the GMC, in particular, exercises its governance
responsibilities, suggesting that the difficulties are not with the regulatory framework per se
but with how the regulatory bodies implement it.
In the four Canadian provinces under review in this section of the chapter, the role of the
state also assumed greater proportions constraining to some extent the powers of the
regulatory bodies. In Alberta, a regulatory body’s regulations must be approved by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council, and proposed by-laws that set out the profession’s code of
ethics and standards of practice must be reviewed by the Minister of Health and Wellness
before adoption. 1403 Another important accountability provision requires regulatory bodies
to submit annual reports to the Minister of Health and Wellness, who then must table them
in the Alberta legislature. 1404 The minister is also empowered to require additional reports
from colleges in order “to ensure that the requirements of this Act are met.” 1405
In British Columbia, a primary accountability mechanism for health professional bodies
under the HPABC, or the other Acts, was to submit an annual report to the minister,
U.K., Department of Health, Establishing the New Health Professions Council (London: Department of Health,
2001).
1402 U.K., Department of Health, Safeguarding Patients, (London: The Stationary Office, 2007); U.K., Department
of Health, Trust, Assurance and Safety: Regulation of Health Professionals, (London: The Stationary Office, 2007);
U.K., Department of Health, Good Doctors, Safer Patients: Proposals to Strengthen the System to Assure and Improve the
Performance of Doctors and to Protect the Safety of Patients: A Report by the Chief Medical Officer by Sir Liam Donaldson
(London: Department of Health, 2006); U.K., Department of Health, The Regulation of Non-medical Healthcare
Professions: A Review by the Department of Health (London: Department of Health, 2006); see also Davies, “SelfRegulation”, supra note 19; Kuhlmann, supra note 19.
1403 HPAA, supra note 1354 ss.131, 133.
1404 Ibid, ss 4.
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although the minister is not required to table the report in the legislature. 1406 An additional
accountability requirement in British Columbia was that government approve rules or bylaws formulated by regulatory bodies. 1407 The government can request a regulatory board to
amend or repeal a by-law, and if it does not can amend it itself. In its report, the HPC noted
that the regulatory boards criticized these innovations, concerned that they eroded
professional self-regulatory autonomy. However, the HPC noted that self-regulation is a
privilege and not a right and that “the ability to review and scrutinise regulatory instruments
is simply another means by which government supervises the grant of self-regulation.” 1408
Further, it is important that the government, “maintain ultimate supervisory authority over
the professions.” 1409 The HPABC also authorizes the minister to appoint a person to inquire
into the operation of a regulatory board or the practice of a health profession and to
subsequently issue a directive requiring change. 1410
Under the Ontario RHPA, the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care is responsible for the
administration of the Act and has a general duty to ensure:
…that the health professions are regulated and co-ordinated in the public interest,
that appropriate standards of practice are developed and maintained and that
individuals have access to services provided by the health professions of their choice
and that they are treated with sensitivity and respect in their dealings with health
professionals, the Colleges and the Board. 1411
In order to fulfil this duty, and hold regulatory boards accountable, the minister has a
number of powers, including: the power to review board activities; to require the submission
of information and reports; to require a board to develop, change, or revoke a regulation;
and a broad power to make a board do any act deemed necessary to carry out the RHPA’s

Ibid, ss 4(3).
HPABC, supra note 1373, s. 18(2).
1407 Ibid, s. 19(5).
1408 British Columbia, Health Professions Council, Safe Choices: A New Model for Regulating Health Professionals in
British Columbia, (Victoria: Health Professions Council, 2001) at E. 1 [HPC, Safe Choices].
1409 Ibid at E.2.
1410 HPABC, supra note 1373, s. 18(1) and 18(2).
1411 RHPA, supra note 1123, ss. 2-3.
1405
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objectives. 1412 Regulations developed by regulatory boards must be reviewed by the Minister
of Health and Long-Term Care and approved by Cabinet. 1413

They must also submit an

annual report. 1414
In Québec, each regulatory body must produce an annual report detailing its activities and
providing its financial statements and provide copies to the Office of the Professions of
Québec and the minister.

The minister must table the report before the National

Assembly. 1415 But, as is described below, Québec has a meta-regulatory layer of governance
that perhaps precludes the need for any further formal powers to be provided to the
minister.
In these Canadian provinces, the requirement that government approves regulations and bylaws issued by the regulatory body illustrates, at least in theory, a tighter degree of control
over the activities of those bodies than is seen in Britain, although it is also important to note
that in Britain the minister has some latitude to intervene in the governance of regulatory
bodies on the basis of that body’s report. Whether it actually results in any change in
practice remains unclear. It may perhaps constitute a form of associational self-regulation in
that the mere fact that such powers exist constitutes an impetus towards responsible
governance. It is also important to note that the existence of meta-regulatory processes and
tighter forms of direct regulation may mean that the constraints seem on professional powers
conferred by legislation, as seen in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario are not required in
Britain. Apart from a few provinces where government-sanctioned self-regulation is slightly
more tightly regulated, the regulatory schemes in most Canadian provinces look similar to
that in Britain. Perhaps a key difference was not so much the form of regulation but the
regulatory cultures within each body determining how they balanced the public interest
against the interests of the professions. Generally, the processes of government-sanctioned
self-regulation remained consistent with their traditional form, although some incremental
changes can be observed, especially in terms of registration and prospective FTPs. The most

Ibid, s. 5(1).
Ibid, s. 95(1).
1414 Ibid, s. 6.
1415 The Code, supra note 1378, s. 104.
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substantive change – government increasing its oversight or the potential for oversight –
occurred in both jurisdictions.

Associational Self-Regulation
Associational self-regulation occurs when one actor places pressure on another to encourage
or compel more effective self-regulation. 1416 While this approach was not seen to any great
extent in Canada, in Britain strategies to encourage, or compel, more effective self-regulation
have been seen throughout the period. In the British context, concerns about the adequacy
of the GMC, particularly as a regulator, prompted suggestions from government and other
actors on various occasions that the GMC might or should lose its power to self-regulate. As
discussed in Chapter 5, in 1998 a government White Paper placed professional regulators on
notice that the public’s trust in them was waning. 1417 This was followed by other similar
statements (some set out in Chapter 6) and acts, all calculated to ensure that the GMC
governed the profession in the public interest, instead of in the interest of the profession.
A self-regulatory initiative to emerge from the GMC in 2000 was a proposal that it should
take proactive steps to ensure that registered doctors remained fit to practise, rather than just
assuming they did until a serious complaint was made. This proposal emerged in the wake of
the publicity around Dr Shipman’s criminal offending and the other significant events
involving failures by doctors. 1418 It emerged, it is suggested, because government placed
pressure on the GMC to take action to ensure that its registrants were indeed competent to
practise, with the implicit threat that if the self-regulatory actor continued to fail to act to
ensure the public safety, the state would take direct action. A consequence of this would be
a reduction of professional autonomy. Government passed amendments to the Medical Act
1983 in 2002 giving the GMC the power to revalidate doctors. 1419
As part of its proposal, the GMC suggested that every five years a doctor would apply for
licence revalidation. As part of that application, the doctor’s practice would be evaluated by
a revalidation group, providing some form of assurance that the doctor’s performance was

McDonald, “Working to Death” supra note 110.
A First Class Service, supra note 714 para. 3.44.
1418 Shipman Inquiry, Safeguarding Patients, supra note 1097.
1416
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consistent with professional standards. However, a pilot project undertaken by the GMC in
2002 indicated that revalidation was unpopular with doctors, expensive, and time-consuming.
The GMC then revised its plans, deciding that a folder of evidence presented by the doctor
was sufficient for revalidation, although of course a folder of documents provided no
independent confirmation of the competency of the doctor. The Shipman Inquiry criticized
this decision, stating that “In my view, the GMC’s change of direction was made not for
reasons for principle but of expediency.” 1420 In other words, the inquiry’s perception was
that the GMC decided to act in a way that was easier for it and consistent with the wishes of
many of its registrants, not because it had any principled disagreement with the concept of
revalidation.
After further pressure from government the GMC again revised its revalidation proposal in
late 2003 so that a doctor must produce a clinical governance certificate from his or her
employer or PCO doing the revalidation process. The certificate would confirm that the
doctor participated in an appraisal process and that nothing adverse was known about the
doctor; it would not amount to a positive affirmation that the doctor was fit for practice.
The Shipman Inquiry concluded that, “the bottom line is that a doctor will fail to be
revalidated only if his/her professional performance is ‘remarkably poor’. I do not think that
this is a satisfactory state of affairs.” 1421 The Shipman Inquiry made recommendations in
2005 that the GMC further strengthen its revalidation process.
The Shipman Inquiry also noted that “the disappointing feature [of the GMC’s actions] is
that all these changes appear to me to have been made as a reaction to some form of external
pressure”, 1422 rather than any true desire by the GMC to institute reforms. This in turn
seems to validate the need for associational regulation, as the GMC was perceived to be
regulating in the interests of the profession and not the public interest. Pressure was needed
to change the GMC’s internal culture. The Shipman Inquiry noted, “It is clear that the GMC
did not recognise the need for change without some prompting from outside.” 1423

Medical Act 1983, supra note 1392, pt. IIIA.
Shipman Inquiry, Safeguarding Patients, supra note 1097 at 41.
1421 Ibid at 42.
1422 Ibid at 43.
1423 Ibid at para. 27.287.
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The development of the National Clinical Assessment Authority (NCAA) in 2002 was, in
some senses, a form of associational regulation. In others it was an example of direct
regulation by the government. As discussed in Chapter 5, the NCAA provided support,
advice, assessments, education, and mediation services to the NHS in respect of concerns
about the performance of an individual doctor or dentist. As a tool of direct regulation, the
creation of this institution was a mechanism used to strengthen the powers of NHS
management to address concerns about professional performance and constituted a way in
which government could strengthen the ability of the NHS and the state to control its
employees in the public interest. The explicit linkage between the activities of the NCAA
and the GMC’s performance-related assessment powers created additional pressure for the
GMC to perform its performance-related functions adequately, as an independent agency
was working closely with it and could observe if it did not. 1424
The closest Canadian equivalent to this process was perhaps seen in respect of the concerns
about how the CPSO addressed the issue of sexual abuse complaints. However, in that case,
the associational pressure came from the public, advocacy groups, and the media, not from
government per se.

The commissioning of the TSAPP, the swift uptake of its

recommendations in Ontario and throughout all Canadian jurisdictions appeared to indicate
a different regulatory culture – one that was more responsive to public concerns.
Regulation by litigation was also used in the Canadian context to change the governance
processes of the regulatory bodies. It was not used in Britain. It too places pressure on selfregulatory actors providing a form of associational self-regulation, although of course it
moved from a threat of legal action to an actual legal action. In Canada, some persons,
unhappy with the manner in which regulatory bodies performed their statutory investigation
function, commenced civil proceedings alleging misfeasance in public office and negligence
against a variety of statutory bodies. In one case, plaintiffs who had alleged that they had
been sexually assaulted by a doctor, sued the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British

1424

Allsop, “Regaining Trust”, supra note 711.
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Columbia, which had not investigated their complaints. 1425 The British Columbian Court of
Appeal affirmed the existence of a tort of negligent investigation in Canada. 1426 This private
law mechanism places pressure on regulators to investigate matters effectively and efficiently
and in a manner consistent with the public interest.
In Britain, an associational self-regulation approach was adopted by government, and other
actors, to compel the GMC to exercise its regulatory responsibilities in a way commensurate
with the public interest. In Canada, any associational regulatory impetus came largely as the
result of the actions of private citizens raising concerns about specific incidents of perceived
regulatory failure. It may be that Canadian governments generally perceived that health
professional regulatory bodies were exercising their regulatory powers appropriately and
official pressure was therefore not required to change regulatory culture. As noted in the
previous section, it may be that accountability mechanisms were such that additional pressure
was not deemed necessary.

Meta-Regulation
Meta-regulation is where government requires or directly oversees the processes of
government-sanctioned self-regulation. 1427 Meta-regulation is said to encompass meta-riskmanagement schemes, enforced quality improvement, or enforced self-regulation. 1428 In the
British context, meta-regulation most certainly occurred during this period with the creation
of the CHRE in 2002 (originally known as the Council for the Regulation of Health Care
Professionals) 1429 and the institution of clinical governance within the NHS. In Canada, only
Québec saw the introduction of meta-regulation in respect of oversight of a regulatory body,
and Manitoba in respect of mandated quality assurance.

McClelland v. Stewart [2004] B.C.J. No. 1852, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 162 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to the S.C.C.
refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No 492 (S.C.C.).
1426 Ibid. See discussion in E. Shirlow & T. Faunce, “Australian Professional Practice Bodies and the Tort of
Negligent Investigation” (2009) 17 J.L. Med. 46.
1427 P. Grabosky, “Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance” (1995) 8:4 Gov.
Int’l J. Pol’y & Admin. 527; Gunningham, supra note 116; McDonald, “Working to Death” supra note 110.
1428 Braithwaite, “Governance”, supra note 24. See also McDonald, “Working to Death” supra note 110.
1429 The Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals is the name accorded to the agency by statute.
The council issued a press release on 15 July 2004 stating that it had changed its name to the Council for
Healthcare Regulatory Excellence. CHRE was established in the National Health Service Reform and Health Care
1425
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The CHRE is an independent agency accountable to the British, Scottish, and Northern
Ireland parliaments/assemblies. 1430 Its functions are to: promote the interests of patients and
the public; to ensure that when regulatory bodies exercise their functions, they do so in
accordance with best practice; formulate principles relating to good professional regulation
and to encourage compliance with those principles; and to promote cooperation between
regulatory bodies. 1431 Each regulatory body within the remit of the CHRE has a duty, in the
exercise of its functions, to cooperate with the CHRE. 1432 The CHRE can investigate and
report on the regulatory body’s performance of its functions, compare the processes and
performance of regulatory bodies, and recommend changes to those processes. 1433 The
CHRE may also, for the protection of the public, give directions to a regulatory body
requiring it to make rules to achieve a desired policy outcome and the regulatory body must
comply with its direction. 1434

The Act also creates provision for CHRE to investigate

complaints against a health professional body. 1435
Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the CHRE’s role, certainly from the perspective of
the professions, is its power to refer to the High Court (or the Court of Session in Scotland)
‘relevant’ decisions of the Fitness to Practise and Disciplinary panels or committees of the
nine regulators that it oversees. 1436 ‘Relevant decisions’ are those that relate to directions as
to penalty, decisions not to undertake disciplinary proceedings, or decisions to restore a
person to the register, but do not include decisions in relation to health impairments, or
decisions made by the regulator at preliminary or investigative stages. 1437 The CHRE may
refer a matter to the courts if it considers that the decision or penalty is “unduly lenient” or a
decision “should not have been made” and that it would be desirable for the protection of
members of the public that the council takes action. 1438 The courts have clarified that the
CHRE can refer an acquittal to the court for consideration of what was meant by “unduly
Professions Act 2002, partly as a result of a recommendation made by the Bristol Inquiry. Health Care Professions Act,
supra note 721, s. 25-29.
1430 Health Care Professions Act, ibid s. 16.
1431 Ibid s. 25(1).
1432 Ibid.
1433 Ibid. s. 26.
1434 Ibid. s. 27(2).
1435 Ibid. s. 28.
1436 McDonald, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 1355.
1437 Health Care Professions Act, supra note 721, s. 29
1438 Ibid. s. 29
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lenient” and in what circumstances it applied. 1439

Government thought that such referrals

would be rare, 1440 but the CHRE has referred higher numbers of cases than was
envisaged. 1441
The closest approximation to meta-regulation in the Canadian context occurs in Alberta,
Ontario, and Québec. In Alberta, the HPAA established a Health Professions Advisory
Board (HPAB), an advisory body designed to increase public input on regulatory matters. 1442
Its role is to provide general advice on regulatory policy – it does not have any true oversight
function in the sense required to constitute meta-regulation. 1443
In Ontario, the RHPA established the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council
(HPRAC), an independent advisory body. 1444 Similar to HPAB, HPRAC’s duties are to
provide advice to the minister. 1445

HPRAC also has extremely limited oversight

responsibilities – namely, it has a statutory duty to monitor the patient relations program of
each regulatory body and advise the minister of the program’s effectiveness. It also reviews
the effectiveness of each regulatory body’s patient relations and quality assurance programs
and complaint and discipline procedures relating to professional misconduct of a sexual
nature. 1446 However, while the mandate of HPRAC is broader than Alberta’s HPAB, its
oversight functions are extremely limited and it really remains an advisory body. Also
established was a Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, an independent agency,
which conducts reviews and appeals of certain decisions made by regulatory boards in
respect of registration and complaints. 1447

The Health Professions Appeal and Review

Board states:

See discussion in Glynn, supra note 19 at 499–503.
See U.K., House of Commons Standing Committee A, Hansard, (13 December 2001) at col. 424-427 (per
John Hutton); explanatory note to The Health Act 1999, supra note 694.
1441 Glynn, supra note 19.
1442 HPAA, supra note 1354, s. 22(1).
1443 Ibid, s.23.
1444 RHPA, supra note 1123 s. 7.
1445 Ibid, s. 11.
1446 Ibid, s. 6.
1447 Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998 S.O. 1998, c.18, Sch. H.
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[t]hrough reviews and hearings, the Board monitors the activities of the Colleges’
Complaints Committees and Registration or Accreditation Committees, in order to
ensure they fulfill their duties in the public interest and as mandated by legislation. 1448
The board performs a meta-regulatory function, but unlike meta-regulation in Britain and
Québec (discussed below), it is not proactive, but reactive. Oversight by the board depends
on an individual bringing a matter to its attention. It does not actively review decisions on its
own initiative.
Meta-regulation does occur in Québec – perhaps not surprisingly given that its level of
statism is the highest of the Canadian provinces. The Office of the Professions of Québec
(Office des professions du Québec) (OPQ) is a government oversight agency whose
mandate is to ensure that each professional body fulfils its function of protecting the
public. 1449 OPQ also serves as an advisory body to government. In summary, OPQ ensures
that each regulatory body adopts the required regulations and suggests changes to such
regulations for voluntary adoption by the regulatory bodies. 1450 If those bodies do not adopt
the recommendations, OPQ can recommend mandatory adoption to government. It may
also set regulations establishing specific rules and standards. 1451 It has investigation powers
that the minister may, in special circumstances, authorize it to use to examine the functioning
of the regulatory body. 1452 In addition, the Québec Interprofessional Council was founded in
1995 as an association of the professional regulatory bodies and as an adviser to government
on matters touching the regulation of professionals; as such, it is a purely advisory body. 1453
Québec is the only province to have a true meta-regulatory process for oversight of the
health professions. It differs from the British model in that it has no power to refer
disciplinary decisions to the courts for review, but other than this the two bodies have similar
powers. It appears that a statist approach may be an indicator of the use of meta-regulatory
mechanisms in the context of the oversight of regulatory bodies.

Ontario, Health Profession Review and Appeal Board, “About Us: Introduction to the Health Professions
Review and Appeal Board” online: Health Profession Review and Appeal Board
<http://www.hparb.on.ca/scripts/english/about.asp>.
1449 The Code, supra note 1378 s. 12.
1450 Ibid.
1451 Ibid.
1452 Ibid.
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In Britain the Health Act 1999 introduced requirements for the introduction of clinical
governance which, as discussed in Chapter 5, is essentially an accountability framework for
clinical practice. 1454

While the responsibility for introducing clinical governance was an

institutional one, i.e. the NHS bore responsibility, it impacted on professional self-regulation
in that it required clinical audit processes and in that sense could be considered to be metaregulatory in effect. 1455 Similar measures were not really seen in Canadian jurisdictions. The
closest perhaps to clinical governance was the Manitoban Hospitals Standards Regulation 1456
which requires Hospital Standards Committees to ensure medical audit programs are
undertaken in each facility.

Direct Regulation of the Professions
As discussed in Chapter 5, in Britain the government steadily increased direct regulation of
the professions through strengthening the employment relationships between the NHS and
medical professionals and dentists, including reducing the powers of the professional peer
review mechanisms (such as the three wise men), strengthening the power of the NHS to
investigate concerns about conduct, competence, or performance, and to suspend or place
conditions on a professional’s ability to practise. Medical professionals, in particular, had
their ability to self-regulate within the NHS severely limited, with the integration of clinical
processes into the broader management of the NHS. Conversely, in Canada, the logics of
the Medicare system meant that the medical profession was able to retain its separate
governance structure within hospitals and maintain professional self-regulation in the
workplace.

Co-Regulation
Both jurisdictions recognized that only so much could be done through top-down regulatory
processes, and that at times the effective change occurred through bottom-up and/or
collaborative processes. In that context, the state’s role should, at best, be to facilitate and
enhance these types of initiatives. It also should be to create processes to enable cross-

Conseil, supra note 1377. See also McDonald, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 1355.
Flynn, supra note 671; Walshe, Clinical Governance, supra note 696; Davies & Mannion, supra note 691.
1455 Davies, “Trust”, supra note 698.
1453
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systemic learning. Both of those would facilitate the development and attainment of best
practices in safety and quality. Accordingly, both jurisdictions saw the development of
organizations to facilitate patient safety improvement.
In Canada, the 2003 federal budget announced the provision of $10 million annually to
support patient safety initiatives, including the creation of the Canadian Patient Safety
Institute (CPSI). The CPSI works collaboratively with governments and other stakeholders
to improve the safety of Canadian health systems. 1457 It has no regulatory authority, but
functions as a clearing house for information, funds patient safety research, and provides
advice and leadership by fostering patient safety related programs.
Two provinces also introduced similar institutions. In 2004, the government of Manitoba
established the Manitoba Patient Safety Institute, also an independent non-profit
organization, pursuant to a recommendation made by the Manitoba Patient Safety Steering
Committee. This committee had been in turn created to respond to the inquest into events
at the WHSC. The Manitoba Patient Safety Institute’s role was to promote, coordinate and
facilitate patient-safety-related activities throughout Manitoba and to enhance the quality of
healthcare for Manitobans. 1458 In British Columbia, the government established the British
Columbia Patient Safety Taskforce, a provincial coalition for patient safety, also intended to
promote, coordinate, and facilitate activities within that province. 1459 These were all agencies
designed to facilitate collaborations between stakeholders in the area, bespeaking a coregulatory mode of governance.
In Britain, the National Patient Safety Agency was established in 2002 as a special health
authority. 1460 Its purpose was to inform, support, and influence health-providers to improve
the quality and safety of health services. It collects voluntarily provided, anonymous, adverse
Hospitals Standards Regulation, Man. Reg. 453/88R [Hospitals Regulation (Manitoba)].
Canada, Canadian Patient Safety Institute, “About CPSI” online: CPSI
<http://www.patientsafetyinstitute.ca/English/About/Pages/default.aspx>.
1458 Manitoba Institute for Patient Safety, online MBIPS <http://www.mbips.ca/aboutus.html>. See also
Downie, supra note 28.
1459 British Columbia, Ministry of Health Services, News Release/Communiqué, “Provincial Taskforce to
Improve Patient Safety” (7 May 2004) online Government B.C.
<http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/nrm_news_releases/2004HSER0018-000280.pdf>. This entity no longer
exists.
1456
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event reports, analyzes them, identifies risks, and recommends action. Similarly to the CPSI,
it acts as a clearing house for information about patient safety, and provides support and
leadership in respect of national initiatives aiming at improving safety.

Both national

agencies are facilitative in nature, and as such the initiatives in this particular aspect of the
framework for regulating patient safety are remarkably similar.

Meta-Regulation
Meta-regulatory processes also occur in the context of the regulation of the health system
more generally. It has been of limited effect in Canadian health systems. In most provinces
and territories, legislation was used to require the creation of bodies within facilities to
address patient safety and quality-related issues and Ministers were given powers to intervene
in respect of safety and quality issues. 1461 For example, in Québec, the Act Respecting Health
Services and Social Services 1462 required that each facility establish a risk and quality
management committee. These committees were to: identify and analyze risks; support the
patient and/or their relatives; and establish a monitoring system which was to include a local
register of adverse events so that root cause analysis may be conducted. 1463 In Manitoba, the
Hospitals Standards Regulation 1464 established the responsibilities of Hospital Standards
Committees to ensure that a medical audit program is undertaken to provide surveillance of
quality of care. However, these requirements are very general and leave the execution, form
and functions of these mechanisms to be determined by each health-provider. 1465
Additionally, there are no mechanisms to enable to state to determine whether these
mechanisms are functioning or to require the Minister to exercise his or her powers
proactively. 1466
However, meta-regulation became a significant part of the regulatory framework in Britain
with the introduction of clinical governance as part of the 1999 NHS reforms. Flynn notes
that, “[t]he genealogy of clinical governance can be traced back to these generic approaches
National Patient Safety Regulations, supra note 715.
Downie, supra note 28.
1462 Health Services and Social Services Act, R.S.Q., chap. S-4.2, s. 182.2 [Health Services and Social Services Act].
1463 Ibid.
1464 Hospitals Regulation (Manitoba), supra note 1456.
1465 Downie, supra note 28.
1466 Ibid.
1460
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of managerialism [NPM] … .” 1467 Generally, the implementation of clinical governance is
said to have involved a shift of power from clinicians to managers and a cultural change
within NHS systems. 1468

As such, it was considered a powerful tool in reducing the

autonomy of the professions.
The Department of Health has proffered various definitions of what exactly clinical
governance is, 1469 including:
A framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continually
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by
creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish. 1470
A key facet of clinical governance was the creation of a statutory duty upon the NHS in
respect of quality and safety (set out in Chapter 5). This duty constituted a requirement for
NHS Trusts to “assure quality and continuously improve it.” 1471 That duty was placed upon
CEOs who would henceforth be held accountable for achievement of service quality, just as
they were for the use of financial resources. The creation of a statutory duty of quality
increases organizational attention to safety and quality issues, especially if organizational
progress and commitment is to be monitored and actors may be held accountable. 1472
NHS Trusts were to use a variety of mechanisms to ensure quality, including: reinvigorated
clinical audit; clinical risk management; quality assurance; clinical effectiveness assessment;
evidence-based decision-making; clinical supervision; learning from complaints; the
identification and management of poor clinical performance; and staff and organizational
development. 1473

As Flynn notes, the scale and scope of clinical governance is far-

Flynn, supra note 671 at 159.
K. Walshe, Clinical Governance: A Review of the Evidence (Birmingham: Health Services Management Centre,
University of Birmingham, 2000); Flynn, supra note 671; S. Nicholls et al., “Clinical Governance: Its Origins and
Foundations” (2000) Brit. J. Clinical Gov. 172 [Nicholls].
1469 See discussion in Flynn, supra note 671.
1470 A First Class Service, supra note 714 para. 3.2.
1471 Flynn, supra note 671 at 158.
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reaching. 1474 Davies and Mannion have observed if managers must secure quality and safety
improvements, it is an instinctual response on their part to introduce measures to check
performance and coerce behavioural change. 1475

Thus not only did clinical governance

strengthen the role of NHS managers; it also signalled an attempt to refashion organizational
culture by reprioritizing issues of safety and quality. Mechanisms to address safety and
quality were embedded throughout the fabric of the organization, with performance
measures and accountabilities attached. Meta-regulation was a tool that allowed the tentacles
of control to move from the state to CEOs, to line managers, and so on down the line. In
return enhanced accountabilities go up the line.
Meta-regulation was a powerful tool employed by the British government to encourage
greater priority to be accorded to safety and quality at the organizational level and greater
incentives for managers to require increased oversight of performance, increased mentoring
and review, and greater accountability for safety and quality. This level of verification and
oversight was not dreamed of in Canada, where it was taken for granted that the professions
should be doing this type of thing anyway, supported where relevant by the hospitals in
which they were based or by the RHAs and enabled in a generic fashion by legislation.

Direct Regulation
Regulatory law grew to become an increasingly important tool in Britain during this period,
whereas in Canada, although it was employed, it was to a lesser extent and with a different
focus than in Britain.
Standards and Guidelines
A part of the state’s bargain with the medical profession, a bargain that occurred on both
sides of the Atlantic was that doctors would retain their professional autonomy, especially in
matters touching upon clinical judgement. This included the power to establish professional
standards and to create clinical guidelines. As discussed in previous chapters, the bargain was
between the professions and the state was substantially renegotiated in Britain. Part of this
renegotiation in Britain saw the state assuming at least some responsibility for the creation of
1474
1475
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clinical standards and guidelines. The ostensible reason for this was a quality issue. It was
deemed troubling that a person with a medical condition, such as asthma, could have that
condition managed in different ways depending upon where that person lived.

An

underlying theme of the NPM was rationality, but differences in treatment modalities
depending on residence seem inherently irrational. The evidence should determine the
standard of treatment that should be provided and that should be broadly consistent across
the NHS. Accordingly, in 1999, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was
established as a special health authority. Its aim is to provide guidance on public health,
health technologies and clinical practice. In respect of the latter, it creates clinical guidelines
and so strengthens the evidence base of medicine. 1476 But more than that, NICEs clinical
guidelines were used as a basis to establish the standards against which organizational
performance would be assessed by agencies such as CHI and the Healthcare Commission. 1477
Evidence of compliance with NICE’s standards provides a basis for evidence-based
decision-making. In addition, government developed National Service Frameworks (NSF),
which established the standard of care in respect of certain services. NSFs were also used by
CHI and the Healthcare Commission as a basis from which to assess performance. Thus,
government established arms length agencies to assume a significant role in establishing
clinical standards. But it also leveraged those standards into practice through the use of audit
and monitoring processes.
Nothing commensurate occurred in Canada. While there were attempts by government to
create clinical guidelines (as discussed in Chapter 5), these were short-lived and ineffective.
The mode of governance was co-regulatory, involving for the most part partnerships with
the professions in the development of the few guidelines that emerged from the process.
Clinicians were encouraged to use the guidelines, but it remained a matter of their personal
choice. There was no monitoring, no audit, and no accountabilities attached to the use of
clinical guidelines by health professionals, health-providers or health-programs.

Allsop, “Regaining Trust”, supra note 711.
U.K., Department of Health, Standards for Better Health, (London: Department of Health, 2004). The
guidelines applied in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland from 2004.
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Complaints
Complaints mechanisms are another manner in which safety and quality can be regulated.
Their purpose is to identify issues, individual and systemic, and implement changes so that
similar events do not occur again – in other words, complaints enable learning and the
institution of preventative measures. Complaints processes also, of course, serve other ends
in terms of displaying responsiveness to patient concerns and managing litigation risk.
Complaints processes can be mandated by the state through processes of direct regulation,
or they can be voluntarily instituted by individuals and facilities.
In the NHS during this period, it became mandatory for NHS facilities to have complaints
management systems. For example, in 2004, regulations required NHS bodies to make
arrangements to handle and consider complaints. 1478 Consistent with the NPMs priority to
establish clear lines of accountability, a senior person must be designated as having the
responsibility for ensuring both compliance with the regulations and that action is taken in
light of the outcome of any investigation. 1479 The NHS body must also appoint a complaints
manager. Additionally, the NHS is accountable to the Healthcare Commission in respect of
its complaints processes, as it must provide it with an annual report on its handling of
complaints. The Healthcare Commission also can review complaints (as long as the Health
Service Ombudsman is not doing so) if the complainant is not satisfied or there is an
unreasonable delay in resolving the complaint.
Since the early 1970s, Britain’s Health Services Ombudsman was able to independently
review complaints but only in relation to the non-clinical aspects of NHS services, and only
after complaints had progressed unsatisfactorily through local levels.

From 1993, its

jurisdiction was expanded to also include clinical matters within the NHS. 1480
Generally, in Canada complaints management has been left to the discretion of the selfregulatory actors – in others words, to hospitals and RHAs – in most provinces except
Québec.

In respect of patient complaints, there was limited independent or quasi-

1478 The National Health Service (Complaints) Regulations 2004 (U.K.), S.I. 2004/1768 pursuant to Health and Social
Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003 (U.K.) s. 48.
1479 Ibid.
1480 Health Service Commissioners Act 1993 (U.K.), 1993, c. 46.
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independent review across the jurisdictions.

In Alberta, the Health Facilities Review

Committee was responsible for investigating patient complaints concerning “the care and
treatment and standards of accommodation received by that patient or any other patient in
the hospital.” 1481 The committee did not investigate complaints about a health professional’s
conduct or patient abuse, which were addressed by other agencies. Complaints were to be in
relation to a specific patient and could be about “any aspect of patient/resident care, safety
or satisfaction,” such as medication administration, the use of restraints, or food quality. 1482
Also in Alberta, the Ombudsman can, since 2003, review the operation of patient concerns
resolution process within RHAs. 1483
Québec also had a complaints system allowing patients to complain about the care they
received in public institutions (but not in respect of the services provided by many health
professionals). 1484 All public facilities are required to establish a complaints process. 1485 Any
complaints are first dealt with at the regional or local level by a quality commissioner, a quasiindependent actor.

If that is unsuccessful because the complainant believed the

commissioner did not act in a timely way, or because the complainant is dissatisfied with the
commissioner’s conclusions; or because he or she is unhappy with the Health Authority’s
response to the commissioner’s recommendations, the complainant can take the matter to
the Health and Social Services Ombudsman. On the whole, in Canada, complaints systems
remained in-house with little capacity for external agencies to play a role or to review inhouse mechanisms.
In Britain, complaints processes were considered important and became mandatory.
However, it was not sufficient that they were mandatory, government wanted to ensure
accountability and compliance and so it established multiple review processes as a check on
the exercise of the NHS body’s discretion. In Canada, apart from Québec, complaints

Health Facilities Review Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-3, s. 8 [Health Facilities Review Act].
Ibid.
1483 Ombudsman Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. 08, s. 12.1.
1484 An Act Respecting the Health and Welfare Commissioner, R.S.Q. c. C-32.1.1 [Act Respecting the Health and Welfare
Commissioner]. See also Protecteur des usagers en matiere de sante et de services sociaux, “Brief History”
[Protecteur], online: <http://www.protecteurdesusagers.gouv.qc.ca/fr/>; Downie, supra note 28.
1485 Health Services and Social Services Act, supra note 1462.
1481
1482
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systems remained up to the discretion of individual facilities or RHAs. Only in Québec and
Alberta were independent complaints review mechanisms established.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluating service quality against accepted standards is suggested to be an
important mechanism to ensure quality and safety. It is also a way in which accountabilities
can be actualized because accountability requires enforcement. Sorrell argues that “it is not
the publication of the standards but the enforcement of the standards that matters to whether
trust is well placed.” 1486 Conversely, it also can be argued that the professions who provide
such services are in the best position to monitor and audit processes through peer review and
assessment. We see each of these approaches taken in the jurisdictions under review in this
thesis.
In Britain, the ‘policing’ approach was adopted for NHS hospitals and in respect of other
health services, such as long-term care. The priority was to obtain an objective, independent
assurance of service quality. If such an assurance was not to be found, it was to identify
problems so that remedial action could be taken and the organization and persons could be
held accountable. This was done through the creation of CHI in 2001 1487 (for NHS Trusts)
and, in 2002, the National Care Standards Commission (for long-term care and other private
facilties). CHI’s initial function was to evaluate the implementation of clinical governance by
undertaking local Clinical Governance Reviews (CGR). CGRs occurred randomly (usually in
four year cycles) and involved site visits and peer assessment. The focus was on processes,
and before each visit available data was analyzed and assessed to inform peer review
processes. 1488 NHS Trusts were required to develop action plans to respond to the key areas
for action identified in CHI’s report, and their achievement of goals within that action plan
formed part of the basis upon which star ratings (discussed below) were assessed. A
problem, of course, was that how well or how poorly a NHS Trust constituted risk and
quality processes might have no, or very little, bearing on the actual quality and safety of the
services it provided.1489 Accordingly, in 2002, as part of government’s response to the Bristol
Sorrell, supra note 1184 at 55.
Health Act 1999, supra note 694.
1488 G. Bevan, “Changing Paradigms of Governance and Regulation of Quality of Healthcare in England”
(2008) 10(1) Health, Risk & Soc’y 85 [Bevan].
1489 K. Walshe, “Improvement Through Inspection? The Development of the New Commission for Health
Improvement in England and Wales” (1999) 8 Quality in Health Care 191.
1486
1487
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Inquiry, CHI became responsible for assessing the quality of care against national
standards. 1490
In 2004, CHI and the National Care Standards Commission were merged to create the
Healthcare Commission. 1491

The Healthcare Commission was to independently inspect

health services, publish regular ratings of NHS Trusts, and provide an annual report about
the quality and safety of services across England and Wales (a similar agency operated in
Scotland). It also developed an independent second stage for complaints, and could
investigate allegations of serious failings in health services. In particular, the Healthcare
Commission was to target its inspections and reviews towards NHS Trusts that were
perceived to have difficulties. Thus, the government’s commitment to safety and quality was
operationalized by the implementation of a policing mechanism to evaluate compliance with
NHS goals.
In Canada, the regulation of hospitals and other facilities still largely follows the traditional
pattern discussed in Chapter 2. 1492 Government agencies lightly monitored hospitals across
Canada, generally through processes of review and inspection, primarily of equipment. 1493
Perhaps the most public of these processes occurred in Alberta, where regular reviews of the
quality of care provided in facilities were undertaken by the Alberta Health Facilities Review
Committee, a quasi-independent committee. 1494 Its focus was on the quality of care, and not
safety per se. The committee reports to the RHA, the facility and the Minister of Health and
Wellness. Its annual report is also tabled in the legislative assembly. This is somewhat
unusual as in the 1980–2005 period, reports of such reviews in other provinces and
territories were generally not made public.
Only one province had a clear accountability structure around safety or quality during this
period. 1495 In Québec, the minister was required to take measures to “ensure users the safe

Bevan, supra note 1488.
Health and Social Care Act, supra note 723 s. 48.
1492 See also Downie, supra note 28.
1493 Ibid.
1494 Health Facilities Review Committee Act R.S.A. 2000, c. H-3, s. 7.
1495 Downie, supra note 28.
1490
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provision of health services and social services.” 1496

In the Northwest Territories, the

Hospital Standards Regulations created a health services committee in each facility to make
recommendations to the hospital authority and, where necessary, the minister with respect
of, among other things, “improving diagnostic and treatment standards within the hospital or
hospitals.” 1497

Governments tended to rely on hospitals seeking, for the most part

voluntarily, accreditation from private accreditation agencies. 1498 So we generally see the light
hand of government performing minimalist inspections of facilities, coupled with a reliance
on largely voluntary processes of self-regulation through accreditation.
The establishment of Quality Councils in a few provinces did not really change this pattern.
These bodies generally focused on enhancing and facilitating collaboration between
providers and other stakeholders.

They did have some form of monitoring function

however, in this context ‘monitoring’ was used in a much looser sense than was the case in
Britain.

Saskatchewan’s Health Quality Council’s 1499 mandate included: monitoring and

assessing the quality of Saskatchewan’s health services; promoting quality improvement
research, training, and education; and developing new clinical standards of care. 1500 In this
context, quality included safety. 1501 The council provided advice to government, health
authorities, and professionals on a number of healthcare quality and safety matters. It was
required to publish public reports on its activities. 1502

In the context of this council’s

activities, monitoring meant using data, provided by Saskatchewan Health, to evaluate
performance in certain areas, i.e. in respect of acute heart attacks. It did not involve any
form of audit or any form of inspection of individual health professionals or providers. Its
work was to provide an overview of the system, not components of that system. The
council emphasized that its function was to act as a catalyst for quality improvement,
through, among other things, the development and maintenance of close working
relationships and strategic alliances with key stakeholders. 1503
Health Services and Social Services Act, supra note 1462.
Hospital Standards Regulations N.W.T. Reg. 1990, c. T-6, s. 61(5)(a)(iii).
1498 Downie, supra note 28.
1499 An independent agency established in 2002.
1500 The Health Quality Council Act, S.S. 2002, c. H-0.04, s. 5.
1501 Downie, supra note 28.
1502 Ibid.
1503 See for example, Saskatchewan, Health Quality Council, 2004/2005: 100 Years of Health: Annual Report
(Saskatoon: Health Quality Council, 2005).
1496
1497
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Alberta had a similar body, the Health Quality Council of Alberta, established in 2004, with
patient safety as an explicit part of its quality mandate. 1504 It too undertook global analysis of
the quality of the system using a framework that focused on: health status; characteristics;
non-medical determinants of health; and performance (acceptability, accessibility,
appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, continuity, competence, and safety). 1505

It too

emphasizes collaboration and its role as a catalyst for change. 1506
In Québec, the National Assembly adopted an Act instituting the office of the
Commissionaire à la santé et au bien-être (Health and Welfare Commissioner). 1507 The
Health and Welfare Commissioner was responsible for assessing the results achieved by the
health and social services system. 1508 This was again assessed by measurement against global
indicators, such as quality, access, integration, insurability, funding, determinants of health,
ethics, medications, and technology. 1509

Hence, its monitoring function was also at a

systemic and global level. Downie et al note that the commissioner did not appear to have a
legislative mandate to address patient safety, but did have a quality mandate, which may be
interpreted by the commissioner to include safety. 1510 Finally, in 2005, Ontario announced it
was establishing a Health Quality Council to monitor and report publicly on health system
outcomes as part of its Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004. 1511
The difference in approach is apparent. In Britain, the focus is on a very specific assessment
of an NHS Trust or other similar facility’s quality and safety outcomes, and their processes.
Performance indicators are clear; independent assessment occurs; and there are
accountability mechanisms. In Canada, the focus is on the system more generally: it does not
involve assessing individual providers, and a global, less intrusive, less prescriptive approach
is preferred.
Alberta’s Health Quality Council was established by Ministerial Order in 2004, but was already in operation
as the Health Services Utilization and Outcomes in Commission.
1505 Alberta, Health Quality Council of Alberta, Annual Review 2003-2004: A Catalyst for Positive Change (Calgary:
Health Quality Council of Alberta, 2004).
1506 Ibid.
1507 Act Respecting the Health and Welfare Commissioner, supra note 1484.
1508 Ibid.
1509 Ibid.
1510 Downie, supra note 28.
1504
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Information and Accountability
Evaluation of a system’s strengths or weaknesses in respect of patient safety and service
quality rely on good information.

In both jurisdictions, little aggregate data had been

collected on outcomes, with the focus for data collection being on inputs and outputs that
are easier to measure. Also, in both jurisdictions, the collection of such data had traditionally
been the preserve of the professions and was highly localized in effect. In other words,
aggregate data was seldom collected. In Britain, as part of the monitoring and evaluation
process, more extensive informational systems were developed.

This enabled both

assessment of an NHS Trust or health system’s performance, but the data could also be used
to inform a variety of accountability mechanisms. The accountability mechanism of choice
was the issuance of public report cards.

Public report cards involve the development of

systems to collect, aggregate, and compare data relating to system performance, particularly
in regard to safety and quality. The dataset is sufficiently broad to enable a clear conclusion
to be reached about the performance of the organization relative to other similar
organizations. A public ‘report card’ is then created and is made publicly available.
It is suggested that public reporting of performance ratings for individual organizations
through a ‘report card’ might create a positive impact on the health system in two ways:
consumer pressure will create upwards pressure on standards (even in public systems like the
NHS); and concern about damage to the institution’s reputation, or about public humiliation,
will motivate quality and safety improvements. 1512 In fact, the system has been described as a
naming and shaming mechanism. 1513 In Britain, the Health and Social Care (Community Health
and Standards) Act 2003 1514 established a mandatory public report cards scheme for NHS
organizations where each institution would be assigned a star rating. Under this scheme the
CHI/Healthcare Commission, with the assistance of the organization whose performance is
being examined, gathers data relating to safety and quality indicators.

The Healthcare

Commission then analyzes the data, compares it with other similar institutions, assigns a

Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 5.
Newdick, “N.H.S.”, supra note 26.
1513 Bevan, supra note 1490 at 90.
1514 Health and Social Care Act, supra note 723 s. 49 & 50.
1511
1512

329

performance rating, reports to government, and publicly publishes the data and the star
rating. Compliance is mandatory.
It has been suggested that the use of public report cards engages management in a
commitment to quality and safety and results in increased collaboration with clinical leaders
to institute meaningful change. 1515

The star ratings awarded to NHS Trusts gradually

improved against increasingly tougher performance indicators, indicating, according to the
Healthcare Commission, improved performance overall. 1516 However, it is also suggested
that star rating narrowed the focus to elements of clinical governance that could be scored,
many of which may have been of little importance when considering actual safety and
quality. 1517
In Canada, a different approach was taken. A few provinces created legislatively mandated
frameworks for province-wide adverse event reporting systems. 1518 Saskatchewan was the
first province to institute mandatory reporting of adverse events to its Health
Department. 1519 Their legislation also requires investigation of critical incidents and the
production of a report detailing the circumstances surrounding the incident, any factors that
may prevent a recurrence, past actions, and future steps to be taken as the result of the
investigation, and any other recommendations. 1520 In Québec, any person working in an
institution providing health services was legally required to report accidents or incidents
within the facility in which they work. 1521 Anonymized reports must also be submitted to the
regional board. Manitoba passed legislation in June 2005 containing mandatory critical
incident reporting requirements, similar to those in Saskatchewan, but the Act was not
proclaimed as of 30 December 2005. 1522

R. Steyn, “Evidence for Quality Improvement” (Panel discussion at the International Conference on the
Scientific Basis of Health Services, September 2005).
1516 U.K., Healthcare Commission, News Release/Communiqué, “Star Ratings Show NHS Improving Against
Tougher
Targets”
(27
July
2005)
online:
Healthcare
Commission
<http://www.healthcarecommission.org.uk/NewsAndEvents/PressReleases/PressReleaseDetail/fs/en?CON
TENT_ID=4018735&chk=kAV%2BG2>.
1517 Bevan, supra note 1490.
1518 Downie, supra note 28.
1519 Regional Health Services Act, R.S.S. 2002, c. R-8.2, s. 58; Downie, supra note 28.
1520 Regional Health Services Act, ibid.
1521 Health Services and Social Services Act, supra note 1462, s. 233.1.
1515
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The Canadian Institute for Health Information collects data about a very limited range of
safety indicators, and results are publicly published. 1523 However, individual institutions are
not given a performance ranking on the basis of the indictors which, in any case, are too few
to make such an assessment. Until the end of this period there was no real way of knowing
in Canada just how well or how poorly health facilities were performing and how safe the
care within those facilities.

Public Inquiries
In Chapter 2, central inquiry mechanisms were identified as public inquiry processes
convened pursuant to statutory authority contained either in a general public inquiry-type act
or in specific provisions in the legislation establishing the health system. There were also
non-statutory inquiries and parliamentary inquiries. In addition, coronial inquiries (inquests)
may occur. The general conclusion was that these mechanisms were used sparingly in the
context of patient-safety-related issues.
From the period 1980–2005, as identified in Chapter 6, there were many patient-safety
focused inquiries in the British context. This led Walshe and Higgins, in 2002, to reach a
number of conclusions. First, the number and scope of inquiries seemed to be increasing
(inside and outside healthcare). Second, inquiries increasingly focused on matters of clinical
performance. Third, problems that may have in the past been dealt with internally are now
subject to greater external scrutiny and transparency.

Fourth, considerable duplication

appears to occur between multiple inquiry processes. 1524 So many inquiries were in fact
convened and called for that the Cabinet Office issued guidance as to the circumstances in
which a public inquiry should be held. 1525 These guidelines suggested that consideration
needed to given as to whether serious harm or loss had occurred; whether the circumstances
raise new or poorly understood issues of concern; and whether the events caused widespread

The Regional Health Authorities Amendment and Manitoba Evidence Amendment Act, S.M. 2005, c. 24.
The Canadian Institute for Health Information is an independent agency funded by the
provinces/territories and federal government to collect, analyse and publish statistical health information.
Online at: CIHI <http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cw_page=home_e>.
1524 Walshe, supra note 295.
1525 U.K., Cabinet Office Central Secretariat, Guidance on Inquiries, (London: Cabinet Office, 2001).
1522
1523
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public concern and loss of confidence. 1526 The number of inquiries inside and outside the
NHS led to what some commentators describe as a sense of inquiry fatigue. 1527
Further than this, though, concern about the performance of the NHS was so great that the
institution of the further specialised process for independent inquiry into the operations and
performance of the NHS was felt to be an imperative. One of the functions of the
Commission for Health Improvement, established in 2001 (now the Healthcare
Commission) is:
the function of carrying out investigations into, and making reports on, the
management, provision or quality of health care for which Health Authorities,
Primary Care Trusts or NHS trusts have responsibility. 1528
Thus, the practices of public inquiry were ritualized within the system through the creation
of an entity charged with, among other things, investigating aberrations within systems of
care. It did not only ritualize inquiry processes; the step of establishing such an inquiry sends
a message to the public that the current system is in such a state that there will most certainly
be further instances of failures in service provision warranting independent review. Actions
taken by authoritative social actors such as government are, as MacGregor phrases it, “in a
sense, regenerative and len[d] additional credence and validity to concerns already being
expressed in the media.” 1529 So in Britain, a greater employment of and an expansion of
available public inquiry mechanisms within the health sector can be seen. This is consistent
with the general approach of the NPM, which creates mechanisms for greater oversight (and
control) of operational measures by the central state in the name of enhancing accountability
and transparency.
Conversely, there were few patient-safety-related inquiries in the Canadian context during the
period in question. There was no similar development of a specialist inquiry entity in any
Canadian jurisdiction, other than what already existed. The existing mechanisms for public
Ibid.
Butler & Drakeford, supra note 817; Stanley & Manthorpe, supra note 818.
1528 Health Act 1999, supra note 694, s 20(1)(c).
1529 MacGregor, supra note 969 at 261.
1526
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inquiry were obviously deemed adequate to manage any issues that might arise. Many such
matters would remain the purview of an internal review.

Conclusion
What the analysis in this chapter demonstrates is a shift in the forms of regulation used to
assess patient safety issues within each jurisdiction.

In examining the regulatory

configuration in Canada, we see measured incremental change that remains broadly
consistent with the pre-1980s regulatory consensus. This consensus relies to a great extent
upon what Mello termed “an unparalleled faith in the ability of medical professionals [and
other health-providers] to regulate themselves.” 1530 Although the tenets of the NPM caused
some transference of authority from the hospitals to regional health authorities, and some –
largely unsuccessful – efforts to rein in expenditure associated with the provision of medical
services by a doctor; in general faith remains a strong underpinning of the framework. While
the latter part of the period saw some patient-safety-directed initiatives, these were generally
intended to support professional initiatives. In short, governments trust and collaborate or
co-regulate with the professions.
In Britain, the regulatory direction changed markedly over the period with a greater use of
mechanisms to control the activities of professionals and the NHS. The increasing layers of
control, with increased use of monitoring and audit activities, are the hallmarks of a
regulatory framework that has lost faith in key institutional actors. While keeping those
actors in place, the state has instituted layers of regulatory controls to monitor performance,
especially service safety and quality, in the public interest. In Britain, trust is only possible
through what Power describes as “rituals of verification”. 1531
There is at this stage no evidence to suggest that one regulatory approach achieves greater
patient safety or service quality over another, and indeed that is not the focus of this analysis.
What the differences do suggest is that the inherent logics of a system, combined with
external factors such as a shift in governance styles and numbers and character of scandals
and the associated perceptions of risk, can result in a significant regulatory realignment. In
1530

Mello, “Fostering Regulation”, supra note 5 at 375.
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the absence of those factors, we see more incremental and minor shifts, remaining largely
consistent with the pre-existing regulatory logics.

1531

Power, supra note 597.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Research Findings
Between 1980 and 2005 patient safety emerged as a pressing issue of social and political
concern. Evidence demonstrated that many thousands of people die or are injured as the
result of preventable adverse events associated with the provision of treatment and care.
The total cost to health systems and to communities more generally is high, both in terms of
its fiscal effect on the economy and the operation of health systems, 1532 but also its effect on
family, community, and society. The emergence of patient safety as an important policy issue
during this period raised a number of questions. Do governments regulate the common issue
of patient safety differently? If they do, why do they? More specifically, why did Britain and
Canada, which had similar regulatory frameworks to address patient safety in the 1980s,
subsequently choose to regulate patient safety differently?
divergences in their regulatory frameworks?

What factors led to the

Understanding how the state’s regulatory

initiatives address patient safety is an important public issue that warrants scholarly analysis,
both for what it can tell as about the factors leading to the reform of regulatory frameworks
and the substance and shape of those frameworks and because of the potential impact of
these frameworks on the welfare and wellbeing of the millions of people who access health
services each year. The analysis in this thesis highlights factors that influence government’s
determination that regulation is required and shapes the choice of regulatory instruments that
it employs.
In 1980 Britain and Canada had very similar regulatory frameworks addressing patient safety
related concerns. The underlying rationale driving the design of these regulatory frameworks
was, to quote Mello et al, “an unparalleled faith in the ability of medical professionals [and
other health-providers] to regulate themselves.” 1533

Other social needs, such as

compensation for those harmed due to the provision of health services and deterrence, were
achieved by supplementing the self-regulatory premise with the mechanisms of tort and
As an example, in 2000 the U.K., Department of Health estimated that the cost to the NHS of the
additional hospital days alone amounted to £2 billion per year. U.K., Department of Health, An Organisation
with a Memory, (London: Department of Health, 2000).
1533 Mello, “Fostering Regulation”, supra note 5.
1532
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criminal law. Law was also used to establish basic minimum standards for the operation of
health facilities.
At least until 1980, differences in overall regulatory contexts and in the structures of health
systems did not make any difference to the convergences in the existent regulatory
frameworks for patient safety. However, divergences in the broader governance context and
in health system design created the conditions or system logics that would influence the
shape of any future regulation. In Britain, the health system, although corporatized and
devolved, was also centralized and statist, creating a logic supporting further centralizing
impulses by the state.

In Canada, the health system was decentralized and often co-

regulatory in its habits of governance. These respective logics would shape and influence
future regulation within health systems in the decades to come.
The differences in constitutional structures were perhaps the weakest source of divergence in
terms of its significance for influencing any future regulatory direction; no surprise given that
the implications of constitutional contexts on regulation are contested by many. Bearing
these limitations in mind, I suggest that constitutional structures can matter for processes of
substantive policy transformation. Unitary states, like Britain, are said to be more inclined to
institute significant regulatory change whereas federal states, like Canada, can be generally
less inclined to institute significant change. There is some kernel of truth in this, but
exceptions to this rule are also easily identified. What does seem to be the case is that if a
Canadian province or territory undertakes a significant regulatory reform (one that is not due
to cross-provincial negotiations), the rest often adopt an approach of simply observing
whether it works or not and evaluating whether local conditions require similar reforms. The
habits of governance in each jurisdiction may also be sufficiently dissimilar to create a point
of subsequent divergence, although this point too is contestable. The relevance of this point
to patient safety comparisons between Britain and Canada is that the habits of executive
federalism in Canada may permeate other levels of policy and regulatory action, to create, in
general, a co-regulatory governance impulse at the federal/provincial level and in the
provincial approach to working with other actors within the health system. In contrast, the
centralizing tendencies at the heart of the British system somewhat mitigate against a similar
co-regulatory approach. Lastly, I argued that changes to cultural perceptions about health

336

systems, the levels of risk associated with such systems and trust relationships with dominant
social actors have been experienced differently in each jurisdiction. Canadian society has
been somewhat less affected by the concepts and attitudes of risk and post-trust societies, at
least in the context of healthcare, than Britain.
Not surprisingly, the extent to which the tenets of the NPM permeated into the clinical
sphere in the requisite health systems was another source of divergence. In Britain, the
strong ideological convictions of the Thatcher Conservative government, deeply suspicious
that the NHS was captured by the interests of the professions facilitated the deep penetration
of the NPM into the formerly sacrosanct clinical sphere. This process continued with even
greater conviction under the ‘New Labour’ government, because of that government’s
centralizing tendencies and due to the pressure of events.

Within the multiplicity of

Canadian governments at the federal and provincial levels, NPM was also at least somewhat
influential. However, in general, the penetration of the tenets of the NPM within health
systems was limited and the sphere of professional autonomy over clinical matters was
largely maintained. I argued that this was due to a lesser degree of ideologically driven
suspicion of the professions, the logics of the Canadian health systems with their arms-length
accommodation between governments and the medical profession, especially in regard to
clinical issues, and the co-regulatory logic of these systems.
The analysis in this thesis illustrates that events may be a powerful driver of change if certain
conditions are met. In Britain, a significant number of scandals within the health system,
separately and in aggregate, raised questions about the accepted regulatory norms in respect
of patient safety. These scandals raised the public’s perception of the risks associated with
the provision of health services, illustrated reasons why trust in established actors could be
questioned, and raised concerns about the adequacy of existing prospective and retrospective
forms of accountability. This cycle placed the acceptability of existing regulatory norms in
question and created a demand for greater control by the state of the health system and of
the delivery of healthcare in general. Conversely, in Canada the relative paucity of scandals
did not do much to heighten public perceptions of risk, except arguably in the narrow
context of public health. The few scandals that emerged indicated that current governance
mechanisms seemed largely (except in the public health context) to be working, hence trust
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in processes and actors was maintained. Accountability mechanisms also seemed to be
reasonably effective. Accordingly, the acceptability of regulatory norms in patient-safety
regulation in Canada was not seriously in question, and there was no overwhelming demand
for greater state control through regulation.
By 2005 the regulatory convergence about patient-safety regulation, evident at the end of the
1970s in both jurisdictions, was in tatters with significant divergences seen in each
jurisdiction’s regulatory framework. While Canada has remained largely faithful to the shape
and form of the pre 1980s regulatory norms, Britain has not. The scope and shape of
Britain’s framework for regulation of patient safety has been subject to a fairly radical
reinterpretation where the state assumes greater responsibilities within the sector for
ensuring, as much as it is possible to do so, patient safety.
Thus, at one end of the regulatory spectrum we have the hyper-regulation that is said to
characterize British governance. 1534 This process of regulation is said to strengthen state
power through the monitoring and oversight of actors within the health system (a top-down
approach) that goes with state regulation. Towards the other end of the spectrum, we have
Canadian governments which, certainly in the health context, have tended to favour
collaborative measures drawing upon the expertise and professionalism of health
professionals, supported by government (a bottom-up approach).
So why do governments regulate the same issue, patient safety, in very different ways? What
governments chose to do and how they choose to do it is a function of the perceived need
for action and the dominant social and political norms within that society. Regulatory action
in the patient safety context is also influenced by the logics of the health system,
constitutional structures, and the habits of governance within each jurisdiction. It appears
that context is everything in the formulation of regulatory approaches to address pressing
social problems.

1534

See, for example, Moran, British Regulatory State, supra note 820.
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Implications for Governance, Regulation, and Policy
The conclusions of this thesis have important implications for the practice of governance,
regulation, and policy formation. Understanding the context in which regulation is formed is
important. From a theoretical perspective, it is important to assess the interaction of law
with society and society with law, and accordingly how law, or regulation in this context,
affects and is affected by the behaviour of individuals, groups, and organizations.
From a more functional perspective, a comparative analysis of the origin and shape of
regulatory frameworks allows us to learn more about the characteristics and norms of our
legal frameworks and their sites of operation in our society. It further allows us to learn
from the experiences of others and to assess what motivates regulation in different contexts.
In practice, regulatory actors look across borders to draw upon the ideas and experiences of
others, a phenomenon only enhanced by technology and globalization, but we must be wary
of approaches that simply look elsewhere and lift promising-looking regulatory innovations
for use in other contexts. Comparative analyses place regulatory innovations in their context,
illustrating the rationales for regulation, and behind choices of regulatory instruments. As
such, comparative examinations enable evaluation of the likely success of any proposed
policy and regulatory innovation, in terms at least of its implementation, in one’s own
jurisdiction. This research may therefore help us understand how regulatory innovations
from other countries may or may not be readily adaptable to different social, legal, and
political contexts.
Patient safety is a significant problem in health systems internationally: “[i]f errors were a
disease, we would call it an epidemic.” 1535 It is also a significant challenge: “[t]he real
problem isn’t how to stop bad doctors from harming, even killing, their patients. It’s how to
prevent good doctors from doing so.” 1536 There is no one way of addressing patient-safety
issues, but it is an issue that is receiving increasing attention both from a policy and
regulatory perspective. If policy-makers intend to employ regulation in this area, they need
to be aware of history and context and the role that these factors have played in determining

1535 John M. Eisenberg cited in M. Graham, Democracy by Disclosure: The Rise of Techno-Populism, (Washington DC:
The Brookings Institution, 2002) at 104.
1536 A. Gawande, “When Doctors Make Mistakes” The New Yorker (1 February 1999) 40.
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whether there should be regulatory intervention and in what form. Top-down approaches to
the regulation of patient safety are not solely directed only at the patient-safety problem;
there are also a variety of other political and policy ends being served. Bottom-up or
collaborative approaches to regulation are also not solely about patient safety; there are other
reasons and rationales that support the choice of one form of regulation over another.

Contributions to Scholarship
This thesis makes several important contributions to scholarship. In terms of the literature,
while the instruments of the regulation of patient safety have been the focus of much
attention from the clinical and policy perspective, comparative analysis of the development
of regulation in this area has been, at best, slight. This thesis, then, addresses this important
issue and remedies the gap in existent research. In so doing, it makes a contribution to
comparative health policy scholarship and to comparative regulatory scholarship. It also
makes a contribution to the literature focusing on sociology of law as it explores the social
forces which bring about evolution or changes in the law.
In terms of theory, my thesis makes several contributions. Path dependency and similar
theories have been criticized for not providing a necessary or sufficient condition to
understand or explain the processes leading to policy change 1537 – its orientation is
fundamentally to answer ‘how’ questions. This thesis then contributes to the theory’s ability
to ask ‘why’ questions, by integrating within it social, regulatory, and public policy
(governance) theory. An inquiry focusing on why governments chose certain regulatory
instruments for application in a highly complex, highly politicized arena (the health system)
to address a problem which, like patient safety, raises a multiplicity of challenges touching on
individual and organizational psychology, requires interrogation through a sophisticated
paradigm of analysis.

My thesis further contributes to theory by extending conventional

policy-cycle analysis to include the important (certainly in the context of the audit, risk, and
blame societies paradigms) variable of accountability. The application of this extended policy
cycle to classify scandals, rather than the traditional examination of their content or focus,

1537

Kay, supra note 47.
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also enables us to better explain why some scandals result in regulatory change, while others
do not.

Future Research and Final Comments
While there is increasingly more discussion of different facets of patient-safety regulation in
the literature, a focus on comparative examinations of cross-national regulatory regimes
remains sparse. Research that raises the ‘why’ question and attempts to trace divergences
and convergences in the development and direction of the regulation of patient safety in a
comparative context is even rarer. There is much potential here for future work, as many
questions remain unanswered.
This thesis examines some aspects of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of regulation in Britain and
Canada, but does not touch upon the enduring “Well, does it really work?” question. Does
the hyper-regulatory audit culture seen in Britain result in safer care for patients, as compared
with the Canadian professionalism model, or is there no difference at all? I am particularly
interested in assessing what impact, if any, regulatory initiatives actually have on
organizational culture but that must remain a project for the future.
Another direction of inquiry could be in regard to constitutional arrangements: are these an
important variable to determine regulatory direction? Does another federal country, like
Australia, have a similar regulatory framework for regulating patient safety to that seen in
Canada? If not, what are the important variables that dictated why and how Australia
regulated patient safety? Are there convergences or divergences between the unitary states of
Britain and New Zealand, both countries in which NPM saw the greater penetration into the
public sector?
This research ends in 2005, but there have been a number of developments in both
jurisdictions since that date. Canada, for example, has seen the advent of several high-profile
scandals relating to health services, including screening practices in Newfoundland 1538 and
Newfoundland & Labrador, Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing, Commission of Inquiry on
Hormone Receptor Testing by M. Cameron (St. John’s: Queens Printer, 2009).

1538
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pathology practices in Ontario 1539 and New Brunswick. 1540 It remains to be seen whether
these scandals, and any others that may arise, will seriously affect the trust vested in the
management of Canadian health systems, in health professional regulators, and in the health
professions to prevent or to respond appropriately to matters of public concern. It is also
interesting to continue to watch developments in Britain, particularly in the context of
government-sanctioned self-regulation which continues to be the cause of some concern.
From 2011, the independent Office of the Health Professions Adjudicator will make
decisions on fitness-to-practise cases brought forward from the GMC and the General
Optical Council (these include health, performance and disciplinary matters). 1541
The internationalization of the problem of ensuring patient safety is also worthy of attention.
As a problem of global concern, a broad consensus seems to emerging in terms of bottomup approaches to patient safety, for example, the near universal adoption of hand-washing
campaigns to prevent the spread of infection.

It is uncertain at this time whether

globalization will have the same effect on the regulatory context resulting in regulatory
convergence or whether national divergence will continue to be the norm.
What is undoubtedly and incontestably true is that the health system will continue to be the
subject of analysis and reform and that patient safety will remain a focus of attention. If
nothing else, it will remain so because we all owe a duty, whether it be moral, ethical, or legal,
to take all possible steps to ensure the safety of those accessing health services. The
consequences and costs to us all of the unnecessary and preventable deaths and injuries of
family members, friends, or – as Lord Atkin’s famous dictum in Donohue v Stevenson 1542 would
put it, our neighbours – as a result of adverse events within our health systems are too high.

Ontario, Inquiry into Forensic Pediatric Pathology in Ontario, Inquiry into Forensic Pediatric Pathology in
Ontario: Report by S. Goudge (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2008).
1540 New Brunswick, Inquiry into Pathology Services at the Miramichi Regional Hospital, Inquiry into Pathology
Services at the Miramichi Regional Hospital by P. Creaghan (Fredericton, Department of Health, 2008).
1541 Health and Social Care Act 2008 (U.K.), c.14, pt 2.
1542 Donoghue, supra note 177, per Lord Atkin.
1539
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